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Summary 
 
Aggression is regarded as one of the core crimes under customary international 
law, but the definition of aggression is still contentious. At present there is no 
international instrument that provides for effective individual criminal liability for 
the crime of aggression. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
provides for the inclusion of the crime of aggression within the court’s jurisdiction, 
but the Statute needs to be amended to include a definition of aggression and 
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC. This dissertation seeks to 
identify the elements of the international crime of aggression, for purposes of 
individual criminal liability. It is submitted that the creation of the ICC provides 
the international community with an historic opportunity to establish effective 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. 
 
Part A puts the research problem in its proper context. The international political 
and legal system, based on state sovereignty, provides the background to the 
analysis. The problem of individual criminal liability for aggression is also put in the 
context of the evolving system of international criminal law. 
 
In Part B the normative roots of the criminalisation of aggression are analysed. 
Collective security and the jus contra bellum (the international prohibition of the 
use of force) form part of the normative framework in terms of which the 
criminalisation of aggression has to be understood. These features of the 
international system are also protected interests underlying the criminalisation of 
aggression. It is argued that collective security (as an institutional/political 
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response to aggression and other threats to peace and security) must be seen as 
complementing the criminal justice response to aggression. 
 
Part C deals with the history of the criminalisation of aggression, in particular the 
post-Second World War trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo. These trials resulted in 
important judgments that form the essential core of the crime of aggression under 
customary international law. The trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo were followed by 
various attempts to find a suitable definition for aggression. None of these 
attempts (analysed in Chapter 4) were successful.  
 
In Part D the crime of aggression is analysed in the context of the application of 
international (criminal) law in national legal systems. In the absence of 
international tribunals with effective jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, the 
possibility to prosecute aggression in national courts is investigated. The customary 
international law status of aggression is explored. It is argued that, although 
aggression can indeed be regarded as a crime under customary international law, 
there are a number of doctrinal, constitutional and other legal problems that 
impede the prosecution of aggression in national courts. National legislation would 
be needed to remedy (some) of these problems. The adoption of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, 1998 provides states party with an opportunity 
to adopt a suitable definition of aggression. In turn, this will be an impetus for 
states to provide for aggression in domestic criminal law. 
 
The diplomatic and legal drafting processes concerning the amendment of the 
Rome Statute to provide for a definition of aggression and for conditions for the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC, are dealt with in Part E. The conclusion arrived 
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at and submissions made in Part F are that any definition of aggression for purposes 
of the ICC jurisdiction must have a rational basis. The essential elements and 
protected interests underlying the criminalisation of aggression are identified. It is 
submitted that the interests of peace and security are best served by 
acknowledging the different (but complementing) political and criminal justice 
responses to aggression. A realistic definition of aggression and conditions for the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC that acknowledges the role of the institutions of 
collective security will furthermore result in a framework for states to provide for 
aggression as a crime in domestic law.  
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Opsomming 
 
Aggressie word as een van die kern misdade in die internasionale gewoontereg 
beskou. Die definisie van aggressie is omstrede. Daar is tans nie ‘n internasionale 
konvensie wat voorsiening maak vir individuele strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid vir 
die misdaad aggressie nie. Die Rome Statuut van die Internasionale Strafhof bepaal 
dat die misdaad van aggressie binne die hof se jurisdiksie val, op voorwaarde dat 
die Statuut gewysig word om voorsiening te maak vir ‘n definisie van aggressie en 
vir voorwaardes vir die uitoefening van jurisdiksie. Hierdie proefskrif het ten doel 
om die elemente van die internasionale misdaad van aggressie (vir doeleindes van 
individuele strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid) te identifiseer. Daar word aan die hand 
gedoen dat die totstandkoming van die Internasionale Strafhof ‘n historiese 
geleentheid vir die internasionale gemeenskap bied om effektiewe jurisdiksie oor 
die misdaad van aggressie te vestig. 
 
Deel A plaas die navorsingsprobleem in behoorlike konteks. Die internasionale 
politieke en regsstelsel wat op soewereiniteit van state gebaseer is, vorm die 
agtergrond tot die analise. Die probleme rondom individuele strafregtelike 
aanspreeklikheid vir aggressie word ook in die konteks van die ontluikende stelsel 
van internasionale strafreg gestel.  
 
In Deel B word daar ondersoek ingestel na die normatiewe basis vir die 
kriminalisering van aggressie. Kollektiewe sekerheid en die jus contra bellum (die 
internasionale verbod op die gebruik van geweld) vorm deel van die normatiewe 
raamwerk waarbinne die kriminalisering van aggressie beskou moet word. Die 
kenmerke van die internasionale stelsel is ook die beskermde belange wat die 
kriminalisering van aggressie onderlê. Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat 
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kollektiewe sekerheid (‘n institusionele/politieke reaksie op aggressie en ander 
bedreigings vir vrede en veiligheid) beskou moet word as aanvullend tot die 
strafregtelike reaksie op aggressie. 
 
In Deel C word die geskiedenis van die kriminalisering van aggressie (in die 
besonder die post-Tweede Wêreldoorlogse verhore te Nuremberg en Tokyo) 
behandel. Hierdie verhore het gelei tot die belangrike uitsprake wat in essensie die 
kern van die gewoonteregtelike misdaad van aggresssie uitmaak. Na die verhore te 
Nuremberg en Tokyo was daar verskeie pogings om ‘n geskikte definisie van 
aggressie te formuleer. Hierdie pogings (wat in Hoofstuk 4 behandel word) was 
grootliks onsuksesvol. 
 
Deel D behels die toepassing van internasionale strafreg in nasionale regstelsels. 
Aangesien daar tans geen internasionale tribunale is met jurisdiksie oor die 
misdaad aggressie nie, is dit nodig om vas te stel of dit moontlik is om die misdaad 
in nasionale howe te vervolg. Die gewoonteregtelike status van aggressie word vir 
die doel ondersoek. Ten spyte van die gewoonteregtelike status van die misdaad 
aggressie is daar tog etlike dogmatiese, grondwetlike en ander regswetenskaplike 
redes wat die vervolging van aggressie in nasionale howe bemoeilik. Nasionale 
wetgewing sou van die probleme kan aanspreek. Die aanvaarding van die Statuut 
van Rome bied aan state wat partye is tot die Statuut die geleentheid om by te dra 
tot die proses om ‘n geskikte definisie vir aggressie te formuleer. Hierdie proses 
kan help dat state ook op nasionale vlak voorsiening maak vir die misdaad 
aggressie. 
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In Deel E word daar ondersoek ingestel na die diplomatieke en regsskrywende 
prosesse tov die wysiging van die Statuut van Rome. Dit het ten doel om ‘n 
definisie van aggressie en voorwaardes vir die uitoefening van jurisdiksie deur die 
Internasionale Strafhof te formuleer. Daar word tot die gevolgtrekking gekom en 
die voorstel word in Deel F gemaak dat enige definisie van aggressie vir doeleindes 
van jurisdiksie van die Internasionale Strafhof ‘n rasionele basis moet hê. Die 
wesenlike elemente en beskermde belange onderliggend aan die kriminalisering 
van aggressie word identifiseer. Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat die belange 
van vrede en sekerheid die beste gedien word deur aanvaarding van die 
verskillende (maar aanvullende) politieke en strafregtelike reaksies op aggressie. ‘n 
Realistiese definisie van aggressie en voorwaardes vir die uitoefening van 
jurisdiksie deur die Internasionale Strafhof wat die rol van die instellings wat 
gemoeid is met kollektiewe sekerheid erken, sal bydra tot ‘n raamwerk waarbinne 
state vir die misdaad van aggressie in nasionale reg voorsiening kan maak. 
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Introduction 
 
a Research problem, rationale, and demarcation 
   a.1 Research problem and rationale 
   a.2 Jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
   a.3 The criminalisation of international aggression 
b Methodology 
c Key concepts and debates  
   c.1 The main features and foundations of the evolving system of international criminal law 
     c.1.1 The international community’s reaction to atrocities 
     c.1.2 Individual criminal liability 
     c.1.3 The importance of the principle of legality 
   c.2 State sovereignty 
 
a Research problem, rationale, and demarcation 
 
a.1 Research problem and rationale 
 
This dissertation attempts to identify the elements of the international crime of 
aggression, for purposes of individual criminal liability. Aggression is regarded as 
one of the core crimes under customary international law, but the definition of 
aggression is still contentious. There is no international instrument that provides 
for effective individual criminal liability for the crime of aggression. The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) provides for the inclusion of the 
crime of aggression within the Court’s jurisdiction, but the Statute needs to be 
amended to include a definition of aggression and conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the ICC. It is argued that the creation of the ICC provides the 
international community with an historic opportunity to establish effective 
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jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. This criminal justice response to 
aggression has implications for the collective security system (embodied by the 
UN).1 Consequently, the latter aspect forms the first substantive part of the 
dissertation, where some of the implications of aggression for the collective 
security system are highlighted and examined. 
 
This dissertation provides an historical account of the development of the notion of 
aggression. It identifies the important debates affecting the attempts to define the 
crime of aggression; puts the legal debates in normative and international political 
context; and examines the conditions necessary for the prosecution of the crime of 
aggression at national and international level. 
 
In conclusion, a proposed ‘working definition’ of the crime of aggression, as well as 
the conditions necessary for effective ICC jurisdiction over the crime, is submitted. 
In addition, the submission includes some thoughts on the possibility of prosecuting 
the crime of aggression at national level.  
 
The essential premise of this dissertation is that aggression is a not only a serious 
threat to international peace and security, but also threatens the stability of the 
international legal order. And, of course, on a micro-level it also affects the lives 
of individuals in a very real sense.  
 
 
 
                                                     
1 This issue is presumably going to get more attention from international lawyers in future. See discussions in 
the Committee on the International Criminal Court of the ILA, Working Session, 7 Jun 2006, Report of the 
Seventy-Second Conference of the ILA (Toronto 2006), ILA, London, 594-599. 
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a.2 Jus ad bellum and jus in bello  
 
The crime of aggression has its normative roots in the historical developments 
towards the regulation of the use of armed force by states – the jus ad bellum. The 
UN Charter embodies the modern jus ad bellum, and provides for the legitimate 
use of force by states in two instances:  Self-defence2 and collective security 
operations as instituted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
Historically, the jus in bello (the rules on the conduct of armed forces in armed 
conflicts) developed as a distinct branch of law. The modern jus in bello is 
collectively known as international humanitarian law. At the core of the jus in 
bello is the principle that, regardless of the legality of the armed conflict (as 
determined by the jus ad bellum), all combatants have the same rights and duties 
in warfare. Thus, regardless of the legal status of the use of force, the combatants 
participating in the conflict have equal protection under international 
humanitarian law, and the combatants have equal responsibility to uphold the rules 
of international humanitarian law. Violations of some of the rules of international 
humanitarian law (notably ‘grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949’) are 
treated as war crimes and can lead to individual criminal liability.3 Customary 
international humanitarian law provides that serious violations of international 
humanitarian law (in both international and non-international armed conflicts) 
                                                     
2 Art 51 UN Charter. 
3 See Art 8 (‘War crimes’) of the Rome Statute of the ICC; Art 3 (‘Violations of Art 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II), Art 4 (‘Other serious violations of international humanitarian law’) 
of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002) (available at www.sc-sl.org); Art 4 (‘Violations of Art 
3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II’) Statute of the International Tribunal for 
Rwanda (1994) ILM, 1994, 1598; Art 2 (‘Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949’), Art 3 (‘Violations 
of the laws or customs of war’) Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993) ILM, 
1993, 1192. 
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constitute war crimes.4 States also have the right (under customary international 
humanitarian law) to ‘vest universal jurisdiction in their national courts over war 
crimes.’5 
 
The most concrete distinction between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello can 
be found in the Statutes of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals.6 In both statutes a 
clear distinction is drawn between violations of the jus ad bellum (or ‘crimes 
against peace’7) and violations of the jus in bello (or ‘war crimes’8). 
 
This study analyses the crime of aggression. Aggression is in a sense a 
criminalisation of the jus ad bellum. Insofar as the distinction between the jus ad 
bellum and the jus in bello is challenged (due to developments in international 
politics and law9), this dissertation briefly addresses some of these debates where 
relevant. These developments include the notions of ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
and the so-called ‘war on terror’.10  
 
a.3 The criminalisation of international aggression 
 
                                                     
4 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol I:  Rules 
(2005) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 568-603.  
5 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (Customary International Humanitarian Law) (supra) 604-607. 
6 See in general Yoram Dinstein ‘The distinctions between war crimes and crimes against peace’ in Yoram 
Dinstein and Mala Tabory War crimes in International Law (1996) Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1-18. 
7 Nuremberg Charter art 6(a); Tokyo Charter art 5(a). 
8 Nuremberg Charter art 6(b); Tokyo Charter art 5(b). 
9 See Antoine Bouvier ‘Assessing the relationship between jus in bello and jus ad bellum:  An “Orthodox” view’ 
ASIL Proceedings (2006) 109-112; Julie Mertus ‘The danger of conflating jus ad bellum and jus in bello’ ASIL 
Proceedings (2006) 114-117; Carsten Stahn ‘”Jus ad bellum,” “Jus in bello,” “Jus post bellum?” Rethinking the 
conception of the law of armed force’ ASIL Proceedings (2006) 158-160. 
10 See Ch 2 par 2.5, and in particular par 2.5.2, infra. 
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The International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg that tried the major Nazi 
war criminals after the end of the Second World War, described the crime of 
aggression (or ‘crimes against peace’) as the ‘supreme international crime’11. 
However, it is shown in this dissertation that since the post-Second World War 
trials in Germany and Japan, there has been no prosecution of an individual for this 
supreme international crime.12 This state of affairs prevails despite the fact that 
aggression is regarded as a crime under customary international law. In Chapter 5 
the implications of this status of aggression for domestic legal systems are 
explored. It is argued that the crime of aggression (as it was prosecuted at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo) constitutes a narrow concept of waging of an aggressive 
war. This is the crime that has customary international law status.  
 
The absence of prosecutions of individuals for the crime of aggression was not due 
to a lack of wars (civil or international) in the decades following the Second World 
War. Indeed, even the period of the Cold War was characterised by conflicts and 
the use of armed force by states, often in prima facie contravention of the 
prohibition of the use of force provided for in the UN Charter.13 The lack of 
prosecutions should not be seen as a reflection on the normative legacy of 
Nuremberg. This legacy, discussed in Chapter 4, provided the legal and normative 
context of many attempts to build on the jurisprudence of Nuremberg (and Tokyo). 
These attempts were primarily aimed at keeping alive the ideal of an international 
criminal court with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes under international 
law, notably aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The 
United Nations and the International Law Commission, as well as numerous 
                                                     
11 Judgment of Oct 1, 1946, International Military Tribunal Judgment and Sentences, 41 AJIL 172, 186 (1947). 
12 See discussion in Ch 3 of the trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo of the major war criminals. 
13 For instance the Iran/Iraq war during the 1980’s; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. 
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specialist organisations, scholars and human rights organisations worked on various 
proposals to create a permanent international criminal court, and to define or 
codify the most serious crimes. Some early successes, like the adoption of the 
Genocide Convention of 194814, provided hope that the ‘legacy of Nuremberg’ (in 
the sense that individuals responsible for the worst international crimes should not 
go unpunished) would not be meaningless. The General Assembly of the UN — 
arguably the entity which is most representative of the ‘international community’ 
— adopted the Nuremberg Principles in 195015. These Principles confirmed the 
notion of individual criminal liability for the most serious crimes under 
international law, and in particular the crimes tried at Nuremberg (crimes against 
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity). The Genocide Convention, the 
Nuremberg Principles, and the four Geneva Conventions adopted in 194916, 
indicated that the international community wanted to keep the legacy of 
Nuremberg alive, and to expand the scope of individual criminal liability for 
international crimes.  
 
The irony is that the ‘supreme international crime’ (aggression) proved to be the 
most contentious of the four ‘core crimes’, referred to above. While the UN 
Charter reflected (especially in Article 2(4)) the commitment of the international 
community to end the use of force by states as a means to settle disputes or to 
further the national interest, neither the Charter nor any other international legal 
                                                     
14 Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of the Crime of Genocide (1948) UN Treaty Series, vol 78, 
227, reproduced in Christine van den Wyngaert (ed) International Criminal Law 3rd (2005) 515.  
15 Nuremberg Principles, 29 Jul 1950, UNGAOR, 5th Session, SuppNo 12, UN Doc A/1316 (1950), reproduced in 
Christine van den Wyngaert (International Criminal Law) (supra) 319. 
16 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces 
at Sea; Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; Convention relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 Aug 1949. 
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instrument provided a definition of aggression. It was only in 1974 that the UN 
General Assembly adopted a so-called ‘consensus’ definition of aggression17, but 
this text was drafted with state-responsibility (and not individual criminal liability) 
in mind.  
 
From the early 1950’s to 1996 the International Law Commission (ILC) attempted to 
define aggression for purposes of individual criminal liability, but these attempts 
proved to be unsuccessful.18  
 
The end of the Cold War did not result in global peace. But it provided the 
international community with an opportunity to react more decisively (and beyond 
the political restrictions of the Cold War) to threats to international peace and 
security. The establishment of two ad hoc international criminal tribunals by the 
Security Council in the last decade of the twentieth century, to deal with massive 
human rights violations in the Former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, provided the 
essential political and legal impetus for the formation of a permanent international 
criminal court. The fusion of political and criminal justice responses to mass 
atrocities that shocked the conscience of the world and threatened international 
peace and security, provided a paradigm conducive to a more effective approach 
to the core crimes. In this spirit the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court was adopted in July 1998, signalling a hopeful end to a bloody century.  
 
The Rome Statute establishes a permanent International Criminal Court to try 
individuals responsible for the most serious crimes under international law, namely 
                                                     
17 Definition of Aggression, GA Res 3314 (xxix), 29 UN GAOR Supp No 31, 142 UN Doc A/9631 (1974). See Ch 4 
par 4.2.3.1 infra for the text of the def. 
18 See discussion in Ch 4 infra. 
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war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. This Statute also includes 
aggression as a crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction, but the ICC can only exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime after the adoption of a definition and conditions for the 
exercise of jurisdiction. The ‘supreme international crime’ proved too contentious 
for direct and immediate inclusion in the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
 
The criminalisation of aggression occurred in the aftermath of the Second World 
War and in the context of the international community’s efforts to outlaw the use 
of force by states. In Chapter 2 it is shown that the development of the jus ad 
bellum — today best described as the jus contra bellum — represents one of the 
outstanding features of the international political and legal system. The prohibition 
of the use of force by states is one of the highest norms of the international legal 
system. This system, of which collective security forms a key characteristic, 
provides the institutional context for the discussion and analysis of the 
developments surrounding the various efforts to build on the post-Second World 
War prosecutions of individuals for the crime of aggression. It is shown in this 
dissertation that the various efforts to define and codify the crime of aggression for 
purposes of individual criminal liability are fundamentally informed by the 
historical, institutional and normative factors referred to above. 
 
The historical attempts to define and codify the crime of aggression are also 
analysed in the context of the evolving system of international criminal law. This 
system is characterised by national and international efforts to end impunity for 
the worst crimes affecting the international community as a whole, notably the 
core crimes of aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. This 
evolving system comprises efforts to establish national criminal jurisdiction over 
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the core crimes. In order to complement this, states party to the permanent 
International Criminal Court are obliged to provide for the necessary domestic legal 
mechanisms that would make it possible for such states to effectively co-operate 
with the ICC. To this end, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC ensures that 
where a state party to the Rome Statute of the ICC is either unwilling or unable to 
prosecute an individual or individuals responsible for one or more of the crimes 
within the ICC’s jurisdiction, the ICC can try the case. 
 
b Methodology 
 
This dissertation seeks to develop a proposal on the substantive law requirements 
for individual criminal liability for the international crime of aggression. It also 
attempts to identify the criteria that would vest jurisdiction in the ICC. The lack of 
criminalisation and prosecution at national level, must be attributed to the 
absence of a substantive definition of aggression at international level. It is argued 
that once progress is made on international level, national systems would follow 
suit. 
 
In order to achieve the above outcomes, sources of international law (as listed in 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice) are consulted. These 
include international treaties and conventions, customary international law 
(primary sources), and international judicial decisions and doctrine (subsidiary 
sources). In addition, other important subsidiary sources like the Draft Codes of 
Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind (International Law Commission) and 
commentary by and teachings of prominent writers are also consulted. In order to 
determine the content of national legal rules, primary sources like legislation are 
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consulted. Other sources for purposes of national legal systems include judicial 
decisions and commentaries on national legal doctrine. The ongoing technical and 
diplomatic processes to find a suitable definition of aggression for inclusion in the 
ICC Statute require a critical and prognostic approach in terms of the various 
reports of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute Special Working 
Group on the Crime of Aggression. 
 
c Key concepts and debates  
 
c.1 The main features and foundations of the evolving system of international 
criminal law 
 
c.1.1 The international community’s reaction to atrocities 
 
One way of looking at the system of international criminal law is to view it as a 
reaction of the international community to atrocities.19 This must be seen in 
context:  States are (still) the primary actors in the international system, but the 
constitutionalist notion of an international community (or, civitas maxima) entails 
that this international community is governed by norms, not power.20 It means that 
the international system (traditionally anarchist, where sovereign states — in the 
absence of an overarching sovereign — acted in their own interest and where the 
                                                     
19 Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) Oxford University Press, Oxford, 3-14. 
20 See Wouter Werner ‘Consitutionalisation, fragmentation, politicization, the constitutionalisation of 
international law as a janus-faced phenomenon’ 8 Griffin’s View on International and Comparative Law (2007) 
17-30, in particular 18-23. 
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exercise of state power was central)21 is moving towards the supra-national 
limitation of state power. The UN Charter has been described as a ‘constitutional’ 
limitation on the raw power of sovereign states, regulating the exercise of state 
power, notably the use of force by states. The ICC has also been described as such 
a ‘constitutional’ development22, albeit not limiting, but rather complementing23 
the exercise of state jurisdiction over the most serious crimes under international 
law. The ICC is arguably in a position to limit the sovereignty of states party to the 
Rome Statute of the ICC in the sense that it can influence state behaviour and 
policy, for instance with respect to human rights practices. The international 
community is thus more than a political community; it is also a legal community. It 
is a community characterised by norms such as the desire to act in the common 
good, and by actions to advance the collective interest. This constitutionalist view 
of the international community also emphasises the importance of certain 
fundamental values, especially ‘super-norms’ like jus cogens obligations — for 
instance the prohibition of the use of force by states.24 
 
The criminal justice reaction to international atrocities is prompted in part by the 
failure of other measures (for instance diplomatic and economic sanctions) to stop 
or prevent atrocities like genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
indeed, aggression. In terms of the criminal justice response, various modalities 
exist to address the atrocities that affect the whole of humankind. Antonio Cassese 
                                                     
21 David Caron pointed out that the condition of anarchy is a basic feature of international relations. David 
Caron ‘Framing political theory of international courts and tribunals:  Reflections at the Centennial’ ASIL 
Proceedings (2006) 56. 
22 Wouter Werner (Constitutionalisation, fragmentation, politicisation) (supra) 27. 
23 Under the principle of complementarity, the ICC will only exercise jurisdiction over a matter if a state party 
is either unwilling or unable to prosecute. See further Ch 6 par 6.1.1 infra. 
24 See in general Anne Peters ‘There is nothing more practical than a good theory:  An overview of 
contemporary approaches to international law’ 44 (2001) German Yearbook of International Law 25-37, 35. 
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listed the following modalities:  The exercise by national courts of jurisdiction over 
offences on grounds of territoriality or nationality; the exercise by national courts 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction (the latter can also be the result of obligations in 
terms of the aut dedere, aut judicare25 enforcement model in international 
criminal law); the establishment of truth commissions to complement traditional 
criminal justice responses to atrocities; the establishment of international criminal 
tribunals.26 
 
c.1.2 Individual criminal liability 
 
This dissertation concerns individual criminal liability for the crime of aggression. 
Individual criminal liability is one of the fundamental features of the evolving 
system of international criminal law.  
 
The main purpose of traditional international law is the regulation of the relations 
between states. The prosecution of individuals for crimes under international law 
in the post-Second World War international criminal tribunals at Nuremberg and 
Tokyo can be seen as the confirmation of the separateness of international criminal 
law from classic (public) international law27:  Individuals are the subjects of 
                                                     
25 Many international instruments contain this model of enforcement of international criminal law. It imposes 
on states parties the duty to either ‘extradite or prosecute’ individuals responsible for crimes under 
international law. Hugo Grotius used the term aut dedere aut punire, but this was in 1973 reformulated by 
Cherif Bassiouni to ‘aut dedere aut judicare’, in order to emphasise the judicial process in the form of a trial 
that is necessary to determine criminal culpability. See Cherif Bassiouni International Criminal Law 2nd Vol I 
(1999) Transnational Publishers, New York, 5. 
26 Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 6-14. 
27 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree International Criminal Law (2001) Oxford University Press, Oxford, 9. Lyal Sunga 
wrote that the term international criminal law ‘is accurate only if used in any one of three senses: 1) to refer 
to the accumulation of international legal norms on individual criminal responsibility (without implying that 
they form a coherent system); 2) to refer to international criminal law as an incipient field of international law 
currently in a stage of emergence (without implying that it already exists as a relatively self-sufficient or 
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international criminal law, and individuals can be held liable for crimes under 
international law. Individual (personal) criminal responsibility28 is necessary to 
establish liability. In Prosecutor v Tadic the ICTY Appeals Chamber put it as 
follows: 
‘The basic assumption must be that in international law as much as in national 
systems, the foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of personal 
culpability:  nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions in 
which he has not personally engaged or in some other way participated (nulla 
poena sine culpa).’29 
 
Article 25 of the Rome Statute of the ICC provides for individual criminal 
responsibility: 
‘1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute. 
2. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be 
individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute. 
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and 
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: 
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or 
through another person, regardless of whether that other person is 
criminally responsible; 
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact 
occurs or is attempted; 
                                                                                                                                                                     
autonomous system); or 3) to refer to the decisions, law and procedure of a permanent international criminal 
court’. See Lyal Sunga The emerging system of International Criminal Law – Developments in Codification and 
Implementation (1997) Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 7. It is submitted that international criminal law 
has (especially after the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC in 1998) indeed emerged as a separate system 
in all three respects as identified by Sunga. 
28 See in general Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 136-139. 
29 ICTY Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (Appeals Chamber) Case No IT-94-1-A, 15 Jul 1999, par 186. 
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(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, 
abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, 
including providing the means for its commission; 
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission 
of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such 
contribution shall be intentional and shall either: 
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal 
purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the 
commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or 
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the 
crime; 
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others 
to commit genocide; 
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its 
execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur 
because of circumstances independent of the person’s intentions. However, 
a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise 
prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment 
under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person 
completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose. 
4. No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall 
affect the responsibility of States under international law.’ 
 
This detailed description of the elements of individual criminal responsibility is a 
reflection of the maturation of international criminal law as the international 
community’s criminal justice response to atrocities that affect the whole of 
humankind.  
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c.1.3 The importance of the principle of legality 
 
The question of individual criminal liability for the international crime of 
aggression also involves the principle of legality — one of the core principles of 
criminal law (often expressed in terms of the maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena 
sine lege). Indeed, the history of the various efforts to define aggression (described 
and analysed in Chapters 3 to 7) is testimony to the impact that this principle had 
(and is still having) on the aggression-debate. The historically important 
international trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo (discussed in Chapter 3) established 
individual criminal liability for crimes against peace, including the crime of waging 
a war of aggression. It is shown that these trials were controversial because of the 
way in which the tribunals dealt with the principle of legality. The historic first 
criminalisation of the crime of aggression was marred by the controversy 
surrounding the application of the principle of legality. In Chapters 4 and 5 it is 
shown how the ‘legacy of Nuremberg’ had an impact on various aspects of the 
aggression debate. It is pointed out in Chapter 5 that the principle of legality plays 
a particular role in the debate about the possible application of international 
criminal law in national legal systems. The principle of legality is one of the 
foundational principles informing the quest for the substantive law elements of the 
crime of aggression — a matter which is fully explored in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
The principle of legality entails that no crime (or punishment) exists without a 
norm or rule in law criminalising the conduct in question and providing for 
punishment.30 Jonathan Burchell summarised the theory of the German scholar JP 
Anselm von Feuerbach (who formulated the nullum crimen principle in 1801) as 
                                                     
30 CR Snyman Strafreg 5th (2006) LexisNexis Butterworths, Durban, 41. 
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follows:  Criminal laws should be made ‘by a competent legislature that announced 
in advance and with clarity and certainty the definition of crimes and the details of 
their punishments.’31  
 
The principle of legality is also well-established in international criminal law.32 
Gerhard Werle pointed out that the principle of legality is part of customary 
international law.33 The Rome Statute of the ICC provides for both nullum crimen 
sine lege (Article 22)34 and nulla poena sine lege (Article 23)35. Article 24 
furthermore provides for the principle of non-retroactive application of criminal 
responsibility under the Rome Statute.36  
 
c.2 State sovereignty 
 
State sovereignty (states exercising exclusive power over their territories) has been 
the organising principle of the modern international political and legal system since 
at least the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 (in terms of the Treaties of Osnabrück and 
                                                     
31 Jonathan Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 3rd (2005) Juta, Cape Town, 95. 
32 Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 139-158; Gerhard Werle Principles of International Criminal Law 
(2005) TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 32-34; Geert-Jan Knoops Defenses in Contemporary International Criminal 
Law (2001) Transnational Publishers, New York, 168. For a discussion of the principle of legality in international 
criminal tribunals, see Mia Swart ‘Legality as inhibitor:  The special place of nullum crimen sine lege in the 
jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals’ (2005) 30 SAYIL 33-49. 
33 Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 32. 
34 Art 22:  ‘1. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question 
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 2. The definition of a crime 
shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be 
interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted. 3. This article shall not affect 
the characterization of any conduct as criminal under international law independent of this Statute.’ 
35 Art 23:  ‘A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute.’ 
36 Art 24:  ‘1. No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to the entry into 
force of the Statute. 2. In the event of a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a final judgment, 
the law more favourable to the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall apply.’ 
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Münster).37 These Treaties, which ended the Thirty Years’ War between Sweden, 
France and Germany, not only confirmed the concept of sovereign states as the 
organising principle of the international system, but also provided for the 
enforcement of the peace treaties. Leo Gross pointed out that Europe therefore 
received ‘an international constitution, which gave to all its adherents the right of 
intervention to enforce its engagements’.38 Thus, the treaties were more than just 
confirmations of state sovereignty, or of peace between two or more sovereign 
states:  The treaties came to represent the first attempt to create a 
‘constitutional’ order in an international system dominated by sovereign states. In 
this sense the Peace of Westphalia can be considered as an important precursor39 
to the international system of sovereign states, governed by the principles of 
collective security contained in the Charter of the United Nations.40  
 
The Charter of the UN provides that the Organisation ‘is based on the principle of 
the sovereign equality of all its Members’.41 This principle forms the basis of 
modern public international law and is also ‘the fundamental premise on which all 
international relations rest.’42 The UN Charter confirms the Westphalian notion of 
sovereignty as a foundation of the international system, and protects the legal 
equality between states.43 The principle of non-intervention and the prohibition of 
the threat or use of force are two features of the international system that are 
closely associated with the concept of sovereignty.44 These notions, however, are 
                                                     
37 For an historical overview, see Leo Gross ‘The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948’ Vol 42 AJIL (1948) 20-41. 
38 Leo Gross (Peace of Westphalia) (supra) 24. 
39 Leo Gross (Peace of Westphalia) (supra) 20. 
40 See further Ch 1 infra. 
41 Art 2(1) UN Charter. 
42 Antonio Cassese International Law 2nd (2005) Oxford University Press, Oxford, 48. 
43 Antonio Cassese (International Law) (supra) 48. 
44 See in general Ch 2 infra. 
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not static. The dynamics of collective security, the constitutionalisation of the 
international system, and the normative impact of human rights are some of the 
factors that shape the content and scope of ‘state sovereignty’, ‘non-intervention’, 
and ‘the prohibition of the threat or use of force’. Since ‘sovereignty’, ‘territorial 
integrity’, and ‘political independence’ of states are also protected interests in the 
context of the criminalisation of international aggression,45 these concepts are of 
great relevance for purposes of this dissertation. 
 
The notion of sovereignty — the organising principle of the international system and 
a protected interest underlying the prohibition of the use of force — has to be 
understood in the light of the normative impact of international human rights and 
the evolving system of international criminal law. ‘Sovereignty’ is thus a very 
complex notion. Although the ‘sovereign equality of states’ can be regarded as the 
raison d’être of the present international system, the normative impact of human 
rights and the evolving system of international criminal law are changing the 
meaning and scope of ‘sovereignty’. The recognition of the notion of individual 
criminal liability for crimes under international law, and the creation of 
international criminal tribunals to try individuals responsible for these crimes, 
marked a fundamental departure from the traditional (Westphalian) notion of 
sovereignty. Bruce Broomhall has put it as follows: 
‘The idea that sovereignty does not arise in a vacuum, but is constituted by the 
recognition of the international community, which makes its recognition conditional 
on certain standards, has become increasingly accepted in the fields of 
international law and international relations. Such limits are held always to have 
                                                     
45 See for instance Art 15(2) of Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1991) 
(discussed in Ch 4, par 4.2.2.2 infra), and Art 1 of UN Gen Assembly Def of Aggression (1974) (discussed in Ch 4, 
par 4.2.3 infra). 
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been imposed by the community on the recognition of its members, but to be 
subject to development over time. From this perspective, crimes under 
international law can be understood as a formal limit to a State’s legitimate 
exercise of its sovereignty, and so in principle justify a range of international 
responses (subject to the rest of international law, including that relating to the 
use of force).’46 
 
It is submitted that the constitutionalisation of the international system and the 
system of collective security, as well as the evolving legal and political processes 
within this paradigm, are important for the development of an effective 
dispensation regarding the question of individual criminal liability for aggression. It 
is shown that the interrelationship between the principal organs of the collective 
security system and the institutions and processes of the evolving system of 
international criminal law, is of fundamental importance to the issue at hand:  
Whither individual criminal liability for the international crime of aggression?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
46 Bruce Broomhall International Justice & The International Criminal Court – Between Sovereignty and the 
Rule of Law (2003) Oxford University Press, Oxford 43. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Aggression in the context of collective security 
 
1.1 Collective security as a means to promote and sustain international peace and security 
   1.1.1 The Uniting for Peace Resolution 
     1.1.1.1 The Uniting for Peace Resolution and the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Case 
1.2 Collective security and the constitutionalisation of the international system 
1.3 The theory of collective security 
   1.3.1 Liberal theory of international relations and governance 
   1.3.2 Liberalism and realist critique 
1.4 The features of the present collective security system 
   1.4.1 The legacy of the League of Nations 
   1.4.2 The United Nations as principal embodiment of collective security 
   1.4.3 Collective security and regional security arrangements 
     1.4.3.1 The notion of regional self-defence and the evolving role of NATO 
     1.4.3.2 Regional security arrangements under Article 52 of the UN Charter 
     1.4.3.3 The African Union (AU) as regional security organisation 
1.5 Concluding remarks 
 
World history is largely a history of wars. All have been fought in a world without governance – 
where national “defence”, regional military alliances, balance of power and hegemonic 
imperialism have been the prevailing regimes. There is a manifest need for a system under 
universal auspices for maintaining global peace and security.47 
 
1.1 Collective security as a means to promote and sustain international peace 
and security 
 
                                                     
47 Ruben P Mendez ‘Peace as a global public good’ in Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc Stern (eds) Global 
Public Goods – International Cooperation in the 21st Century (1999) Oxford University Press, Oxford, 382. 
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The debate about a suitable and effective definition of and enforcement regime for 
international aggression must be considered against the background of the 
collective security system. This system is primarily concerned with the 
maintenance of international peace and security. The criminalisation of aggression 
is analysed in terms of the international peace and security regime which 
developed during the twentieth century in the wake of two devastating world wars. 
While the focus of this dissertation is the question of individual criminal liability as 
a response to (and possible deterrent for) international aggression, this must be 
seen contextually. Indeed, it will be shown that the criminal justice response to 
international aggression is ultimately not only intertwined with, but also to a 
considerable degree dependent upon, the key institutions of the system of 
collective security.48 
 
At present, the primary embodiment of the international collective security regime 
is the United Nations (UN). The UN Charter (1945) provides for three pillars49 of the 
system of collective security: 
(a) Pacific behaviour by states:  Article 2(3) of the Charter provides that 
member states ‘shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means’. 
Furthermore, Article 2(4) provides that states ‘shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state’50; 
                                                     
48 See especially the discussion in Ch 7 infra, as well as the proposals in Ch 8 infra, on the relationship between 
the ICC – as a criminal justice response to aggression – and the key institutions of collective security under the 
UN Charter, namely the Security Council, and, to a lesser extent, the General Assembly. 
49 See Ruben Mendez (Peace as a global public good) (supra) 392-393. 
50 For the full text, see The Charter of the UN, 26 June 1945, UNCIO XV, 335, as reprinted in Bruno Simma (ed) 
The Charter of the United Nations – A Commentary 2nd (2002) Vol I CH Beck Verlag/Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
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(b) Collective responses and mechanisms aimed at the settling of disputes 
(notably in terms of Chapter VI of the Charter), and Chapter VII powers and 
mechanisms to deal with threats to or breaches of the peace and with 
aggression; 
(c) International co-operation to deal with socio-economic development, 
decolonisation, and the advancement of human rights, as means to prevent 
international conflict. 
 
For present purposes, the focus is on the second pillar of the UN collective security 
system, namely the various powers (especially under Chapter VII) to deal with 
threats to or breaches of the peace, and with aggression. It is important to 
understand the principles and practical implications of this second pillar. The 
institutional dynamics and relationship between the various organs of the UN that 
form the system of collective security have important implications for the criminal 
justice response to aggression, as is clear from the analysis in later Chapters. Thus, 
the question of individual criminal liability for the crime of aggression must be 
analysed with due regard to the collective security system. 
 
The Security Council of the UN has the primary51 obligation to address threats to 
international peace and security. Where the Security Council cannot fulfil this 
obligation, the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950 provides the General Assembly 
of the UN with a complementary role to address threats to peace and security.52 
                                                     
51 Art 24 UN Charter; Stefan Talmon ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ Vol 99 AJIL (2005) 175-193, 
179; Danesh Sarooshi The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security – The delegation by the 
UN Security Council of its Chapter VII powers (1999) Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1. 
52 Uniting for Peace Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly 3 Nov 1950 GA Res 337A, in Do A/1775 
(1951). For the collective security role of the UN, see Hans Kelsen ‘Collective security and collective self-
defense under the Charter of the United Nations’ Vol 42 AJIL (1948) 783-796. For a more recent understanding 
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For present purposes, but also in the light of discussions in later Chapters on the 
relationship between the UN organs and the International Criminal Court (ICC), it is 
important to understand the roles of the Security Council and the General Assembly 
in the Charter system of collective security. 
 
1.1.1 The Uniting for Peace Resolution  
 
In June 1950 North Korea invaded South Korea. This invasion caught the collective 
security system envisaged by the UN Charter, in a state of paralysis. At the time, 
the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council (as well as other UN 
institutions) in protest against the UN’s refusal to replace Taiwan with the People’s 
Republic of China in the structures of the UN. Thus, when the United States asked 
the Security Council to act on the Korean-crisis, the Soviet Union did not 
participate in the process that led to the Security Council resolutions calling on 
North Korea to withdraw from the South53 and recommending assistance of the 
international community to South Korea54. According to Henry Kissinger, this Soviet 
boycott of the Security Council provided the United States with the opportunity to 
invoke military force in collaboration with its allies and to ‘justify the American 
role in Korea in the familiar Wilsonian terms of freedom versus dictatorship, good 
versus evil.’55 The United States could thus argue that the use of military force was 
justified in order to uphold the resolutions of the Security Council.56 Five decades 
later, the US would use the same argument to justify the use of force against Iraq, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of the collective security role of the UN, see the Report of the Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo (2000) Oxford University Press Oxford 166 – 176. 
53 UN SC Res 82 (1950). 
54 UN SC Res 83 (1950). 
55 Henry Kissinger Diplomacy (1994) Touchstone, New York, 477. 
56 Kissinger (Diplomacy) (supra) 477. 
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challenging yet again the way in which the collective security system is suppose to 
deter the use of force by states other than in cases of self-defence or with Security 
Council permission.57 
 
It was noted above that the Security Council is the organ of the UN primarily 
responsible for issues concerning international peace and security. During the 
Korean crisis the Security Council was in a position to act, only because the Soviet 
Union was not using its veto (the latter was boycotting the Security Council at the 
time). Kissinger pointed out that the Soviet ambassador to the UN would ‘surely 
have vetoed the Security Council resolution proposed by the United States’ if the 
ambassador was ‘less terrified of Stalin or [had] been able to obtain instructions 
more rapidly’.58 There was, however, a need to provide for the inevitable return of 
the Soviet Union to the Security Council and the real possibility that the Soviet 
Union, or one or more of the other permanent members of the Security Council, 
would (in the context of the Cold War politics of that time) use their veto and thus 
cause paralysis in the UN’s primary organ for international peace and security. To 
provide for this scenario, the General Assembly adopted the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution59 in 1950. Paragraph 1 of the Resolution provides as follows: 
‘[If] the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, 
fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the 
matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to 
Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or 
act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore 
                                                     
57 See discussion in Ch 2 para 2.3 and 2.5.1.1 infra. 
58 Kissinger (Diplomacy) (supra) 477. 
59 UN GA Res 377 (V) 3 Nov 1950. 
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international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General 
Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the 
request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the 
Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the 
Members of the United Nations’.60 
 
Early commentators on the UN Charter, like Hans Kelsen, observed that the Charter 
envisages a primary role for the Security Council in collective security matters, and 
a secondary role for other organs, like the General Assembly. However, Kelsen 
submitted that ‘no other central organ of the United Nations but the Security 
Council’ has the power of using force.61 The Uniting for Peace Resolution was thus 
a pragmatic development and perhaps not in line with the rather rigid division of 
labour between the organs of the UN, as described by Hans Kelsen in 1948. This 
Resolution seems to confer upon the General Assembly the kind of duties and 
responsibilities associated with the Security Council, and is perhaps evidence of the 
need for a more flexible (and arguably more democratic, or representative) 
collective security system. At the very least, it is submitted that the pragmatism 
reflected by the Uniting for Peace Resolution serves to illustrate the difficulties in 
trying to reconcile the ideals of international peace and security with political 
realities and the complexities of international relations. These complexities also 
impact on the process to find a suitable (and acceptable) definition of aggression 
and conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 
which are explored in Chapter 7 below.62 
                                                     
60 Uniting for Peace Resolution, par 1. 
61 Hans Kelsen (Collective security) (supra) 786. 
62 The critical question in this regard is the relationship between the SC and the ICC, and whether the SC 
should play any formal role in the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over the crime of aggression. In addition, 
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 It is submitted that the Uniting for Peace Resolution, although not providing for a 
parallel collective security regime, does at least establish a potentially 
complementary role for the General Assembly in matters of peace and security, 
including cases of aggression. Michael Cowling pointed out that the General 
Assembly has acted under the Uniting for Peace Resolution on a number of 
occasions during the Cold War, and the practice in this regard is of growing 
importance.63 Farhad Malekian argued that, because of the perception that the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution was essentially adopted to by-pass potential Security 
Council vetoes by Russia, it was widely perceived to be anti-Soviet. Therefore, 
according to Malekian, the Resolution ‘lost its potential to create a democratic 
approach to the machinery of the collective security system of the United 
Nations’.64 It is submitted, though, that the Uniting for Peace Resolution holds out 
some potential for purposes of finding a mechanism to make the collective security 
system more democratic, especially in light of demands for Security Council 
reforms. The latter process will probably take some time and assumes considerable 
political will.  
 
1.1.1.1 The Uniting for Peace Resolution and the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory case 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the question is raised whether, in the light of demands for SC reform, the GA should also play a role in the 
context of ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. See Ch 7 par 7.2.4 infra. 
63 Michael Cowling ‘The relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly with particular 
reference to the ICJ Advisory Opinion in the ‘Israeli Wall’ case (2005) 30 SAYIL 50-81, 62. 
64 Farhad Malekian The Monopolization of International Criminal Law in the United Nations (1993) Almqvist & 
Wiksell International, Uppsala, 158. 
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One of the world’s enduring conflicts (that outlived the Cold War, apartheid and 
various civil wars that plagued the post-Second World War international system) is 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This conflict not only generates much international 
political and diplomatic attention, but it also raises important legal questions. In 
December 2003 the International Court of Justice (ICJ)65 was asked66 to deliver an 
advisory opinion on the legal consequences of the construction of a very 
controversial wall in Israeli occupied Palestinian territory. Israel contended that 
the construction of the wall was necessary for the security of Israel, while a 
number of states as well as human rights groups argued that the construction of the 
wall was contrary to international law (notably humanitarian and human rights 
law). 
 
For present purposes, the importance of the ICJ’s advisory opinion in the 
Construction of a Wall case lies in the way the Court dealt with the intricate 
question of the role of the General Assembly vis-à-vis the Security Council in 
matters that affect international peace and security. The meaning and impact of 
the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950 was considered by the ICJ. It is submitted 
that the opinion of the ICJ in the Construction of the Wall case has implications for 
one of the pertinent questions of this dissertation, namely the conditions for the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court (ICC) over the crime of 
aggression. This is fully explored in Chapter 7 infra. The relationship between the 
                                                     
65 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) 9 
Jul 2004 ICJ Reports 2004, 136.  
66 GA Res ES-10/14 8 Dec 2003. The GA requested the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the following question: 
‘What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying 
Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the 
report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth 
Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?’ See Construction 
of a Wall case (supra) par 1. 
 - 29 - 
 
General Assembly and the Security Council is thus important, not only for a 
discussion of collective security, but also for pertinent debates in international 
criminal law. 
 
The present features of the collective security system (and the ongoing debate 
about the different roles of the UN organs in this system) need to be put in 
historical, theoretical and normative perspective.  
 
1.2 Collective security and the constitutionalisation of the international system 
 
Hugo Grotius, in his Prolegomena to the Law of War and Peace, noted the following 
about the legal dimension of international security: 
‘[There] is no state so powerful that it may not at some time need the help of 
others outside itself, either for purposes of trade, or even to ward off the forces of 
many foreign nations united against it. In consequence we see that even the most 
powerful peoples and sovereigns seek alliances, which are quite devoid of 
significance according to the point of view of those who confine law within the 
boundaries of states. Most true is the saying that all things are uncertain the 
moment men depart from law.’67 
 
In Swords into Plowshares, by Inis Claude, the basic assumption on which collective 
security rests is described as follows: 
                                                     
67 Hugo Grotius Prolegomena to the Law of War and Peace translated by Francis W Kelsey (1957) The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, New York, par 22. This statement of Grotius must be seen in context:  Grotius acknowledged 
(especially with reference to the Just War theory) the role of politics in international law. In that sense Grotius 
was more of a realist than his fellow Dutchman Erasmus, who was described by Grotius as an idealist who 
would forbid all use of arms. See Hugo Grotius (Prolegomena) (supra) par 29. For further analysis see BVA 
Röling ‘Jus ad bellum and the Grotian heritage’ in International Law and the Grotian Heritage (1985) TMC 
Asser Institute, The Hague. 
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‘The necessary assumption of collective security is simply that wars are likely to 
occur and that they ought to be prevented. The conflicts may be the fruit of 
unreflective passion or of deliberate planning; they may represent efforts to settle 
disputes, effects of undefinably broad situations of hostility, or calculated means to 
realize ambitious designs of conquest. They may be launched by the irresponsible 
dictate of cynical autocrats or the democratic will of a chauvinistic people – 
although the champions of collective security have frequently evinced the 
conviction that most wars are likely to stem from the former type of initiative. The 
point is that the theory of collective security is not invalidated by the discovery 
that the causes, functional purposes, and initiatory mechanisms of war are 
varied.’68 
 
The rationale and assumed working of collective security have been described by 
Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst as follows: 
‘Collective security is based on the conviction that peace is indivisible and that all 
states have a collective interest in countering aggression whenever and wherever it 
may appear. It assumes that potential aggressors will be deterred by the united 
threat of counterforce mobilized through an international organization like the 
league [the League of Nations] or the UN. If enforcement is required, however, 
then a wide range of economic and diplomatic sanctions as well as armed force may 
be utilized.’69 
 
Karns and Mingst observed that while Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides for the 
legal foundations of collective security, the veto power of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council ‘assures that no collective security measures can 
                                                     
68 Inis L Claude Swords into plowshares 4th ed (1971) Random House, New York 249. 
69 Margaret P Karns and Karen A Mingst International Organizations – The politics and processes of global 
governance (2004) Lynne Rienner Publishers, London 297. 
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ever be instituted against any of them’70. Because of this, the authors concluded 
that the UN is in fact a limited collective security organization. 
 
Danesh Sarooshi (like Inis Claude) linked the notion of collective security with the 
concept of legitimacy in international political and legal theory. In this regard, 
Sarooshi argued that while an important aspect of collective security consists of 
the maintenance of the status quo of the system, the perception of states ‘that 
their individual interest is best served by ensuring that the interests of the 
community’ of states is preserved, is actually a condition for the acceptance of the 
preservation of the status quo.71 This seems to be a more nuanced mixture of 
idealism and realism as motivating factors informing states’ participation in the 
collective security system. 
 
In the light of the above, a brief outline of the theoretical underpinnings of the 
collective security system is given. Following on that, the practice of collective 
security will be discussed with reference to the main features of the UN organs 
that form the focus of the present collective security system. 
 
1.3. The theory of collective security 
 
Inis Claude viewed the place of collective security in international law and policy 
as follows: 
‘Collective security is a specialized instrument of international policy in the sense 
that it is intended only to forestall the arbitrary and aggressive use of force, not to 
provide enforcement mechanisms for the whole body of international law; it 
                                                     
70 Karns and Mingst (International Organizations) (supra) 297. 
71 Danesh Sarooshi (Collective Security) (supra) 5-6. 
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assumes that, so far as the problem of world order is concerned, the heart of the 
matter is the restraint of military action rather than the guarantee of respect for 
all legal obligations. Moreover, it assumes that this ideal may be realized, or at 
least approximated, by a reformation of international policy, without the 
institution of a revolution in the structure of the international system.’72 
 
Claude has identified a number of subjective and objective requirements of 
collective security. One of the subjective requirements (referring to the 
acceptability of the responsibilities of collective security) rests on the Kantian 
notion of a constantly integrating world community:  a community of peoples and 
nations that are becoming more and more interdependent and integrated into a 
true world community.  
 
1.3.1 Liberal theory of international relations and governance 
 
Immanuel Kant articulated the relationship between democracy and peace and put 
forward the idea that free communities and states would co-operate to promote 
peace.73 These Enlightenment ideas were later reflected in what became known as 
the liberal theory of global governance and international co-operation.74 Apart 
from the notion of a common humanity, one of the major threads running through 
                                                     
72 Claude (Swords into Plowshares) (supra) 249. 
73 For a critique of Kant’s For a Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), and the way the modern 
political philosophers Jürgen Habermas, John Rawls and Norberto Bobbio treat the ideas of Kant (via Hegel) 
and the liberal/cosmopolitan view of international law, see commentary by Perry Anderson, ‘Arms and Rights – 
Rawls, Habermas and Bobbio in an Age of War’, NLR 31 (2005) 5 – 40. For a discussion of the impact of the so-
called neo-conservative view of international relations on the UN-dominated collective security system, and 
how neo-conservative thinking differs from the realist school of international law and relations, see Jürgen 
Habermas, ‘Interpreting the Fall of a Monument’, German Law Journal Vol 4(7) (2003) 701 – 708. The 
commentary appeared in reaction to the American-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The invasion was carried 
out without UN Security Council authorisation.  
74 See Karns and Mingst (International Organizations) (supra) 35 – 36. 
 - 33 - 
 
the liberal theory of international relations is the respect for international law. 
Liberals, who are often also being regarded as idealists, have expectations of an 
international system not based on power alone, but power being exercised within 
the framework of rules (international law75), and the institutions of collective 
security.76  
 
In terms of collective security, this notion of a common humanity implies that the 
large majority of states must positively commit to ‘the value of world peace’.77 
Authors like Hans Kelsen described collective security in terms of a continuum with 
‘a highest possible degree’ of collective security. This ‘highest degree’ would have 
one central organ for the maintenance of peace and security, which would exercise 
an exclusive right to take enforcement actions against member states. Kelsen 
further described the ‘highest form of collective security’ in terms of the 
disarmament of individual states, and the commitment to community.78 
 
The commitment to a more abstract value oriented view of world order is perhaps 
the one feature that distinguishes collective security from the balance of power 
international system that existed before. Both systems rely on the deterrent effect 
of overwhelming military power (be it in the form of alliances, or the international 
community collectively), but collective security is premised on the commitment to 
a higher international order – hence the irrelevance of the geographical remoteness 
                                                     
75 The creation of ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the permanent ICC can be regarded as flowing 
from the Kantian notion of a liberal/cosmopolitan international order based on the rule of law. On another 
level, the interaction between international criminal law and national criminal law, and the harmonization that 
may occur as a result, can also be seen as consistent with a liberal/cosmopolitan view of international law and 
relations. For an international criminal law perspective, see Mireille Delmas-Marty, ‘The contribution of 
comparative law to a pluralistic conception of International Criminal Law’, JICJ 1 (2003), 13 – 25. 
76 Karns and Mingst (International Organizations) (supra) 37. 
77 Inis Claude (Swords into Plowshares) (supra) 250. 
78 See Hans Kelsen (Collective Security) (supra) 784. 
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of aggression.79 Inis Claude linked the normative element of the community of 
nations to the essential characteristic of the international system as a rules-based 
system – not for the sake of rules, but for the deeper commitment to peace and 
harmony: 
‘The responsibilities of participation in a collective security system are too onerous 
to be borne by any but a people actuated by genuine sympathy for any and all 
victims of aggression, and loyalty to the values of a global system of law and 
order.’80 
 
The ideal of peace is thus served by the certainty that the international rule of law 
is suppose to bring about:  The certainty that acts of aggression will be met by the 
collective opposition of the nations of the world.81  
 
1.3.2 Liberalism and realist critique 
 
Whereas the liberal view of international relations and collective security is to a 
certain extent idealistic (there is an expectation that states will adhere to certain 
norms or would want to act for the global good of peace and security); realists 
view the international system as basically anarchic. Karns and Mingst summarise 
the realist theory of international relations as follows: 
‘Within the international system, realists see states as the primary actors, entities 
that act in a unitary way in pursuit of their national interest, generally defined in 
terms of maximizing power and security. States co-exist in an anarchic 
international system characterized by the absence of an authoritative hierarchy. As 
                                                     
79 Inis Claude (Swords into Plowshares) (supra) 251. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Inis Claude (Swords into Plowshares) (supra) 252-253. 
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a result, states must rely primarily on themselves to manage their own insecurity 
through balance of power and deterrence.’82 
 
The realist view of international relations often regards the application of 
international law as problematic. The functioning of the collective security system 
is thus viewed from a national/sovereign policy perspective. While realists are not 
absolutely opposed to the idea of international law83, they would scrutinize the 
application of international law very critically.84 In extreme cases, there could be 
severe tension between the policy decisions of a sovereign state (acting in national 
self-interest) and the constraints imposed by international law. Consider the 
following statement by Stephen Krasner:  ‘For realists, the defining characteristic 
of the international system is anarchy, and the most important empirical reality is 
that national power, including but not limited to the ability to wage war, matters 
more than anything else.’85  
 
1.4. The features of the present collective security system 
 
1.4.1 The legacy of the League of Nations 
 
The United Nations, particularly the Security Council, is the institutional 
embodiment of the present collective security system. The UN was created in the 
                                                     
82 Karns and Mingst (International Organizations) (supra) 45. 
83 See comments by Richard Steinberg ‘Overview:  Realism in International law’, ASIL Proceedings (2002) 260 – 
262.  
84 For a realist critique on the role of international law, specifically in terms of American responses to acts of 
terrorism and humanitarian intervention, see Edwin D Williamson ‘Realism versus legalism in international 
relations’ ASIL Proceedings (2002) 262 – 265. 
85 Stephen D Krasner ‘Realist views of international law’ ASIL Proceedings (2002) 265. 
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wake of the Second World War. This war shook the international system to the core 
and exposed the failures of its institutional predecessor, the League of Nations.  
 
The League of Nations was created as a result of the liberal ideal that the horrors 
of the First World War should never be repeated. Apart from the peace treaty that 
was signed at Versailles to end hostilities, the League of Nations was created to 
serve the ideal of collective security and to prevent war. The Covenant of the 
League of Nations took effect on 10 January 1920, the date on which Germany 
deposited its instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Versailles.86 Despite the 
fact that the League in many respects represented the ideals of liberal 
internationalists like President Woodrow Wilson of the US, it is ironic that the US 
declined to become a member of the League.87 The reasoning of the US at the time 
seemed to be that some provisions in the Covenant of the League would diminish or 
bring an end to an important aspect of US foreign policy which had at that time 
been in place for almost a century:  The Monroe Doctrine. This political doctrine 
was essentially a policy statement that the US would not tolerate interference or 
colonial projects in its ‘sphere of influence’, namely the continents of North and 
South America. The US considered some of the provisions of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations to form a basis for possible European influence and interference 
in the American continents. Higgins pointed out that part of the reason of American 
refusal to become a member of the League was the provisions of Article 10 of the 
Covenant.88 This article contained the general principle that aggression was 
unlawful.89 It imposed a legal obligation on states to respect the territorial 
                                                     
86 Pearce Higgins (ed) Hall’s A Treatise on International Law 8th (1924) Clarendon Press Oxford 71. 
87 Pearce Higgins (International Law) (supra) 72. 
88 Pearce Higgins (International Law) (supra) 79. 
89 See Ian Brownlie International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963) Clarendon Press Oxford 62-65. 
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integrity and political independence of all members of the League. The crucial 
political problem for the US seemed to lie in the fact that the Council of the 
League could decide on measures to be taken in cases where the political 
independence or territorial integrity of states was violated as a result of 
aggression. This dispensation created tension with the Monroe Doctrine which 
provided that the US (and by implication not other countries or international bodies 
or alliances) would be the guarantor of political independence and territorial 
integrity in the American continents. Although the wording of Article 10 of the 
Covenant were criticised as being too vague, authors like Ian Brownlie regarded the 
principle contained in the article as a clear and important declaration on the 
illegality of aggression.90 However, geopolitical considerations of the US trumped 
the normative impact of Article 10, and the emerging superpower was not willing 
to partake in the collective security regime of the League of Nations. 
 
Ultimately, neither the legal provision in Article 10, nor the working of the League 
of Nations could prevent the disastrous war of aggression that became the Second 
World War. Inis Claude, who viewed the League of Nations as the embodiment of 
the liberal ideal of collective security, concluded the following on the nature of 
the Covenant of the League: 
‘[All] the basic concepts of nineteenth-century liberalism – democracy, nationalism, 
natural harmony, law, limited government, rationalism, discussion, consent – made 
their imprint upon the Covenant of the League of Nations.’91 
 
                                                     
90 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 65. Other commentators, like Hans Kelsen, pointed out that the 
prohibition of the use of force was much weaker under the Covenant of the League of Nations than it is under 
the UN Charter. See Hans Kelsen (Collective Security) (supra) 787-788. 
91 Inis Claude (Swords into Plowshares) (supra) 54. 
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The fact that these ideals were shattered by the Second World War obviously called 
into question not only the practical impact of the League, but also the ideal of a 
collective security regime based on international law. Authors like Inis Claude, 
however, seemed to have had a more optimistic prognosis for collective security 
after the Second World War. Claude viewed the United Nations as ‘a revised 
version of the League’, and not a radically new concept. Of course, for tactical and 
political reasons, the resemblances between the League and the UN were 
understated. Essentially, Inis Claude regarded the UN as a continuation of the 
‘progressive trends’ of the period between the two world wars.92 In other words, 
the idea of collective security was not dead, but the organisational aspects were 
certainly in need of adjustment and reform. Hans Kelsen pointed out that 
decentralisation and self-help were key features (and weaknesses!) of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations. Thus, it ‘was for the members, and not for a 
central organ of the League to decide whether a violation of the Covenant by 
illegal resort to war had occurred, and to decide what enforcement action had to 
be taken.’93 Members were also not legally bound by the recommendations of the 
Council of the League. According to commentators like Kelsen, these features of 
the Covenant of the League led to the League’s ultimate ineffectiveness.94 
 
1.4.2 The United Nations as principal embodiment of collective security 
 
The establishment of the United Nations was an attempt by the international 
community to create a more effective collective security system. The ideal of 
                                                     
92 Inis Claude (Swords into Plowshares) (supra) 60-61. 
93 Hans Kelsen (Collective Security) (supra) 787. 
94 Hans Kelsen (Collective Security) (supra) 788. 
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collective security, together with other areas of concern for the international 
community, is set out in Article 1 of the UN Charter: 
‘The Purposes of the United Nations are: 
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end:  to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for 
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring 
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations 
which might lead to a breach of the peace; 
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace; 
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and  
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these 
common ends.’95 
 
It is clear from Article 1 of the UN Charter that, although international peace and 
security is the primary objective of the organisation, the UN was also created, as 
Inis Claude put it, ‘as a general organization in the additional sense that it was to 
deal with a comprehensive range of subject matter.’96 While the UN Charter, like 
its predecessor the Covenant of the League of Nations, represented the old liberal 
ideal of international co-operation and collective security, the Charter also 
signalled the development of a new understanding of the liberal ideal:  a far more 
                                                     
95 Art 1 UN Charter.  
96 Inis Claude (Swords into Plowshares) (supra) 67. 
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active role for international organisations like the UN to enhance the ideals set out 
in the UN Charter.97  
 
Apart from peace ands security, the UN is also active in the fields of human 
rights,98 refugees and migration,99 the emancipation of women,100 labour issues,101 
economic relations and development,102 the environment and sustainable 
development,103 the law of the sea,104 outer space,105 and international and 
transnational substantive and procedural criminal justice issues (notably terrorism, 
                                                     
97 Inis Claude (Swords into Plowshares) (supra) 79. 
98 For a concise discussion of the ‘three stages’ of international protection of human rights by the UN, see 
Antonio Cassese International Law in a divided world (1986) Oxford University Press, Oxford, 293-316. See 
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102 See Art 55 UN Charter on the UN’s role in socio-economic sphere. International trade is a specialised area of 
international law, with the work of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) at the centre. See in general 
www.wto.org.  
103 Especially through the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), UN Doc A/8730 (1972). See further Draft 
Principles on Human Rights and the Environment (Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, Annex I (1994) and 
Commission on Human Rights (Res 2003/71) on human rights and the environment as part of sustainable 
development. 
104 Notably in terms of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982, (1982) 21 ILM 1261. 
105 It is generally assumed that international law also applies in space. There are a number of specific treaties 
dealing with specific outer space related issues, eg The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, GA Res 2222 (XXI) 
Dec 19, 1966, 610 UNTS 205. Some international treaties have implications for activities in outer space, eg the 
Multilateral Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, 5 Aug 
1963, 480 UNTS 43. 
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drug trafficking and organised crime)106. It is submitted that the role of the UN is 
by no means limited to issues of peace and security. Indeed, the role of the UN as 
an agent for the advancement of human development and human rights prompts 
the suggestion that the UN Charter should not be seen as a static document, set in 
the time-frame of 1945. Issues of security and social development; the 
environment and security; and socio-economic issues, trade and human rights are 
all interrelated. It would therefore be wrong to regard the role of the UN’s primary 
organ for collective security, the Security Council, as a very limited role – only 
concerned with questions of interstate aggression. International practice, 
especially since the early 1990’s, has shown that the Security Council is willing to 
view for instance human rights violations to be a threat to international peace and 
security, thus triggering the collective security machinery of the UN Charter. The 
latter is also relevant for purposes of the debate on so-called humanitarian 
intervention107, which is dealt with below108. 
 
From the above it is clear that the present collective security system, which is 
dominated by the UN, has its roots in liberal ideals and efforts to foster 
international peace and security; first attempted through the failed League of 
Nations. Authors like Inis Claude regarded the Charter of the UN as a more 
satisfactory basis for collective security than the Covenant of the League. With 
reference to the core provisions of the Charter that constitute the essence of the 
limits put on the use of force by states, namely Article 2(4) (prohibition on the 
threat or use of force by states), Article 51 (individual or collective self-defence by 
                                                     
106 For this vast area of international law, see in general Cherif Bassiouni International Criminal Law 
Conventions and their penal provisions (1997), Transnational Publishers, New York. 
107 See G Barrie ‘Forcible intervention and international law:  legal theory and realities’ 116 (4) SALJ (1999) 
791-809, 804. 
108 See Ch 2 par 2.5.2 infra. 
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states) and Article 53 (regional enforcement action with Security Council 
authorisation), Claude concluded as follows: 
‘[The Charter] leaves no such convenient gaps in the legal fence for aggressors to 
crawl through as did the [Covenant of the League]; it substitutes for a limited 
prohibition of war the more comprehensive proscription of the threat or use of 
force, and it even undertakes to close the gap of fictitious defensive and law-
enforcement measures by subjecting all coercive activity to the control and 
supervision of the Security Council.’109 
 
The most important legal framework for the maintenance of international peace 
and security by the UN can be found in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The key 
provision is Article 39, which provides as follows: 
‘The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.’ 
 
Once the Security Council has determined under Article 39 that there exists a 
violation of or threat to international peace and security or an act of aggression, 
Articles 40 to 42 can potentially take effect. According to Erika de Wet, it is clear 
that the Security Council has a discretion both in terms of the determination of a 
threat or breach of peace or an act of aggression, and a further discretion as to 
what measures should be taken in response to these situations. She has also 
identified three schools of thought on the full extent of the Security Council’s 
discretion: 
                                                     
109 Inis Claude (Swords into Plowshares) (supra) 264. 
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‘Some authors claim that both types of action fall within the absolute discretion of 
the Security Council. Others argue that the decision as to when the Security Council 
should intervene in terms of Article 39 lies purely within its discretion, but that 
general international law, in particular ius cogens, as well as the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations would pose limits to the type of action that may be 
taken by the Security Council. Yet others argue the exact opposite and state that 
once the Security Council is acting in terms of Article 39, there are no limits as to 
what it can do. However, whether it has passed the threshold constituted by Article 
39 is something that can be measured by means of judicial criteria.’110 
 
There seems to be an underlying divide between those who view the discretionary 
powers of the Security Council as primarily of a political nature and those who 
regard the exercise of the powers as closely resembling a judicial function involving 
legal interpretation. De Wet points out that supporters of the view that the 
Security Council is basically acting in terms of political considerations when 
interpreting Article 39, would point to the fact that the phrases ‘threat to the 
peace’, ‘breach of the peace’ and ‘and act of aggression’ as used in Article 39, are 
not defined – not in Article 39 or anywhere else in the Charter. Thus, the modus 
operandi of the Security Council would be to look at the factual situation and 
political realities when exercising its discretion. This, coupled with the veto power 
of the five permanent members of the Security Council (France, Russia, China, 
United Kingdom and United States) underpins the ‘clear indication that decisions in 
the interest of peace and security will be based exclusively on (national) political 
considerations’.111 Another indication of the political nature of the Article 39 
discretionary powers of the Security Council is the fact that there is no obligation 
                                                     
110 Erika de Wet The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (2004) Hart Publishing, Portland 
133 – 134. 
111 Erika De Wet (Chapter VII Powers) (supra) 135. 
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on the Security Council to act, despite the apparent seriousness of a given 
situation. The Security Council can in other words act ‘selectively and with 
discretion’112. 
 
However, there are those who argue that Article 39 does not provide the Security 
Council with an unlimited discretion.113 The fact that the Security Council can 
muster the political will (and overcome the veto threshold) to act on a specific 
situation that might constitute and act of aggression or a breach of peace, does not 
imply that it also has unlimited discretion to act. De Wet points to the fact that the 
‘imprecision and vagueness’ of the terms used in Article 39 does not necessarily 
support the argument that the exercise of the Article 39 discretion by the Security 
Council is essentially a political act:  ‘The concretisation of vague terms is, in the 
first instance, a matter of legal interpretation.’114 And further: 
‘There is nothing inherently special about the terms used in Article 39 that would 
ab initio remove them from the ambit of legal interpretation. On the contrary, the 
mere fact that Article 39 distinguishes between three criteria that trigger binding 
resolutions of the Security Council, implies that it does not have an unbound 
discretion. If an unbound discretion had been intended, such a distinction would 
have been obsolete. The Charter would only have contributed to the Security 
Council the general power to adopt binding measures in the interest of 
international peace and security and nothing more.’115 
 
                                                     
112 Erika De Wet (Chapter VII Powers) (supra) 136. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Erika De Wet (Chapter VII Powers) (supra) 136. 
115 Erika De Wet (Chapter VII Powers) (supra) 136-137. 
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Erika de Wet pointed out that the International Court of Justice has not yet taken a 
position on the meaning of Article 39.116 However, in Prosecutor v Tadic117, the 
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
did have the opportunity to address not only the meaning of Article 39 but also the 
broader question of Security Council powers under Chapter VII. The ICTY was 
established by the Security Council in 1993118 to try persons ‘responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia since 1991’.119 At the Trial Chamber, one of the three grounds 
on which the appellant attacked the jurisdiction of the ICTY was the ‘illegal 
foundation’ of the Tribunal. The other two grounds were the ‘wrongful primacy’ of 
the ICTY over national courts and the ‘lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae’. The 
motion challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was denied in the Trial 
Chamber. The matter came before the Appeals Chamber, and for present purposes 
the focus will be on the first aspect of the motion on jurisdiction, namely the 
foundation of the ICTY in terms of the Chapter VII powers of the Security Council of 
the UN. The Appeals Chamber accepted that the Security Council has a ‘very wide 
discretion’ under Article 39 of the UN Charter. But the Appeals Chamber also 
stated that these discretionary powers are not unlimited.120 The UN Charter cannot 
be interpreted in such a way as to depict the Security Council as ‘legibus solutus 
                                                     
116 Erika De Wet (Chapter VII Powers) (supra) 135. 
117 Decision on the Defence Motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Case No 
IT-94-1-AR72, Decision of 2 Oct 1995, reproduced in Andre Klip & Göran Sluiter (eds) Annotated Leading Cases 
of International Criminal Tribunals – Student Ed (2005) Intersentia, Antwerp 9. Decision also available on 
http://www.un.org/icty.  
118 SC Res 827 (1993) on Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, ILM 
(1993) 1192 (Statute) and 1203 (Resolution); Amended by S C Res 1166 of 13 May 1998, Res 1329 of 30 Nov 
2000, Res 1411 of 17 May 2002, Res 1431 of 14 Aug 2002 and Res 1481 of 19 May 2003 – see 
http://www.un.org/icty.  
119 Art 1 ICTY Statute. 
120 Prosecutor v Tadic (Appeal on Jurisdiction) supra par 28. 
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(unbound by law)’121. The structure of the UN Charter is such that the Security 
Council is indeed given wide powers to maintain international peace and security, 
but these powers are specifically laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII of the 
Charter. Regarding the Chapter VII powers, the Appeals Chamber acknowledged the 
complex political and legal dimensions to an Article 39 determination, as also 
pointed out above. But importantly, the Appeals Chamber emphasised that the 
exercise of the discretion by the Security Council is ultimately still bound by the 
letter and spirit of the UN Charter: 
‘While the “act of aggression” is more amenable to a legal determination, the 
“threat to the peace” is more of a political concept. But the determination that 
there exists such a threat is not a totally unfettered discretion, as it has to remain, 
at the very least, within the limits of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter.’122 
 
The Appeals Chamber in Tadic had to consider whether the establishment of an 
international criminal tribunal (such as the ICTY) was within the Chapter VII powers 
of the Security Council – powers aimed at the maintenance or restoration of peace 
after a determination under Article 39 that there was a threat to peace or an act of 
aggression occurred. The Chamber noted that ‘[t]he establishment of an 
international criminal tribunal is not expressly mentioned among the enforcement 
measures provided for in Chapter VII, and more particularly in Articles 41 and 
42.’123 The Appeals Chamber held that Article 41 provides the necessary legal 
grounds for the Security Council to establish an international criminal tribunal in 
response to a threat to peace or an act of aggression. Article 41 of the UN Charter 
provides as follows: 
                                                     
121 Prosecutor v Tadic (Appeal on Jurisdiction) supra par 28. 
122 Prosecutor v Tadic (Appeal on Jurisdiction) supra par 29. 
123 Prosecutor v Tadic (Appeal on Jurisdiction) supra par 33. 
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‘The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations.’ 
 
The Appeals Chamber held that the measures listed in Article 41 are merely 
illustrative examples of appropriate measures; the use of armed force clearly 
excluded. Thus, the establishment of an international tribunal can also be an 
appropriate way of responding to an act of aggression or a threat to peace and 
security.124  
 
The primary role of the Security Council as guardian of international peace and 
security is not only to determine whether the acts listed in Article 39 have 
occurred, but also to decide on appropriate responses to maintain peace and 
security. From the Tadic decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber discussed above, it 
is clear that the creation of international criminal tribunals can also be an 
appropriate measure to restore peace and security. It is however prudent to guard 
against the view that international criminal tribunals can by themselves bring about 
peace. Michael Reisman has pointed out that the ICTY, for instance, was created as 
a Chapter VII measure, to ‘stop the war’ in Yugoslavia and not in the first instance 
to ‘prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law’.125 Reisman’s criticism is that the Security Council, with the 
creation of the ICTY in the midst of a conflict, has abdicated its primary function of 
                                                     
124 Prosecutor v Tadic (Appeal on Jurisdiction) supra para 35 – 36. 
125 Michael Reisman ‘Stopping wars and making peace:  Reflections on the ideology and practice of conflict 
termination in contemporary world politics’ (1998) 6 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 48. 
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maintaining international peace and security. Reisman stated the following about 
the apparent paradoxical role of the ICTY as a Chapter VII measure: 
‘In the ordinary course of events, it is precisely at the end of a conflict that the 
operation of an international criminal tribunal kicks into operation. However, the 
purpose and essential design of the former Yugoslav Tribunal was to use it to 
accomplish other goals; it was to be terminated as soon as those goals were 
secured. Meanwhile, efforts at securing a political settlement had to continue, for 
no outsider was then willing to invest what was militarily necessary to force one of 
the parties to relent. However, the same people who should have been agreeing to 
a political solution were also the individuals who were assumed to be the prime 
candidates for indictment and trial. With two contradictory political strategies 
being pursued, the possibility of contribution by the Tribunal was not 
auspicious.’126 
.1 below, the conflict eventually led to military 
tervention by NATO forces. 
Charter provides for the contribution of military forces to be made available to the 
                                                     
 
It falls beyond the scope of this dissertation to evaluate the historical role of the 
ICTY in contributing to the end of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. However, 
it is common cause that the conflict continued for years after the creation of the 
ICTY and a major conflict erupted in 1998/1999 in the province of Kosovo. As 
discussed in paragraph 1.4.3
in
 
The Security Council can decide on military action if the Article 41 measures 
‘would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate’127. Article 43 of the 
126 Michael Reisman (Stopping Wars) (supra) 48 – 49. 
127 Art 42 Un Charter provides as follows: ‘Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in 
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.’ 
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Security Council in order to maintain peace and security.128 This provision has 
proved to be unsuccessful, since states were very reluctant to enter into 
agreements with the Security Council. Of course, this state of affairs does not 
mean that the Security Council cannot make use of military forces assigned for ad 
hoc peace keeping or for peace enforcement under Article 42 of the Charter.129 
 
The framework of collective security as set out in the UN Charter also provides in 
Article 51 for individual and collective self-defence. States which are under 
military attack are entitled to use force in self-defence, but only until the Security 
Council has taken the necessary measures to restore peace and security.  
 
1.4.3 Collective security and regional security arrangements 
 
1.4.3.1 The notion of regional self-defence and the evolving role of NATO 
 
During the Cold War, the bipolar international political system, which was 
dominated by two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union), caused 
the collective security system of the UN to be complemented by selective security 
regimes like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Inis Claude viewed 
NATO as an elaboration of the alliance concept, ‘in contrast to the collective 
                                                     
128 Art 43 UN Charter provides as follows: ‘(1) All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its 
call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, 
including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. (2) Such 
agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general 
location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. (3) The agreement or agreements shall 
be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between 
the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject 
to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.’ 
129 See in general commentary by Jochen Frowein in Simma (supra) Vol I 749-759. 
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security ideal of obtaining the abandonment and replacement of the alliance 
concept’.130 Indeed, NATO’s constituting treaty makes it clear that it is first and 
foremost an alliance or pact formed to collectively defend any member or 
members against external attacks. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty confirms that the 
pact is subject to the collective security regime provided for in the UN Charter: 
‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they 
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of 
individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, 
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems 
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of 
the North Atlantic area. 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately 
be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the 
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain 
international peace and security.’131 
 
It can be argued that after the end of the Cold War the role of NATO as a regional 
defence alliance changed from a purely defence alliance to a more active (and 
assertive) regional collective security organisation. One event that certainly 
changed the way NATO views its mission and role as a ‘selective security 
organisation’ (as Inis Claude labelled it), was the military intervention in Kosovo in 
the Balkans in 1999. Indeed, during the Kosovo conflict, NATO acted far more 
                                                     
130 Inis Claude (Swords into Plowshares) (supra) 267. 
131 Art 5 of The North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949, available on 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.  
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actively as a collective security apparatus and not so much in self-defence of any 
of its members. 
 
The conflict in Kosovo during 1998-1999 must be viewed within the context of the 
bigger regional conflict of the 1990’s in the Balkans. After the disintegration of the 
old Yugoslav Federation with its six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) and two autonomous provinces in 
Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo), President Slobodan Milosevic of the new, smaller 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) wanted to change the 
identity of Kosovo from being mainly Albanian to being more Serbian. By 1998 
Milosevic’s policies involved acts of violence and gross human rights violations 
against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. There was a real concern that another genocide 
was about to begin in the Balkan region – the other being the Bosnian genocide of 
the early 1990’s. There were diplomatic efforts to end the conflict and human 
rights abuses in Kosovo. These efforts were accompanied by a series of UN Security 
Council Resolutions aimed at ending the conflict. The situation in Kosovo was also 
grave enough for the Prosecutor of the ICTY to declare the violations of 
international humanitarian law in Kosovo to fall within the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.132 By September 1998 the conflict in Kosovo deteriorated to such an 
extent that the UN Security Council acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and 
passed Resolution 1199, demanding a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Yugoslav 
armed forces from Kosovo.133 On 23 March 1999 NATO informed the Secretary-
General of the UN about the worsening humanitarian situation and escalation of 
                                                     
132 Kosovo Report of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000) 69-70. 
133 Kosovo Report (supra) 75. 
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conflict in Kosovo. The next day the NATO air campaign against Yugoslav targets 
started.134 
 
The military intervention by NATO armed forces in response to the ongoing conflict 
in Kosovo during the first half of 1999 was the first time that NATO acted beyond 
its narrow mandate of self-defence. The official basis for the military intervention 
was not so much out of concern for direct security threats against NATO members, 
but out of humanitarian concerns primarily, and security concerns secondary. 
Broadly speaking, NATO justified the military intervention in Kosovo on two 
grounds, namely humanitarian concerns for the people of Kosovo and, further, the 
enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions and other relevant international 
agreements.135 However, it needs to be stressed that NATO’s armed intervention 
was carried out without prior UN Security Council approval.136 
 
It is true that the political statements by NATO leaders at the time seem to provide 
a more nuanced rationale for the military action – from pure humanitarian concerns 
to concerns for the peace, security and stability of the Balkan region and the rest 
of Europe.137 Questions as to the legality (and political wisdom) of the intervention 
were raised. There was no UN Security Council approval of the intervention. In 
fact, two permanent members – China and Russia – were strongly opposed to the 
                                                     
134 Kosovo Report (supra) 85. 
135 See Press Statement by Dr Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, 23 March 1999, reproduced in Marc 
Weller The Crisis in Kosovo 1989 – 1999 Vol I (1999) Documents & Analysis Publishing Ltd, Cambridge 495. 
136 See Statement made by the UN Secretary-General on NATO military action against Yugoslavia, 24 March 
1999; and SC Provisional Record, 3988th Meeting, 24 March 1999 (reprinted in Marc Weller (Crisis in Kosovo) 
(supra) 498-501. 
137 See for instance statements by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair (23 March 1999) and US President Bill Clinton 
(24 March 1999). Both leaders from the prominent NATO members cited not only humanitarian concerns, but 
also peace, stability and security in Europe as reasons for NATO to intervene militarily to end the conflict in 
Kosovo. Marc Weller (Crisis in Kosovo) (supra) 495-496 and 498-499. 
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NATO action.138 In light of the legal and political ramifications of the conflict in 
Kosovo, and in particular the controversial NATO military action, the Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo (‘the Kosovo Commission’) was convened by 
the Prime Minister of Sweden, Göran Persson. The Commission was endorsed by 
Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General. Justice Richard Goldstone from South Africa 
and Mr Carl Tham from Sweden served as co-chairmen. The findings of the Kosovo 
Commission were published in a comprehensive report139. 
 
One of the important themes that were addressed in the Kosovo Report is of 
particular interest for the collective security debate in the post Cold War world:  
The impact of claims of legitimate use of force (often referred to as humanitarian 
intervention) outside the framework of the UN Charter. In this Chapter the aim is 
not to analyse possible new justifications for the use of armed force, for instance 
the emerging notion of humanitarian intervention,140 but rather to investigate to 
what extent the collective security system that was created in the wake of the 
Second World War, is still in place.  
 
1.4.3.2 Regional security arrangements under Article 52 of the UN Charter 
 
Article 52 of the UN Charter provides as follows: 
                                                     
138 See SC Provisional Record, 3988th Meeting, 24 March 1999 reproduced in Marc Weller (Crisis in Kosovo) 
(supra) 499 – 501. The Russian ambassador stated that Russia was ‘profoundly outraged’ by the NATO use of 
force in Yugoslavia. Mr Lavrov, the Russian ambassador, stated that the NATO action was illegal and in violation 
of the UN Charter. Russia even linked the NATO action to the 1974 definition of aggression (further discussed in 
Ch 4 par 4.2.3 infra) and referred to the fact that under that definition, ‘no consideration of whatever nature, 
whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression.’  
139 Kosovo Report (supra). 
140 On this debate, see in general Gerhard Kemp ‘Mission Impossible? “Humanitarian intervention” and the new 
paradigm of international criminal law’ 2002 (3) Stell LR 460-472. 
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‘(1) Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional 
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance 
of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided 
that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the 
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. 
(2) The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or 
constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of 
local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies 
before referring them to the Security Council. 
(3) The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of 
local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies 
either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security 
Council. 
(4) This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 [Security Council 
may investigates disputes] and 35 [referral of disputes by states to the Security 
Council].’ 
 
Waldemar Hummer and Michael Schweitzer analysed the different aspects of 
Article 52 and proposed the following definition of a regional arrangement or 
agency within the meaning of Article 52: 
‘[It] refers to a union of States or an international organization based upon a 
collective treaty or a constitution and consistent with the Purposes and Principles 
of the UN, whose primary task is the maintenance of peace and security under the 
control and within the framework of the UN. Its members, whose numbers must be 
smaller than that of the UN, must be so closely linked in territorial terms that 
effective local dispute settlement by means of a specially provided procedure is 
possible. Accordingly, regional agencies are internally focussed, thereby 
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distinguishing themselves from, inter alia, externally focussed systems of collective 
self-defence under Art. 51.’141 
 
In terms of the above definition, three organisations were identified by Hummer 
and Schweitzer as regional arrangements or agencies within the ambit of Article 
52. These are:  The Organisation of American States, the League of Arab States and 
the Organization of African Unity.142 The latter has since been replaced by arguably 
a more assertive (interventionist) regional organisation, the African Union, which is 
briefly discussed below as an example of an organisation within the meaning of 
Article 52 of the UN Charter. 
 
1.4.3.3 The African Union (AU) as regional security organisation 
 
The AU is the institutional successor of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 
which had a broad political and social agenda. The OAU evolved into the AU on 9 
July 2002 with an aspiration to not only build upon the Pan-African ideals of the 
OAU, but also to eradicate the sources of conflict on the African continent.143 To 
this end the AU, unlike its predecessor, will be able to actively intervene on the 
African continent in order to prevent human rights violations on the scale of crimes 
against humanity and genocide.144  
                                                     
141 Waldemar Hummer and Michael Schweitzer ‘Chapter VIII Regional Arrangements’ in Simma (The Charter of 
the United Nations Vol I) (supra) 828. 
142 Waldemar Hummer and Michael Schweitzer in Simma (The Charter of the United Nations Vol I) (supra) 828-
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143 For a critical comparison between the objectives of the OAU and the AU, see Michael Cowling, ‘The African 
Union – an evaluation’ 2002 (27) SAYIL 193 – 205. 
144 See Stephan Klingebiel, ‘Africa’s new peace and security architecture’ African Security Review 14 (2) (2005) 
35-44. The author argues that the AU will be able to actively intervene to prevent conflicts and mass human 
rights violations on the African continent. However, the author also points out that external actors like the UN 
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 Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the AU provides for the creation of peace and 
security structures. In December 2003 the Peace and Security Council was 
established. The crucial provisions on collective security can be found in the 
Protocol on the Peace and Security Council (PSC).145 On the importance of this 
regional security body, Hennie Strydom noted that the UN regards the African 
continent as particularly prone to conflict and that this poses a major challenge to 
the UN.146 In terms of the Protocol on Peace and Security, the Council can 
recommend to the Assembly of Heads of State intervention in a member state in 
respect of certain situations constituting serious crimes under international law, 
namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. ‘Intervention’ could 
include military intervention and the use of force. An African Standby Force can be 
deployed on instructions from the PSC. Although the AU’s peace and security 
structures might seem to constitute a complete collective security regime for 
Africa, the Protocol on the Peace and Security Council provides for close co-
operation with the UN.147 Having said that, it is also prudent to consider the 
following observations by Timothy Murithi on the role of the AU vis-à-vis that of the 
UN who, according to Murithi, has failed Africa on several occasions, including the 
Rwandan genocide in 1994: 
‘The Constitutive Act of the African Union has introduced a principle that if 
individual states are unable to live up to their responsibilities to protect people 
affected in internal conflicts then in theory the African Union is empowered to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and regional groupings like NATO, the EU and even individual states like former colonial powers Britain and 
France will still play a significant interventionist role in Africa. 
145 See Art 1 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union, 9 Jul 2002. 
146 Hennie Strydom ‘Peace and Security under the African Union’ 28 SAYIL (2003) 60. 
147 Art 17(1) and (3) Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union. 
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intervene. In effect African governments by signing up to the Union have accepted 
external intervention in the internal affairs in serious crisis situations which 
basically dilutes the provision found in the UN Charter on the non-intervention in 
the affairs of a member state.’148 
 
It is clear that the Peace and Security Council of the AU will have a function unlike 
that of the Security Council of the UN. Strydom has pointed out that the PSC has 
the typical collective security aim of ‘promoting peace, security and stability’,149 
but this is linked to broader economic, social and environmental objectives. Time 
will tell whether this broader approach to peace and security will be more 
successful in securing peace and stability than the narrower approach to security as 
provided for by the UN Charter and as practised by the UN Security Council.  
 
The humanitarian crisis in the Darfur-region of Sudan – where thousands of people 
have died in a conflict that some have labelled ‘genocide’ - provided an acid test 
for the effectiveness of the AU’s peace and security structures.150 This crisis, which 
has already prompted a criminal justice response in the form of a Security Council 
referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court,151 will perhaps be the 
first real test of whether the AU has the necessary political will and resources to 
bring the crisis to an end. On 31 July 2007 the Security Council adopted a 
                                                     
148 Timothy Murithi, The African Union – Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development (2005) Ashgate 
Publishing, Aldershot p 97. 
149 Hennie Strydom (Peace and Security) (supra) 62. 
150 See CDR Seth Appiah-Mensah ‘AU’s critical assignment in Darfur’ 14 (2) African Security Review (2005) 7-21; 
Stephan Klingebiel ‘Africa’s new peace and security architecture’ 14 (2) African Security Review (2005) 35-44. 
151 UN SC Res 1593 (2005). Par 1 of the Resolution provides for the referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC. 
This was the first time that the SC referred a situation to the ICC. The SC has on a number of occasions 
determined that the situation in Darfur continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security. 
For further analysis see Luigi Condorelli and Annalisa Ciampi ‘Comments on the Security Council referral of the 
situation in Darfur to the ICC’ 3 JICJ (2005) 590-599; Cécile Aptel Williamson 15(1) African Security Review 
(2006) 20-31. 
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resolution152 providing for the deployment of one of the biggest peacekeeping 
forces ever. This force will be a so-called ‘hybrid’ force — consisting of both AU 
and UN personnel.153 This could become a test case for the relationship between 
the UN, regional organisations like the AU, and the ICC in complex humanitarian 
situations affecting international peace and security. 
 
1.5 Concluding remarks  
 
The collective security system, dominated by the UN and in particular the powers 
of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, has been described 
as a ‘perfect representative’ of a collective security system.154 However, it should 
be clear from the discussion above that this system is in practice not working as 
well as in theory. There are a number of problematic areas of a systemic nature 
that were pointed out by commentators to be the crucial weaknesses of the UN 
dominated collective security system. First, the political (and legal) implications of 
the veto power of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council:  Craig 
Barker observed as follows: 
‘This problem [the veto power] is particularly acute in relation to the operation of 
the collective security system of the Charter because it places the permanent 
members of the Council above the system, ensuring that they can never properly be 
regarded as aggressor states under that system.’155 
 
A second problem derives from the unfulfilled ideal expressed in the UN Charter 
that the system of collective security should be supported by a standing UN military 
                                                     
152 UN SC Res 1769 (2007).  
153 UN SC Res 1769 (supra) par 1. 
154 Craig Barker International law and international relations (2000) Continuum, London and New York, 99. 
155 Craig Barker (International law) (supra) 100. 
 - 59 - 
 
force that would help with the maintenance of peace and security.156 Barker 
submitted that this aspect of the collective security regime is in fact a crucial 
prerequisite of military action under Chapter VII of the Charter. The unwillingness 
of especially the big powers to enter into agreements with the UN to establish such 
a permanent UN force undermined the structure and credibility of the collective 
security system.157 It was also pointed out by Dinstein that the Security Council in 
the past was quite reluctant to actively pursue agreements with potential 
contributing states to a UN standby force.158  
 
Third, the political realities of the Cold War (1945 to 1990) resulted in the Security 
Council being unable to fully utilise the powers under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
During the Cold War a number of conflicts or possible threats to international 
peace occurred, but the Security Council proved to be reluctant to actively 
intervene, or to make determinations in terms of Article 39. Three conflicts in this 
period were labelled ‘breaches of the peace’, namely the Korean War (1950), the 
Falklands Island War (1982) and the Iran-Iraq War (1987).159 The Security Council 
also determined that certain situations were ‘threats to peace’, for example during 
Israel’s 1948 War of Independence.160 The fact is that during the period of the Cold 
War the collective security system was virtually paralysed by political manoeuvring, 
and the reluctance of states to heed calls for military action, even with Security 
Council authorisation.161 It was only after the Cold War ended effectively in 
                                                     
156 See Art 43 of the UN Charter. 
157 Craig Barker (International law) (supra) 100-101. 
158 Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression Self-Defence) (supra) 304. 
159 For a list of the relevant SC resolutions see Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression Self-Defence) (supra) 292. 
160 Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression Self-Defence) (supra) 293. 
161 For an analysis of various SC Resolutions in this period, see Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression Self-Defence) 
(supra) 293. 
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1989/1990162, that a dramatic increase in Security Council action under Chapter VII 
could be seen.163 In this regard the role of the Uniting for Peace Resolution 
(referred to above) must also be noted. 
 
Ultimately, the response of international bodies like the UN Security Council to 
threats to international peace and security can take many different forms. Security 
Council responses (under Chapter VII) to threats to international peace and security 
can be regarded as the ‘legalization of international politics’164. An example of the 
power of the Security Council to act as lawmaker as part of its Chapter VII 
powers,165 is the adoption of Resolution 1373 in reaction to the terrorist attacks on 
New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. In terms of this Resolution the UN 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999, effectively 
became binding on all states, because of the fact that it was adopted as a Chapter 
VII measure.166  
 
In the collective security context an important fusion of politics and law can be 
seen. It is simply not possible to draw clear lines between ‘political’ and ‘legal’ 
responses to threats to international peace and security. One can ascribe primary 
roles or responsibilities to international organisations like the UN (and its organs 
the Security Council, the General Assembly and the ICJ); or collective self-defence 
or regional security organisations like NATO or the AU. Their responses to threats to 
                                                     
162 The Cold War ended symbolically when the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. Of course, the end of this ‘war’ 
was a much more gradual affair that really ended in the demise of the Soviet Union and the crumbling of 
Russian (Soviet) influence in Eastern Europe. 
163 See examples listed by Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression Self-Defence) (supra) 300. 
164 See Stefan Oeter ‘International law and General Systems Theory’ German Yearbook of International Law Vol 
44 (2001) 77. 
165 See in general Stefan Talmon ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ 99 (2005) AJIL 175-193. 
166 Stefan Oeter (International law) (supra) 77. 
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peace and security have political and legal consequences relevant for purposes of 
this dissertation.  
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Chapter 2 
 
From jus ad bellum to jus contra bellum:  The prohibition of the use 
of force in normative and institutional perspective 
 
2.1 Introduction:  The shift from jus ad bellum to jus contra bellum 
2.2 The prohibition of the use of force as a peremptory norm in international law 
2.3 The prohibition of the use of force in institutional perspective 
2.4 The role of the General Assembly in relation to UN Charter provisions on the use of force 
2.5 A brief overview of the content of the prohibition of the use of force, and of some developments that 
might affect the interpretation of this prohibition 
   2.5.1 An evolving concept of self-defence? 
     2.5.1.1 The use of force and the ‘war on terror(ism)’ 
   2.5.2 The notion of humanitarian intervention 
2.6 Concluding remarks 
 
2.1 Introduction:  The shift from jus ad bellum to jus contra bellum 
 
In Chapter 1 it was shown how the collective security system as it stands today, 
developed primarily in response to the two devastating world wars. The anarchic 
international system where war was part of international politics (and regarded as 
an extension of a sovereign state’s right to pursue the national interest), gave way 
to the liberal ideal of a collective security system based on respect for 
international law and institutions of collective security. Part of this shift away from 
power politics at international level involved a move away from what was known as 
the jus ad bellum, or the right that states would assert in order to use war in the 
national interest. The jus ad bellum was not limited by legal constraints to the 
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extent that we have today in the Charter of the United Nations, and under 
customary international law. Ian Brownlie pointed out that in the period before 
1914 (outbreak of the First World War) the right to resort to war was often asserted 
as a sovereign right. But even then statesmen and writers on the topic often linked 
the jus ad bellum to some or other justification, such as self-defence.167 By 1928, 
with the conclusion of the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact (General Treaty for 
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy)168, the contracting parties 
declared that war would no longer be used as an instrument of national policy or to 
solve international disputes.169 This, according to Yoram Dinstein, was the 
historical moment when ‘international law progressed from jus ad bellum to jus 
contra bellum.’170  
 
In Chapter 1 the prohibition on the use of force was explained with reference to 
the theory and practice of the liberal ideal of collective security. The Security 
Council of the UN is the primary institutional guarantor of this ideal. The 
institutional framework designed to maintain international peace and security as 
discussed in Chapter 1 will serve as background to a discussion in Chapter 2 of the 
content of the prohibition of the use of force and the criminalisation of crimes 
against peace, which will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
 
                                                     
167 See Ian Brownlie International Law and the use of force by states (1963) Oxford University Press, Oxford 40 
– 41.  
168 International Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, 27 Aug 1928, reproduced in 
McNair The Law of Treaties (1961) Clarendon Press, Oxford 234 – 236. 
169 Art 1 Kellogg-Briand Pact.  
170 Yoram Dinstein War Aggression and Self-Defence 4th (2005) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 83. 
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2.2 The prohibition of the use of force as a peremptory norm in international 
law 
 
Alexander Orakhelashvili defines the notion of a peremptory norm in international 
law as follows: 
‘In order to qualify as peremptory, a norm, while protecting a given actor, legal 
person or value, must safeguard interests transcending those of individual States, 
have a moral or humanitarian connotation, because its breach would involve a 
result so morally deplorable as to be considered absolutely unacceptable by the 
international community as a whole, and consequently not permitting division of 
these interests into bilateral legal relations.’171 
 
One of the peremptory norms in international law that does satisfy the above 
definition is the prohibition of the use of force. The International Law Commission 
(ILC) is of the opinion that the prohibition of the use of force protects not only the 
survival and security of individual states, but more than the sum of this, also the 
interests of the international community as a whole.172 The collective security 
system (including regional manifestations) as discussed in Chapter 1 provides the 
theoretical and institutional framework for a discussion of the content of the 
prohibition of the use of force.  
 
Orakhelashvili states that the prohibition of the use of force forms part of jus 
cogens.173 The prohibition of the use of force and the inherent right of states to 
                                                     
171 Alexander Orakhelashvili Peremptory Norms in International Law (2006) Oxford University Press, Oxford 50. 
172 ILC Report 2001 322. 
173 Orakhelashvili (supra) 50.  
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self-defence form the modern jus ad bellum (primarily Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter and the customary international law prohibition of the use of force).174  
 
For purposes of this discussion the position as set out by Dinstein is preferred, 
namely that there was a shift from the jus ad bellum to the modern jus contra 
bellum.175 Thus, states are generally prohibited from using force in their 
international relations and in the pursuit of their national interest. There is no 
longer a ‘right to go to war’. This right is now governed by the collective security 
regime under the UN Charter. The legal position was summarised by the ICJ in the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case176: 
‘This [Art 2(4)] prohibition of the use of force is to be considered in the light of 
other relevant provisions of the Charter. In Article 51, the Charter recognizes the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs. A 
further lawful use of force is envisaged in Article 42, whereby the Security Council 
may take military enforcement measures in conformity with Chapter VII of the 
Charter.’177 
And further, regarding the method of armed force, or the kind of weapons 
employed, the ICJ stated: 
‘They [Articles 2(4), 42 and 51] apply to any use of force, regardless of the weapons 
employed. The Charter neither expressly prohibits, nor permits, the use of any 
specific weapon, including nuclear weapons. A weapon that is already unlawful per 
se, whether by treaty or custom, does not become lawful by reason of its being 
used for a legitimate purpose under the Charter.’178 
                                                     
174 Orakhelashvili (supra) 51. 
175 See discussion of the implications of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and Dinstein’s opinion supra. 
176 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion (8 Jul 1996) ICJ Reports 1996, 226. 
177 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case (supra) par 38. 
178 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case (supra) par 39. 
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Regarding self-defence, the ICJ held in casu that the well-established conditions of 
necessity and proportionality (as rules of customary international law on the use of 
force in self-defence) are also limitations on the use of force in terms of Article 51 
of the UN Charter.179  
 
2.3 The prohibition of the use of force in institutional perspective 
 
When it comes to the prohibition of the use of force in international law, many 
complexities can arise. It is important to take into account not only the texts and 
provisions of the relevant international instruments, but also the competencies of 
the different role players like the Security Council, the ICJ, the General Assembly 
of the UN, and, as will be seen in later Chapters, the ICC. 
 
Christine Gray points out that one should not assume that the Security Council has 
(or should have) the final say as to the legality or illegality of the use of force, or 
on the content of the norms in question.180 She asks: 
‘How far is the law developed by institutions? That is, do states acting collectively 
through the UN have a more important role than they do outside the UN in the 
interpretation and application of the UN Charter? Does the Security Council have 
the final say as to not only what is an act of aggression, threat to the peace or 
breach of the peace under Chapter VII of the Charter, but also as to what is a 
threat or use of force under Article 2(4) or an armed attack and as to whether a 
state is acting in self-defence under Article 51?’181 
 
                                                     
179 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case (supra) par 40-41. 
180 Christine Gray International law and the use of force (2000) Oxford University Press, Oxford 9. 
181 Gray (supra) 9. 
 - 67 - 
 
The primarily political role of the Security Council in determining whether conduct 
amounts to prohibited conduct under Article 39 of the UN Charter seems to be still 
an outstanding characteristic of not only the collective security system, but also 
the international use of force regime. The role of the ICJ as a forum for judicial 
review of Security Council decisions (notably under Chapter VII of the Charter) is 
debatable and the ICJ itself has not pronounced in clear terms on its relationship 
with the Security Council in this regard.182  
 
Apart from the ICJ’s seeming unwillingness to play a significant role in terms of 
Article 39 determinations (regarding acts of aggression, breaches of peace or 
threats to peace), the Court does seem to play an increasingly active role in terms 
of Article 2(4) questions on the prohibition of the use of force.183 The important 
case of Nicaragua v United States184 not only provided a judicial interpretation of 
the prohibition of the use of force under the UN Charter, but also delineated the 
respective roles of the ICJ and the Security Council in determining various aspects 
of the UN Charter on the use of force. Nicaragua alleged that the US violated 
Nicaragua’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence with an 
‘army’ of mercenaries. Nicaragua alleged that these mercenaries were trained and 
supplied by the US and ‘directed their attacks against human and economic targets 
inside Nicaragua’.185 
 
                                                     
182 See Gray (supra) 9 – 10.  
183 Gray (supra) 11 – 12. Gray refers to a number of ICJ cases post Nicaragua where the Court were approached 
by states to rule on the legality of the use of armed force.  
184 Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America) Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p 14; 25 ILM 1023 (1986). 
185 See Nicaragua v United States (Judgment on Jurisdiction) (supra) par 85. For more historical and political 
background on this, see Max Hilaire International law and the United States military intervention in the 
Western Hemisphere (1997) Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 97-108. 
 - 68 - 
 
Gray pointed out that it was the United States that tried to portray the situation in 
Nicaragua as one relating to Chapter VII of the Charter (threats or breaches of 
peace or acts of aggression). However, the ICJ held that it was in fact an Article 
2(4) matter (prohibition of the use of force). On the basis of this jurisdictional 
finding the matter could be brought before the ICJ, ‘the principal judicial organ of 
the UN’.186  
 
Gray concludes that ‘[the] implication seems to be that matters under Chapter VII 
could not properly be entertained by the Court.’187 Gray observed that the ICJ can 
at present play an important role in the development of the law on the use of force 
– not an exclusive role, but alongside the Security Council. Put differently, issues 
involving the use of force fall not only within the political domain of the Security 
Council, but the ICJ is quite willing to assert its right to hear matters arising from 
the use of force by states and resolve the legal implications of such conduct.188 
This view is in line with the ICJ’s interpretation of its role vis-à-vis the Security 
Council: 
‘The Charter … does not confer exclusive responsibility upon the Security Council 
for the purpose [maintenance of international peace and security]. While in Article 
12 there is a provision for a clear demarcation of functions between the General 
Assembly and the Security Council, in respect of any dispute or situation, that the 
former should not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or 
situation unless the Security Council so requires, there is no similar provision 
anywhere in the Charter with respect to the Security Council and the Court. The 
Council has functions of a political nature assigned to it, whereas the Court 
                                                     
186 Gray (supra) 11. 
187 Gray (supra) 11. 
188 Gray (supra) 11 – 12. 
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exercises purely judicial functions. Both organs can therefore perform their 
separate but complementary functions with respect to the same events.’189 
 
Two decades after the judgment in the Nicaragua case, in Democratic Republic of 
Congo v Uganda (hereinafter ‘DRC v Uganda’)190, the ICJ had to consider, inter 
alia, the legality of military interventions by Uganda in the DRC and whether that 
constituted a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Perhaps it is an indication 
of the ICJ’s sensitivity to not taking on the conflict resolution or collective security 
responsibilities of the Security Council that the Court declared in DRC v Uganda: 
‘The Court is aware of the complex and tragic situation which has long prevailed in 
the Great Lakes region. There has been much suffering by the local population and 
destabilization of much of the region. In particular, the instability in the DRC has 
had negative security implications for Uganda and some other neighbouring States 
… The Court is aware, too, that the factional conflicts within the DRC require a 
comprehensive settlement to the problems of the region … However, the task of 
the Court must be to respond, on the basis of international law, to the particular 
legal dispute brought before it. As it interprets and applies the law, it will be 
mindful of context, but its task cannot go beyond that.’191 
 
Two decades after the Nicaragua case the different, but complimentary roles of 
the Security Council and the ICJ in matters of the use of force by states, are still in 
place. The Security Council still has the primary political function to determine 
under Article 39 of the UN Charter whether there is a threat or breach of peace, or 
an act of aggression. The Security Council can then act in terms of Chapter VII to 
                                                     
189 Nicaragua v United States (Judgment on Jurisdiction of the Court) (supra) par 95 [emphasis in the original]. 
190 Case concerning armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda) 45 
ILM 271 (2006). 
191 DRC v Uganda (supra) par 26. 
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maintain peace and security. This is not to say that the Security Council action 
under Chapter VII cannot involve criminal liability for perpetrators of international 
crimes through criminal tribunals like the Rwanda Tribunal and the Yugoslav 
Tribunal.192 The ICJ on the other hand is the primary judicial organ under the UN 
Charter. It is the duty of the ICJ to settle disputes between States in terms of its 
powers under the Charter. Thus, a dispute regarding the use of force by a state in 
contravention of Article 2(4) of the Charter falls within the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ.193 
 
2.4 The role of the General Assembly in relation to UN Charter provisions on the 
use of force 
 
It was pointed out in Chapter 1 that the General Assembly has since the adoption of 
the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950, in theory if not always in practice, an 
increasingly important role to play in matters of peace and security. Indeed, it was 
argued in Chapter 1 that the General Assembly’s role in peace and security matters 
could help to bring about a more democratic or representative collective security 
regime, especially in light of growing demands for Security Council reform, which is 
perhaps still a long way off.  
 
                                                     
192 Leslie Green The Contemporary law of armed conflict 2nd (2000) Manchester University Press, Manchester, 9 
– 10. With reference to the SC’s powers under Ch VII UN Charter to maintain peace and security, the author 
stated:  ‘[As] with the Covenant and all other agreements seeking to control aggression, there is no suggestion 
that any individual responsible for resorting to aggression shall be subject to criminal proceedings. However, in 
view of the atrocities committed during the conflicts consequent upon the break-up of the former Yugoslavia 
and during the civil war in Rwanda, the Security Council decided that action was necessary under Chapter VII 
and authorised the despatch of military forces as well as the establishment of ad hoc war crimes tribunals.’ 
Thus, a combination of military and legal responses to threats to international peace and security. 
193 See Nicaragua v United States (Judgment on Jurisdiction) (supra) par 94. 
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It is tempting to think of the General Assembly as a ‘world parliament’ or the 
natural place to search for the voice or voices representing ‘the international 
community’. However, the structure of the UN Charter and the powerful political 
role that the big powers, especially the permanent members of the Security 
Council (United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China and France) play, limit 
the impact and role of the General Assembly in the peace and security context, 
and also with regards to use of force matters. Siegfried Magiera commented that 
the [General Assembly] is a conference of states, not a world parliament of 
independent representatives of the peoples.’194 But whether one regards the 
General Assembly as the (perhaps idealistic) ‘Parliament of Man’, or as an 
ineffective political talk shop,195 this UN body has a role to play in questions 
surrounding the use of force by states. Christine Gray points out that since the end 
of the Cold War, the debates and resolutions of the General Assembly are often the 
results of consensus, rather than confrontation. During the Cold War it was much 
more common for blocs of states to object to the General Assembly adopting 
resolutions on perceived acts of ‘aggression’. The argument was that only the 
Security Council could make determinations of aggression under its Chapter VII 
                                                     
194 Siegfried Magiera ‘Chapter IV. The General Assembly’ in Simma (supra) Vol I 247-256. 
195 Paul Kennedy, in his book The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations 
(2006), Random House, New York, argues that despite all the criticism against the UN, including the notorious 
ineffectiveness of General Assembly measures, the world needs the UN, and organs like the General Assembly 
needs more power, not less. Rosemary Righter, who reviewed Kennedy’s book in the London Times, was very 
critical about Kennedy’s assumptions and his idealistic view of the UN dominated international system. She 
wrote: ‘The General Assembly’s obsession with process, rather than results, is reflected in the 
inconsequentiality of most of its decisions. UN files are filled with mould-pocked resolutions which never stood 
a chance of being implemented, reports and requests for further reports. Few of these documents are read by 
delegates, let alone by their governments. In New York alone, a recent inventory – the first attempted since 
1956 – identified no fewer than 9,000 “active mandates” which the secretariat is supposed to be implementing. 
A body that cannot even organize its own agenda is unlikely to contribute to the better ordering of the world. 
There and elsewhere in the UN, the grinding of the mill has come to matter more than the quality of the flour 
produced.’ See review by Rosemary Righter ‘What use the UN?’ Timesonline, http://tls.timesonline.co.uk (5 
Dec 2006). 
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powers.196 Even so, Gray further points out that resolutions of the General 
Assembly ‘tend not to use the language in the Charter in Articles 2(4) [use of force] 
and 51 [self-defence], nor to refer to them expressly’197. Gray makes the argument 
(albeit tentatively) that condemnation of a particular use of force by an organ such 
as the General Assembly (or, for that matter, the Security Council) ‘is conclusive or 
at least persuasive as to illegality.’198 The author uses the curious argument that 
the closer the political ties between the states involved (for example 
condemnation by the United Kingdom of the use of force by the United States), the 
stronger the evidence of illegality. Must one deduce from this argument that other 
resolutions on the use of force might be so clouded by partisan political or other 
considerations that findings on the illegality of the use of force in such cases need 
to be treated with scepticism? This is not a simple matter. Gray points to the 
following: 
‘It is … common for the Security Council and the General Assembly’s initial response 
to a conflict to be to avoid any finding of responsibility and simply to call for an 
end to all [armed] intervention.’199 
And further: 
‘Express findings of aggression (or of aggressive acts) are extremely unusual. It has 
been only states which were in some sense seen as outlaws which have been 
condemned for aggression by both the Security Council and the General Assembly; 
Portugal when it refused to relinquish its colonial possessions, Southern Rhodesia 
after its unilateral declaration of independence, Israel after its occupation of the 
                                                     
196 Gray (supra) 13. 
197 Gray (supra) 14. 
198 Gray (supra) 15. 
199 Gray (supra) 16. 
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West Bank, Gaza and other territory, South Africa during apartheid and its 
occupation of Namibia, and Indonesia after its invasion of East Timor.’200 
 
The reluctance of the General Assembly (and also the Security Council) to name 
specific states and to apportion blame and responsibility for the illegal use of 
armed force can perhaps be explained with reference to a number of factors, 
including the powers given to these organs under the UN Charter, and also political 
factors.201 The General Assembly’s reluctance to apportion blame to parties to a 
conflict, or where a state has used armed force, should not necessarily be seen as a 
particular weakness of the General Assembly. The scope of the General Assembly’s 
powers and duties was intended by the drafters of the UN Charter to create a real 
discussion forum for the world. This feature certainly has its own potential 
advantages from a peace and security perspective. In brief, the General Assembly’s 
duties and powers should be seen as complementary to that of the Security Council 
and International Court of Justice. With reference to Article 10 of the UN Charter, 
Hailbronner and Klein summarised the role of the General Assembly as follows: 
‘Art. 10 vests the [General Assembly] with a general power of discussion and 
recommendation regarding any questions which come within the scope of the 
Charter (the ‘comprehensive jurisdiction’ of the [General Assembly]). The [General 
Assembly] represents the most prominent forum for the discussion of world politics 
and is therefore also described as the ‘town meeting of the world’ and the ‘open 
conscience of humanity’. Taking into account the wide-ranging goals and principles 
which are stipulated in the UN Charter, there are hardly any political questions of 
international importance not covered by the [General Assembly’s] power of 
discussion contained in Art. 10. On the other hand, the breadth and vagueness of 
the formulation of the scope of its responsibility mirrors the lack of power to make 
                                                     
200 Gray (supra) 17. 
201 See references to a number of General Assembly and Security Council decisions in Gray (supra) 17. 
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binding decisions. So long as the [General Assembly] may only make 
recommendations that are usually of a non-binding nature … there is no real need 
in practice to lay down and define more precisely its area of responsibility.’202 
 
This last mentioned aspect of the General Assembly seems to be both a strength 
and a weakness, depending on one’s perspective. If the General Assembly 
condemns the use of force in a particular instance, but the condemnation is not 
followed with action; such condemnation would amount to acquiescence.203 
Christine Gray rightly depicts this line of argument as rather extreme, for a number 
of reasons, but not the least because this argument does not take into account the 
reaction of states (other than formal, binding resolutions) to the use of force.204 
And reaction to the use of force in the General Assembly is always relevant, if not 
formally, at least as evidence of how the international community view a particular 
instance of the use of force. 
 
2.5 A brief overview of the content of the prohibition of the use of force, and 
some developments that might affect the interpretation of this prohibition 
 
With the UN Charter’s prohibition of the use of force (which also forms part of jus 
cogens) in mind, and against the background of the broader collective security and 
international legal context described in Chapter 1, it is now necessary to turn to 
some of the specific problems regarding the content of the rule prohibiting the use 
of force, and the implications of that for the aggression debate, which will be the 
focus of Chapter 3 and further.  
                                                     
202 Kay Hailbronner and Eckart Klein ‘Functions and Powers – Article 10’ in Simma (supra) Vol I 258. [Emphasis 
added]. 
203 Gray (supra) 18. 
204 Gray (supra) 18. 
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 There are obvious normative connections between the prohibition of the use of 
force (the jus contra bellum) and aggression as a crime under international law 
(discussed in the following Chapters). These are, most notably, the respect for the 
sovereignty and political integrity of states and the very limited instances where 
the use of force would be allowed under international law. It is useful to examine a 
number of new developments that might alter the content of the jus contra 
bellum, and to determine how these developments would affect the aggression 
debate.  
 
The UN Charter was drafted in the context of a world recovering from the Second 
World War, and with a view to prevent such wars from ever happening again. That 
explains the strict regime regarding the lawful use of force. The Charter regime 
provides for only two instances where armed force would be justified, namely 
armed intervention under the auspices of the Security Council205, and individual or 
collective self-defence in terms of Article 51206. 
 
The political context in which the UN Charter regime operates is not static. Henry 
Kissinger, one of the most prominent exponents (and practitioners) of realpolitik in 
international relations, described the dynamics of international relations as 
follows: 
‘International systems live precariously. Every “world order” expresses an 
aspiration to permanence; the very term has a ring of eternity about it. Yet the 
elements which comprise it are in constant flux; indeed, with each century, the 
                                                     
205 See in general Ch 1 supra. 
206 See also limitations on the use of force in self-defence, as identified by the ICJ in the Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons case (supra). 
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duration of international systems has been shrinking. The order that grew out of the 
Peace of Westphalia lasted 150 years; the international system created by the 
Congress of Vienna maintained itself for a hundred years; the international order 
characterized by the Cold War ended after forty years. (The Versailles settlement 
never operated as a system adhered to by the major powers, and amounted to little 
more than an armistice between the two world wars.) Never before have the 
components of world order, their capacity to interact, and their goals all changed 
quite so rapidly, so deeply, or so globally…Whenever the entities constituting the 
international system change their character, a period of turmoil inevitably 
follows.’207 
 
There are a number of developments that have the potential to challenge the jus 
contra bellum as provided for in the UN Charter. Johan van der Vyver identified 
three instances that might pose challenges for the use of force regime of the 
Charter: Anticipatory self-defence; humanitarian intervention; and wars of national 
liberation.208 Especially anticipatory self-defence (for instance, as claimed by the 
US as a casus bellum for the invasion of Iraq in 2003), and humanitarian 
intervention (for instance, claimed by NATO member states as a justification for 
the 1999 use of force against Serbia to protect Kosovo) proved to cause the kind of 
turmoil that Kissinger referred to:  Fundamental challenges to the underpinnings of 
the UN Charter regime on the use of force. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
207 Kissinger (Diplomacy) (supra) 806.  
208 Johan van der Vyver ‘Ius contra bellum and American foreign policy’ 28 SAYIL (2003) 1 -28. 
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2.5.1 An evolving concept of self-defence? 
 
Article 51 of the UN Charter protects the right of states to use force in self-
defence: 
‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this 
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall 
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under 
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order 
to maintain or restore international peace and security.’ 
 
Under the modern jus contra bellum, the only permissible exceptions to the 
prohibition of the use of force by states are cases of self-defence, and in terms of 
Security Council action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.209 Both individual 
state conduct and collective security measures210 can be viewed as permissible 
exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force. In the Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons case (referred to above), the ICJ seemed to link the ‘right 
to self-defence’ of every state to a rather high threshold, namely when the 
‘survival’ of the state is at stake. The Court stated: 
‘[The] Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every State to survival, 
and thus its right to resort to self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the 
[UN] Charter, when its survival is at stake.’211 
 
                                                     
209 For a detailed discussion, see Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression and Self-Defence) (supra) 175-325. 
210 See also Ch 1 supra. 
211 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case (supra) par 96. 
 - 78 - 
 
The generally accepted position, however, seems to be that self-defence is 
available to states, not only in the most drastic instances when the very survival of 
the state is at stake, but indeed more broadly speaking when the rights of the 
state are violated.212 The analogy with inter-personal self-defence (which is a well-
established notion under domestic criminal law of virtually all legal systems) as 
well as notions such as the ‘Just War theory’, clearly underpin the modern 
international law concept of self-defence. One can even recognise elements of the 
modern (international law) notion of self-defence in older (political) doctrines like 
those of raison d’état and state-interest, in terms of which the self-preservation of 
the state was paramount.213 But it is important to note the shift from doctrines like 
raison d’état and Just War (in terms of which states sought to use force as a means 
to advance interests), to self-defence under the modern jus contra bellum, where 
the use of force is an exception (employed to defend the rights of the state under 
international law).214 But even this more limited scope of the modern right of 
states to use force in self-defence, need to be carefully considered. 
 
Article 51 of the UN Charter does not define ‘armed attack’. It is generally 
accepted that the customary notion of self-defence is broader than that implied by 
Article 51. States should be allowed to use force in self-defence when the attack is 
imminent, but publicists like Alexandrov pointed out that the use of force as part 
of preventive or pre-emptive actions are not justified.215 Albrecht Randelzhofer 
                                                     
212 Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression and Self-Defence) (supra) 175-176. 
213 See in general Richard Tuck The Rights of War and Peace – Political thought and the International order 
from Grotius to Kant (1999) Oxford University Press, Oxford 3-6. 
214 Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression and Self-Defence) (supra) 176. 
215 SA Alexandrov Self-Defense Against the Use of Force in International Law (1996) Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague, 165. The author refers to a number of instances where force were used not in self-defence, but as 
preventive or pre-emptive actions:  Israel on the Sinai Peninsula (1956), Israel in Beirut (1968), Israel against 
other targets in Lebanon (1966-1974, 1975, 1981, 1982), South Africa’s actions against Angola, Botswana and 
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noted that Articles 51 and 2(4) of the UN Charter do not correspond exactly in 
terms of scope. Thus, ‘not every use of force contrary to [Article] 2(4) may be 
responded to with armed self-defence.’ The rather startling conclusion is that ‘any 
State affected by another State’s unlawful use of force not reaching the threshold 
of an “armed attack”, is bound, if not exactly to endure the violation, then at least 
to respond only by means falling short of the use or threat of force, which are thus 
often totally ineffective.’216  
 
It falls beyond the scope of this Chapter, and is furthermore not the aim of this 
dissertation, to fully explore the meaning and scope of the right to self-defence 
under modern international law. The aim here is rather to highlight the contentious 
nature of this right, and to use a particularly controversial phenomenon (the ‘war 
on terror’) to illustrate that the right to self-defence is indeed a notion in flux. 
This has certain implications for the debate on a suitable definition of aggression 
(for purposes of individual criminal liability) and of conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the ICC over this crime.217 
 
2.5.1.1 The use of force and the ‘war on terror(ism)’ 
 
One of the most profound challenges to the dual requirements of ‘necessity’ and 
‘proportionality’,218 as well as the condition of ‘imminent threat’, underlying the 
right to self-defence in terms of Article 51 of the UN Charter, came about as a 
result of the spectacular attacks on New York and Washington DC on 11 September 
                                                                                                                                                                     
other states in the region (1976-1984) (many of these were condemned by the UN SC), Turkey’s use of force in 
Northern Iraq (1995). 
216 Albrecht Randelzhofer ‘Article 51’ in Bruno Simma (Charter of the United Nations Vol I) (supra) 790. 
217 See Ch 6, 7 and 8 infra. 
218 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case (supra) par 41. 
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2001 that killed approximately 3000 people. The immediate response of the US was 
in the form of Operation Enduring Freedom, by which the US invaded Afghanistan 
on the basis that the Taliban-regime — at the time in power in that state — 
harboured the Al Qaeda terrorists responsible for the planning of the attacks. The 
US removed the Taliban regime and started a military campaign to destroy Al 
Qaeda bases in Afghanistan. The legal basis for the US invasion of Afghanistan was 
thus presented as a classical case of self-defence, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the UN Charter, notably Article 51.219 UN Security Council Resolution 
1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001, together with Resolution 1373, stated that the 
terrorist attacks constituted a threat to international peace and security. Both 
Resolutions confirmed the ‘inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence’.220 But this initial use of force in self-defence was only the first chapter in 
the bigger ‘War on Terrorism’.221  
 
The National Security Strategy of the United States of 2002 — published in the wake 
of the 11 September 2001 attacks — linked the phenomenon of international 
                                                     
219 For views on the justification for the US invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of the 11 Sept 2001 attacks, see 
Christopher Bertram ‘Afghanistan:  A just intervention’ 6(2) Imprints (2002) 
(http://info.bris.ac.uk/~plcdib/imprints/bertram.html); Darrel Moellendorf ‘Is the War in Afghanistan just?’ 
Vol 6 (2) Imprints (2002) (http://info.bris.ac.uk/~plcdib/imprints/moellendorf.html); Garth Abraham and 
Kevin Hopkins ‘Bombing for humanity:  The American response to the 11 September attacks and the plea of 
self-defence’ SALJ 783-801; Michael Reisman ‘Aftershocks:  Reflections on the implications of September 11’ 6 
Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal (2003) 81-102. 
220 UN SC Res 1368 (2001); UN SC Res 1373 (2001). 
221 The rhetoric and public discourse on these attacks reveal the political context of the later justifications for 
the notion of pre-emptive strikes against supposed terrorist targets and states that harbour terrorists, and also 
on states that allegedly possess weapons of mass destruction. For analyses of the rhetoric, see Parag Khanna 
‘Terrorism as War’ 121 Policy Review (2003) (www.policyreview.org/oct03/khanna_print.html); Grenville 
Byford ‘The wrong war’ Foreign Affairs Jul/Aug 2002 
(www.foreignaffairs.org/Sea.../printable_fulltext.asp?i=20020701FAEssay8518.xm). Although the Security 
Council did not call the terrorist attacks of 11 Sep 2001 ‘acts of aggression’, the Council declared that ‘acts of 
international terrorism constitute one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the 
twenty-first century’. See UN SC Res 1377 (2001) Annex.  
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terrorism with the risk of these terrorists acquiring ‘weapons of mass destruction’. 
Furthermore, the National Security Strategy also identified the risk posed by so-
called ‘rogue states’:  States that not only harbour terrorists; but states that are 
themselves interested in acquiring weapons of mass destruction, thus posing a 
threat to the security interests of the US. In response to these threats, the National 
Security Strategy of 2002 states: 
‘The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter 
a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is 
the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory 
action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of 
the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the 
United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.’222 
 
Since the drafters of the National Security Strategy was no doubt aware that more 
states would want to assert the right to use force pre-emptively, the document 
also made reference to aggression. Pre-emptive strikes should, according to the 
document, not serve as pretexts for aggression.223 In 2006 the US restated its 
assertion of the right to use force pre-emptively: 
‘Taking action [against enemy state and non-state actors which possess weapons of 
mass destruction] need not involve military force. Our strong preference and 
common practice is to address proliferation concerns through international 
diplomacy, in concert with key allies and regional partners. If necessary, however, 
under long-standing principles of self-defence, we do not rule out the use of force 
before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the 
enemy’s attack. When the consequences of an attack with [weapons of mass 
destruction] are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly by as 
                                                     
222 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 17 Sept 2002, 15. 
223 National Security Strategy 2002 (supra), 15. 
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grave dangers materialize. This is the principle and logic of preemption. The place 
of preemption in our national security strategy remains the same. We will always 
proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. The reasons for 
our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.’224 
 
In terms of its stated policy to strike pre-emptively against (rogue) states that 
harbour terrorists and/or possess weapons of mass destruction (thus posing a 
threat) US and allied forces attacked Iraq in 2003. The reason for this was that US 
President Bush believed (and his Vice-President, Dick Cheney, seemed to be 
convinced) that Iraq was somehow also involved in the 11 September 2001 attacks 
on US cities. This, together with Iraq’s alleged possession of weapons of mass 
destruction (including biological and chemical weapons, and an alleged programme 
to acquire nuclear weapons) formed the rationale for the US’s decision to go to war 
with Iraq, even without Security Council authorization.225 Britain supported the US 
in this, and put forward the same reasons as casus belli.226 By mid 2003 the 
government of President Saddam Hussein was removed from power and US and 
allied forces occupied the whole of Iraq.227  
 
                                                     
224 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 16 March 2006, 23. 
225 See in general Bob Woodward Plan of Attack (2004) Simon & Schuster, New York, for an account of the Bush 
Administration’s planning for the invasion of Iraq, and of the reasoning behind the invasion in 2003. See also 
transcript of Pres Bush’s State of the Union Address of 2003, published in The New York Times 29 Jan 2003 
(www.nytimes.com/2003/01/29/).  
226 For the UK, see Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction – The Assessment of the British Government ID 114567 
9/2002 776073, The Stationary Office (www.official-documents.co.uk). This document not only mentions the 
alleged weapons of mass destruction, it also refers (albeit as an afterthought) to reports of human rights 
abuses by the regime of Saddam Hussein.  
227 For an historical and international law account of the Iraq-war of 2003, see in general Lori Fisler Damrosch 
and Bernard H Oxman (eds) Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict (2003) The American Society of 
International Law, Washington DC. 
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The assertion by the US of the right to use force pre-emptively (that is, not in cases 
of self-defence or as a collective security measure) came in for strong criticism.228 
In the case of pre-emptive self-defence, the problem is articulated by Van der 
Vyver as follows: ‘Article 51 of the UN Charter authorises individual and collective 
self-defence “if an armed attack occurs”. Would, therefore, pre-emptive strikes by 
a country under the threat of attack be lawful?’229 Van der Vyver uses the concepts 
‘anticipatory self-defence’ and ‘pre-emptive strikes/action’ interchangeably. The 
way the author formulates his observations in this regard seems as if he regards 
‘pre-emptive strikes/action’ as manifestations of or at least part of ‘anticipatory 
self-defence’. The author has a restrictive view of anticipatory self-defence: 
‘Anticipatory self-defence must … remain confined to “situations in which the 
imminence of an attack is so clear and the danger so great that defensive action is 
essential for self-preservation”.’230 
 
The use of armed force against Iraq in 2003 went beyond anticipatory self-defence. 
The invasion was furthermore not authorised by the UN Security Council (US 
arguments to this effect notwithstanding231) as a Chapter VII collective security 
measure. This distinguishes the Iraq invasion from the use of armed force against 
and the eventual removal of the Taliban-regime of Afghanistan in the wake of the 
11 September 2001 attacks on US cities.232 Rhetorically, the phrases ‘war on terror’ 
                                                     
228 For a critique of the 2002 National Security Strategy, see Stanley Hoffmann ‘America goes backward’ Vol 50 
(10) The New York Review of Books, 12 Jun 2003 (www.nybooks.com/articles/16350).  
229 Johan Van der Vyver (Ius contra bellum) (supra) 4. 
230 Johan Van der Vyver (Ius contra bellum) (supra) 5. 
231 Ruth Wedgwood argued that the US had the necessary legal basis (as presented by UN SC resolutions on 
weapons inspections in Iraq) to invade Iraq, after the latter did not adhere to relevant resolutions on its 
weapons programme. See Ruth Wedgwood ‘The fall of Saddam Hussein:  Security Council mandates and 
Preemptive Self-Defense’ 97 AJIL (2003) 577. 
232 For this argument, see Stephen P Marks ‘Branding the “War on Terrorism”:  Is there a “New Paradigm” of 
International Law?’ Vol 14 (1) Michigan State Journal of International Law (2006) 71-119.  
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and ‘war on terrorism’ became powerful instruments in the international media 
and in domestic and international political discourse. From a legal perspective, the 
question is whether the ‘war on terror/terrorism’ presents a paradigmatic shift 
from the traditional jus contra bellum as embodied in the UN Charter, notably 
Articles 2(4), 51 and the powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII. The 
High-level Panel (convened by the Security Council) drew a distinction between 
‘the right to intervene in the event of an imminent or proximate threat’ 
(anticipatory self-defence) and ‘the right to intervene based on pure threat’ 
(preventive self-defence). The Panel concluded that international law recognises 
anticipatory self-defence, but on condition that the act of self-defence must be 
proportional to the imminent or proximate threat. The Panel indicated that 
‘preventive self-defence’ would normally be regarded as contrary to international 
law. However, in certain circumstances (the Panel used the example of terrorists 
armed with a nuclear weapon) a state that would want to use preventive force, can 
put arguments before the Security Council which can authorise the necessary 
action.233  
 
In light of the above, it is submitted that, although the National Security Strategy 
(and, indeed, practice) of the most powerful state on earth might present a new 
paradigm of justification for the use of force, ‘terrorism’ should in principle be 
treated as a criminal phenomenon234 and not necessarily as an attack by a state 
                                                     
233 ‘A more secure world:  Our shared responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change’ UN Doc A/59/565, 1 Dec 2004. See further discussion of the report by Mireille 
Delmas-Marty ‘The Paradigm of the War on Crime – Legitimating inhuman treatment?’ 5 JICJ (2007) 584-598, in 
particular 593-594. 
234 It is difficult to define international terrorism. A proposed definition is:  ‘”Terrrorism” [is] “an ideologically 
strategy of internationally proscribed violence designed to inspire terror within a particular segment of a given 
society in order to achieve a power-outcome or to propagandize a claim or grievance, irrespective of whether 
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(although the acts of terrorism can be committed on behalf of or with the backing 
of a state). The use of armed force (even when it is primarily aimed at terrorists) 
as against Afghanistan and Iraq, should remain firmly within the paradigm of the 
UN Charter prohibition of the use of armed force. The UN Charter does not (as yet) 
provide for individual or collective self-defence and collective security measures 
beyond Article 51, and measures sanctioned by the Security Council under Chapter 
VII.235  
 
By 2004 it became clear that the two main reasons for the US and its allies’ 
invasion of Iraq — weapons of mass destruction and Iraq’s alleged links with Al 
Qaeda terrorists — were without factual basis. President Bush himself admitted 
that there was no evidence to support the initial theory that Saddam Hussein had 
links to the 11 September 2001 attacks. It also became clear that Iraq did not 
possess weapons of mass destruction, and even the alternative rationale of going to 
war on the basis that Iraq had ‘programmes’ to develop weapons of mass 
destruction, turned out to be rather weak.236  
 
In the absence of the two main reasons for going to war, the US and the UK started 
to present a somewhat ex post facto rationale for the invasion, namely that the 
invasion was justified, because it rid Iraq of the oppressive regime of Saddam 
                                                                                                                                                                     
its perpetrators are acting for and on behalf of themselves, or on behalf of a state.”’ See Cherif Bassiouni 
(International Criminal Law Vol I) (supra) 777-778. 
235 See also Stephen Marks (Branding the “War on Terrorism”) (supra). 
236 Christopher Scheer, Robert Scheer & Lakshmi Chaudhry ‘Bush’s lies about Iraq’ The Nation 29 March 2004 
(www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040329&s=scheer). 
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Hussein. This justification seemed more akin to ‘humanitarian intervention’ than to 
self-defence.237 
 
2.5.2 The notion of humanitarian intervention 
 
Perhaps even more controversial than anticipatory self-defence, is the claim of 
humanitarian intervention.238 With reference to the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 
1999, Michael Ignatieff observed that a motive of humanitarian concern to justify 
the use of armed force, renders it more controversial than the use of armed force 
for interests;239 the latter motive being unacceptable in terms of the modern jus 
ad bellum. It is interesting to note how Van der Vyver deals with humanitarian 
intervention from an essentially international law and politics perspective. He 
explains his understanding of humanitarian intervention by way of the following 
scenario:  ‘[State] A takes military action against state B to protect the citizens of 
state B against severe atrocities committed by the powers-that-be of state B.’240 
This scenario closely resembles definitions and descriptions of the notion of 
humanitarian intervention from the early twentieth century.241 Where a state 
would invite another state to intervene militarily or to use force against possible 
insurgents within its borders, it would not be regarded as humanitarian 
                                                     
237 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope ‘Slouching towards new “Just” Wars:  International law and the use of 
force after September 11th’ NILR (2004) 363-392, 382. 
238 See in general Francis Kofi Abiew The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention 
(1999) Kluwer Law International, The Hague. The author uses the following ‘general’ definition of humanitarian 
intervention: ‘[The] reliance upon force for the justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another 
state from treatment which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits of that authority 
within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice.’ See Francis Kofi Abiew (Humanitarian 
Intervention) (supra) 31.  
239 Michael Ignatieff Virtual War – Kosovo and beyond (2000), Chatto & Windus, London, 72. 
240 Johan Van der Vyver (Ius contra bellum) (supra) 5. 
241 See references to older sources by Lyal Sunga The Emerging System of International Criminal Law – 
Developments in Codification and Implementation (1997) Kluwer Law International, London, 81. 
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intervention.242 This scenario (armed intervention by a state with the consent of 
the requesting or receiving state) is indeed provided for in the 1974 UN General 
Assembly Definition of Aggression. The armed intervention will only be regarded as 
an act of aggression if the intervening state contravened the conditions provided 
for in the agreement to intervene.243 
 
There are many arguments for and against humanitarian intervention, especially in 
those instances where there is no clear UN mandate or UN Charter legal cover for 
the perceived intervention. Van der Vyver classifies the arguments in support of 
the legality (or moral legitimacy) of humanitarian intervention into three 
categories or approaches: 
(a) The literalist approach; 
(b) The flexible and teleological approach; 
(c) The emergency mechanism argument.244 
The first two schools of thought concern themselves with the interpretation of the 
UN Charter in such a way as to bring humanitarian intervention within the ambit of 
the Charter regime. For instance, Julius Stone (classified as a literalist by Van der 
Vyver245) argued that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter forbids the threat or use of 
force in a very specific way. The prohibition is directed at the use of force (or the 
threat of force) aimed at the territorial integrity or political independence of a 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the aims of the United Nations. 
Stone thus maintained that the authors of proper humanitarian intervention should 
                                                     
242 Francis Kofi Abiew (Humanitarian intervention) (supra) (1999) 31. 
243 UN GA Def of Aggression art 3(e). For the text of the Def, see Ch 4 par 4.2.3 infra. For a discussion of 
various (‘legitimate’) military interventions in Africa on the basis of inter alia requests by incumbent 
governments, see Francois van As ‘African Peacekeeping:  Past practices, future prospects and its contribution 
to international law’ 45 Revue de Droit Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre (2006) 329-354. 
244 Johan Van der Vyver (Ius contra bellum) (supra) 6. 
245 Johan Van der Vyver (Ius contra bellum) (supra) 6.  
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normally not have the above-mentioned ill intentions. Stone also referred to Article 
2(3)246 of the UN Charter and the value of ‘justice’ as one of the elements to be 
considered when deciding on the legality of the threat or use of force.247  
 
Perhaps the most progressive (but also potentially most controversial) argument in 
support of humanitarian intervention is the flexible and teleological approach. Van 
der Vyver regards the scholar Michael Reisman as the principal exponent of this 
school. The argument is basically that the Charter’s prohibition of the threat or use 
of force ‘must be read in conjunction with the overarching human rights concerns 
of the United Nations as recorded in several provisions of the UN Charter and of 
which humanitarian intervention is a logical extension.’248  
 
The third school of thought referred to by Van der Vyver is perhaps less of a school 
of interpretation of the UN Charter, but rather sceptical commentators on 
international affairs, or as some would put it, realists. Van der Vyver quotes the 
following from Richard Baxter (an exponent of the ‘emergency mechanism 
argument’): ‘[It] is almost as if we were thrown back on customary international 
law by a breakdown of the Charter System’.249 The context of this statement by 
Baxter is the often ineffective way in which the Security Council operates in the 
face of massive human rights violations. This was especially true during the Cold 
War, but even post-Cold War inaction by the Security Council (for example in the 
                                                     
246 Art 2(3) of the UN Charter provides as follows:  ‘The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the 
Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles: […] 3. All Members shall 
settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, 
and justice, are not endangered.’  
247 See Johan Van der Vyver’s description (supra at 6) of Stone’s main argument on the proper construction of 
Art 2(4) of the UN Charter.  
248 Johan Van der Vyver (Ius contra bellum) (supra) 6. 
249 Ibid. 
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face of the Rwanda genocide of 1994 and the initial stages of the conflict in the 
Former Yugoslavia during the early 1990’s) lends considerable credibility to the 
arguments of commentators like Baxter and Richard Lillich.250 The ‘emergency 
mechanism’ argument is summarised as follows: 
‘[T]here is a need for humanitarian intervention exactly because the Security 
Council has been immobilised by the veto power of the permanent members. This 
presupposes that humanitarian intervention is to be ‘deactivated’ should the 
Security Council ever begin to function smoothly.’251 
 
The third instance of the use of force that might pose a challenge to the 
prohibition of the use or threat of force-regime in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is, 
according to Van der Vyver, wars of national liberation. Van der Vyver is not 
convinced that international armed conflict should always imply armed conflict 
between states: 
‘If an organised armed group engaged in protracted armed violence against a 
governmental authority, or against another organised group, were to include 
insurgents from another state, the hostilities would constitute an international 
armed conflict.’ 
And further: 
‘Wars of liberation, which may in some instances actually be armed conflicts not of 
an international character, are regulated by Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949 and have thus been made subject to the rules pertaining to 
international armed conflict.’252 
 
                                                     
250 Johan Van der Vyver (Ius contra bellum) (supra) 6 refers to Lillich’s contribution ‘A United States policy of 
humanitarian intervention’ in Donald P Kommers and Gilburt D Loescher (eds) Human Rights and American 
Foreign Policy (1979). 
251 Johan Van der Vyver (Ius contra bellum) (supra) 6. 
252 Johan Van der Vyver (Ius contra bellum) (supra) 13. 
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The latter refers more to jus in bello, or International Humanitarian Law protection 
for certain categories of persons involved in armed conflict. It is certainly the case 
that a number of states from the so-called developing world regarded wars of 
national liberation as not only protected in terms of International Humanitarian 
Law but also as a further exception to the prohibition of the use of force.253 In 
1970 the General Assembly of the UN adopted the Declaration on Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States254. One of the principles that gained affirmation in 
the 1970’s — and in no small measure as a result of the position taken by the 
General Assembly — was that the use of force as part of national liberation 
struggles were recognised as international matters and protected by International 
Humanitarian Law.255 While it is quite clear that wars of national liberation are not 
regarded as ‘purely domestic issues’ and are also protected by the relevant 
instruments of International Humanitarian Law, it is a different matter whether 
wars of national liberation can be treated as exceptions to the general prohibition 
of the use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The former is a 
matter for jus in bello; the latter for jus contra bellum. 
                                                     
 
Wars of national liberation in the context of jus contra bellum must be considered 
with due regard to the ideological divide that was very much apparent during the 
1970’s — the era of the big surge in anti-colonial struggles, as well as the 
deepening of the Cold War rift between the former Soviet Union and the Western 
powers. Against this background, Randelzhofer pointed out that the former Soviet 
Union and much of the ‘third world’ (where the anti-colonial struggles typically 
253 See comments by Albrecht Randelzhofer ‘Article 2(4)’ in Bruno Simma (Charter of the UN Vol I) (supra) 128-
129.  
254 GA Res 2625 (XXV) 24 Oct 1970. 
255 See Lyal Sunga (Emerging system) (supra) 102. 
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took place) propagated the notion that wars of liberation were indeed exceptions 
to the Article 2(4) prohibition of the use of force. Thus, liberation movements 
could be supported by third states to help them in their anti-colonial struggles. 
This argument was principally based on the idea that colonialism was regarded to 
be ‘a permanent armed attack, against which individual and collective self-defence 
is allowed.’256 This revolutionary idea was for obvious reasons not accepted by 
Western States — especially not by states with colonial histories. However, it is 
interesting to note that the non-binding 1974 Definition of Aggression257 (adopted 
by the General Assembly) incorporates the idea that people can ‘struggle’258 for 
self-determination. As Randelzhofer pointed out, the Definition of Aggression does 
not relate to either Article 2(4) (the use of force) or Article 51 (individual and 
collective self-defence) of the UN Charter. Wars of liberation as exceptions to the 
prohibition of the use force seems doubtful, not only because of the notion’s 
contentious doctrinal basis, but also because of the deep divide among states 
regarding the interpretation and application and proper place of wars of national 
liberation in the modern jus contra bellum.  
 
2.6. Concluding remarks 
 
In Chapter 3 the focus shifts from the jus contra bellum to the international 
criminal law paradigm of individual liability for the crime of aggression. This 
development has its roots in the Nuremberg-trials after the Second World War, 
where individuals were held responsible for crimes against peace, including 
                                                     
256 Randelzhofer in Bruno Simma (Charter of the UN Vol I) (supra) 128. 
257 For a discussion see Ch 4 par 4.2.3 infra. 
258 The draft of the relevant article referred to a right ‘to use force’, but this language was successfully 
opposed by Western States. See Randelzhofer in Bruno Simma (Charter of the UN Vol I) (supra) 128. 
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aggression. The content of the crime of aggression, as it was defined and applied at 
Nuremberg, will be analysed to serve as a starting point for the further discussion 
on the question of individual criminal liability for the crime of aggression, not only 
in terms of customary international law, but particularly in terms of the difficult 
process of finding an acceptable definition and conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction with respect to the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). It is shown that the criminalisation of aggression 
has its normative roots in the jus contra bellum. 
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Chapter 3 
 
From jus contra bellum to the criminalisation of aggression 
 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 Precursors to Nuremberg and Tokyo:  Historical attempts to establish individual criminal liability for the 
unlawful use of force 
   3.2.1 The debate:  Should states or individuals be held criminally liable for crimes under international law? 
   3.2.2 Pre-Nuremberg efforts to establish individual criminal liability for the international crime of aggression 
3.3 The importance and meaning of the Nuremberg-precedent 
   3.3.1 The Charter of the IMT Nuremberg 
     3.3.1.1 A legislative history of the crime of aggression under the Nuremberg Charter 
   3.3.2 Judgment at Nuremberg 
     3.3.2.1 Political and legal problems at Nuremberg:  Legality, foreign policy and Allied ‘complicity’ 
3.4 The judgment of the Tokyo Tribunal (IMTFE) 
3.5 The proceedings in occupied Germany under the Control Council Laws 
3.6 Concluding remarks 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter charts the historical development of the criminalisation of aggression 
as a crime under international law. It also traces the development in international 
criminal law towards the acceptance of individual (as opposed to state) criminal 
liability for aggression.  
 
In the previous Chapters it was explained how the use of force by states became 
outlawed. The use of force is no longer acceptable as an instrument of foreign 
policy. The jus ad bellum became the jus contra bellum.  
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 The liberal ideal of collective security manifested in the twin reactions to the use 
of force by states:  The essentially political response, where the Security Council 
of the UN determines when a situation is regarded as a threat to or breach of 
peace, or an act of aggression; and the legal response where the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) has a prominent role to play to determine whether the use of 
force violates the relevant provisions of the UN Charter, notably the prohibition of 
the use of force provided for in Article 2(4). The Security Council, which is the 
most important body to maintain international peace and security under the UN 
dominated collective security system, may also create international criminal 
tribunals as a response to threats to peace and security, as it did in reaction to the 
conflict in the Former Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s and with the genocide in 
Rwanda in 1994. Thus it can be said that the Security Council has set precedents in 
terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter whereby international peace and security 
can be maintained by various methods like the use of armed force (for example 
during the Korea conflict in the 1950’s), economic sanctions (for instance against 
apartheid South Africa), and also the creation of international criminal tribunals to 
try individuals responsible for serious crimes under international law (the 
aforementioned creation of the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia).  
 
The shift from jus ad bellum to jus contra bellum has been an important historical 
development in international law. Another important development in international 
law has been the acceptance of individual criminal liability for certain serious 
crimes under international law.259 The emerging system of International Criminal 
                                                     
259 See also discussion in Introduction supra. 
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Law, with its modern roots in the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials of the major Nazi 
and Japanese war criminals of the Second World War, confirmed the fact that 
states are no longer the only actors in international law and politics. Individuals 
(and not only states) are subjects of international law – not only in terms of 
responsibility for crimes under international law260, but to an ever growing extent 
in other areas of international law as well.261 States are subject to the prohibition 
of the use of force and those who would act contrary to the jus contra bellum can 
expect political and legal responses from the principal organs of the United Nations 
as described in Chapters 1 and 2. The discussion will now turn to the other 
important dimension of the response to the illegal use of force and specifically acts 
of aggression, namely individual criminal liability for such acts. First, attention will 
be given to the historic precedent of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials – including a 
discussion of attempts predating these two ad hoc tribunals to held individuals 
liable for crimes of aggression. 
 
3.2 Precursors to Nuremberg and Tokyo: Historical attempts to establish 
individual criminal liability for the unlawful use of force 
 
Military conflict between two or more states not only involves the military 
apparatus of the states involved, but also the political leadership. It is after all 
                                                     
260 See comments by Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 165 on the implications of the principles of the Charter 
of the IMT (Nuremberg Charter). The author states:  ‘[Those] who state their acceptance of the principles of 
the Nuremberg Charter but deny the proposition that the individual is a subject of international law invite 
charges of illogicality.’ 
261 In the context of international co-operation in criminal matters, it can be argued that individuals are also 
subjects, and not objects of international law. See Christine van den Wyngaert ‘The criminal justice systems 
facing the challenge of organised crime’ (1999) 70 Revue Internationale de Droit Penal 204. For a South African 
perspective on the position of individuals in international co-operation matters, see Gerhard Kemp ‘Foreign 
relations, international co-operation in criminal matters and the position of the individual’ 16 (3) SACJ (2003) 
370 – 392. 
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usually the political leadership which has the constitutional ability to command the 
military. For a state to ‘make war’262 in the conventional sense involves a 
concerted political and military effort. The question about the individuals involved 
in the decision to use armed force will come into play when determining possible 
liability for aggression. It was pointed out in the Introduction to the dissertation 
that historically, the notion that individuals can be held liable for what amounts to 
essentially an act of state (the use of force by the military of a state), was an ideal 
of non-governmental pressure groups and academics, but the road to the 
actualisation of international criminal tribunals was a long and tortuous one. 
 
3.2.1 The debate:  Should states or individuals be held criminally liable for 
crimes under international law? 
 
After the First World War a number of non-governmental organisations and 
writers263 suggested that states or a combination of states and individuals should 
be held liable for the initiation of the war of aggression. However, Brownlie 
pointed out that in terms of criminal liability for aggression, the debate initially 
leaned in favour of state liability. The early advocates of state liability or 
                                                     
262 For a definition of ‘war’ see Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression and Self-Defence) (supra) 15: ‘War is a hostile 
interaction between two or more States, either in a technical or in a material sense. War in the technical sense 
is a formal status produced by a declaration of war. War in the material sense is generated by actual use of 
armed force, which must be comprehensive on the part of at least one party to the conflict.’ For further 
discussion on the modern notion of ‘war’, see Ch 8 par 8.1.1 infra.  
263 These included prominent organisations in the fields of International law and International criminal law like 
the International Law Association (ILA) and the Association Internationale De Droit Penal (AIDP), the latter 
which was instrumental in the diplomatic conference in 1998 in Rome, which lead to the creation of the 
permanent ICC. The AIDP was working for the creation of some or other form of international criminal court 
since 1924. See Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Preface’ International Criminal Law Quo Vadis? (2004), Association 
Internationale De Droit Penal, Ramonville Saint-Agne, 11 – 15. For references to writers and organisations 
which advocated for state and/or individual liability for the outbreak of the First World War, see Ian Brownlie 
(Use of Force) (supra) 150. 
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cumulative state and individual liability ‘[regarded] the state as a unit susceptible 
to certain penalties in the form of indemnities and various measures of security 
such as military occupation, demilitarization, and destruction of existing war 
potential, and international control of certain aspects of governmental activity.’264 
The notion that collective criminal liability in the form of state (criminal) liability 
was appropriate in post-conflict situations was particularly relevant in the context 
of liability for aggressive wars as serious violations of international law and 
order.265 International instruments that came in the wake of the First World War, 
like the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, referred to aggression as international 
wrongful acts.266 This, together with (unsuccessful)267 attempts to try individuals 
like Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany for the initiation of hostilities that lead to war268, 
in fact implied state liability (the Kaiser represented the state) and not so much 
individual liability. Brownlie pointed out that instruments like the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact could ‘at that time only refer, to state responsibility’.269 The emphasis, in 
other words, still fell on collective responsibility and not the liability of individuals 
per se. However, looking back, the idea that a whole state should be ‘punished’ 
collectively for the policies and decisions of individuals (and without also punishing 
                                                     
264 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 150. 
265 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 151. 
266 Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (2003), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 111 opined that a state 
that engaged in aggression committed ‘an international wrongful act entailing State responsibility’ [Emphasis 
in the original]. 
267 Art 227 of the Treaty of Versailles provided that ‘William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor’ was 
to be publicly arraigned ‘for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties’. The 
government of the Netherlands refused to surrender Kaiser Wilhelm to stand trial. See Pearce Higgins (ed) 
Hall’s A Treatise on International Law 8th (1924) Clarendon Press, Oxford, 498 – 499. 
268 See Cherif Bassiouni International Criminal Law 2nd Vol I (1999) Transnational Publishers, New York, 63 and 
Cherif Bassiouni The legislative history of the International Criminal Court: Vol I Introduction, Analysis, and 
Integrated text (2005) Transnational Publishers, New York, 47. 
269 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 151. 
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the responsible individuals who have made crucial policy decisions) seemed to be 
misdirected. 
 
Georg Schwarzenberger, one of the prominent early writers on international 
criminal law, argued that states cannot be held criminally liable for crimes under 
international law. He analysed a number of cases before international tribunals and 
concluded that these cases all concerned breaches of treaties or international torts 
and not crimes under international customary law. Indeed, Schwarzenberger 
(writing in 1950) pointed out that no international tribunal has ever (at that stage, 
on the basis of customary international law) classified an act of state as an 
international crime.270  
 
In terms of state responsibility for acts in violation of international law, Brownlie 
suggested that the emphasis should rather fall on reparation and compensation.271 
Brownlie explained the doctrinal basis for the aforementioned argument as follows: 
‘War guilt is simply an explanation, a moral justification for demanding 
reparation and for trying those individuals responsible for launching 
aggressive war. The imposition of collective sanctions would in any case 
violate general principles of justice and there is a strong presumption 
against vicarious responsibility in criminal law.’272 
Indeed, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) sitting at Nuremberg after the 
Second World War, which will be discussed in the next section, took a practical 
                                                     
270 Georg Schwarzenberger ‘The problem of an international criminal law’ (1950) 3 Current Legal Problems 276 
- 280. 
271 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 153. 
272 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 154. 
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approach (and essentially followed the arguments put forward by American 
prosecutor Jackson). The IMT stated as follows: 
‘Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
provisions of international law be enforced.’273 
 
Significantly, one finds an echo of the IMT’s statement decades later in a 
statement by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): 
‘Under present international law it is clear that States, by definition, cannot 
be the subject of criminal sanctions akin to those provided for in national 
criminal systems.’274 
 
John Dugard — a proponent of state criminal liability for crimes under international 
law275 — pointed out that the International Law Commission (ILC), which initially 
was of the opinion that certain international wrongful acts should give rise to state 
criminal liability, is not advancing this notion any longer.276 It is furthermore 
interesting to note that the 2001 Principles of State Responsibility rejected the 
concept of criminal liability for states.277 Whatever the reason or reasons, it is 
                                                     
273 From the Nuremberg Judgment, quoted by Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 154. 
274 Prosecutor v Blaskic, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for a review of the Decision of 
Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, Case No IT-95-14-AR 108bis (1997) 110 ILR 688 at 698 par 25, reproduced in 
André Klip and Göran Sluiter Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals – Student Ed (2005) 
Intersentia, Antwerp/Oxford, 179 – 215. For commentary on the decision, see Göran Sluiter in Klip and Sluiter 
(supra) 216 – 219. 
275 For arguments in support of criminal responsibility of states, see John Dugard ‘Criminal Responsibility of 
States’ in Bassiouni (International Criminal Law) (supra) 239 – 253. 
276 For a discussion of the ILC’s position regarding state criminal liability, see John Dugard International Law – A 
South African Perspective 3rd (2005) Juta, Cape Town, 269 – 270. 
277 See Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative history Vol I) (supra) 48. See further ILC 2001 Report at 279 (available at 
www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State_responsibility/responsibilityfra.htm).  
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clear that criminal liability for states seems to be not only impractical, but also 
problematic from a doctrinal point of view.278  
 
The position taken by the driving forces for the acceptance of individual criminal 
liability for crimes under international law during the twentieth century were 
vindicated with the creation of a number of ad hoc international tribunals with 
jurisdiction to try individuals for international crimes, as well as a number of 
investigatory commissions which investigated international crimes.279 The pre-
                                                     
278 See arguments of Ian Brownlie and Georg Schwarzenberger supra. 
279 Bassiouni (Legislative history Vol I) (supra) 45 – 46 lists the following tribunals and commissions:  Tribunals:  
The International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg to try the major war criminals of the European Axis; the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) at Tokyo to try the Japanese war criminals; the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at the Hague to try individuals accused of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity which occurred in the Former Yugoslavia since 1991; and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) at Arusha for the prosecution of individuals responsible for 
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity between 1 Jan 1994 and 31 Dec 1994. The five investigatory 
commissions are:  The 1919 Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties, investigating crimes occurring during First World War; the 1943 UN War Crime Commission for the 
investigation of German war crimes during Second World War; the 1946 Far Eastern Commission for the 
investigation of Japanese war crimes during World War II; the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to SC 
Res 780 for the investigation of violations of international humanitarian law in the Former Yugoslavia; and the 
Independent Commission of Experts established in terms of UN Security Council Resolution 935 (Rwanda 
Commission) for the investigation of violations committed during the 1994 Rwanda genocide. More recent 
developments in International criminal law include the creation of so-called ‘mixed tribunals’ and a report by 
an international commission of inquiry that lead to a referral to the ICC. The category of so-called ‘mixed 
tribunals’ concern national courts with some degree of international involvement or support. Two recent 
examples of mixed tribunals are:  The Extraordinary Chambers of Cambodia (ECC) for the prosecution of 
individuals responsible for crimes committed during the reign of the Khmer Rouge and the Sierra Leone Special 
Court (SLSC) for the prosecution of individuals responsible for mass human rights violations in the 1990’s (A 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission was also created to help with the reconstruction and normalisation of 
society in Sierra Leone). For the ECC see Agreement between the UN and the Royal Government of Cambodia 
concerning the prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the period of Democratic 
Kampuchea, 6 Jun 2003, UN Doc A/RES 57/228B (Annex) (13 May 2003) (available at 
www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/Agreement%20between%20UN%20and%20RGC.pdf). For the SLSC see SC Res UN 
doc S/RES/1315 (2000). See further comments by William Schabas ‘Conjoined twins of transitional justice? – 
The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court’ JICJ 2 (2004) 1082 – 1099. One of 
the big humanitarian disasters of the early 21st century – the mass human rights violations (many regard it to be 
a genocide) in the Sudanese area of Darfur, lead to an International Commission of Inquiry. See Report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary General, Pursuant to SC Res 1564, 18 Sept 2004 
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Nuremberg and -Tokyo attempts were not very successful, mainly because of the 
lack of political will on the side of the international community280 (basically the 
victors of the First World War). The Treaty of Versailles281, which ended the war, 
made provision for ad hoc tribunals, but, the political will to actually establish 
tribunals were lacking.282 In 1920 the Commission on the Responsibility of the 
Authors of War came out in support of criminal liability for the violations of 
international law at the outbreak of and during what became the First World War. 
To make this more concrete, an Advisory Committee of Jurists proposed a ‘High 
Court of International Justice’ to try violations of international law. However, the 
realities of international politics at the time, as well as the relative weak position 
of the League of Nations, were not factors favourable to individual (or state) 
criminal liability for crimes under international law. Brownlie summed up the 
political atmosphere of the time: 
‘The idea that states themselves, or state officials, should be subject to criminal 
jurisdiction in respect of acts of state, acts within their legal capacity according to 
classical international law, was naturally regarded as utopian and exotic. The 
subject of international criminal jurisdiction and penal law was for the next decade 
[the 1920’s] principally the domain of writers and specialist institutions.’283 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(available at www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf). For commentary on the Report see George 
Fletcher and Jens David Ohlin ‘Reclaiming fundamental principles of criminal law in the Darfur Case’ 3 JICJ 
(2005) 539 – 561. Acting on the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry, the Security Council referred 
the situation in Darfur to the permanent ICC. The SC acted in terms of its Ch VII powers. For a comment on this 
historic referral of a situation that poses a threat to international peace ands security to the ICC, see Luigi 
Condorelli and Annalisa Ciampi ‘Comments on the Security Council Referral of the situation in Darfur to the 
ICC’ 3 JICJ (2005) 590 – 599. 
280 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History) (supra) 47. 
281 Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Treaty of Versailles), 28 Jun 1919. 
282 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History) (supra) 47. 
283 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 155. 
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After the First World War there was a tentative commitment of the international 
community to pursue justice while establishing peace. But, as pointed out above, 
no actual criminal trials occurred at international level to punish individuals for 
international crimes. Nevertheless, the period following the Treaty of Versailles 
(1919) and later the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) were important milestones on the 
way to the criminalisation of aggression and the eventual prosecution at Nuremberg 
and Tokyo of individuals for crimes against peace. 
 
3.2.2 Pre-Nuremberg efforts to establish individual criminal liability for the 
international crime of aggression 
 
In the aftermath of the First World War, and in the context of international 
processes that were aimed at bringing about peace in Europe (notably in terms of 
the Treaty of Versailles and later the Kellogg-Briand Pact), the drive for individual 
criminal liability for the crime of aggression also became stronger. Brownlie 
pointed out that this effort was basically the result of the work of organisations 
like the International Association of Penal Law, as well as a number of academic 
writers.284  
 
The problem with post First World War instruments on the use of force was that 
these instruments (notably the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928) were quite clear in 
their intent to outlaw the use of force, but less clear on the question of criminal 
liability for aggression.285 However, Brownlie pointed out that the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact did have some impact on the criminalisation of aggression, but that was at 
national level (a number of states incorporated the provisions of the Pact into their 
                                                     
284 See Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 155 fn 6. 
285 See Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 111. 
 - 104 - 
 
domestic legislation). It became clear that even this development was not 
unequivocally aimed at individual liability for aggression – neither at international 
nor national level.286 It was left to academics and non-governmental organisations 
to promote the notion of individual criminal liability for aggression. An important 
development in this regard was the adoption of ‘Fundamental Principles of an 
International Legal Code for the Repression of International Crimes’ of 1925 by the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union which met in Washington DC and Ottawa. Farhad 
Malekian summarised the most important principles set out in the document as 
follows: 
‘(a) there must be an international criminal code applicable to all nations; (b) 
measures of repression should not only apply to the act of declaring a war of 
aggression, but to all acts on the part of individuals of bodies or persons with a 
view to preparation of the setting in motion of a war of aggression; (c) there must 
be a principle for the criminal responsibility of individuals alongside the 
international responsibility of states for violations of public international legal 
order and international law as a whole; (d) a list of crimes which can be committed 
by states and individuals should be formulated with relevant applicable penalties; 
moreover, international repression should be based on the principles of nulla poena 
sine lege.’287 
 
From the above discussions two observations can be made:  First, although there 
were proposals made in this regard, the international community in the aftermath 
of the First World War clearly lacked the political will to create the necessary 
tribunals with the jurisdiction to try individuals responsible for international 
                                                     
286 See Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 156. The author also made reference to instruments like the draft 
Treaty of Mutual Assistance (1923), the Geneva Protocol (1924) and certain resolutions of the Assembly of the 
League of Nations (in 1925 and 1927) which referred to wars of aggression as international crimes. 
287 Farhad Malekian ‘International Criminal Responsibility’ in Bassiouni (International Criminal Law) (supra) 178. 
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crimes. Second, in the context of aggression, the combined effect of the above 
mentioned lack of political will to create ad hoc tribunals and the fact that 
international instruments (drafted in the wake of the war) did not clearly 
criminalise international aggression, was that individual criminal liability for 
aggression was still an academic notion rather than reality. The notion of individual 
responsibility for crimes under international law, and in particular, for the crime of 
aggression, would only become a reality after the Second World War, at Nuremberg 
and Tokyo.288 The efforts of the League of Nations to avoid another world war with 
inter alia attempts to end impunity for international crimes, were poignantly 
described as follows by Geoffrey Robertson: 
‘[It] seemed that the only way to stop war crimes was to stop war – a solution 
embraced in 1928 with the Kellogg-Briand Pact, by which state signatories falsely 
promised to renounce war as an instrument of national policy. The League of 
Nations, concerned by random assassinations of politicians and diplomats, managed 
by 1937 to draft a convention for the creation of an International Criminal Court 
with jurisdiction to try terrorist offences, but it failed to attract many signatories 
before most of its members slid into another world war.’289 
 
3.3  The importance and meaning of the Nuremberg-precedent 
 
Aggression has been described as the most serious crime under international law. 
The International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg (which tried the major Nazi 
                                                     
288 For an eloquent exposition of the international political and legal legacy of the First World War, and the 
period 1920 – 1945, see Antonio Cassese International Law in a divided world (1986), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
57 – 64. See further comments by Farhad Malekian in Bassiouni (International Criminal Law) (supra) 179.  
289 Geoffrey Robertson Crimes Against Humanity – The struggle for global justice (1999) The New Press, New 
York, 211. 
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war criminals after the Second World War) articulated the special status of 
aggression as follows: 
‘War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the 
belligerent States alone, but affect the whole world. 
To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is 
the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it 
contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.’290 
 
The trial at Nuremberg seems from a historical point of view as the zenith of 
individual criminal liability for aggression; the strongest possible legal response to 
international aggression. It will however be shown that historical precedent is not 
enough to rely on for purposes of creating an effective regime to regulate 
individual criminal liability for aggression. This entails more than a search for an 
acceptable definition of aggression for inclusion in the Statute of the ICC – the 
debate goes to the heart of the assumptions, institutions and values associated 
with the international crime of aggression. These issues are further elaborated on 
in Chapters 6 and 7 below. 
 
3.3.1 The Charter of the IMT Nuremberg 
 
The process to establish an international criminal tribunal for the trial of Nazi war 
criminals already began while the Second World War was still ongoing (and an 
Allied victory seemed probable). During 1943 and 1944 academic writers and Allied 
Governments began to look into the question of possible individual criminal liability 
                                                     
290 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg trial) Judgment (1946), IMT 171, at 186. Yoram Dinstein pointed 
out that the passage from the judgment is based on an article by Lord Wright, ‘War Crimes under International 
Law’ 62 LQR (1946) 40, at 47. See Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression Self-Defence) (supra) 120 fn 23. 
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for the crime of aggression. However, at that stage there was still some confusion 
regarding the question whether aggression was indeed criminal in terms of positive 
international law. Despite this confusion, some Allied leaders (notably Josef Stalin 
of the Soviet Union) came out strongly in support of the punishment of Nazi leaders 
who were responsible for the war. While Stalin was adamant about ‘punishment’ 
(or ‘show trials’291), other leaders like Churchill and Roosevelt were in favour of a 
formal trial in terms of international law.292 On 8 August 1945 the four Allied 
nations293 concluded the London Agreement, including the Charter of the IMT 
Nuremberg.294 
 
The problem of the legal basis for the prosecution of individuals for aggression 
became a contentious issue at various junctures prior to the conclusion of the 
London Agreement on the Charter of the IMT. Robert H Jackson, at the time Chief 
Counsel of the US and later Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, explained the legal 
basis for the inclusion of the crime of aggression within the jurisdiction of the IMT 
as follows: 
‘International law … is an outgrowth of treaties or agreements between nations and 
of accepted customs. But every custom has its origin in some single act … Unless we 
are prepared to abandon every principle of growth for International Law, we cannot 
deny that our own day has its right to institute customs and to conclude agreements 
                                                     
291 Geoffrey Robertson (Crimes against Humanity) (supra) 213.  
292 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 160 – 161. See further Geoffrey Robertson (Crimes against Humanity) 
(supra) 211 – 213. 
293 UK, the Soviet Union, the US and France. 
294 For comments on the legal nature of the Nuremberg Charter, see Hans-Heinrich Jescheck ‘The General 
Principles of International Criminal Law set out in Nuremberg, as mirrored in the ICC Statute’ 2 JICJ (2004) 38 – 
55. 
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that will themselves become sources of a new and strengthened International 
Law.’295 
 
Brownlie pointed out that Jackson referred to the post First World War instruments 
that outlawed war, namely the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), the Geneva Protocol 
(1924), the Assembly of the League of Nations Resolution (1925 and 1927), and the 
Resolution of the American States (1928).296  
 
The IMT Charter provisions on the crime of aggression were the result of much 
debate and disagreement between Britain, the US, France and the Soviet Union. 
These states had to agree on a compromise text in the end. The differences were 
more than just political, or strategic, they were also dogmatic. While the US 
regarded aggressive war to be criminal per se297, France wanted the Charter 
provisions on aggression to be linked to violations of treaties and other 
international instruments (to avoid problems of retroactive application of criminal 
law).298 Incidentally, references to ‘violations of treaties’ would also relieve the 
drafters of having to define aggression.299 Because of the compromises 
necessitated by the different dogmatic positions taken by the four Allied states, 
the final provisions on the crime of aggression in the IMT Charter were – in the 
words of Ian Brownlie – a ‘clumsy formula’.300 Indeed, this formula was the result 
of different, but valid, concerns about the content of a crime that was at that 
stage all but established under international law. The French concerns about 
                                                     
295 As quoted in Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 162. 
296 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 162, fn 5. 
297 See also discussion of the legislative history of the Nuremberg Charter par 3.3.1.1 infra. 
298 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 163. 
299 See reference in Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 164 to the opinion of Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, who 
pointed to this result. 
300 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 164. 
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retroactivity proved to be relevant, because the application of the law on 
aggression by the IMT was one of the main criticisms against the judgment at 
Nuremberg.301 With respect to aggression, Article 6 of the Charter of the IMT302 
provid
n the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for 
g in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment 
of any of the foregoing;’ 
contained in the Nuremberg Charter as not only a (dogmatic) compromise of the 
                                                     
ed as follows: 
‘The Tribunal established … for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals 
of the European Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish persons who, 
acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as 
members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes. The following 
acts, or any of them are crimes coming withi
which there shall be individual responsibility: 
(a) Crimes against peace:  namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a 
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participatin
 
It has to be pointed out that, although the definition of aggression as set out in the 
Nuremberg Charter was accepted, not only by the Nuremberg Tribunal, but also by 
the international community’s confirmation of it subsequent to the Nuremberg 
trial, the controversy regarding the ex post facto criminalisation of aggression 
remained. Even authors clearly in favour of individual responsibility for 
international crimes (including aggression) saw the definition of aggression as 
301 FB Schick ‘The Nuremberg Trial and the International Law of the Future’ 41 AJIL (1947) 770, 783 – 784. For 
comments on the defence objections against ex post facto application of procedural and substantive law at 
Nuremberg, see Leo Gross ‘The criminality of aggressive war’ 41(2) The American Political Science Review 
(1947) 205 – 225.  
302 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (1945) UN Treaty Series, vol 82, 279, reproduced in Christine 
van den Wyngaert (ed) International Criminal Law – A collection of International and European Instruments 3rd 
(2005) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 35 – 41. Apart from the 4 Allied powers (the US, the UK, France and 
the Soviet Union) the London Agreement (to which the IMT Charter was attached) was also adhered to by 19 
other Allied nations. See Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression Self-Defence) (supra) 118.  
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drafters303, but also more of a ‘political-legal’ rather than a ‘purely juridical’ 
definition.304 In other words, the Nuremberg Charter definition was criticised 
because it potentially violated the principles nulla poena sine lege / nullum crimen 
sine lege (the legality principles) in terms of the retroactivity implicit in the fact 
that aggression was never defined or regarded as an international crime with 
individual responsibility attached to it (despite provisions in the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact that could form a basis for such liability).305 
 
The above description of the genesis of the Nuremberg Charter (later followed by 
the Tokyo Charter) is quite well-known. However, it is necessary to look at the 
particular circumstances and factors that made these developments possible. It is 
important to note the prehistory of the Nuremberg Charter and the subsequent 
criminal processes at Nuremberg and elsewhere in order to understand why and 
how the international law prohibition on the use of force was transformed or 
interpreted to form the basis of individual criminal liability for the crime of 
aggression (or crimes against peace). 
 
3.3.1.1 A legislative history of the crime of aggression under the Nuremberg 
Charter 
 
The customary law status of aggression as a crime under international law (and the 
implications of this for individual criminal liability) is today quite well-
                                                     
303 Compare comments by Ian Brownlie (supra) on the different dogmatic positions of the French and US 
drafters of the IMT Charter. 
304 See Farhad Malekian in Bassiouni (International Criminal Law) (supra) 179. 
305 On the legality-debate, see Leo Gross (Criminality of aggressive war) (supra); Telford Taylor ‘The 
Nuremberg Trials’ 55(4) Columbia Law Review (1955), 488 – 525 (Taylor, Jackson’s successor as prosecutor at 
Nuremberg, eloquently addressed the legal-cultural differences between the Allied lawyers that often informed 
fundamental notions of legal doctrine, including the nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege principle).  
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established.306 The attempts to define (and also to expand the notion of) 
aggression (the notorious processes explored in Chapter 4 infra) are still on-going 
(notably the process to define aggression for purposes of ICC jurisdiction307). 
However, the principle that individuals can be held liable for the crime of 
aggression (at least for wars of aggression) is at present regarded as customary 
international law.308 International lawyers and legal historians might speculate on 
the factors that made it possible for the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter and 
consequently the judges at the IMT Nuremberg to have held individuals responsible 
for ‘crimes against peace’. From an international criminal law point of view, it is 
important to look at some of the compelling arguments that ultimately made the 
transition from the prohibition of the use of force to the criminalisation and 
individual liability for aggression possible. 
 
Many legal and political factors made the trials at Nuremberg and later Tokyo 
possible. However, the inclusion of the crime of aggression first at Nuremberg and 
later at Tokyo was one of the most remarkable developments in international 
criminal law.309 The extraordinary advocacy and intellectual input that made this 
possible were well documented, but one of the most comprehensive narratives on 
the legislative history of the crime of aggressive war was written by Jonathan Bush, 
who had access to some of the behind-the-scenes correspondence between lawyers 
                                                     
306 See Ch 5 infra. 
307 See Ch 6 infra. 
308 Gerhard Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra), 390 – 391; Antonio Cassese (International 
Criminal Law) (supra) 112 – 113.  
309 For an early prognostic view on the impact of the Nuremberg judgment on international law, see Philip C 
Jessup ‘The Crime of Aggression and the future of International law’ 62(1) Political Science Quarterly (1947) 1 – 
10. 
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and academics that ultimately had a great impact on the drafting of the Nuremberg 
Charter and the subsequent prosecutions and judgments.310  
 
It is quite well-known that during the negotiations in London to draft a legal 
framework for what would later become the Nuremberg Charter, objections 
regarding the inclusion of aggression/waging a war of aggression were raised. 
These objections were based on concerns that to try German war criminals for the 
crime of aggression would violate the legality principle (nullum crimen/nulla poena 
sine lege), as was already pointed out above. It is also well-known that proponents 
of the inclusion of aggression in the legal framework for the trial of the major war 
criminals of the European Axis mostly relied on the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) as 
the principal instrument that outlawed aggressive war. But, with reference to the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, Jonathan Bush stated:  ‘Neither friend nor foe mentioned the 
possibility of criminal trials for individual aggressors.’311 But during the course of 
the Second World War the intellectual, political and ultimately practical conditions 
that led to the inclusion of individual criminal liability for aggression aligned. This 
important moment in the history of international criminal law was seized by a 
number of lawyers who for some time had advocated the criminalisation of 
aggression. 
 
Throughout the Second World War, an influential community of exiled intellectuals, 
writers and lawyers lived and worked in London. Their publications were aimed at 
bringing to attention the atrocities of the Nazi-regime and to create awareness of 
the allegations of massive war crimes and other atrocities committed on the 
                                                     
310 See in general Jonathan A Bush ‘“The Supreme…Crime” and its origins:  The lost legislative history of the 
crime of aggressive war’102(8) Columbia Law Review (2002) 2324 – 2424. 
311 Jonathan Bush (Legislative history) (supra) 2335. 
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European Continent by the Nazis. For present purposes it is interesting to note 
what Jonathan Bush pointed out in his narrative: 
‘[It] was common in both popular and scholarly literature to denounce the Nazi 
leaders for starting the war, as well as for their brutal means of waging it, and 
occasionally to speak of the need for Nazis to face a reckoning for starting the war. 
Typically aggression, war-making, expansionism, militarism, or the like was used as 
a description and a political charge, to which responses – political or military, but 
possibly legal – would be required. … In short, there were many articles that 
approached the notion of criminal liability for initiating war.’312 
 
Bush also pointed out that few of these writers (lawyers or non-lawyers) called for 
trials for ‘an identifiable legal crime of planning, initiating, or waging aggressive 
war.’313 Bush’s narrative identified a number of American criminal lawyers and 
criminologists as the key group of individuals who eventually conceptualised and 
introduced individual criminal liability for aggression as a workable part of the 
legal framework for what would later become the Nuremberg Trials. In essence, 
this notion took shape in the correspondence in 1944 between William Chanler, an 
American criminal lawyer who also served in the American military, and the 
Harvard criminologist Sheldon Glueck.314 Professor Glueck also served as the 
                                                     
312 Jonathan Bush (Legislative History) (supra) 2338 – 2339. 
313 Jonathan Bush (Legislative History) (supra) 2339. 
314 The eventual influence of Prof Sheldon Glueck on the Prosecution at Nuremberg was recognised by early 
commentators on the Nuremberg trial. See for instance Franz B Schick ‘Crimes against Peace’ 38(5) Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology (1948) 445 – 465. Schick stated (458 – 459) as follows: ‘Relying greatly, it 
appears, on the opinion of an American criminologist [Glueck] the Allied Prosecution declared that “the only 
innovation which this [Nuremberg] Charter has introduced is to provide machinery, long over-due, to carry out 
the existing law; and there is no substance in the complaint that the Charter is a piece of post facto 
legislation, either in declaring wars of aggression to be criminal, or in assuming that the State is not immune 
from criminal responsibility”.’ 
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American delegate on the United Nations War Crimes Commission315 that started 
work in 1944. It is important to note that by 1944, both Glueck and Marcel de Baer, 
the influential Belgian delegate on the War Crimes Commission, concluded that the 
Nazi leadership could not be tried for aggression – both found that the pre-war 
legal framework (consisting primarily of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Treaty of 
Versailles) did not sufficiently establish individual criminal liability. Thus, for them 
the legality concerns trumped any notions of possible criminal liability for 
aggression.316  
 
In 1944 the War Crimes Commission invited its member nations to express their 
views on the crime of aggression. This presented William Chanler with the 
opportunity to submit to various American role-players his views and theories on 
the criminality of aggression. Jonathan Bush summarised Chanler’s theory as 
follows: 
‘[The] solution [for the legality concern] was to recognize that Kellogg-Briand and 
related instruments had determined that aggressive wars – wars not fought in self-
defense – were illegal. If they were, then it followed, for example, that persons 
carrying guns and committing killings in Poland or Czechoslovakia were not 
privileged combatants, as they would be if they were lawful fighters in a lawful war 
under the traditional laws and customs of war. They were, instead, legally 
unprivileged fighters – men using violence without legal justification or excuse, men 
whom the law terms ordinary criminals – committing violations of Polish or Czech 
domestic criminal law.’317 
 
                                                     
315 This Commission of the Allied nations served as an advisory and fact-gathering body. Its first meeting was in 
Jan 1944. See further Jonathan Bush (Legislative History) (supra) 2347. 
316 Jonathan Bush (Legislative History) (supra) 2346. 
317 Jonathan Bush (Legislative History) (supra) 2355. 
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It would be obvious for any international (criminal) lawyer that the above theory 
represented a fusion of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.318 The theory also 
did not advance any compelling argument or basis to regard aggression as an 
international crime with individual liability attached to it. Because of this apparent 
weakness in the theory, William Chanler at first advanced the argument that 
although Kellogg-Briand did not establish individual criminal liability for aggression, 
this Pact could at least serve as a legal basis to argue that the war was illegal 
under international law. With that as starting point, the argument can then 
proceed to say that aggression is not an international crime yet, but because the 
German conduct in the various occupied territories were illegal, that would permit 
domestic criminal jurisdiction over the soldiers. In turn, on the basis of respondeat 
superior (or command responsibility) the Nazi leadership could ultimately be held 
responsible. But responsible for what? Jonathan Bush explains the way Chanler 
crossed this bridge as follows: 
‘[Chanler] reasoned … that, at a minimum, Kellogg-Briand had declared the 
illegality of aggression on an international plane. Based on that, some individual or 
institution – perhaps even the victim nation itself – could determine that the 
invader had launched an act of aggression against it. That determination in turn 
would strip the protective layer from German soldiers, who now became in legal 
contemplation ordinary violent criminals under [for instance] Polish law, subject to 
domestic criminal law.’319 
 
Creative though this argument was at the time, it obviously did not address the 
central problem of how to establish substantive jurisdiction over the crime of 
                                                     
318 For a brief discussion of the scope and application of International Humanitarian Law, see Christopher 
Greenwood ‘Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law’ in Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook of Humanitarian 
Law in Armed Conflicts (1995) Oxford University Press, Oxford, 39 – 63. 
319 Jonathan Bush (Legislative History) (supra) 2355. 
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aggression for purposes of a possible international criminal tribunal. The 
alternative was to use the illegality of the war (in terms of the legal regime 
provided for under the Kellogg-Briand Pact) as not only a starting point, but as the 
legal focus point. Chanler pushed the idea that for the prosecution of Nazi war 
criminals to be effective, America had to insist on the inclusion of the charge of 
aggression in the legal framework of any future international war crimes tribunal. 
His arguments prevailed, and via his contacts in the American war administration 
(notably the Pentagon) his ideas won the favour of President Roosevelt. In January 
1945 a memorandum from the President stated that charges against the Nazis 
‘should include an indictment for waging aggressive warfare, in violation of the 
Kellogg Pact.’ And further, ‘[perhaps] these and other charges might be joined in a 
conspiracy indictment.’320 The ideas of Chanler advanced from a rather novel idea 
to hold individuals criminally liable at domestic level, for violent conduct that was 
deemed illegal under international law, to the theory that became accepted as 
part of the legal framework of the Nuremberg Charter, namely that aggressive war 
was part of an overall ‘Axis criminal conspiracy’, and ‘aggressive war as a free-
standing substantive crime’.321 Once the notion of individual criminal liability for 
aggression had been accepted as part of American policy, the inclusion of this 
notion as part of the legal framework for the Nuremberg Tribunal became a much 
more realistic prospect.322  
 
                                                     
320 Statement by Pres Roosevelt as quoted in Jonathan Bush (Legislative History) (supra) 2363. 
321 Jonathan Bush (Legislative History) (supra) 2364. 
322 The notion of individual criminal liability for the crime of aggression was also strongly supported by Robert 
Jackson, who later became the American chief prosecutor at Nuremberg. During the negotiations in London in 
1945 on the legal framework for the war crimes tribunal (that resulted in the Nuremberg Charter) Jackson was 
one of the few who advocated a ‘neutral’ definition of aggression, i.e. a definition not limited to aggressive 
acts of the Axis powers only. Jackson’s overall view prevailed and can be found in the language of art 6(a) of 
the Nuremberg Charter. See comments by Jonathan Bush (Legislative History) (supra) 2369.  
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The substantive definition of aggression that was ultimately included in the 
Nuremberg Charter was the result of much advocacy and negotiation. The fact that 
it was a ‘neutral’ definition (in other words not limited to acts of aggression by the 
Axis powers) meant that it could serve as the basis for future prosecutions of 
aggressive war. Jonathan Bush described the opening arguments of the American 
and British prosecutors at Nuremberg as follows: 
‘On November 21 [1945], Jackson gave one of the great arguments in forensic 
history as he opened the case, using the notions of conspiracy and Crimes against 
Peace to knit together acts that had occurred over two decades and around the 
world. Two weeks later, Sir Hartley Shawcross opened the British case with a 
speech almost as eloquent, focused on Crimes against Peace by means of forcibly 
violating treaties.’323 
 
3.3.2 Judgment at Nuremberg 
 
The trial of the major Nazi war criminals (in all twenty-four Nazi leaders were 
indicted) started on 20 November 1945 and lasted till 1 October 1946 in the Palace 
of Justice at Nuremberg. Only twenty-one of the twenty-four defendants were 
present during the trial.324 
 
The indictment at the IMT contained two counts related to the war of aggression 
conducted by the European Axis powers: 
‘Count One:  [The] common plan or conspiracy embraced the commission of crimes 
against peace, in that the defendants planned, prepared, initiated and waged wars 
                                                     
323 Jonathan Bush (Legislative History) (supra) 2370. 
324 Gustav Krupp von Bohlen was too sick, Martin Bormann was tried in absentia, and Robert Ley committed 
suicide. See Quincy Wright ‘The law of the Nuremberg Trial’ 41(1) AJIL (1947) 38 – 72, 40. 
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of aggression, which were also wars in violation of international treaties, 
agreements or assurances. 
Count Two:  All the defendants with divers other persons, during a period of years 
preceding 8th May, 1945, participated in the planning, preparation, initiation and 
waging of wars of aggression, which were also wars in violation of international 
treaties, agreements or assurances.’325 
 
The strategy of the prosecution was to first set out the aggressive Nazi foreign 
policy objectives and the way in which the German people were prepared for war 
in the period 1933 to 1939.326 In this way the prosecution introduced the Common 
Plan that led to the wars of aggression. Germany’s seizure of Austria and 
Czechoslovakia (the latter first had to cede part of her territory – Sudetenland – to 
Germany in terms of the infamous Munich Agreement327) were used by the 
                                                     
325 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 167. 8 May 1945 is significant, because at 23h01, Central European Time, 
on that day, the German High Command surrendered to the Allied Expeditionary Force and the Supreme High 
Command of the Red Army. See Act of Military Surrender, signed at Berlin on 8 May 1945, reprinted in Walter 
Consuelo Langsam Historic Documents of World War II (1958) Greenwood Press Publishers, Westport, 
Connecticut, 145 – 146. 
326 The Tribunal held: ‘The first acts of aggression referred to in the Indictment are the seizure of Austria and 
Czechoslovakia and the first war of aggression charged in the Indictment is the war against Poland begun on 
the 1st September, 1939. … The war against Poland did not come suddenly out of an otherwise clear sky; the 
evidence has made it plain that this war of aggression, as well as the seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia, 
was pre-meditated and carefully prepared, and was not undertaken until the moment was thought opportune 
for it to be carried through as a definite part of the pre-ordained scheme and plan. For the aggressive designs 
of the Nazi Government were not accidents arising out of the immediate political situation in Europe and the 
world; they were a deliberate and essential part of Nazi foreign policy.’ See Judgment of the IMT (Nuremberg) 
reprinted in Wise and Podgor (Cases and Materials) (supra) 518. See further Franz Schick (Crimes against Peace) 
(supra) 447 et seq.  
327 The Munich Agreement of 29 Sept 1938 was signed by Germany, the UK, France and Italy. In terms of this 
agreement (which became known as the primary example of the policy of ‘appeasement’ of Hitler by Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain of Britain), Czechoslovakia had to cede to Germany the territory of Sudetenland, 
inhabited by many German speaking people. It became clear that Germany obtained the territory because of 
the threat of force and the policy of appeasement of Britain and France to avert war. For the text of the 
Munich Agreement, see Walter Langsam (Historic Documents) (supra) 10 – 13. 
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Prosecution at Nuremberg to show Germany’s aggressive foreign policy that 
eventually resulted in the Second World War.328 
 
The rather tricky issue of retroactivity (as referred to in the previous paragraphs) 
was next addressed. As shown above, the prosecution argued that aggressive war 
was illegal in terms of international law since 1920 (the Treaty of Versailles, 
followed by various other instruments and treaties outlawing the use of force, 
notably the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928).329  
 
3.3.2.1  Political and legal problems at Nuremberg:  Legality, foreign policy and 
Allied ‘complicity’ 
 
The defence in the Nuremberg trials of the German major war criminals developed 
an interesting argument to counter the prosecution’s apparent insistence that 
international law not only outlawed war, but also that the criminalisation of 
aggression could be applied retroactively.330 The defence argument focussed on the 
status of international instruments and treaties like the Covenant of the League of 
Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact and concluded that by 1939 the collective 
security system were all but in ruins.331 Indeed, it was ironic that the Soviet Union 
- one of the states most outraged by German aggression - was herself expelled from 
the League of Nations because of the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939.332 Thus, 
                                                     
328 See further Franz Schick (Crimes against Peace) (supra) 447 – 449. 
329 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 167 – 168. See also discussion of the legislative history of the crime of 
aggression in terms of the Nuremberg Charter par 3.3.1.1 supra.  
330 Quincy Wright (Nuremberg Trial) (supra) 62 – 66. 
331 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 169. 
332 The Soviet Union invaded Finland on 30 Nov 1939. The League of Nations expelled the Soviet Union on 14 
Dec 1939. See Resolution Adopted by the Council of the League of Nations, Dec 14, 1939, League of Nations 
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the defence argued that the distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ wars became 
unworkable because of the failure of the League of Nations’ dominated collective 
security system.333 The annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia by Germany 
(events, the prosecution alleged, were the precursors to what would become the 
Second World War) occurred, as also shown above, with a great degree of Allied 
complicity. Franz Schick has pointed out that ‘the prosecuting governments [at 
Nuremberg] recognized the annexation of Austria without delay.’334 Furthermore, 
in the case of Germany’s attack on Poland (an attack which the IMT labelled 
‘plainly an aggressive war’335) the murky political reality of foreign relations before 
and during the Second World War was illustrated by the fact that the Soviet Union, 
one of the Allied prosecuting nations at Nuremberg, had in fact reached an 
agreement on the partition of Poland with Nazi Germany in September 1939. This 
act of cold political manoeuvring by the Soviet Union did not stop them from 
accusing Nazi leaders of aggression at Nuremberg.336 The defence arguments at 
Nuremberg illustrate the peculiar political and legal dilemmas that the IMT faced. 
This was also compounded by the obvious weak collective security environment of 
the post-war international system. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Official Journal 1939, 506; Resolution of the Assembly on 540. Reprinted in Walter Langsam (Historic 
Documents) (supra) 31 – 32. 
333 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 169 – 170. 
334 Franz Schick (Crimes against Peace) (supra) 447. 
335 Nuremberg judgment 34. 
336 Walter Langsam described the German-Soviet Boundary Agreement of 28 Sept 1939 as follows: ‘While the 
outmanned and outmaneuvered Poles were trying to make a stand against the Nazis in southern and eastern 
Poland, the Soviet Union on September 17, 1939, invaded the unhappy country. The official explanation was 
the protection of the Ukrainian and White Russian minorities living in eastern Poland. Berlin and Moscow 
promptly divided the spoils.’ Walter Langsam (Historic Documents) (supra) 28. For the text of the partition 
agreement and confidential correspondence between the Russian and German foreign ministers, see Walter 
Langsam (Historic Documents) (supra) 28 – 31. 
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The gist of the defence’s argument was that this collapse of the collective security 
system that came into existence after the First World War signalled a return to the 
jus ad bellum;  the anarchical international system where the use of force as part 
of foreign policy was quite acceptable. But, however interesting (or even 
compelling) some of these tu quoque (‘you do it so I can do it too’337) defence 
arguments might have been, the IMT rejected them as irrelevant. Geoffrey 
Robertson opined that the IMT was wrong to treat these tu quoque arguments as 
inadmissible:  ‘So far as the counts alleging the conspiracy to wage aggressive war 
and the commission of crimes against the peace were concerned, the tu quoque 
argument was most pertinent:  the Germans were charged inter alia with violating 
the rearmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty which the French had ignored 
and the British had joined the Germans in circumventing.’338 According to 
Robertson, the relevance of tu quoque evidence and arguments lie in the 
assessment of justification for war or modes of warfare.339 Others, like Albin Eser, 
suggests that the IMT Nuremberg was right in its general disregard of the tu quoque 
defence-arguments, for, ‘by opening this door, even if just a crack, the way is 
paved for an ever-increasing escalation of competing crimes.’340 
 
Apart for the tu quoque-arguments, the Tribunal also dealt with the issue of 
legality with reference to the jus contra bellum of the time (and the defence 
arguments about the retroactive application of criminal provisions on aggression) 
by referring to the fact that the defendants (senior leaders of the Nazi regime) 
                                                     
337 For an explanation of the tu quoque argument as a possible defence in international criminal trials, see 
Albin Eser ‘“Defences” in War Crime Trials’ in Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory (ed) War Crimes in International 
Law (1996) Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 269. 
338 Geoffrey Robertson (Crimes Against Humanity) (supra) 215. 
339 Ibid. 
340 Albin Eser (Defences in War Crime Trials) (supra) 269. 
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must have known that Germany’s aggressive foreign policy was in violation of 
treaties like the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which outlawed the use of force. The 
Tribunal furthermore used the analogy of criminal liability for war crimes (which 
were also not always expressly criminalised under international law) to support its 
opinion that, read together with the particular history of the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
and other international instruments and draft instruments actually providing for 
the criminalisation of aggression341, there could be no doubt that retroactive 
criminal liability for aggression in terms of the IMT Charter was justified.342  
 
The issue of retroactivity (and criticism that the IMT disregarded the principles of 
nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege) can today be regarded as an 
important, but largely academic debate.343 The fact is that since the Judgment at 
Nuremberg, aggression has been established as a crime under international law by 
not only national legal systems344, but also by the International Military Tribunal for 
                                                     
341 The IMT referred to Art 227 of the Versailles Treaty as well as instruments like the Geneva Protocol (1925) 
which intended aggressive war to be a crime under international law. See Judgment of the IMT at p 40 – 41; see 
also Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 171. 
342 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 170 – 171. 
343 One should however, not take lightly the criticisms against the IMT’s treatment of the principle nullum 
crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Some commentators argued that the ‘improvising’ spirit at Nuremberg should 
not serve as a general example for the future development of International criminal law and procedure. See 
the critical observations by Hans Leonhardt ‘The Nuremberg Trial: A legal analysis’ 11(4) The Review of Politics 
(1949) 449 – 476. For an argument in favour of the dynamic nature of international law and the development of 
customary law (and for the basis of the crime of aggression in customary law before the Nuremberg trial), see 
Leo Gross ‘The criminality of aggressive war’ 41(2) The American Political Science Review (1947) 205 – 225. 
Compare also the following passage from the Nuremberg judgment, as quoted by Telford Taylor: ‘International 
law is not capable of development by the normal processes of legislation, for there is no continuing 
international legislative authority…It grows, as did the common law, through decisions reached from time to 
time in adapting settled principles to new situations.’ Telford Taylor ‘The Nuremberg Trials’ 55(4) Columbia 
Law Review (1955), 516. 
344 See Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 175 – 182 for a discussion of the provision for the crime of aggression 
in national legal systems. For a discussion of the trials that were conducted under the so-called Control Council 
Laws, see Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 174 – 175. The latter provided for military tribunals in the various 
areas of Germany under the control of the Allied forces. These tribunals also had jurisdiction to try individuals 
for aggression (crimes against peace). Many of the judgments in these tribunals relied on the precedent of the 
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the Far East (IMTFE) in Tokyo, and other trials subsequent to the Nuremberg 
proceedings. This crime of aggression must, however, be seen in the context of the 
liability that the IMT Nuremberg had ultimately attached to the individual accused. 
 
Regarding the scope of aggression as an individual crime and the extent of 
individual liability for this crime, it is important to note the difference between 
the ‘individual crime of aggressive war’ and ‘aggressive war as an international 
delinquency’. The latter concept refers to the often broadly stated international 
obligations of states. Violations of treaty obligations, the use of armed force in the 
absence of the necessary conditions for collective or individual self-defence, or the 
use of armed force without the authorisation of international organs would fall in 
this category. As Quincy Wright observed, ‘[the] international delinquency arises 
from an act or omission of the state, and the element of individual intention is not 
involved.’345 Wright distinguished this concept from the individual crime of 
aggression, as developed at Nuremberg:  ‘[In] the individual crime of aggression, 
the element of individual intention is of major importance. This crime as stated in 
the [Nuremberg] Charter consists in “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of 
a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”’ Wright emphasised the extent of 
individual liability for aggression with reference to the particular defendant’s 
subjective intention, linked to that individual’s position of authority: ‘To 
determine whether an individual is guilty of [aggression] it is necessary to examine 
                                                                                                                                                                     
IMT Judgment at Nuremberg. The application of international criminal law (in particular the crime of 
aggression) before national courts (either on the basis of national laws or international law (customary or 
treaty) will be discussed in Ch 5 infra.  
345 Quincy Wright (Nuremberg Trial) (supra) 66. 
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the extent of his authority over the armed forces involved or his importance as an 
advisor of, or collaborator with, the person exercising such authority, and his 
intention in authorizing, or in advising or collaborating in authorizing, the use of 
such forces.’346 
 
3.4 The judgment of the Tokyo Tribunal (IMTFE) 
 
The trial of the Japanese war criminals at the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East (IMTFE) in Tokyo started in 1947. It involved 28 senior Japanese 
military and political leaders, who were accused, inter alia, of the crime of 
aggression. Article 5(a) of the Charter of the IMTFE (Tokyo Charter) provided for 
individual criminal responsibility for Crimes against peace: 
‘[The] planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a declared or undeclared war 
of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment 
of any of the foregoing;’347 
 
There are similarities, but also striking differences, between the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Tribunals and the judgments delivered by these ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals.348 Although it can be said that both tribunals were ultimately examples 
of ‘victors’ justice’349, the criticism against the establishment and judgment of the 
                                                     
346 Quincy Wright (Nuremberg Trial) (supra) 67. 
347 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946), Special Proclamation by the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers, as amended 26 April 1946, TIAS No 1589, reprinted in Christine Van den 
Wyngaert (International Criminal Law) (supra) 43 – 47. 
348 See AS Comyns Carr ‘The judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East Transactions of the 
Grotius Society Vol 34 Problems of Public and Private International Law, Transactions of the Year 1948 (1948) 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 141 – 151. 
349 See comments by Christine van den Wyngaert ‘De bijdrage van de internationale straftribunalen tot de 
ontwikkeling van het straf(process)recht vanuit internationaal en Belgisch perspektief’, Paper delivered at 
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Tokyo Tribunal seems to strike at the very heart of the legitimacy of the Tribunal 
and the value of its jurisprudence.350 The critique goes further than the legitimacy 
problem, and includes criticism against procedural and material aspects of the 
process and judgment.351 As far as legitimacy is concerned, the most obvious 
difference between the IMT at Nuremberg and the Tokyo Tribunal is the fact that 
the Tokyo Tribunal was established unilaterally by the American Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers in the Pacific. The Charter of the Tribunal was 
furthermore not the result of international conferences, but was drafted largely by 
American officials.352 
 
Apart from the perceived legitimacy-problem and problems from a procedural 
perspective referred to above, one of the more fundamental problems with the 
judgment at Tokyo concerns for present purposes the Tribunal’s adjudication on 
the crime of aggression and specifically the way the Tribunal employed the 
doctrine of conspiracy-liability to hold individuals responsible for crimes committed 
in the Far East. All the defendants (the 28 senior political and military leaders) 
were charged with the offences of ‘conspiring to wage an aggressive war’ or 
‘waging a war of aggression’.353 The critical point however is that these defendants 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Delva cyclus, Gent, Belgium, 17 March 2006 (copy on file). Prof Van den Wyngaert observed:  ‘[Het] was een 
justitie van overwinnaars tegen overwonnenen (enkel Duitse en Japanse oorlogsmisdadigers stonden er terecht, 
en feiten zoals Hiroshima/Nagasaki en het bombardement van Dresden werden er niet beoordeeld), het was 
ten dele ex post facto rechtspraak (de Genocideconventie en de Rode Kruisconventies die genocide en 
oorlogsmisdaden omschreven kwamen pas tot stand achteraf), en op de procedure zelf was ook een en ander 
aan te merken.’ 
350 For a contextual analysis of the trial, see P Lowe ‘An embarassing necessity:  the Tokyo trial of Japanese 
leaders, 1946-48’ in RA Melikan (ed) Domestic and International Trials, 1700-2000, The Trial in History Vol II 
(2003) Manchester University Press, Manchester, 137-156. 
351 See in general Allison Marston Danner ‘Beyond the Geneva Conventions:  Lessons from the Tokyo Tribunal in 
prosecuting war and terrorism’ 46 Virginia Journal of International Law 83 (2005) 83 – 130. 
352 See Allison Marston Danner (Lessons from Tokyo Tribunal) (supra). 
353 Allison Marston Danner (Lessons from Tokyo Tribunal) (supra) 90. 
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were not necessarily in the same position as their Nazi counterparts at Nuremberg 
with regards to their perceived responsibility for formulating and executing 
aggressive Japanese foreign policy prior to the war. The mens rea of the specific 
individual accused were in other words of less concern for the prosecution. The 
defendants were thus chosen as representatives of a certain influential political 
and military class, the members of which were regarded as being responsible for 
the formulation and direction of the militaristic and aggressive Japanese foreign 
policy – and anyone in this group could, according to the prosecution’s theory, be 
held responsible on the basis of the perceived conspiracy to commit aggression.354 
AS Comyns Carr described the grand political plan to pursue an aggressive foreign 
policy as follows: 
‘The story as unfolded in the judgment is one of a grandiose plot which originated 
in the late 1920’s in the minds of a few officers and civilians, and grew until it 
became the dominating purpose, in varying degrees and with occasional variations 
of emphasis, of every successive government of Japan.’355 
 
As noted, neither the Nuremberg Charter nor the Tokyo Charter defined 
‘aggression’. The judges of the Tokyo Tribunal had the opportunity to study the 
proceedings at Nuremberg, but did not define aggression. With reference to the 
legal basis for the criminalisation of aggression and the impact of the Kellogg-
Briand Pact in this regard, Brownlie quoted the following passage from the opinion 
of the President of the IMTFE: 
‘This Pact [Kellogg-Briand Pact] does not contain the word ‘crime’ or the word 
‘criminal’; but having regard to the language of the Pact – the solemn 
condemnation of war, the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, 
                                                     
354 Allison Marston Danner (Lessons from Tokyo Tribunal) (supra) 90. 
355 AS Comyns Carr ((Military Tribunal for the Far East) (supra) 146. 
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and the agreement not to resort to it to settle or solve disputes or conflicts, and to 
the natural and probable, if not inevitable consequences of recourse to war – the 
conclusion is irresistible that the illegality of aggressive war and its criminality 
were perceived and acknowledged … Every State that became a party to the Pact of 
Paris perceived and acknowledged the illegality and criminality of recourse to war 
for the solution of international controversies … If, nevertheless, any State resorts 
to aggressive war, those individuals through whom it acts, knowing as they do that 
their State is a party to the Pact, are criminally responsible for this delict of 
State’.356 
 
The Tokyo judgment ultimately linked the aggressive foreign policy of Japan357 to a 
single conspiracy of the defendants before the war to use the Japanese military 
and political apparatus to dominate the Far East. Allison Marston Danner explained 
this conspiracy as follows: 
‘The Tokyo indictment first alleged that “a conspiracy between the defendants, 
joined in by the rulers of other aggressive countries, namely Nazi Germany and 
Fascist Italy, was entered into. The main object of this conspiracy was to secure 
the domination and exploitation by the aggressive States of the rest of the world.” 
                                                     
356 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 173. 
357 The aggressive Japanese foreign policy was first and foremost aimed at establishing Japan as the dominant 
power in Asia, and specifically Pacific-Asia. When the war in Europe started in 1939 Japan was already at war 
with China (Japan occupied Manchuria and wanted to occupy the whole of China). On 27 Sept 1940 Japan, 
Germany and Italy entered into an alliance. For the text of the German-Italian-Japanese Pact, see Walter 
Langsam (Historic Documents) (supra) 76 – 77. The first 3 articles set out the geo-political vision of the Pact: 
‘[Art 1] Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order 
in Europe. [Art 2] Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a 
new order in Greater East Asia. [Art 3] Germany, Italy and Japan agree to co-operate in their efforts on the 
aforesaid basis. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic, and military means, 
if one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European war or in 
the Chinese-Japanese conflict.’ See further Stephen E Ambrose Rise to Globalism – American foreign policy 
since 1938 7th (1993) Penguin Books, New York, 9 – 14 for a brief but eloquent description of the aggressive 
Japanese foreign policy, and the eventual US involvement in the war in East Asia. 
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Count One of the indictment then charged the defendants with the more specific 
(although still breathtakingly broad) conspiracy.’358 
 
On the matter of conspiracy to plan and commit aggression, dissenting judge Pal 
from India made the critical observation359 that to characterize national foreign 
policy as a criminal conspiracy was rather simplistic, especially where such a 
characterization would lead to a finding of individual criminal responsibility.360 
With this warning in mind, Allison Marston Danner warned against the dangers of 
relying on the doctrine of conspiracy to hold individuals responsible for a crime like 
aggression – a crime so closely associated with state conduct and the political 
processes of that state: 
‘Alleging a conspiracy against a broader historical and political canvas has several 
potential failings. It allows prosecutors to overreach on the scope of the overall 
wrongdoing by rolling up what turns out to be disparate activity into one legal 
package. It also bears the significant risk of sweeping up too many defendants into 
its ambit. … A clear link between wrongdoing and conviction helps overcome the 
negative perception that may attach to criminal cases with strong political 
overtones.’361 
 
There was an attempt by Judge Röling in his dissenting opinion to limit the 
convictions for conspiracy only to those defendants who were in actual fact 
formulators of Japanese government policy. Broadly speaking, the Tribunal – 
although less cautious than Judge Röling – also emphasised that one of the 
                                                     
358 Allison Marston Danner (Lessons from Tokyo Tribunal) (supra) 114. 
359 For commentary on the extent and impact of Judge Pal’s dissenting opinion, see E Kopelman ‘Ideology and 
International Law:  the dissent of the Indian Justice at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal’ 23 (1991) New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 373. 
360 Allison Marston Danner (Lessons from Tokyo Tribunal) (supra) 118.  
361 Allison Marston Danner (Lessons from Tokyo Tribunal) (supra) 119. 
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conditions for individual liability for conspiracy to commit aggression was that such 
defendants had to have the capacity or official position to influence Japanese 
government policy.362 The approach in the Tokyo judgment nevertheless 
represented a wider understanding of conspiracy liability than at Nuremberg. In the 
more restrictive interpretation of ‘conspiracy’ in the Nuremberg Judgment only 
those defendants who actively participated in the planning of the aggressive war 
were held responsible on the basis of conspiracy.363  
 
The Tokyo Tribunal confirmed the individual criminal responsibility for aggression 
under international law. However, it is clear that the Tokyo judgment, although in 
some respects more nuanced than the Nuremberg judgment as a result of some 
dissenting opinions, was always far less celebrated and influential than the 
Nuremberg Judgment.364 The reasons for this may vary, but one factor is certainly 
the perceived problem of legitimacy of the Tokyo Charter and Tribunal. Apart from 
that, aspects of the judgment like the broader interpretation of conspiracy 
(discussed above) might add to the present debate about a suitable definition of 
aggression for purposes of the Statute of the ICC. But one must also be realistic:  
The narrower approach regarding the elements of aggression for purposes of 
individual criminal liability (as formulated by the Nuremberg Tribunal) seem to set 
the parameters of aggression under customary international law. In this respect, 
the legacy of Nuremberg is indeed the fact that the debate about the definition of 
aggression was influenced to a far greater degree by the judgment at Nuremberg 
(and also the judgments under the Control Council Laws365) than by the judgment 
                                                     
362 Allison Marston Danner (Lessons from Tokyo Tribunal) (supra) 123 – 124. 
363 Gerhard Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 398. 
364 See in general the critical assessment by BVA Röling and A Cassese The Tokyo trial and beyond:  Reflections 
of a peacemaker (1993) Polity Press, Cambridge.  
365 See discussion under par 3.5 infra. 
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of the Tokyo Tribunal – the latter’s legacy tainted (perhaps more than 
Nuremberg’s) by the problems of legitimacy. Nevertheless, the judgment of the 
Tokyo Tribunal certainly adds value to the ongoing debate about individual criminal 
liability for aggression, apart from the fact that it brought to justice at least some 
of the individuals closely associated with the aggressive Japanese regime that 
caused much suffering in East Asia.366 
 
3.5  The proceedings in occupied Germany under the Control Council Laws 
 
On 29 April 1945 Hitler realised that his Reich had ended. In his bunker in Berlin he 
prepared his ‘Private and Political Testament’. In terms of this document the 
Presidency of the Reich was handed to Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, who became 
Hitler’s successor as German Head of State. Hitler committed suicide shortly after 
the testament was signed. On 1 May 1945 Admiral Doenitz assumed the position of 
German Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Less than a 
week later Doenitz agreed to Germany’s unconditional surrender to the Allied 
forces.367 After the German surrender and the conference of the Allied forces at 
Potsdam, the sovereign state of Germany seized to exist. Doenitz was no longer 
Head of State. In the place of the Nazi government, the Allied Forces created a 
Condominium over the German territory, which was exercised by the Allied Control 
Council at Berlin. This Control Council consisted of the Commanders in Chief of the 
four Allies.368 
 
                                                     
366 See concluding remarks by AS Comyns Carr (Military Tribunal for the Far East) (supra) 150 – 151. 
367 For the text of ‘The Private and Political Testaments of Hitler 29 April 1945’; ‘Assumption of Power by 
Doenitz, 1 May 1945’; and ‘The German Surrender, 7-8/9 May 1945’, see Walter Langsam (Historic Documents) 
(supra), 137 – 146. 
368 See Franz Schick (Crimes against Peace) (supra) 452. 
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While the major war criminals were tried at the IMT Nuremberg, the Control 
Council issued Control Council Law Number 10 on the Punishment of Persons Guilty 
of War crimes, Crimes against Peace and against Humanity (1945)369. The aim of 
this legislation was to make sure that the trials of Nazi war criminals subsequent to 
the IMT Nuremberg trial would have a sound legal basis and to enhance legal 
uniformity throughout occupied Germany. A number of important judgments were 
delivered by tribunals that operated in terms of the Control Council Law, for 
example the prosecution of powerful industrialists who supported the Nazi war 
effort (Krupp), the case against high officials of the Nazi state not tried at 
Nuremberg (Von Weizsakcker et al), and the so-called High Command Trial of the 
senior military officers (Von Leeb et al).370 While these cases confirmed the law on 
aggression371 as applied by the IMT Nuremberg, a common feature of these 
judgments is that they put the emphasis on the more nuanced personal positions 
and personalities of the accused. More emphasis was for example put on the 
‘actual power of individuals to shape or influence the war policy’ of Germany. 
These statements by the tribunals under the Control Council Law later had an 
impact on the International Law Commission’s work on the definition of aggression, 
especially on the meaning of ‘waging of a war of aggression’.372 
 
 
                                                     
369 Control Council Law No 10 (Official Gazette Control Council for Germany No 3, Berlin, 31 Jan 1946 50 et 
seq), reprinted in Christine van den Wyngaert (International Criminal Law) (supra) 49-52. See further comments 
by Gerhard Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 12. 
370 See Gerhard Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 13.  
371 Art II 1(a) provided for Crimes against peace:  ‘Crimes against Peace. Initiation of invasions of other 
countries and wars of aggression in violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to 
planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war of violation of international treaties, 
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of 
the foregoing.’ 
372 See discussion of various cases under the Control Council Law in Caroline Fournet (International Crimes) 
(supra) 159 – 160. See further discussion of the work of the ILC in Ch 4 infra. 
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3.6  Concluding remarks 
 
The judgments of the ad hoc tribunals at Nuremberg and, perhaps more 
controversially, Tokyo, represent the maturation of international criminal law. This 
was no longer the utopian ideal of writers and non-governmental organisations, but 
as a consequence of the work of the tribunals important areas of the desired 
international criminal law (de lege ferenda) became de lege lata — the law in 
force.373 Part of this historical development was the acceptance of individual 
criminal liability for the crime of aggression. Two important principles were thus 
established:  (1) Aggression is a crime under international law; (2) Individuals can 
be held liable for the crime of aggression. 
 
Looking at the Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments of the two post-war ad hoc 
tribunals, one can say that both the political and legal conditions were optimum for 
their relative success. Yes, one can criticise the processes as ‘victors’ justice’, and 
some dogmatic and jurisprudential critique against the ex post facto 
criminalisation of aggression at IMT Nuremberg seems (even today) to have some 
merit. However, the historical fact is that at Nuremberg (and later Tokyo) the long 
desired criminalisation of aggression reached its maturity. However, it is also 
prudent to make some critical preliminary observations regarding the ‘legacy of 
Nuremberg’, which will be more fully analysed in the next Chapter. 
 
                                                     
373 For a discussion of the distinction between de lege lata (the law in force) and de lege ferenda (the law in its 
primary stages; not in force, or desired law) in international criminal law, see Farhad Malekian The 
monopolization of International Criminal Law in the United Nations (1993) Almqvist & Wiksell International, 
Stockholm, 34 – 37. 
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The processes at Nuremberg (and later Tokyo) were, all matters considered, 
successful in making sure that peace was established not through political 
convenience, but at least with the help of justice. The two ad hoc tribunals 
represented important milestones on the long road to end impunity for crimes of 
international concern. As pointed out above, the political conditions were 
favourable to establish the ad hoc tribunals. The Allies could make sure that the 
logistics and political support for the tribunals were in place. Another important 
factor was that the big powers all committed themselves to the creation of a 
collective security system, dominated by the UN as successor of the failed League 
of Nations. This commitment to collective security and international co-operation 
was also later manifested in the important Nuremberg Principles374, which can be 
regarded as another cornerstone of the developing system of international criminal 
law. Apart from the fact that the political conditions after the Second World War 
were favourable for the creation of two ad hoc tribunals, one should not forget one 
of the contentions of the defence counsel before the IMT (Nuremberg), namely that 
aggression could never have been a crime under international law, because the 
very powers who were at that stage prosecuting the Nazis for aggression, were 
themselves responsible for the collapse of the post First World War collective 
security system. Indeed, the US never took part in the League of Nations, and the 
Soviet Union was expelled from the League because of its invasion of Finland in 
1939. Although that argument of the defence was rejected by the IMT, it is an 
important theme that might recur when we look at the present debate about the 
inclusion of aggression as a crime within the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court. For sure, although the criminalisation of aggression and the 
eventual judgments at Nuremberg and Tokyo were important historical milestones, 
                                                     
374 See discussion in Ch 4 para 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 infra. 
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the reality of the Cold War had a significant impact on the development of 
international criminal law, including the doctrine and enforcement mechanisms for 
the crime of aggression.  
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Chapter 4 
 
The ‘legacy of Nuremberg’:  Establishing individual criminal liability 
for the crime of aggression 
 
4.1 Introduction 
4.2 Efforts to consolidate the jurisprudential legacy of Nuremberg and Tokyo 
   4.2.1 Creating a new international legal order:  The UN Charter and the Nuremberg Principles 
   4.2.2 Building on the Nuremberg Principles:  The further work of the International Law Commission:  
Searching for a definition of aggression 
     4.2.2.1 The Draft Code of Offences against Peace and Security of Mankind (1954) 
     4.2.2.2 The Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1991) 
     4.2.2.3 The Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996) 
   4.2.3 The UN General Assembly ‘Consensus Definition’ of Aggression (1974) 
     4.2.3.1 The Definition in perspective 
     4.2.3.2 Some observations on the usefulness of the Definition from an international criminal law 
perspective:  Elements of criminal liability 
4.3 Concluding remarks:  Attempts to define aggression in the light of the Nuremberg legacy 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 3 above it was observed that to a certain extent the trials at Nuremberg 
and Tokyo were remarkable historical events (and to an important extent, 
exercises in history writing375). It was also noted that these trials represent the 
                                                     
375 The trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo involved long narrative presentations by the prosecution that showed the 
genesis of policies and practices beyond the involvement of the individuals concerned. In that sense the ad hoc 
tribunals were not only fact finders, but also history writers. See for instance the assessment of the work of 
the Tokyo Tribunal in this regard by AS Comyns Carr (Military Tribunal for the Far East) (supra) 146:  ‘The story 
as unfolded in the judgment is one of a grandiose plot which originated in the late 1920’s in the minds of a few 
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concretisation of the ideal to end impunity for international crimes. However, as 
far as individual criminal liability for aggression is concerned, the sometimes 
awkward jurisprudential positions concerning questions of legality (nullum 
crimen/nulla poena sine lege), the scope and ambit of the concept of aggression, 
the issue of conspiracy, and other factors impacting on the aggression debate were 
not definitively solved at Nuremberg and Tokyo. As William Schabas observed: 
‘[It] is certainly striking to observe that the uncertainty about the role of aggression 
within the overall system of international criminal law is not only characteristic of 
the debate that immediately preceded Nuremberg, but it is also manifested in the 
approach to the issue in the decades that were to follow the landmark trial. The 
failure of the United Nations War Crimes Commission to even take a position on 
whether or not aggressive war should be a crime seems remarkably like the 
hesitations at the Rome Conference [on the International Criminal Court], more 
than half a century later.’376 
 
Indeed, after Nuremberg, Tokyo and the subsequent trials under Control Council 
Law 10 in Germany, no serious attempts were made to prosecute individuals for the 
crime of aggression in the post-Second World War era.377 The aim of this Chapter is 
to analyse the reasons for this state of affairs. First, the efforts of the United 
Nations to consolidate and preserve the legal legacy of Nuremberg will be 
examined. Second, this ‘Legacy of Nuremberg’ will be analysed contextually, with 
reference to some of the key developments in international criminal law in the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
officers and civilians, and grew until it became the dominating purpose, in varying degrees and with occasional 
variations of emphasis, of every successive government of Japan.’ 
376 William A Schabas ‘Origins of the criminalization of aggression:  How crimes against peace became the 
“supreme international crime”’ in Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi (eds) The International Criminal Court and the 
Crime of Aggression (2004) Ashgate, Aldershot, 31. 
377 Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression Self-Defence) (supra) 121. See further critical comments by Jonathan Bush 
(“The Supreme…Crime”) (supra); Caroline Fournet (International Crimes) (supra) 143. 
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post-Second World War period. Finally, some preliminary conclusions regarding the 
impact of the legacy of Nuremberg on the establishment of the permanent 
International Criminal Court will be identified. 
 
4.2 Efforts to consolidate the jurisprudential legacy of Nuremberg and Tokyo 
 
4.2.1 Creating a new international legal order:  The UN Charter and the 
Nuremberg Principles 
 
The judgment at Nuremberg, and the subsequent judgments at Tokyo and other 
tribunals, affirmed the criminalisation of aggression and the individual liability 
attached to this international crime. In order to assess the legal developments 
post-Nuremberg, it is necessary to briefly contextualize the collective security 
regime that emerged in the wake of the Second World War, and as identified in 
Chapters 1 and 2 above.  
 
The provisions of the UN Charter on the use of force do not in themselves 
criminalise aggression, but they do reflect the development of principles that 
already took shape in the last part of the Second World War and in the immediate 
post-Second World War era. This must be viewed in light of the general prohibition 
of the use of force - jus contra bellum - that developed after the First World War. 
But these provisions also reflect a deliberate attempt away from the constraints or 
anomalies of the League of Nations era. Thus, while the Charter of the League of 
Nations prohibited resort to ‘war’, the UN Charter prohibits the ‘threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’378. 
                                                     
378 Art 2(4) UN Charter. 
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While the UN Charter in this respect provides for a more realistic legal regime in 
the context of the use of force by states, the Charter provisions can be criticised 
when considering the strides made at Nuremberg to criminalise international 
aggression. The problem seems to lie in the fact that Article 2(4), read with Article 
39 of the UN Charter, does not contain a definition or explanation of the elements 
of aggression. It is essentially left to the political processes at the Security Council 
where the existence of acts of aggression, threats to peace and breaches of peace 
are determined379. Cherif Bassiouni and Benjamin Ferencz described the problem 
as follows: 
                                                     
‘The text of Article 39 left the term “aggression” undefined and gave equal weight 
to the “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” It was 
hoped that Article 2(4) would satisfactorily prohibit a use of force unless it was 
“consistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” Should a “threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” take place, it is left in the hands 
of the Security Council to determine its existence and what sanctions should be 
used to end it. When the Charter was drafted, it was felt that (1) no definition of 
aggression could be established that could cover every possible case and (2) it was 
best to let the Security Council decide what had happened and what actions to 
take. Both reasons fall short of their objective.’380 
 
While it is true that the UN Charter contains this apparent weakness because of the 
lack of any definition of aggression, one should also be mindful of the historical 
processes that led to the drafting of the Charter. Regarding aggression, it is clear 
that the Charter could never be a codification of the law as it was interpreted and 
developed at Nuremberg and the subsequent trials. The drafting of the Charter was 
379 See discussion of Ch VII powers of the SC in Ch 1 par 1.4.2 supra. 
380 M Cherif Bassiouni and Benjamin B Ferencz ‘The crime against peace’ in Cherif Bassiouni International 
Criminal Law 2nd Vol 1 (1999) Transnational Publishers, New York, 322. 
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of course a process quite independent from the conferences that lead to the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters. The judicial processes at Nuremberg and the other 
post-Second World War trials (all of which were completed after the adoption of 
the UN Charter in 1945) were furthermore linked to the particular political 
situation at the end of the war and the dynamics of the peace settlement in Europe 
and eventually the Far East. The trials can in a certain respect be regarded as 
‘victor’s justice’, set in a particular political context.381  
 
Having said the above, it is also clear that the international community had the 
desire to preserve the legacy of Nuremberg, if not in terms of a permanent 
international criminal court than at least suggestive of the desire to create such an 
institution with jurisdiction to hold individuals accountable for crimes under 
international law. Thus, the General Assembly of the UN adopted a number of 
resolutions aimed at consolidating and preserving the principles of individual 
criminal liability for certain international crimes.382  
 
The International Law Commission (ILC)383, established in terms of Article 13 of the 
UN Charter, acted on a request by the General Assembly to ‘formulate the 
principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal 
and in the Judgment of the Tribunal’.384 The Nuremberg Principles385 were adopted 
                                                     
381 See comments on ‘victors’ justice’ by Christine Van den Wyngaert Ch 3 par 3.4 supra. 
382 See Herman von Hebel ‘An International Criminal Court – A historical perspective’ in Herman von Hebel, 
Johan Lammers and Jolien Schukking (eds) Reflections on the International Criminal Court – Essays in Honour 
of Adriaan Bos (1999) TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 22 – 23. 
383 The ILC was established in 1947 in terms of Art 13 of the UN Charter. The first session of the ILC opened on 
12 April 1949. For an historical overview of the ILC, see Sir Arthur Watts The International Law Commission 
1949 – 1998 Vol I (1999) Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1 – 20. 
384 GA Res 177 (II), of 21 Nov 1947. See also Arthur Watts (International Law Commission Vol III) (supra) 1657. 
385 Nuremberg Principles, Geneva, 19 Jul 1950, UNGAOR, 5th Session, Supp No 12, UN Doc A/1316 (1950), 
reproduced in Christine van den Wyngaert (International Criminal Law) (supra) 319 - 320.  
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in 1950, and were, generally speaking, more than just an attempt to preserve the 
jurisprudential legacy of Nuremberg.386 In many ways the work of the ILC in this 
regard served as an impetus to keep many of the ideals of international criminal 
law alive; most important of which was the ideal of a permanent International 
Criminal Court with jurisdiction over the core international crimes.387 Principle VI 
provides as follows: 
‘The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international law: 
(a) Crimes Against Peace: 
(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a 
war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances; 
(ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment 
of any of the acts mentioned under (i). 
(b) War Crimes:  Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not 
limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour of for any other 
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment or 
prisoners of war, of persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or 
private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation 
not justified by military necessity. 
(c) Crimes Against Humanity:  Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation 
and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on 
political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions 
are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any 
war crime.’ 
 
                                                     
386 For a discussion of the impact of the Nuremberg Principles in various domestic legal contexts (mainly in 
American jurisprudence), see Gary Komarow ‘Individual responsibility under International law: The Nuremberg 
Principles in Domestic legal systems’ 29(1) ICLQ (1980) 21 – 37. 
387 Arthur Watts (International Law Commission Vol III) (supra) 1658.  
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The ILC neither analysed nor commented in much detail on the Principles 
crystallised from the Charter and judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal. The ILC 
confirmed that, as far as the crime of aggression was concerned, the IMT at 
Nuremberg could not rely on any definition in the Nuremberg Charter, and the IMT 
also did not provide its own definition of ‘aggression’ or ‘war of aggression’. The 
ILC noted the following: 
‘It was by reviewing the historical events before and during the war that it [the 
Nuremberg Tribunal] found that certain of the defendants planned and waged 
aggressive wars against twelve nations and were therefore guilty of a series of 
crimes.’388 
 
One important clarification that the ILC included in their commentary on the 
Nuremberg Principles, was on the meaning of the words ‘waging of a war of 
aggression’. It was noted that some members of the ILC regarded this to extend 
criminal liability for ‘waging’ a war of aggression to all persons (in uniform) who 
fought in the war in question. However, the ILC interpreted the judgment at 
Nuremberg to limit responsibility for ‘waging’ a war of aggression to senior military 
officers and personnel and senior State officials.389 
 
The language of Principle VI (a) affirms (with some measure of clarification) the 
criminality of international aggression, but does not provide for a definition of 
aggression. The desirability of an international criminal code and/or court with 
jurisdiction over aggression was thus clear. To affirm the jurisprudential legacy of 
Nuremberg was not enough; a clear definition of aggression (which could be 
applied beyond the political settlement of the Second World War) was needed, 
                                                     
388 Arthur Watts (International Law Commission Vol III (supra) 1665. 
389 Arthur Watts (International Law Commission Vol III) (supra) 1665. 
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together with a tribunal to enforce this aspect of international criminal law. With 
the formulation of the Nuremberg Principles the ILC completed the first important 
part of the comprehensive project to preserve the legacy of Nuremberg. The 
second leg of this important project was to make the principles more concrete and 
relevant for future generations. Thus, a first draft Code of Offences against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind was finalised in 1954. Following on that, a number 
of further draft Codes were authored between 1954 and 1996. Sir Arthur Watts 
noted that one can in this regard distinguish between two phases, namely the draft 
Codes of the period 1947 to 1954; and the period 1982 to 1996.390 It is clear, 
however, that the Nuremberg Principles were the foundational work from which 
the ILC draft codes cannot be separated.391 
 
4.2.2  Building on the Nuremberg Principles:  The further work of the 
International Law Commission:  Searching for a definition of aggression  
 
Bassiouni and Ferencz pointed out that the drafters of the UN Charter did not view 
it necessary to provide for any definition of aggression, apart from the wording of 
Article 39.392 Aggression was thus put firmly in the domain of international political 
processes via the Security Council, and not primarily in the judicial domain as it 
was done at Nuremberg and the other post-war trials. There were however 
attempts to define aggression for purposes of criminal responsibility. The most 
important work in this regard was done by the ILC in the context of its twin tasks of 
                                                     
390 Arthur Watts (International Law Commission Vol III) (supra) 1669. 
391 See references by Arthur Watts (International Law Commission Vol III) (supra) 1669. to the foundational GA 
Res 177 (II) of 21 Nov 1947, which requested the ILC to identify and formulate the Nuremberg Principles and to 
write a draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 
392 Bassiouni and Ferencz in Bassiouni (International Criminal Law) (supra) 322. 
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compiling the Nuremberg Principles and writing draft Codes on criminal liability for 
the most important crimes under international law, including aggression. 
 
It is important to study the development of the various ILC draft Codes. These 
drafts shed some light on the trends in international legal thinking and are indeed 
important legal sources. Gerhard Werle described the role of the draft Codes as 
follows:  ‘The reports and drafts … are aids in determining customary international 
law and general principles of law, and thus have significant influence on the 
development of international criminal law. The various revisions of the [draft 
Codes] have proved particularly influential for substantive international criminal 
law.’393 
 
4.2.2.1 The Draft Code of Offences against Peace and Security of Mankind (1954)394 
 
In 1951 the ILC adopted a draft of the Code of Offences against Peace and Security 
of Mankind for circulation among governments. They adopted the final text of the 
draft Code in 1954. One of the problematic aspects of the draft Code related to the 
definition of aggression. In the light of this, the General Assembly decided to task 
a Special Committee to deal with this particular problem. However, despite the 
fact that the definition of aggression (or lack of such a definition) remained a 
problematic aspect, the ILC nevertheless adopted the draft Code which included 
the crimes covered under ‘offences against peace and security’, namely ‘an act of 
                                                     
393 Gerhard Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 53.  
394 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1954), Yearbook of the ILC, 1954, 151; 
UN Doc A/2693 (1954), reproduced in Christine Van den Wyngaert (International Criminal Law) (supra) 321. 
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aggression’ and ‘any threat of aggression’.395 The relevant parts396 of Article 2 of 
the draft Code provides as follows: 
‘The following acts are offences against the peace and security of mankind: 
1. Any act of aggression, including the employment by the authorities of a State of 
armed force against another State for any purpose other than national or 
collective self-defence or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation of a 
competent organ of the United Nations. 
2. Any threat by the authorities of a State to resort to an act of aggression against 
another State. 
3. The preparation by the authorities of a State of the employment of armed force 
against another State for any purpose other than national or collective self-
defence or in pursuance of a decision or recommendations of a competent organ 
of the United Nations.’ 
 
The ILC’s 1951 comment on the draft Code referred to the fact that the inclusion 
of crimes against peace in the Code was confirmation of the General Assembly’s 
resolution of 1950397, a resolution that reaffirmed that aggression is the gravest of 
all crimes against peace and security. In addition, the relevant paragraph of the 
draft Code also took the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal into consideration.398 
The 1951 comment further made reference to all the important instruments on the 
illegality of the use of force (Covenant of the League of Nations, Kellogg-Briand 
Pact etc) as well as the jus contra bellum dispensation in terms of the UN Charter, 
notably Article 2(4). The comment also referred to the ILC draft Declaration on 
                                                     
395 See Arthur Watts (International Law Commission Vol III) (supra) 1670. 
396 The remaining provisions of Article 2 deal with other forms of intervention, violation of sovereignty, 
encouragement of civil strife, terrorism, annexation of territory contrary to international law etc. Art 2 also 
make provision for the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
397 GA Res 380 (V), 17 Nov 1950. 
398 Arthur Watts (International Law Commission Vol III) (supra) 1677. 
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Rights and Duties of States, which also provided for the prohibition of war as an 
instrument of national policy.399 On criminal responsibility for aggression, the 
comment read as follows: ‘The offence defined in this paragraph [Article 2, par 1] 
can be committed only by the authorities of a State. A criminal responsibility of 
private individuals under international law may, however, arise under the 
provisions of paragraph [13] of [this] article.’400  
 
From a criminal law perspective the provisions of Article 2 did not in fact address 
the problem of a suitable definition of aggression. Both the ILC and the Sixth 
Committee of the UN General Assembly (which deals with legal matters) could not 
agree on a definition. The disagreement was not confined to the substantive 
content of aggression. Indeed, the Sixth Committee itself was not capable of 
agreeing on whether aggression could (or should) be defined at all.401  
 
In terms of the collective security system structured by the UN Charter, the task of 
the maintenance of international peace and security is allocated to the Security 
Council.402 One of the main features of this dispensation is the paramount role of 
the Security Council in determining whether international incidents would qualify 
as ‘acts of aggression’.403 Thus, during the early 1950’s this dispensation caused 
some political unease in the General Assembly and led the Assembly to further 
investigate the possibility to define aggression.  
 
                                                     
399 Arthur Watts (International Law Commission Vol III) (supra) 1677. 
400 Arthur Watts (International Law Commission Vol III) (supra) 1677.  
401 Cherif Bassiouni and Benjamin Ferencz ‘The Crime against Peace’, in Cherif Bassiouni (International Criminal 
Law Vol I) (supra) 323. See further Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 353 – 355. 
402 See discussion in Ch 1 above. 
403 See Art 39 UN Charter; discussion of Ch VII powers of the SC in Ch 1 above. 
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The work of the ILC on the draft Code, as well as processes within the General 
Assembly to establish the content of the crime of aggression, must be viewed 
against the background of not only the frustration over the lack of a definition of 
aggression, but also because of the place of the crime of aggression within the 
Security Council-dominated collective security system.404 Should aggression be 
treated as primarily a political problem; or a criminal justice problem? This 
underlying dynamic formed an important impetus for the further quest for a 
definition of aggression – with important implications for the overall development 
of international criminal law.  
 
While the ILC’s draft Code certainly represented a concrete effort to ‘define’ 
aggression (albeit unsatisfactorily from a criminal law point of view), it is 
nevertheless important to consider the value of the draft Code’s treatment of the 
subject of aggression contextually. Thus, the drafting process exposed the many 
political and legal dimensions impacting on the quest to define aggression at 
international level. 
 
4.2.2.2 The Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
(1991)405 
 
While the early 1990’s were in many respects very hopeful and optimistic times 
(the fall of the Berlin Wall; the end of the Cold War; democratization in Eastern 
Europe; the official end of apartheid in South Africa), there were also events that 
                                                     
404 See Bassiouni and Ferencz in Cherif Bassiouni (International Criminal Law) (supra) 323 – 324. 
405 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1991), Report of the ILC, 43rd Session, 
UNGAOR, 46th Session, Supp No 10, A/46/10 (1991), reprinted in Christine Van den Wyngaert (International 
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threatened international peace and security. These events challenged the ‘New 
World Order’ that was supposed to have emerged after the end of the Cold War. 
Most vividly, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the subsequent US-led armed 
response to liberate Kuwait were widely broadcasted by CNN and other media to 
make this war the first major ‘media war’. This conflict was also a major test for 
the post-Cold War collective security system and the working of the Security 
Council.406 The Security Council was indeed able to respond to the invasion in a 
way unimaginable during the Cold War era. In terms of Resolution 660 of 2 August 
1990, the Security Council determined that the invasion was a breach of 
international peace and security. This determination was followed by a number of 
Resolutions setting out Security Council action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
including the important Resolution 678 which served as the basis for an 
international coalition, led by the USA, to act in collective self-defence and to 
liberate Kuwait.407 
 
The international political response to the violation of peace and security by Iraq 
was accompanied by calls for the creation of an international criminal tribunal to 
try senior Iraqi officials – including the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein – for crimes 
under international law. The international community, while willing to co-operate 
to end the conflict, was not enthusiastic about the creation of an international 
criminal tribunal. However, as a consequence, the work of the ILC on international 
crimes, including the crime of aggression, gained renewed attention. After the 
                                                     
406 For a brief description of the events that led to the (First) Gulf War in 1990-1991 and the role of the UN SC, 
see Stephen Ambrose (Rise to Globalism) (supra). For a legal analysis of the SC action in the wake of the 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990, see Arthur Mark Weisburd in Enzo Cannizzaro and Paolo Palchetti Customary 
International Law on the Use of Force – A Methodological Approach (2005) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 
51 – 53. 
407 See in general Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression and Self-defence) (supra) 294 – 296. 
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issue was dormant for many years, the question of the definition of aggression 
received new prominence with the adoption of the 1991 draft Code of Crimes 
against Peace and Security of Mankind.408 
 
Article 15 (Aggression), provides as follows: 
‘1. An individual who as leader or organizer plans, commits or orders the 
commission of an act of aggression shall, on conviction thereof, be sentenced 
(to…). 
2. Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. 
3. The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall 
constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression, although the Security 
Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an 
act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other 
relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their 
consequences are not of sufficient gravity. 
4. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, constitutes an act 
of aggression, due regard being paid to paragraphs 2 and 3: 
(a) the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another 
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion 
or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or 
part thereof; 
(b) bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another 
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State; 
(c) the blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another 
State; 
                                                     
408 Lyal Sunga (Emerging system) (supra) 10 – 11. 
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(d) an attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or 
marine and air fleets of another State; 
(e) the use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another 
State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions 
provided for in the agreement, or any extension of their presence in such territory 
beyond the termination of the agreement; 
(f) the action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal 
of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of 
aggression against a third State; 
(g) the sending by or on behalf of a State or armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts or armed force against another State of such 
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement 
therein; 
(h) any other acts determined by the Security Council as constituting acts of 
aggression under the provisions of the Charter; 
5. Any determination by the Security Council as to the existence of an act of 
aggression is binding on national courts. 
6. Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as in any way enlarging or diminishing 
the scope of the Charter of the United Nations including its provisions concerning 
cases in which the use of force is lawful. 
7. Nothing in this article could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, 
freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly 
deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under 
colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of 
these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in 
accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-
mentioned Declaration.’ 
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 Article 16 (Threat of aggression), provides as follows: 
‘1. An individual who as leader or organizer commits or orders the commission of a 
threat of aggression shall, on conviction thereof, be sentenced (to…). 
2. Threat of aggression consists of declarations, communications, demonstrations of 
force or any other measures which would give good reason to the Government of a 
State to believe that aggression is being seriously contemplated against that State.’ 
 
It is clear from the text of the 1991 draft Code that the ILC intended the proposed 
substantive provisions to be much broader in scope than the 1954 draft Code. The 
crimes provided for in the 1991 draft Code was intended by the ILC to form the 
competence ratione materiae of a future international criminal court.409 At the 
time, the creation of what would become the first permanent international 
criminal court – the ICC in terms of the Rome Statute, 1998 – was still politically 
and legally unlikely. Nevertheless, some commentators viewed the draft Code as a 
possible set of guidelines for the prosecution of international crimes at national 
level. The formulation of some of the crimes or categories of crimes in the draft 
Code came in for strong criticism, especially from criminal and constitutional 
lawyers. John Murphy, one such commentator, identified a number of problematic 
aspects relating to the structure and formulation of the offences contained in the 
draft Code.410 It has to be said that he analysed and criticised the various 
provisions, including the provisions on aggression, from a US constitutional and 
criminal law perspective. However, it is submitted that these criticisms were 
noteworthy at the time and are still relevant from an international criminal law 
                                                     
409 Lyal Sunga (supra) 11. 
410 John F Murphy, ‘Commentaries on the Draft Code of Crimes, 11 Nouvelles Études Pénales 209 (1993) 
[excerpts reprinted in Bassiouni (International Criminal Law Vol I) (supra) 338 – 340]. 
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point of view, since the system of international criminal law still relies (even after 
the coming into operation of the ICC) to a large extent on national courts to apply 
the norms of international criminal law.411  
 
Murphy raised the general objection that the provisions on aggression (Articles 15 
and 16) were ‘simply unacceptable’, because they were too vague and were 
essentially designed to serve ‘various political agendas’.412 The Draft Code could 
serve a useful purpose in guiding the Security Council with its determination of 
‘acts of aggression’, but not as a definition of a crime in a court of law. Murphy 
pointed to US case law that held that ‘a criminal statute is void (as a constitutional 
law matter) when it is so vague and imprecise that “men of common intelligence 
must guess its meaning and differ as to its application”.’413 Murphy referred to the 
fact that words like ‘use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations’ (Article 15(2)), are ‘imprecise’ 
and ‘subject to too many varying interpretations’.414  
 
These concerns from a national constitutional and criminal law perspective could 
equally have been made from an international criminal law perspective, where the 
legality principle (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) is also protected. The 
principle of legality at international level is today protected in terms of treaty and 
                                                     
411 See Gerhard Erasmus and Gerhard Kemp ‘The application of international criminal law before domestic 
courts in the light of recent developments in international and constitutional law’ 27 SAYIL (2002) 64.  
412 Murphy in Cherif Bassiouni (International Criminal Law Vol I) (supra) 338. 
413 Reference to Coronally v General Construction Company, 296 US 385, 391 (1926); Murphy in Cherif Bassiouni 
(International Criminal Law Vol I) (supra) 339. 
414 Murphy in Cherif Bassiouni (International Criminal Law Vol I) (supra) 339. 
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customary international law.415 It is submitted that from a national criminal law 
perspective (set out by Murphy above), many of the criticisms against the 
formulation of Articles 15 and 16 of the draft Code could equally be informed by 
the principle of legality as protected in international criminal law.416 Furthermore, 
the way in which the draft Code extended the notions of aggression and threat of 
aggression, seems to be unrealistic. It is clear that the notion of aggression in the 
draft Code was almost identical to that of the UN General Assembly Consensus 
Definition of Aggression (1974)417, which were drafted with state liability (not 
individual criminal liability) in mind.418 
 
4.2.2.3 The Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
(1996)419 
 
The provision on aggression contained in the 1996 draft Code is much shorter than 
the 1991 draft and is basically a restatement of the interpretation and application 
of aggression by the Nuremberg Tribunal. Article 16 (Crime of aggression) provides 
as follows: 
‘An individual who, as leader or organizer, actively participates in or orders the 
planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression committed by a State shall 
be responsible for a crime of aggression.’ 
                                                     
415 Hans-Heinrich Jescheck ‘The general principles of International Criminal Law set out in Nuremberg, as 
mirrored in the ICC Statute’ 2 JICJ (2004) 38 – 55; Gerhard Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) 
(supra) 32 – 34. 
416 See also Introduction par c.1.3 supra. 
417 See discussion in par 4.2.3 et seq infra. 
418 See comments by Timothy McCormack and Gerry Simpson ‘The International Law Commission’s Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind:  An appraisal of the substantive provisions’ 5(1) Criminal 
Law Forum (1994) 1 – 55. 
419 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 5 Jul 1996, Yearbook of the ILC 1996 vol II 
(2); http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htm. Reprinted in Christine Van den Wyngaert (International 
Criminal Law) (supra) 331.  
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 Although the formulation of Article 16 was clearly not intended to shed any new 
light on the definition of aggression, the ILC was intent on confirming and 
emphasising individual criminal liability for the crime of aggression. In their 
commentary on Article 16 the ILC stated as follows: 
‘The phrase “An individual … shall be responsible for a crime of aggression” is used 
to indicate that the scope of the present article is limited to the crime of 
aggression for the purpose of individual criminal responsibility. Thus, the present 
article does not address the question of the definition of aggression by a State 
which is beyond the scope of the present Code.’420 
 
Bassiouni and Ferencz observed that the work of the ILC on the definition of 
aggression involved a process of ‘gradual deletion’. Article 16 in the 1996 draft 
Code was a total replacement of the deleted (and much longer) definition of 
aggression contained in the 1991 draft Code. Thus, the 1996 provision on aggression 
contained no list of the elements of aggression – only the confirmation that 
individuals can be held liable for the crime of aggression.421 It seems that the role 
of the Security Council as a sine qua non for determining the existence of an act of 
aggression loomed so large that it was politically and legally not possible (or 
desirable) to define aggression in the draft Code. After all the attempts to define 
aggression (with elements clear enough for purposes of criminal liability and in 
accordance with the internationally recognised principle of nullum crimen, nulla 
poena sine lege), the 1996 draft Code was a giant step backwards. The commentary 
of the ILC on Article 16 of the 1996 draft Code confirmed that ‘[the] Charter [of 
the UN] and Judgement of the Nürnberg Tribunal are the main sources of authority 
                                                     
420 Arthur Watts (The International Law Commission Vol III) (supra) 1738. 
421 Bassiouni and Ferencz in Cherif Bassiouni (International Criminal Law Vol I) (supra) 342. 
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with regard to individual criminal responsibility for acts of aggression.’ Thus, 
according to this comment, any court that would want to determine criminal 
responsibility of an individual for the crime of aggression, would have to determine 
whether the State in question violated the prohibition of the use of force in Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter, and further, ‘whether such conduct [constituted] a 
sufficiently serious violation of an international obligation’.422  
 
4.2.3 The UN General Assembly ‘Consensus Definition’ of Aggression (1974) 
 
4.2.3.1 The Definition in perspective 
 
In the decades that followed the establishment of the United Nations, and while 
the various efforts of the International Law Commission to define aggression (and 
to draft the legal framework for an international criminal court) were ongoing, 
international claims of ‘aggression’ were manifold.423 As Bassiouni and Ferencz put 
it, ‘[it] was easier to commit aggression than to define it.’424  
 
                                                     
422 Arthur Watts (The International Law Commission Vol III) (supra) 1739. See further comments by Lyal Sunga 
(Emerging system) (supra) 13 – 14. On the deletions and ‘slimming down’ of the 1996 draft Code (compared to 
the much broader and more detailed 1991 draft Code) Sunga concluded as follows: ‘A more restrictive and 
precise international criminal code would promote greater objectivity, fairness and predictability in 
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See also comments by Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression and Self-Defence) (supra) 124 – 125. 
423 For instance:  The invasion of Hungary by the Red Army of the Soviet Union, various military interventions in 
Latin America, and perhaps the most notorious conflict of the post-Second World War era – the conflict in 
Vietnam. For an ‘insider’s perspective’ on many of these conflicts (especially the Vietnam conflict), see Henry 
Kissinger (Diplomacy) (supra). See further Stephen Ambrose (Rise to Globalism) (supra) 224 – 253 for a 
discussion of the foreign policy of US Pres Nixon and the impact of détente.  
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Bassiouni and Ferencz submitted that the compromises that were reached in the 
UN Special Committee that dealt with the question of a definition for aggression, 
was in part made possible by the ‘spirit of détente’ that was prevalent in 
international politics at the end of the Vietnam war in the early 1970’s.425 The 
‘spirit of détente’ did not, of course, replace the divisions that characterised Cold 
War international relations,426 but merely made it possible to reach certain key 
agreements at the UN. A close scrutiny of the text of the ‘Consensus Definition of 
Aggression’ reveals the political divisions of the time. Nevertheless, after much 
debate the Sixth (Legal Affairs) Committee of the General Assembly was able to 
accept (in substance) the proposed text of the Special Committee. The slightly 
amended text was adopted by the General Assembly as Resolution 3314 (XXIX) on 
14 December 1974. This Resolution is not legally binding, but is nevertheless quite 
a significant text with interpretative value.427 
 
The substantive provisions of the UN General Assembly ‘Consensus Definition of 
Aggression’428 provides as follows: 
‘Article 1 
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition. 
Explanatory note:  In this Definition the term “State”: 
                                                     
425 Bassiouni and Ferencz in Cherif Bassiouni (International Criminal Law Vol I) (supra) 327. 
426 For a critical assessment of the geopolitical realities of the era of détente after the Vietnam conflict, see 
Henry Kissinger (Diplomacy) (supra) 733 – 761. 
427 See Cherif Bassiouni International Criminal Law Conventions and their Penal Provisions (1997) Transnational 
Publishers, New York, 227. 
428 UN Res No 3314 (XXIX). Definition of Aggression (1974) GA Res of 14 Dec 1974, 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/29/ares29.htm, reprinted in Christine Van den Wyngaert (International 
Criminal Law) (supra) 357 – 358; (1974), 13 ILM 710.  
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(a) Is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is a 
member of the United Nations; 
(b) Includes the concept of a “group of States” where appropriate. 
 
Article 2 
The First use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall 
constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security 
Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an 
act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other 
relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their 
consequences are not of sufficient gravity. 
 
Article 3 
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to an in 
accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another 
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such 
invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of 
another State or part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another 
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another 
State; 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another 
State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or 
marine and air fleets of another State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another 
State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the 
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conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in 
such territory beyond the termination of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the 
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act 
of aggression against a third State; 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts or armed force against another State of such 
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement 
therein. 
 
Article 4 
The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may 
determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter. 
 
Article 5 
1. No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or 
otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression. 
2. A war of aggression is a crime against international peace. Aggression gives rise 
to international responsibility. 
3. No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from aggression is or 
shall be recognized as lawful. 
 
Article 6 
Nothing in this Definition shall be construed as in any way enlarging or diminishing 
the scope of the Charter, including its provisions concerning cases in which the use 
of force is lawful. 
 
Article 7 
 - 158 - 
 
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way prejudice 
the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the 
Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien 
domination:  nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and 
receive support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity 
with the above-mentioned Declaration. 
 
Article 8 
In their interpretation and application the above provisions are interrelated and 
each provision should be construed in the context of the other provisions. 
 
While the political context in which the consensus Definition of Aggression of 1974 
was agreed on was clearly one of hope in a time of reduced international tension 
(the period of détente), the Definition itself was the subject of some strong 
criticism from legal scholars and commentators. Rhetoric about the virtues of this 
new Definition sprung forth to underline an achievement that was perhaps more of 
a testament to the politics of détente than clear legal drafting. Julius Stone, one of 
the Definition’s strongest critics, put the central critique as follows:  ‘[That] 
remarkable text rather appears to have codified into itself (and in some respects 
extended) all the main “juridical loopholes and pre-texts to unleash aggression” 
available under preexisting international law, as modified by the UN Charter.’429  
 
                                                     
429 Julius Stone ‘Hopes and loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression’ 71 AJIL (1977), 224. 
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Generally speaking, the Definition is quite useful as an indication of the 
international community’s understanding of the notion of aggression, but less so 
from a purely legal (and certainly international criminal law) perspective.430 It is 
perhaps appropriate to describe the value of the Definition as a guide for the 
Security Council more than a legal definition for judicial interpretation.431  
 
There seems to be many compromises in the text that were the result of attempts 
to cover the deep-seated political and doctrinal divisions within the international 
community. Even more than that, the Definition also reflects the structural aspects 
of the UN-dominated collective security system that is central to the problem of 
finding an acceptable (and workable) definition of aggression. To an important 
extent the Definition exposed the inherent weaknesses caused by the powerful role 
of the Security Council in matters that affect the aggression-debate.  
 
Article 1 of the Definition lists the basic protected interests of the generic notion 
of aggression. Although, as Bassiouni and Ferencz have pointed out, Article 1 has 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter as its foundation, there are some important 
differences in content and structure between the two texts.432 While both the UN 
Charter and some of the Nuremberg judgments include ‘threat of force’ as part of 
the notion of aggression, the Definition does not include it as such.433 An 
                                                     
430 See Justin Hogan-Doran & Bibi T van Ginkel ‘Aggression as a crime under international law and the 
prosecution of individuals by the proposed International Criminal Court’ NILR (1996) 321 – 351, 336. 
431 Caroline Fournet (International Crimes) (supra) 160. 
432 Bassiouni and Ferencz in Cherif Bassiouni (International Criminal Law Vol I) (supra) 329. 
433 See reference to The Ministries Case, Military Tribunal IV, Case 11, The United States of America against 
Weizsaeker et al, Vol XII, XIII, Trials of War Criminals, Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Bassiouni and Ferencz in 
Cherif Bassiouni (International Criminal Law Vol I) (supra) 329. Defendants Wilhelm Keppler and Hans Heinrich 
Lammers were convicted on charges of crimes against peace, but the convictions of the other defendants - 
Ernst von Weizsaeker and Ernst Wörmann - were overturned on appeal. See further Gerhard Werle (Principles 
of International Criminal Law) (supra) 391. 
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interesting addition to the notion of aggression is the reference to ‘sovereignty’ in 
Article 1 of the Definition. Bassiouni and Ferencz found this to undermine at least 
some aspects of the prohibition of the use of force-dispensation: 
‘The … reference to “sovereignty” in the definition seems to strengthen a concept 
that runs counter to the notion of the interdependence of states and the need for 
nations to yield some of their prerogatives if there is to be any effective control 
over the use of armed force.’434 
 
The Definition was, on balance, not a very successful attempt to define aggression 
form an international criminal law perspective. However, it did help the Security 
Council on a number of occasions to make findings that certain state conduct 
amounted to ‘aggression’.435 In this respect one can say that the Definition helped 
to concretise the notion of aggression that is not defined as such in the UN Charter.  
 
4.2.3.2 Some observations on the usefulness of the Definition from an 
international criminal law perspective:  Elements of criminal liability 
 
The notion of individual criminal responsibility is one of the key principles of 
modern international criminal law. In essence this entails that individuals are 
criminally liable for unlawful conduct (actus reus), provided that a mental element 
(mens rea) can in some way be ‘directed to or linked with the commission of the 
crime’.436 
 
                                                     
434 Bassiouni and Ferencz in Cherif Bassiouni (International Criminal Law Vol I) (supra) 329. 
435 For instance, the SC employed the 1974 Def in its finding that South Africa has committed ‘acts of 
aggression’ against Angola in the 1970’s war. See SC Res 387 (1976) 31 March 1976. See further Hogan-Doran 
and Van Ginkel (supra) 334. 
436 Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 159. 
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(a) Actus reus 
 
The language and structure of the 1974 Definition reflects the two basic 
approaches to aggression that were advanced during the debates preceding the 
adoption of the consensus Definition. While Article 1 contains a more general 
approach to aggression (based on the language of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter), 
Article 3 (read with Article 2) contains a non-exhaustive list of acts that would 
typically constitute aggression (such as military invasion and occupation of 
territory). The fact that the Definition contains elements of both the general 
definition and enumerative approaches is yet another indication of not only the 
political but also doctrinal compromises that were made to reach a Consensus 
Definition.437 
 
(b) Mens rea 
 
The 1974 Definition of Aggression, which focuses on state-liability and not 
individual criminal liability, naturally does not provide for the element of mens 
rea. However, this means that the Definition cannot really serve as a basis for 
individual criminal liability for the crime of aggression. In this regard the Definition 
does not move beyond the UN Charter dispensation where it is left to the Security 
Council to determine whether acts of aggression occurred.438 There is therefore no 
specific mention of what would constitute the subjective mental element(s) 
necessary to prove criminal liability for aggression.439 It is submitted that the 
absence of specific provisions on mens rea in the 1974 Definition is a serious lacuna 
                                                     
437 Hogan-Doran and Van Ginkel (supra) 335. 
438 See Stone (Hopes and Loopholes) (supra) 228. 
439 See Hogan-Doran and Van Ginkel (supra) 336 – 337. 
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from a criminal law perspective. This is not to say that the drafters of the text did 
not intend it to be so, given the state-centred nature of the Definition, but it 
should be clear that the Definition as it stands cannot serve as the basis for 
individual criminal liability.  
 
Yoram Dinstein pointed out that, given the seriousness of aggression as an 
international crime, a special kind of subjective element (sometimes referred to as 
animus aggressionis) developed around the concept of crimes against peace.440 The 
need for actus reus to be accompanied by mens rea was also confirmed by the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and subsequent trials of senior Nazis by the various Control 
Council-proceedings.441 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree stated that the mens rea-element 
of aggression involves intent plus knowledge. In this regard, he quoted the 
following passage from the High Command case442, where the US Military Tribunal 
held that individuals accused of the crime of aggression must have 
‘actual knowledge that an aggressive war is being intended and that if launched it 
will be an aggressive war. It requires in addition that the possessor of such 
knowledge, after he acquires it shall be in a position to shape or influence the 
policy that brings about its initiation or its continuance after its initiation, either by 
furthering, or by hindering or preventing it. If he then does the former, he becomes 
criminally responsible; if he does the latter to the extent of his ability, then his 
action shows the lack of criminal intent with respect to such policy…’443 
 
Dinstein summarised the mens rea-requirement as follows: 
                                                     
440 Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression and Self-Defence) (supra) 136.  
441 See references and discussion by Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression and Self-Defence) (supra) 137. 
442 Wilhelm von Leeb and Others, US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 28 Oct 1948, as quoted in Kittichaisaree 
(International Criminal Law) (supra) 221. 
443 Ibid. 
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‘The intent to undertake war of aggression may be formed by only one or few 
individuals at the helm of a State. Others at the policy-making level need not be 
personally guided by the same intent. The acid test is whether, in assisting the 
preparations for war, they actually know of the aggressive schemes. If they know 
that aggression is planned, this may suffice to establish the requisite mens rea. The 
obverse side of the coin is that when a person (who actively participates in honing 
the military machinery) does not possess personal knowledge as to aggressive plans, 
he cannot be convicted of crimes against peace.’444 
 
The 1974 Definition brings us closer to an understanding of what acts would 
constitute aggression under international law. However, the important subjective 
element is still lacking and certainly open for debate. 
 
4.3 Concluding remarks:  Attempts to define aggression in the light of the 
Nuremberg legacy 
 
There are different schools of thought on the possibility and desirability to define 
aggression. Julius Stone, one of the prominent exponents of the ‘sceptical school’ 
supported the criticism that a definition would provide a ‘trap for the innocent and 
a signpost for the guilty’.445 This school of thought opposed attempts to define 
                                                     
444 Dinstein (War Aggression and Self-Defence) (supra) 137. For a discussion of the element of mens rea in 
international criminal law, see Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 159 – 178. 
445 Julius Stone (1958) as quoted in Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 355. Echoes of this scepticism can also 
be found in the debate about US opposition to the ICC, particularly in the context of the process of drafting a 
definition for the crime of aggression for purposes of ICC jurisdiction. For some of these arguments, see 
William Nash ‘The ICC and the Deployment of US Armed Forces’ in Sarah Sewall and Carl Kaysen The United 
States and the International Criminal Court (2000) Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, Maryland, 153 – 
164. The controversial nature of the crime of aggression, and the debate about a suitable definition, resulted 
in the compromise provision of Art 5(d) of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which lists aggression as one of the 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, but further provides that the ICC can only exercise jurisdiction over 
the crime after adoption of an acceptable definition. See Theodor Meron ‘Crimes under the jurisdiction of the 
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aggression, regardless of whether a ‘general definition’ approach or ‘enumerative’ 
approach was taken. These sceptical voices were also informed by a desire not to 
restrict the functions of international bodies (notably the Security Council) in 
determining or identifying the occurrence of aggression.446 
 
Ian Brownlie, a proponent of attempts to define aggression, stated the following 
about the requirements for a definition of aggression: 
‘Definition must involve generalization and employ elements which require further 
definition. It may also be said that no definition is ‘automatic’, since the organ 
concerned must necessarily apply any criteria to particular facts. Particularly 
dubious is the argument that a criminal may take advantage of a precise definition; 
one might assume instead that he would welcome the absence of a definition.’447 
 
Apart from the general comments on the desirability (and indeed possibility) to 
define aggression, Brownlie further argued that the international legal conditions 
were in place to define aggression, since ‘states generally have accepted 
obligations relating to the use of force expressed in various forms of words, 
‘aggression’ or its variants being merely one of these forms.’448  
 
The real problem, according to Brownlie, was that since the Nuremberg trials and 
the creation of the new UN-dominated collective security system, ‘the quest for a 
definition of aggression’ became a ‘vast law-making project with many facets’.449 
From being originally a military concept, it became much more of a legal concept 
                                                                                                                                                                     
International Criminal Court’ in Herman von Hebel, Johan Lammers and Jolien Schukking (eds) Reflections on 
the International Criminal Court – Essays in Honour of Adriaan Bos (1999) TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 47 – 48. 
446 See Brownlie (International Law and the Use of Force) (supra) 355. 
447 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 356. 
448 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 356. 
449 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 356. 
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after the First World War.450 While the IMT at Nuremberg (and certainly the 
subsequent proceedings) interpreted and applied aggression rather narrowly, the 
attempts to define aggression in the post-Second World War era drew a number of 
state policies that might have an impact on the interests of other states451 — thus 
making the ‘law-making project’ much more comprehensive, but less focussed and 
certainly, in the end, less successful.452 The concept of aggression was no longer 
limited to the use of armed force, but concepts like ‘economic aggression’453 and 
‘indirect aggression’ (states acting vicariously)454 were also entertained and played 
a role in the different drafting processes and debates on a suitable definition for 
aggression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
450 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 356. See also discussion of the various post-First World War instruments 
in Ch 2 supra. 
451 Ian Brownlie (Use of Force) (supra) 356.  
452 See critical assessment of the various ILC Draft Codes of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind in 
para 4.2.2.1 – 4.2.2.3 supra. 
453 See also discussion by Julius Stone (Hopes and Loopholes) (supra) 230 – 231. 
454 See further Julius Stone (Hopes and Loopholes) (supra) 237 – 239, for a discussion of ‘Aggression and attack 
by armed bands and volunteers’.  
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 5.1  Introduction:  The relationship between international (criminal) law and 
national law 
 
There is no international criminal tribunal455 with effective jurisdiction over 
aggression. In the present chapter it is argued that the success of the system of 
international criminal law cannot rely solely on prosecutions of individuals before 
ad hoc international tribunals or the International Criminal Court (ICC). For 
practical, logistical and policy reasons, it is clear that much of the success of the 
movement against impunity for international crimes depends upon the application 
of international criminal law in domestic courts.456  
 
Certain events shock the whole of humankind. In such contexts domestic 
prosecutions are of international significance. In the Eichmann-case, for instance, 
the Supreme Court of Israel said the following about war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, as core crimes under international law: 
‘[Core crimes] constitute acts which damage vital international interests; they 
impair the foundations and security of the international community; they violate 
the universal moral values and humanitarian principles that lie hidden in the 
criminal law systems adopted by civilised nations … Those crimes entail individual 
criminal responsibility because they challenge the foundations of [the] international 
society and affront the conscience of civilised nations … [They] involve the 
                                                     
455 The crime of aggression is included as one of the crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction. The process of 
drafting a definition of and formulating conditions under which the ICC will exercise jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression, is analysed in Ch 6 and Ch 7 infra. 
456 Chris van den Wyngaert Strafrecht en Strafprocesrecht (1999) Maklu, Antwerp, 939-940; Lyal Sunga 
(Emerging system) (supra) 249. 
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perpetration of an international crime which all the nations of the world are 
interested in preventing.’457 
 
The quotation above contains at least three important protected interests:  
‘Humanitarian concerns’, ‘universal moral values’, ‘foundations and security of the 
international community’. The crimes that damage these values are the so-called 
core crimes prosecuted at Nuremberg and Tokyo (war crimes, crimes against 
peace, and crimes against humanity). The list of crimes affecting the whole of 
humanity can be extended to include the post-Nuremberg criminalisation of 
genocide, as well as crimes of international concern like apartheid and torture.458  
 
The history of international criminal law shows that in the absence of an 
international criminal court, the enforcement in domestic courts of the norms of 
international criminal law (more specifically the so-called core crimes459) gained 
importance.460 This possibility (which proved to be quite successful for the 
prosecution of war crimes and to a certain extent crimes against humanity and 
genocide), was not used for the crime of aggression.461 Yoram Dinstein submitted 
the following broad set of reasons for the lack of prosecutions at national level for 
the crime of aggression, or for crimes against peace in general:  
                                                     
457 Attorney General of Israel v Eichmann, 29 May 1962, 36 ILR 277, 291-293. For the complete transcripts of 
the trial (provided by the Nizkor Project) see www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts.  
458 Edward Wise and Ellen Podgor International Criminal Law:  Cases and Materials (2000) Lexis Publishing, New 
York, 498. 
459 War crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and aggression. It will be pointed out in this Ch that 
aggression, although a serious international crime, was never prosecuted at national level. In fact, since the 
post-Second World War prosecutions discussed in Ch 3 supra, aggression has never been prosecuted.  
460 See also Introduction par c.1.1 (supra) for more on this aspect of the emerging system of international 
criminal law. 
461 For a comparative analysis of selective jurisdictions that allow for the prosecution of international crimes in 
national courts, see Ward Ferdinandusse Direct Application of International Criminal Law in National Courts 
(2006) TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 17-87. 
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‘The rationale for entrusting an international criminal court with jurisdiction over 
crimes against peace is palpable. Trials of other international crimes (principally, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity) have a lot of merit even when conducted 
before domestic courts. But the nature of crimes against peace is such that no 
domestic proceedings can conceivably dispel doubts regarding the impartiality of 
the judges. As a matter of law, jurisdiction over crimes against peace is probably 
universal, although the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and 
Buergenthal in the 2002 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 [ICJ] 
expressed a certain hesitation about the range of application of the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction. In any event, only enemy (or former enemy) States, rather 
than neutrals, are likely to convict and sentence offenders charged with crimes 
against peace. Any panel of judges comprised exclusively of enemy (or former 
enemy) nationals will be suspected of irrepressible bias. There is no escape from 
the conclusion that the present state of affairs is lamentable, giving rise as it does 
to assertions of ‘victor’s justice’. The flaw in the system cannot be redressed until 
the Rome Statute is amended in a satisfactory fashion.’462  
 
Indeed, the obstacles to prosecute individuals in national courts for the crime of 
aggression do seem (prima facie) to prove Dinstein’s point that it is best to entrust 
an international court with jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. Some of the 
important theoretical and practical factors affecting the possible prosecution of 
individuals for the crime of aggression at national level, are analysed below. 
 
At present there are no international treaties or instruments obliging states 
generally to exercise jurisdiction over individuals for the crime of aggression.463 It 
                                                     
462 Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression Self-Defence) (supra) 145 [Emphasis added]. 
463 The same is true for crimes against humanity. See Alexander Zahar and Göran Sluiter International Criminal 
Law (2008) Oxford University Press, Oxford, 498 [book forthcoming]. 
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was pointed out in the previous Chapters that there is still considerable debate and 
uncertainty as to the definition of aggression.464 This debate is still ongoing due to 
the inclusion of an undefined crime of aggression in the Rome Statute of the ICC.465 
States can of course in their domestic legislation provide for the crime of 
aggression (in various forms). Only a relatively small number of states provide for 
the crime of aggression in this way.466 There are at present no reported 
prosecutions for the crime of aggression on the basis of domestic legislation.467 
 
On the assumption that aggression is a crime under customary international law,468 
the question is whether the theory of direct application of international criminal 
law in domestic courts could serve as a basis for individual criminal liability for the 
crime of aggression.  
 
Before the creation of the permanent ICC, the (international) enforcement of the 
prohibition of crimes under international law depended on ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals like the ICTY and ICTR, and their historical post-Second World 
War predecessors — the IMT Nuremberg and the IMTFE at Tokyo. International 
criminal tribunals (including the permanent ICC) do not always have the 
                                                     
464 See Ch 4 supra. For an overview of the processes and debates in the context of the ICC, see PrepCom (ICC) 
Historical Review of Developments Relating to Aggression, UN Doc PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L1,24 (Jan 2002). See 
further Ch 6 infra. 
465 See discussions in Ch 6 and Ch 7 infra. 
466 Apart from Germany and Iraq (see discussion under par 5.1.3.3 infra), the following states also provide for 
the crime of aggression in one way or another as part of their penal codes:  Armenia, the Russian Federation, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bulgaria, Republic of Macedonia, Republic of 
Montenegro, Latvia. See Christina Villarino Villa ‘The Crime of Aggression before the House of Lords’ 4 JICJ 
(2006) 866-877, 876. 
467 Christina Villarino Villa (Crime of Aggression) (supra) 876. 
468 The basis for this assumption is explained below.  
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mandate,469 or capacity,470 to enforce the norms of international criminal law to 
the fullest extent. National courts are therefore, generally speaking, very 
important complements to international criminal tribunals.471 In order to explain 
the role of national jurisdictions in the context of enforcement of international 
criminal norms, Jann Kleffner identified two roles:  National criminal jurisdictions 
can function as ‘organs of the international community’, and as important role-
players in the ‘domestic legal order in which they operate’.472 Regarding the first 
aspect, Kleffner states as follows: 
‘In enforcing the prohibition of these crimes, national courts … act on behalf of the 
whole of humanity within the international legal order. In the absence of genuine 
international enforcement mechanisms, or to the extent that crimes are beyond the 
reach of such other mechanisms due to their limited mandate or capacity, national 
suppression of the core crimes is the only way to effectuate their prohibitions.’473 
 
The second role referred to above, entails the function of national courts to 
enforce domestic legal norms, or ‘domesticated’ international legal norms.474 The 
result of this can be that the original international norm is transformed to suit 
                                                     
469 For instance, the ICTR’s jurisdiction is limited in terms of time, place, and persons (serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such 
violations committed in neighbouring states between 1 Jan 1994 and 31 Dec 1994). See Art 1 ICTR Statute. The 
ICTY’s competence is also limited in terms of time and territory. Art 1 ICTY Statute provides:  ‘The [ICTY] shall 
have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991’.  
470 International criminal tribunals often only try the major criminals, based on criteria such as seniority and 
leadership roles in military and political structures. For an assessment, see Dominic McGoldrick in Dominic 
McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnelly (eds) The Permanent International Criminal Court – Legal and Policy 
Issues (2004) Hart Publishing, Oxford, 14-25. 
471 Jann Kleffner (Complementarity in the Rome Statute) (supra) 29-35. On the relationship between 
international criminal tribunals and national courts, see Zahar and Sluiter (International Criminal Law) (supra) 
447-476. 
472 Jann Kleffner (Complementarity in the Rome Statute) (supra) 29-30. 
473 Jann Kleffner (Complementarity in the Rome Statute) (supra) 30. 
474 Jann Kleffner (Complementarity in the Rome Statute) (supra) 30-31. 
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domestic legal purposes. In this context it is necessary to examine the relationship 
between international and national law generally, and the possibility to implement 
international (criminal) law via national courts specifically. 
 
5.1.1 The monism/dualism debate 
 
The role of international law vis-à-vis national legal systems has been the subject 
of debate.475 Three476 distinct theories or schools of thought on the subject 
emerged:  The monistic doctrine, advocating the supremacy of domestic law; the 
dualist theory, that acknowledges the existence of two distinct legal orders 
(international and domestic); and the second monistic theory, that maintains the 
‘unity of the various legal systems and the primacy of international law.’477  
 
The first monistic school (dominated by German scholars) viewed national law as 
supreme. This school in fact regarded international ‘rules’ not as legal rules, but as 
guidelines and always subject to the behaviour of powerful states. This doctrine, in 
the words of Cassese, ‘denied the existence of international law as a distinct and 
autonomous body of law. It clearly reflected the extreme nationalism and 
authoritarianism of a few great Powers, anxious to protect their respective 
interests.’478 The second monistic school (with proponents like Hans Kelsen) 
advocates the opposite of the first monistic school. This second school regards 
international law to have primacy over national law. This is based on a hierarchical 
                                                     
475 On this relationship, see in general Rosalyn Higgins Problems and Process — International law and how we 
use it (1994) Clarendon Press, Oxford, 205-218. 
476 John Dugard distinguishes between the two main schools – the monist and the dualist schools of thought. 
See John Dugard (International Law) (supra) 47-48. Others, like Antonio Cassese, distinguish further between 
two different groups within the broader school of monism, plus the dualist school. See discussion infra. 
477 Antonio Cassese (International Law) (supra) 213. 
478 Antonio Cassese (International Law) (supra) 214. 
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view of legal systems with international law at the top. An important consequence 
of this view is that, since international and national law form part of one normative 
system (with international legal rules at the top), ‘transformation’ of international 
law into national law is not necessary. In terms of the application of international 
law in national legal systems, Cassese states the following about the second 
(Kelsian) school of monism: 
‘[The] sources of international law belong to a legal system that is hierarchically 
superior to municipal systems, not radically different from them. As a result, 
international rules can be applied as such by domestic courts, without any need for 
transformation.’479 
 
Cassese points out that the monistic school allows for certain qualifications in 
terms of the notion of direct application of international law in national courts: 
‘National constitutions (be they written or unwritten) may require domestic courts 
to apply only statutes enacted by national legislatures … Nevertheless, this 
necessity of transformation is a question of national, not of international law.’480 
 
Dualism, the third school of thought, views international law and national legal 
systems as constituting distinct and separate categories of legal orders.481 This 
view of the relationship between international law and national legal systems is 
dominant in Anglo-American systems. International law may only be applied by 
national courts if ‘‘adopted’ by such courts or transformed into local law by 
legislation.’482  
 
                                                     
479 Antonio Cassese (International Law) (supra) 215. 
480 Ibid. 
481 Antonio Cassese (International Law) (supra) 214; John Dugard (International Law) (supra) 47. 
482 John Dugard (International Law) (supra) 47. 
 - 175 - 
 
5.1.2 International law in South Africa 
 
The position in South Africa has to be viewed in terms of the country’s Roman-
Dutch and English law heritage, as well as constitutional developments since 1994. 
Some of the most prominent and influential writers on Roman-Dutch law, like Hugo 
Grotius, regarded international law and domestic law to be part of the same 
universal legal order (with natural law as common foundation).483 Dugard points 
out that the monist-dualist debate (described above) ‘postdates the classical 
period of Roman-Dutch scholarship.’484 Thus, in terms of South Africa’s Roman-
Dutch heritage, the position is that international law simply formed part of 
national law. This position was retained even after the British occupation.485 
English law was, until 1994, an important source of South African public law, 
including public international law. The recourse to English law confirmed, in the 
words of Dugard, ‘the common-law rule governing the relationship between 
international law and municipal law.’486  
                                                     
 
Under common law, customary international law forms part of South African 
domestic law. In this regard, South African courts ‘showed strong support for the 
monist approach’487. Section 232 of the Constitution of South Africa confirms the 
common law position: 
‘Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament.’ 
 
483 John Dugard (International Law) (supra) 48. 
484 Ibid. 
485 John Dugard (International Law) (supra) 49. For a contrary view, see Hercules Booysen ‘Is 
Gewoonteregtelike Volkereg Deel van Ons Reg?’ 38 THRHR (1975) 315, especially at 316. 
486 John Dugard (International Law) (supra) 50. 
487 John Dugard (International Law) (supra) 51. 
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Dugard points out that the common law and judicial decisions ‘are now subordinate 
to customary international law as it is only the Constitution and Acts of Parliament 
that enjoy greater legal weight.’488 This view is consistent with the view of some 
publicists on the doctrine of incorporation in English law. Ian Brownlie points out 
that the doctrine of incorporation is still the dominant principle in the context of 
the relationship between customary international law and domestic law in 
England.489 Customary rules ‘are to be considered part of the law of the land and 
enforced as such, with the qualification that they are incorporated only so far as is 
not inconsistent with Acts of Parliament or prior judicial decisions of final 
authority.’490 However, Brownlie notes that there is an alternative (but — 
according to him — unconvincing) view that interprets case law (post-1876) ‘in such 
a way as to displace the doctrine of incorporation by that of transformation’491. In 
terms of the latter doctrine customary international law is part of English domestic 
law ‘only in so far as the rules have been clearly adopted and made part of the law 
of England by legislation, judicial decision, or established usage.’492 This may also 
be the dominant view in the context of the ‘assimilation’ of crimes under 
customary international law (including aggression) into the domestic law of 
England, as illustrated by the opinion of the House of Lords in R v Jones et al, 
discussed below.493 
                                                     
 
From the discussion above it is clear that the monism/dualism debate can at best 
provide a general background to the question at hand, namely the application of 
488 John Dugard (International Law) (supra) 56. 
489 Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 6th (2003) Oxford University Press, Oxford, 41. 
490 Ibid. 
491 Ian Brownlie (Principles of Public International Law) (supra) 42. 
492 Ibid. 
493 See par 5.1.3.6 infra. 
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international (criminal) law in domestic courts. Against this background the 
different ways in which customary international law and treaties become part of 
domestic law are considered below. The position of customary international law 
vis-à-vis domestic law is informed by national jurisprudential and constitutional 
developments. It is suggested below that a distinction between (general) customary 
international law and customary international (criminal) law provide further 
nuances relevant for the application of international criminal law in national 
courts. Apart from customary international law, the position of treaties as a source 
of law is also briefly addressed below.  
 
5.1.3 The application of international criminal law in national courts 
 
5.1.3.1 The theoretical framework: Incorporation and transformation of treaties 
 
There are constitutional and other considerations (notably the principle of legality) 
that have an impact on the application of international (criminal) law at national 
level. In general, one can distinguish between two methods to implement 
international law, namely incorporation and transformation. These two methods 
are described as follows: 
‘Incorporation takes place when an international rule is integrated in the national 
legal order, so that the judiciary can directly apply that rule. This method of 
incorporation promotes complete implementation of the international rule, as it 
cannot be modified. Transformation denotes the enactment of a national law that 
mirrors the content of the international rule, thus transforming a rule of 
international law in a national one. This method of transformation gives the 
legislature the opportunity to tailor, or even modify, the international rule to fit 
the peculiarities of the national legal system. Technically speaking, international 
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law is applied not at all after transformation. In these cases, national courts apply 
national law that reproduces the content of the original international norm.’494 
 
It is not always clear what approach is favoured by national systems. Elements of 
both incorporation and transformation can exist in the domestication of 
international norms. This often involves different routes of domestication for 
customary international law and treaty law — as suggested above in the context of 
the monism/dualism debate. 
 
In South Africa treaties (‘international agreements’) are normally ‘incorporated’ 
into national law. Neville Botha described the basic process of incorporation with 
reference to three broad stages. First, the Cabinet must consent to the submission 
of the relevant treaty to Parliament. Thereafter a legal-technical stage 
commences. This stage is obviously important, since the department must draft 
legislation which will in turn be submitted to the State law advisors to ‘ensure its 
compliance with domestic law’.495 The legal drafting section of the Department of 
Justice is responsible for the formal drafting of the (draft) legislation. 
Furthermore, the law advisors of the Department of Foreign Affairs have the 
responsibility to make sure that the draft legislation is ‘consistent with 
international law and with the Republic’s international relations and other 
obligations.’496 Finally, the draft legislation will have to pass through Parliament, 
in compliance with Chapter 4 of the Constitution which provides for the national 
legislative process.497 The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International 
                                                     
494 Ward Ferdinandusse (Direct Application) (supra) 7 [Emphasis in the original]. 
495 NJ Botha ‘National treaty law and practice:  South Africa’ in Duncan Hollis, Merritt Blakeslee & Benjamin 
Ederington (eds) National Treaty Law and Practice (2005) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 601. 
496 Ibid. 
497 Ibid. 
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Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 (‘ICC Act, 2002’) thus ‘incorporated’ the Rome 
Statute of the ICC, 1998 (a multilateral treaty to which South Africa is a state 
party) into South African law. The ICC Act incorporates the definitions of crimes 
(war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide) into South African domestic 
law. In this respect one can say that the ICC Act is an act of transformation. 
Although the definitions of the crimes were not modified, but directly taken from 
the Rome Statute, the ICC Act also omits some parts of the Rome Statute (notably 
Article 9 of the Rome Statute on Elements of Crimes). Max du Plessis points out 
that ‘the drafters of the ICC Act have not chosen to expressly adopt Part 3 of the 
[Rome] Statute on general principles of liability and defences’.498 Since the 
drafters of the ICC Act, 2002 have chosen to tailor the Act for South African 
purposes, Anton Katz499 is correct to use the term ‘act of transformation’ to 
describe the ICC Act, 2002. 
                                                     
 
Apart from the possibility to incorporate treaties and other international 
instruments into South African law (making them part of national law), courts can 
also take judicial notice of international law (including customary international 
law). Expert testimony to prove international law is inadmissible.500 It is submitted 
that the parties should nevertheless be given the opportunity to address the court 
on the question of judicial notice and application of the content of the rule or 
norm of international law in question. 
 
498 Max du Plessis ‘South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute’ 5 JICJ (2007) 464. 
499 Anton Katz ‘An Act of Transformation — The incorporation of the Rome Statute of the ICC into national law 
in South Africa’ 12(4) African Security Review (2003) 25-30. 
500 See Inter-Science Research and Development Services (Pty) Ltd v Republica Popular de Mocambique 1980 2 
SA (T) at 124H; South Atlantic Islands Development Corp v Buchan 1971 1 SA 234 (C) at 238A-E. See further 
Schmidt & Rademeyer Bewysreg 4th (2000) Butterworths, Durban, 201. 
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South African law does not recognise the crime of aggression. (The question 
whether aggression as a crime under customary international law is directly 
applicable in South African courts, will be examined below.) The ICC Act, 2002501 
provides that genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are crimes under 
South African law.502 Apart from the explicit criminalisation of the three core 
crimes, Section 2 of the Act provides as follows: 
‘In addition to the Constitution and the law, any competent court in the Republic 
hearing any matter arising from the application of this Act must also consider and, 
where appropriate, may apply – 
(a) conventional international law, and in particular the [Rome] Statute; 
(b) customary international law; and 
(c) comparable foreign law.’ 
 
Although the Act does not provide for the crime of aggression, the Preamble does 
refer to ‘the crime of aggression’ as a crime ‘in terms of international law’. The 
relevant paragraph of the Preamble reads as follows: 
‘[T]hroughout the history of human-kind, millions of children, women and men have 
suffered as a result of atrocities which constitute the crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression in terms of international 
law’. 
And further: 
‘[The] Republic of South Africa is committed to- 
                                                     
501 27 of 2002. The Act entered into force on 16 Aug 2002. See GG No 23761, 16 Aug 2002. For comments on the 
Act see Max du Plessis ‘Bringing the International Criminal Court home – the Implementation of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 2002’ SACJ (2003) 16 1-16; Anton Katz ‘An Act of 
Transformation – The incorporation of the Rome Statute of the ICC into national law in South Africa’ African 
Security Review 12(4) 2003 25-30; Max du Plessis ‘South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute’ 5 JICJ 
(2007) 460-479. 
502 See Ch 2, read with Schedule 1 of Act 27 of 2002. 
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bringing persons who commit such atrocities to justice, either in a court of law of 
the Republic in terms of its domestic laws where possible, pursuant to its 
international obligations to do so when the Republic became party to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, or in the event of the national 
prosecuting authority of the Republic declining or being unable to do so, in line 
with the principle of complementarity as contemplated in the [Rome] Statute, in 
the International Criminal Court, created by and functioning in terms of the said 
Statute’. 
 
The entire Rome Statute of the ICC is attached as an annexure to the ICC Act of 
2002. Anton Katz points out that this ‘allows South African Courts to have regard to 
the relevant substantive and procedural provisions [of the Rome Statute]’.503 
Section 1(xix) of the Act provides that ‘the…text of [the Rome Statute] is attached 
in the Annexure for information’. Schedule 1 of the Act contains the definitions of 
the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, namely genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. The definitions are taken from the Rome Statute. By 
including the definitions of the crimes provided for in the Rome Statute in a 
Schedule to the ICC Act, the legislature transformed these crimes into South 
African national law.504 
 
Max du Plessis submitted that this approach of transformation was partly due to the 
fact that South Africa lacked statutory law defining and criminalising genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.505 This approach will presumably also be 
                                                     
503 Anton Katz ‘An Act of Transformation – The incorporation of the Rome Statute of the ICC into national law in 
South Africa’ 12(4) African Security Review (2003) 25-30, at 27. 
504 For the different methods employed by Parliament to transform treaties into national law, see John Dugard 
(International Law) (supra) 61-62. See further NJ Botha (National treaty law and practice:  South Africa) 
(supra) 581-625. 
505 Max du Plessis (South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute) (supra) 463. 
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followed with the crime of aggression, if the Assembly of States Parties to the 
Rome Statute can adopt an acceptable definition of aggression for inclusion in the 
Rome Statute.506 It is assumed that the South African Parliament will not draft its 
own definition of aggression, but will rather wait for the results of the legal and 
diplomatic processes to adopt a suitable definition — a matter which is addressed 
in Chapters 6 and 7 below.  
 
5.1.3.2 In the absence of statutory law on aggression:  Possibilities presented by 
customary international law  
 
Some of the most prominent publicists on the subject of international criminal law 
view aggression as a crime under international law, with customary status.507 
However, what is the scope of the crime of aggression that is accorded customary 
status? 
 
Cherif Bassiouni has identified more than fifty instruments relevant to the crime of 
aggression.508 It is not the aim here to analyse each and every one of them. 
However, the path from the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes (known as the First Hague Convention) of 1899 to the Rome Statute of the 
ICC of 1998 points to a chequered history of politics and pragmatism that shows, as 
a minimum, the international community’s opposition to the use of armed force to 
settle disputes. At the core of that is the criminality of aggressive war. Bassiouni 
                                                     
506 See Ch 6 and Ch 7 (infra) on the process to adopt a definition for aggression for inclusion in the Rome 
Statute of the ICC. 
507 Cherif Bassiouni (International Criminal Law) (supra) 58; Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression Self-Defence) 
(supra) 121-123; Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 113-114. 
508 Bassiouni (International Criminal Law) (supra) 64-66. The list starts with the Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes (First Hague Convention) 29 Jul 1899, and ends with the Rome Statute of 
the ICC, 1998. 
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has pointed out that most of the instruments referred to above lack the necessary 
penal characteristics509 for purposes of criminal liability. The majority of the 
instruments are therefore more relevant to a general discussion on the use of force 
in international law. It is clear that the law of Nuremberg (as confirmed by the 
international community510) and a number of international instruments underline 
the criminality of aggressive war. Yet we do not have any international tribunal at 
present with the necessary jurisdiction to try individuals for the crime of 
aggression. That leaves us with the possibility of customary international law and 
the application of customary international law at domestic level.511 The impact of 
possible universal jurisdiction over the crime of aggression warrants special 
attention.  
 
5.1.3.3 Proving custom, and the customary status of aggression as a crime under 
international law 
 
Customary international law is one of the sources of law provided for in the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice. The method of proving custom is today well-
                                                     
509 Cherif Bassiouni (International Criminal Law) (supra) 47 – 48. The author used the following ten penal 
characteristics to identify proscribed conduct under conventional international law as part of ICL:  ‘(1) Explicit 
recognition of proscribed conduct as constituting an international crime, or a crime under international law, or 
a crime; (2) Implicit recognition of the penal nature of the act by establishing a duty to prohibit, prevent, 
prosecute, punish, or the like; (3) Criminalization of the proscribed conduct; (4) Duty or right to prosecute; (5) 
Duty or right to punish the proscribed conduct; (6) Duty or right to extradite; (7) Duty or right to cooperate in 
prosecution, punishment (including judicial assistance in penal proceedings); (8) Establishment of a criminal 
jurisdictional basis (or theory of criminal jurisdiction or priority in criminal jurisdiction); (9) Reference to the 
establishment of an international criminal court or an international tribunal with penal characteristics (or 
prerogatives); (10) Elimination of the defense of superior orders’. 
510 UN GA Res 95(I) of 11 Dec 1946 affirms the ‘principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal.’ 
511 See Kevin Hopkins ‘Can customary international law play a meaningful role in our domestic legal order:  A 
short case study to consider’ 30 SAYIL (2005) 276-289 for an argument on the progressive application of 
customary international law in South African domestic law. 
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established and applied by the ICJ. Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ provides for 
the law to be applied by the ICJ: 
‘(1) The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.’ 
 
The existence of custom (a source of law provided for in Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ 
Statute512) requires the twin elements of state practice, or usus (the material 
element), and a legal conviction that such practice is indeed required or allowed as 
a matter of law — the latter referring to the subjective (or psychological) element 
of custom, namely opinio juris.513  
 
Regarding the element of practice, the ICJ in the past regarded administrative 
acts, legislation, judicial decisions, and treaties as examples of state practice.514 
Antonio Cassese summarised the progression of the formation of custom, and the 
                                                     
512 For an overview of the formation of custom as a source of international law, see Ian Brownlie The Rule of 
Law in International Affairs (1998) Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 18-23. 
513 See Statute of the ICJ, Art 38(1)(b) reproduced in Simma (The Charter of the United Nations Vol I) (supra). 
See commentary on Art 38 by Alain Pellet ‘Article 38’ in Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat and Karin 
Oellers-Frahm (eds) The Statute of the International Court of Justice – A Commentary (2006) Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 677-792. For an exposition of the methodology vis-à-vis proof of custom in international criminal 
law see The Prosecutor v Pavle Strugar (Prosecutor’s response to defence brief on interlocutory appeal on 
jurisdiction) ICTY, Case No IT-01-42-AR72, Response filed on 22 Aug 2002 (copy on file). See further North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports (1969), at 43 par 74.  
514 See Alain Pellet in Andreas Zimmermann et al (Statute of the ICJ) (supra) 750-751. 
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relationship between practice and opinio juris as constitutive elements thereof, as 
follows: 
‘It would seem that the two elements [practice and opinio juris] need not be both 
present from the outset. Usually, a practice evolves among certain States under the 
impulse of economic, political, or military demands. At this stage the practice may 
thus be regarded as being imposed by social or economic or political needs (opinio 
necessitates). If it does not encounter strong and consistent opposition from other 
States but is increasingly accepted, or acquiesced in, a customary rule gradually 
crystallizes. At this later stage it may be held that the practice is dictated by 
international law (opinio juris). In other words, now States begin to believe that 
they must conform to the practice not so much, or not only, out of economic, 
political, or military considerations, but because an international rule enjoins them 
to do so.’515 
 
Alain Pellet suggests that the ‘collective attitude of states’ can be regarded as an 
important indication of the material element of custom. In this regard the conduct 
of states at diplomatic conferences,516 or their conduct as members of 
international organisations,517 is also relevant to determine custom. In the context 
of resolutions adopted by international organisations (like the UN), Pellet argues 
that in order to ascertain a customary rule of general international law, resolutions 
adopted by an international organisation belong to ‘the manifestation of the opinio 
juris’ element.518 The General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the Definition of 
Aggression (1974) (as discussed in Chapter 4519 above) should, for example, be 
                                                     
515 Antonio Cassese (International Law) (supra) 157. 
516 For instance the statements made by delegations at the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Establishment of an ICC, Rome 1998.  
517 In this regard resolutions of the UN GA are relevant. 
518 Alain Pellet in Andreas Zimmermann et al (Statute of the ICJ) (supra) 752. 
519 See Ch 4 para 4.2.3, 4.2.3.1 and 4.2.3.2 (supra). 
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regarded as a manifestation of opinio juris on the notion of aggression. An earlier 
example of the opinio juris is UN General Assembly Resolution 95(I) of 11 December 
1946, in terms of which the criminality of ‘waging aggressive war’ was ‘affirmed’. 
With this resolution the international community ‘expressed the view that [the 
crime of waging of aggressive war] was valid generally, and not merely in regard to 
the Axis powers’.520 Furthermore, the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation521 confirms that ‘aggressive 
war’ is a crime against international peace. The ICJ has, in fact, relied in a number 
of cases (notably in the Nicaragua and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons cases) on UN General Assembly Resolutions to prove the existence of 
opinio juris. In the Nuclear Weapons case the ICJ stated as follows: 
‘The Court notes that General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, 
may sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide 
evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an 
opinio juris.’522 
 
In the Nicaragua case the ICJ held that the prohibition of the use of force by states 
is protected under customary international law. The ICJ in casu referred to state 
practice, opinio juris and indeed the acceptance of states of the principle as 
expressed in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter as evidence of the customary status of 
the prohibition of the use of force.523 The ICJ in casu went further and linked the 
                                                     
520 See comments by Gerhard Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 392. 
521 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN Doc A/RES/2625 of 24 Oct 1970. 
522 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion ICJ Reports 1996, 226, par 70 [emphasis 
added]. 
523 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States), 
Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, 14; par 188 – 190. 
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customary status of the prohibition of the use of force with its status as a principle 
of jus cogens (that is, a superior norm in international law524): 
‘A further confirmation of the validity as customary international law of the 
principle of the prohibition of the use of force expressed in Art. 2, paragraph 4, of 
the Charter of the United Nations may be found in the fact that it is frequently 
referred to in statements by State representatives as being not only a principle of 
customary international law but also a fundamental or cardinal principle of such 
law, that is a ‘principle of jus cogens’, a position also taken by the ILC and by the 
contesting States themselves.’525 
 
The critical question is whether there is a resemblance between the opinio juris of 
states and actual state behaviour. Dinstein argued persuasively that while 
‘recourse to force continues to permeate international relations,’526 states are still 
in the majority of cases at least trying to justify their behaviour in terms of the jus 
contra bellum. He concludes: 
‘The discrepancy between what States say and what they do may be due to 
pragmatic reasons, militating in favour of a choice of the line of least exposure to 
censure. Even so, a disinclination to challenge the validity of a legal norm has a 
salutary effect in that it shows that the norm is accepted, if only reluctantly, as the 
rule. There is a common denominator between those who try (even disingenuously) 
                                                     
524 On occasion the ICJ might label a particular rule or norm as ‘erga omnes’, ‘peremptory’, ‘essential’, 
‘inderogable’, or ‘intransgressible’. Alain Pellet submitted that ‘the particular or superior nature of the norms 
involved can only result from the general belief that these norms are of such a nature’. The ICJ will normally 
employ the same methodology to determine the existence of a ‘peremptory’ norm as it would use to determine 
opinio juris. In other words, a peremptory norm, or a norm erga omnes, is just an ‘intensified opinio’ of a 
particular right or obligation. See Alain Pellet in Andreas Zimmermann et al (Statute of the ICJ) (supra) 759. 
525 Nicaragua v United States (supra) par 190. 
526 Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression and Self-Defence) (supra) 93. 
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to take advantage of the refinements of the law, and those who rigorously abide by 
its letter and spirit. They all share a belief in the authority of the law.’527 
 
Even though the prohibition of the use of force by states (the jus contra bellum) is 
firmly established under customary international law, it is necessary to determine 
for purposes of individual criminal liability the extent to which the crime of 
aggression is also established under customary international law. In Chapter 3 
above the historical processes that led to the criminalisation of aggression are 
discussed against the background of the development of the modern jus contra 
bellum (as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 above). Criminalisation of aggression as a 
crime against peace (as at Nuremberg)528 is the core of the international crime of 
aggression. To this are added the developments in the second half of the twentieth 
century (the adoption of various resolutions and draft statutes dealing with various 
aspects of aggression, referred to above and discussed in Chapter 4).529 With this in 
mind, publicists on international criminal law generally regard the crime of 
aggression to have customary status.530 Cassese describes the customary 
international law notion of the crime of aggression as follows: 
‘[The] planning, or organizing, or preparing, or participating in the first use of 
armed force by a State against the territorial integrity and political independence 
of another State in contravention of the UN Charter, provided the acts of aggression 
concerned have large-scale and serious consequences.’531 
 
                                                     
527 Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression and Self-Defence) (supra) 95. 
528 See Ch 3, in particular par 3.3 and further, supra. 
529 See discussion of the Nuremberg Principles (para 4.2.1 and 4.2.2), as well as the various draft Codes of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (para 4.2.2.1 – 4.2.2.3) and the UN GA Def of Aggression (par 
4.2.3), in Ch 4 supra. 
530 Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression Self-Defence) (supra) 123; Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) 
(supra) 114; Gerhard Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 390-391. 
531 Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 114. 
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The above description of the customary law notion of aggression refers to a 
threshold of seriousness. The description contains the developments in 
international law from Nuremberg to date. Publicists like Dinstein and Cassese 
draw a distinction between ‘the crime of aggression’ and other ‘acts of 
aggression’, which are regarded as international wrongful acts, but which do not 
give rise to individual criminal liability.532 Thus, the criminalisation of aggression in 
terms of the Nuremberg Charter, plus the provisions of the international draft 
codes, as well as some of the provisions of the General Assembly Definition of 
Aggression of 1974 (discussed in Chapter 4 above) form elements of the 
international crime of aggression. According to Cassese, the following acts are not 
international crimes, despite being labelled ‘acts of aggression’: 
‘(i) engaging in an armed conflict in violation of international treaties proscribing 
resort to armed violence, or (ii) participating in a conspiracy to wage aggressive 
war (that is, planning aggressive war without such planning being followed by 
action or at least an attempt).’533 
The above classes of conduct (although provided for in the Charter of the IMT 
Nuremberg) never became part of customary international law, due to a lack of 
state practice and opinio juris.534 
 
Although the ILC’s Draft Code of 1954535 refers to ‘[a]ny act’ of aggression as a 
crime against peace, later commentaries by the ILC536 linked individual criminal 
responsibility for the crime of aggression with the threshold of ‘a sufficiently 
                                                     
532 Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression Self-Defence) (supra) 125 et seq; Antonio Cassese (International Criminal 
Law) (supra) 114. 
533 Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 114. 
534 Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 114; Gerhard Werle (Principles of International 
Criminal Law) (supra) 390-394. 
535 See Ch 4 par 4.2.2.1 supra. 
536 See Ch 4 para 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.3 supra. 
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serious violation of the prohibition contained in [Article 2(4)] of the [UN] 
Charter’.537 Although the Rome Statute of the ICC does not at present contain a 
definition of aggression, Article 1 of the Statute provides that the ICC ‘shall have 
the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of 
international concern’. Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute provides that the ICC can 
exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a definition is agreed 
upon. Commentators suggest that such a definition will have to satisfy the 
threshold of seriousness referred to in Article 1 of the Statute.538 The Rome Statute 
of the ICC also suggests a link between individual criminal liability for crimes under 
international law and a certain threshold of seriousness or effect on the 
international community.  
 
Although state practice pertaining to the criminalisation of aggression is scarce539 
and no prosecutions540 for this crime have occurred since the trials at Nuremberg 
                                                     
537 Arthur Watts (International Law Commission Vol III) (supra) 1739. 
538 Otto Triffterer in Otto Triffterer (Commentary on the Rome Statute) (supra) 40. 
539 There are a number of states that criminalise aggression (in some form) under domestic law. An example of 
a state that does provide for the crime of aggression (a domestic variation) in its national criminal law is 
Germany. The Code of Crimes Against International Law of 2002 (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch or VStGB) provides for 
the incorporation of international crimes (notably the core crimes) into German criminal law. The Code of 
Crimes does not include the crime of aggression, which is understandable, since the Code is aimed at bringing 
German criminal law in line with the law of the ICC and aggression is not yet a crime effectively within the 
jurisdiction of the international court. However, section 80 of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch or 
StGB) provides for the crime of ‘preparation of aggressive war’. The crime of preparation of aggressive war is 
subject to extraterritorial jurisdiction. If the act of preparation of aggressive war (within the meaning of 
section 80 StGB) occurred in a foreign state, German courts will be able to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over the crime. For the position in Germany, see in general Helmut Satzger ‘German Criminal Law and the 
Rome Statute – A critical analysis of the New German Code of Crimes against International Law’ 2 ICLR (2002) 
261-282; Gerhard Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 83; Heinrich Wilhelm Laufhütte in 
Burkhard Jähnke, Heinrich Wilhelm Laufhütte and Wlater Odersky Strafgesetzbuch – Leipziger Kommentar 
Vierter band (2005) De Gruyter Recht, Berlin, 1-30; Nikolaus Schultz ‘Was the war on Iraq illegal? – The 
judgment of the German Federal Administrative Court of 21st June 2005’ 7(1) German Law Journal (2006) 
(available at www.germanlawjournal.com/print.php?id=684 25 Jan 2006). Another national jurisdiction that 
provides for the crime of aggression in some form, is Iraq. The IST was established by the American-led 
Coalition Provisional Authority after the regime of Saddam Hussein was ousted in 2003. In terms of the Statute 
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and Tokyo, the above discussion shows that there is an established opinio juris that 
waging aggressive war is a crime under customary international law. Gerhard Werle 
concludes as follows: 
‘[Aggressive] war is criminal under customary international law. The scope of the 
offence must be determined on the basis of the only precedents to date, the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments. However, there is no evidence that acts of 
aggression not reaching the level of intensity of aggressive war are criminal under 
customary international law.’541 
 
It is submitted that aggression as a crime under customary international law 
(‘aggressive war’) is relatively narrow in scope. This submission corresponds with 
the minimalist view on the objective elements of the crime of aggression, 
discussed below. The precedents of Nuremberg and Tokyo (discussed in Chapter 3 
above) and the opinio juris that manifested in the second half of the twentieth 
century (via various resolutions and other documents reflecting the convictions of 
the international community) confirm the narrow scope of the crime of aggression 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, the IST has jurisdiction over Iraqi nationals or residents for crimes committed 
since 17 Jul 1968 up until 1 May 2003 in the territory of Iraq or elsewhere, namely the crime of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and violations of certain Iraqi laws. The latter category of crimes 
includes: ‘The abuse of position and the pursuit of policies that may lead to the threat of war or the use of the 
armed forces of Iraq against an Arab country, in accordance with Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958, as 
amended.’ This particular domestic version of aggression is a downgrade from the Nuremberg Tribunal’s 
treatment of aggression as the ‘supreme crime’ under international law. Thus, the IST has jurisdiction over an 
essentially domestic notion of aggression. The provision in the relevant Iraqi legislation of 1958 is not a 
reference to the international crime of aggression as it was formulated by the Nuremberg Tribunal. Thus, it 
does not incorporate international law; it is simply a particular Iraqi statutory offence. See Claus Kreß ‘The 
Iraqi Special Tribunal and the crime of aggression’ 2 JICJ (2004) 348. International practice (especially via the 
UN SC) provides evidence of the international community’s views on state action that amounts to ‘acts of 
aggression’. See for instance UN SC Res 387 of 31 March 1976, Res 577 of 6 Dec 1985 (‘acts of aggression’ by 
South African Defence Force against Angola); UN SC Res 527 of 15 Dec 1982 (‘premeditated aggressive act’ by 
South Africa against Lesotho); UN SC Res 568 of 21 Jun 1985 (‘acts of aggression’ by South Africa against 
Botswana). 
540 Caroline Fournet (International Crimes) (supra) 143. 
541 Gerhard Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 393-394. 
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under customary international law. The elements constituting this crime will be 
considered below. 
 
5.1.3.4 The elements of the crime of aggression under customary international law 
 
In Chapter 3 above the history of the criminalisation of aggression is set out against 
the background of the emergence of the idea of collective security, and the jus 
contra bellum in general. Part of the rationale for the criminalisation of aggression 
under the Nuremberg Charter (and later the Tokyo Charter) can be found in the 
view that the aggressive foreign policy of Germany and Japan violated international 
law, and the prevailing jus contra bellum. It must be pointed out, once again, that 
at the core of the criminalisation of aggression was and is the international 
community’s desire for peace.542 But the criminalisation of aggressive war rested 
on more than the illegality of German and Japanese aggressive foreign policy. An 
additional element — the aggressive aim of the war to subjugate another state — 
was also added.543  
 
For purposes of individual criminal liability for the above described crime of war of 
aggression (which is essentially the crime of aggression under customary 
international law), it is necessary to establish the two main elements, namely the 
subjective element (mens rea) and the criminal act(s) or objective element(s) 
(actus reus).544  
 
                                                     
542 Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 116. 
543 See Ch 3 par 3.3.2 supra on the aggressive German foreign policy that led to the occupation of other 
European countries. For the discussion on the Japanese aggressive foreign policy, see Ch 3 par 3.4 supra. 
544 See also the brief outline of the requirements for individual criminal liability under international criminal 
law, Introduction par c.1.2 supra. 
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In essence, the element of actus reus was addressed above with reference to the 
methods of determining the scope and content of the crime of aggression under 
customary international law. At least two (conflicting) views exist regarding the 
scope of the objective elements of the customary international law crime of 
aggression. The first (which I call the minimalist point of view) suggests that the 
scope of the crime of aggression under customary international law must be 
determined with reference to the only judicial precedents — Nuremberg and 
Tokyo. Other acts of aggression (as for instance listed in Article 3 of the UN 
General Assembly Definition of 1974)545 are not criminal under customary 
international law, if they do not reach the intensity and scope of an aggressive 
war.546 The second point of view (which I call the expansive view) suggests a notion 
of aggression broader than the precedents of Nuremberg and Tokyo. Antonio 
Cassese, a proponent of this view, argues that the crime of aggression also includes 
the acts of aggression listed in Article 3 of the UN General Assembly Definition of 
Aggression. The fundamental requirement is that these acts must ‘have large-scale 
and serious consequences.’547 The expansive view on the objective elements of the 
crime of aggression under customary international law seems at first to be quite 
progressive, in the sense that it not only relies on the judgments at Nuremberg and 
Tokyo (and subsequent confirmations of the international validity of these 
judgments) as bases to determine the actus reus of aggression, but also refers to 
international practice in the form of Security Council resolutions on ‘acts of 
aggression’ and the ‘opinion’ of the international community (especially with the 
adoption of the General Assembly Definition of 1974).  
 
                                                     
545 See Ch 4 par 4.2.3.1 supra. 
546 For this view, see Gerhard Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 393-394. 
547 Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 114. 
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It was pointed out in Chapter 4 above that one of the problems with the UN 
General Assembly Definition of Aggression of 1974 is (from an international 
criminal law point of view) that it does not provide for the element of mens rea.548 
The question is to what extent this fundamental element for purposes of individual 
criminal responsibility, is addressed in terms of the crime of aggression under 
customary international law.  
 
As far as mens rea is concerned, it should be noted that one of the prominent 
characteristics of the crime of aggression as it developed under customary 
international law, is the fact that it is a leadership crime par excellence.549 It was 
pointed out in Chapter 3 above that the aggressive foreign policy of Germany and 
Japan developed through years of planning by the political leadership of the two 
countries. However, this should not imply collective responsibility of a leadership 
class, or of all senior government officials.550 The focus should be on the 
individual’s conduct and knowledge. In this regard Yoram Dinstein describes the 
element of mens rea as follows: 
‘The intent to undertake [a] war of aggression may be formed by only one or few 
individuals at the helm of a State. Others at the policy-making level need not be 
personally guided by the same intent. The acid test is whether, in assisting the 
preparations for war, they actually know of the aggressive schemes. If they know 
that aggression is planned, this may suffice to establish the requisite mens rea.’551 
 
                                                     
548 See Ch 4 par 4.2.3.2 supra. 
549 Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression Self-Defence) (supra) 137; Gerhard Werle (Principles of International 
Criminal Law) (supra) 397-398; see further comments on the crime of aggression at Nuremberg as a ‘leadership 
crime’ in Ch 3 par 3.3.2.1 supra. 
550 It has to be pointed out, however, that the trial at Tokyo seemed to focus more on a class of defendants (as 
representatives of Japanese political leadership) and not on the individual responsibility of the accused to the 
same extent as the trial at Nuremberg. See comments on this issue in Ch 3 par 3.4 supra. 
551 Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression Self-Defence) (supra) 137. 
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Some publicists favour mens rea in the form of a special intent. This approach 
requires that the individual not only has knowledge of the wrongfulness of his or 
her actions (for instance planning and waging of a war of aggression), but must also 
have the additional intent to ‘achieve territorial gains, or to obtain economic 
advantages, or to interfere with the internal affairs’552 of the victim state. Thus, 
for instance, a war in contravention of the UN Charter but on humanitarian grounds 
(‘humanitarian intervention’)553 is regarded as illegal state conduct, but does not 
constitute the crime of aggression with individual criminal liability.554 This line of 
argument is controversial, since humanitarian intervention often involves 
interference with the internal affairs of the victim state. Humanitarian 
intervention could even involve ‘regime change’,555 which certainly amounts to the 
subjugation of the victim state, and at the very least interference with its internal 
affairs. Such conduct would satisfy the required actus reus of aggressive war, plus 
the necessary intent (even special intent) to subjugate the victim state. 
‘Humanitarian intervention’ would be the motive, which is generally irrelevant for 
purposes of determining criminal responsibility. From a criminal law perspective, 
intent (dolus) requires knowledge of the elements of the crime (definition of the 
crime) as well as knowledge of the unlawfulness of the act. This is sometimes 
referred to as dolus malus (‘evil intent’).556 Intent, even special intent, is not the 
same as motive. However laudable the motive (for instance to protect citizens 
from their abusive and oppressive government), if the individual had the necessary 
                                                     
552 See the views of S Glaser, as quoted in Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 115-116. 
553 For a discussion of humanitarian intervention in the context of the jus contra bellum, see Ch 2 par 2.5.2 
supra. 
554 Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 116. 
555 See concluding remarks in Ch 2 par 2.5.1.1 supra. The US and UK ultimately presented an argument based 
on humanitarian grounds (‘promotion of freedom and human rights’) as rationale for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 
and the eventual regime change that followed. It is submitted that the human rights/humanitarian rationale 
was presented ex post facto, and not the real casus belli for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
556 CR Snyman (Strafreg) (supra) 181. 
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intent in the above sense, the good motive will not absolve the individual from 
criminal responsibility.557 To attack another state in order to end mass human 
rights violations in that state would be regarded as ‘aggression’, since a war was 
waged in violation of international law and the aggressor had the intent to 
subjugate the victim state. The humanitarian motive in this context does not take 
away the intent (dolus) of the aggressor. Even if ‘political subjugation’ would be 
required as a special intent for the crime of aggression, that would be conceptually 
different from motive,558 which does not have a bearing on criminal responsibility. 
Motive may ultimately be relevant for purposes of punishment after a guilty 
verdict. The prosecution may also use motive (as circumstantial evidence) in order 
to establish their case, but it does not form an element of the crime for purposes 
of criminal responsibility.559 
 
The scope and content of the jus contra bellum is the subject of debate. 
Humanitarian intervention560 and an evolving practice of self-defence561 (especially 
in the context of the ‘war on terror’) indicate that jus contra bellum is in flux. 
Many of the rules concerning the use of force by states, including the criminality of 
aggression (at least in the form of ‘war of aggression’) are well-established. The 
rule ignorantia juris non excusat (‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’)562 should in 
principle apply here. However, some publicists argue that there exists ‘relative 
uncertainty of many rules of international criminal law.’563 The apparent reason is 
                                                     
557 CR Snyman (Strafreg) (supra) 190. 
558 For a theoretical analysis of the notion of ‘motive’ vis-à-vis ‘intent’, see AP Simester and ATH Smith (eds) 
Harm and Culpability (1996) Clarendon Press, Oxford, 94-98. 
559 Glanville Williams Textbook of Criminal Law (1978) Stevens & Sons, London, 56. 
560 See Ch 2 par 2.5.2 supra. 
561 See Ch 2 par 2.5.1 supra. 
562 For a critical discussion of this doctrine (or presumption), see Snyman (Strafreg) (supra) 203-208. 
563 Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression Self-Defence) (supra) 138. 
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that international law is a body of law more removed from the daily lives of 
individuals, who essentially function in a particular domestic legal environment. 
This may generally speaking be true. However, Dinstein correctly suggests that 
‘mistake of law may be less potent in the context of crimes against the peace … 
since policy-makers are more likely than plain soldiers to be knowledgeable about 
international law.’564 In the context of an international system characterised by 
institutions of collective and regional security, continuous diplomatic interaction 
through the structures of the UN, and well-publicised condemnations by the 
Security Council of acts of aggression, it is indeed implausible that individuals in 
political and military leadership positions can successfully claim ignorance of the 
law in respect of the prohibition of the use of force. Dinstein goes further than 
this. He suggests that in situations where the subjective knowledge of individuals 
(in leadership positions) with respect to the norms relating to the use of force and 
the criminality of aggressive wars ‘cannot be ascertained by direct evidence, the 
task can be facilitated through the use of objective criteria (such as the manifest 
illegality of the action taken).’565 
 
Given the above arguments, a number of submissions can be made relevant to the 
discussion that follows below (on the prosecution of crimes under customary 
international law in national courts). Regarding the scope of the crime of 
aggression under customary international law, and with reference to the objective 
elements, the minimalist position described above is supported here. From an 
international policy perspective, the more idealistic view of publicists like Cassese 
(an exponent of the expansive point of view) can certainly be supported. This 
aspirational view of the crime of aggression under customary international law is 
                                                     
564 Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression Self-Defence) (supra) 139. 
565 Ibid. 
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arguably closer to the overarching rationale for the criminalisation of aggression, 
namely international peace and security. This view is perhaps also closer to the 
substantive justice approach (as opposed to the strict approach) to legality, 
referred to below. On balance, from a criminal justice point of view, the expansive 
notion of the crime of aggression under customary international law cannot be 
supported. The minimalist view stands on firmer ground regarding the methodology 
to prove custom. This leaves a clearer picture of the elements of the crime. In 
turn, this could present a better basis for the prosecution in national courts of 
individuals for the crime of aggression, discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Other factors, including constitutional considerations, also play a role in this 
regard. 
 
5.1.3.5 Prosecuting crimes under customary international law in South African 
courts 
 
In S v Basson566 Judge Sachs in his separate opinion relied on section 232 of the 
Constitution. He stated that a failure by the Supreme Court of Appeal ‘to give 
sufficient or any weight to the State’s obligations under international law, raise 
constitutional issues’.567  Basson was initially charged with various offences under 
South African law, notably in terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act568. The facts of 
the case concerned activities in South Africa and abroad, including conspiracy to 
commit murder outside the territory of South Africa. Some of the acts could be 
regarded as possible war crimes against members of the liberation movements who 
                                                     
566 S v Basson 2005 (1) SA 171 (CC). 
567 S v Basson (supra) separate opinion of Sachs J par 127. 
568 17 of 1956. 
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resided in Namibia.569 All the offences were allegedly committed before 1994. The 
Constitutional Court was not asked to pronounce on the merits of possible war 
crimes charges against Basson, who worked for the Civil Co-operation Bureau, a 
division of the apartheid-era Defence Force. Basson was never charged with war 
crimes, because of the problem with retroactive application of law. Although South 
Africa was at the time of the alleged offences a party to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949570 (breaches of which can constitute war crimes), these instruments were not 
incorporated into national law. Although the Constitutional Court ultimately chose 
not to deal with the issue of retroactive application of war crimes, some of the 
opinions of the judges in this regard are relevant for present purposes. 
 
Chief Justice Chaskalson, in a separate opinion, pointed to the following: 
‘The objection to the charges under the Riotous Assemblies Act raises an issue of 
considerable importance. Can a South African court put one of its citizens on trial 
for conspiring to commit murders and other offences during the period 1981 to 1989 
in a territory [Namibia], then under South African administration but beyond the 
territorial borders of the country? The answer given by the High Court was, no. The 
reason, so the Court held, was that such matters are not crimes according to South 
African law. This, despite the fact that the conspiracy is alleged to have been 
entered into in South Africa, and the crimes, which if proved may amount to war 
crimes, are alleged to have been committed in the course of a conflict involving the 
South African armed forces and those fighting against it.’571 
 
                                                     
569 See opinion of Sachs J in S v Basson (supra) par 121-123. 
570 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 
(1949) (Geneva I); Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1949) (Geneva II); Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(1949) (Geneva III); Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War (1949) (Geneva 
IV) (reprinted in Christine Van den Wyngaert (International Criminal Law) (supra) 363 -452. 
571 S v Basson (supra) separate opinion of Chaskalson CJ par 84. 
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Importantly, Chief Justice Chaskalson also added that the Constitution alone 
cannot serve as a basis to prosecute conduct that did not constitute criminal 
conduct at the time when it occurred. The Chief Justice stated as follows: 
‘If the conduct with which the accused was charged did not constitute an offence 
under South African law at the time it was committed … the State cannot contend 
that it has become an offence because of the provisions of the Constitution.’572 
 
In making the above statement, the Chief Justice relied on Du Plessis and Others v 
De Klerk and Another573 where the Constitutional Court held that the Constitution 
does not have retroactive operation or impact.574  
 
The issue of retroactivity aside, it is important to determine whether the 
Constitution, and in particular section 232, could serve as a basis for prosecutions 
of crimes under customary international law, where such crimes are not provided 
for in terms of South African legislation or the common law. This question involves 
other constitutional issues as well, notably the right to a fair trial.575 
 
Having regard to the general principles of South African criminal law, as well as the 
constitutional right to a fair trial576, it is submitted that the Constitution cannot 
serve as a basis for the exercise by South African courts of substantive jurisdiction 
over crimes under international law, including crimes under customary 
international law. Nico Steytler stated that ‘crimes under international law are not 
                                                     
572 S v Basson (supra) separate opinion of Chaskalson CJ par 97. 
573 Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC). On the non-retrospective rule in South 
African Constitutional law, see also Iain Currie and Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th (2005) Juta, 
Cape Town, 57-60. 
574 See separate opinion of Chaskalson CJ in S v Basson (supra) par 95-96. 
575 See comments by Sachs J in S v Basson (supra) par 129. 
576 Art 35 Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
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ipso facto part of South African law.’577 This is true, not only in terms of the 
general approach to the application of international law in South Africa as 
identified above, but in particular because of well-established constitutional and 
criminal law principles. In terms of the latter, the criminal law principle of legality 
(nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) poses an important obstacle in the way of 
the application of customary international criminal law in South African courts.  
 
5.1.3.5.1 The legality principle versus the application of customary 
international (criminal) law in South African courts 
 
Before the principle of legality is discussed from a South African (national) 
perspective, it is important to briefly refer to the conflicting views of publicists 
and judges regarding the scope of the principle of legality in the context of 
international crimes. Publicists generally accept that the principle of legality 
requires that the criminal behaviour ‘be laid down as clearly as possible’ but at the 
same time they also point out that ‘this standard is less rigid’ than in many 
domestic legal systems.578 In terms of the different ‘families’ of legal systems 
(notably the civil law/continental European systems and the common law systems) 
different notions of legality can also be identified. In general, civil law countries 
(for instance France, Belgium, Germany) adhere to a strict understanding of 
legality. One consequence of this view is for instance that criminal offences must 
be in written law, adopted by parliament. Furthermore, ‘rules criminalizing human 
conduct must be as specific and clear as possible, so as to guide the behaviour of 
citizens’.579 Common law systems follow — generally speaking — a less strict 
                                                     
577 Nico Steytler Constitutional criminal procedure (1998) Butterworths, Durban, 373. 
578 Gerhard Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 33. 
579 Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 141-142. 
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approach to the principle of legality. The obvious manifestation of judge-made law 
is that it may lack the same degree of rigidity or certainty as is the case with 
written/codified law in civil law systems.580  
 
In the context of international criminal law, Cassese has pointed out that (at least 
initially) international criminal tribunals (like the IMT Nuremberg) followed a less 
strict approach to the principle of legality.581 The criminalisation of aggression 
(crimes against peace) in the Nuremberg Charter and as applied by the IMT 
Nuremberg, is discussed in Chapter 4 above. One pertinent issue that the defence 
raised at Nuremberg was the issue of legality, in particular the ex post facto 
criminalisation of crimes against peace. It is not necessary to repeat all the 
objections here, suffice to say that the approach of the IMT was one of substantive 
justice, where the focus is on the socially harmful conduct, not the question 
whether the conduct in question had already been criminalised.582 This approach 
was also taken by Judge Röling in his dissenting opinion at the IMTFE Tokyo. In 
particular, the judge concluded that crimes against peace were to be punished 
‘because of the dangerous character of the individuals who committed them, hence 
on security considerations.’ The decisive element, according to Judge Röling, was 
in other words, ‘the danger rather than the guilt.’583  
 
More recently, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) also had the opportunity to 
address the principle of legality. In Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman584 the defence 
                                                     
580 Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 142. 
581 Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 143. 
582 Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 139. 
583 See discussion by Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 143-144 (emphasis in the original). 
584 Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman (Decision on preliminary motion based on lack of jurisdiction – child 
recruitment) Case No SCSL-2004-14-AR72 (E) 31 May 2004. 
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raised a number of points in its submissions in a Preliminary Motion. The following 
pertained to the principle of legality: 
‘(a) The Special Court has no jurisdiction to try the Accused for crimes under 
Article 4(c) of the Statute … prohibiting the recruitment of children under 15 “into 
armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities” since the 
crime of child recruitment was not part of customary international law at the times 
relevant to the Indictment. (b) Consequently, Article 4(c) of the Special Court 
Statute violates the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.’585 
To the above the prosecution replied, in part, as follows: 
‘The principle of nullum crimen sine lege should not be rigidly applied to an act 
universally regarded as abhorrent. The question is whether it was foreseeable and 
accessible to a possible perpetrator that the conduct was punishable.’586 
 
The majority of the Court in the Norman-case favoured (in principle) the less strict 
approach to legality as described above with reference to the judgments of the IMT 
and the IMTFE. The Court stated:  ‘The emphasis on conduct, rather than on the 
specific description of the offence in substantive criminal law, is of primary 
relevance.’587 With reference to the Tadic case (ICTY) the Court stated that ‘it is 
not necessary for the individual criminal responsibility of the accused to be 
explicitly stated in a convention for the provisions of the convention to entail 
individual criminal responsibility under customary international law.’588 The 
reasoning of the majority of the Court was, all matters considered, less than 
satisfactory. The Court did not really address the fundamental concern of legality, 
and how the principle of specificity was addressed — in particular in the context of 
                                                     
585 Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman (supra) par 1. 
586 Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman (supra) par 2. 
587 Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman (supra) par 25. 
588 Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman (supra) par 38 (emphasis in the original). 
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crimes under customary international law. More elegant was the reasoning of 
dissenting Judge Robertson. Regarding conduct that shock the whole of humankind 
(and for present purposes one could say that this includes the ‘most serious crime’ 
of aggression), Judge Robertson warned against convictions based on ‘disgust 
rather than evidence, or of a non-existent crime.’589 The Judge stated as follows: 
‘The principle of legality, sometimes expressed as a rule against retroactivity, 
requires that the defendant must at the time of committing the acts alleged to 
amount to a crime have been in a position to know, or at least readily to establish, 
that those acts may entail penal consequences. Ignorance of the law is no defence, 
so long as that law is capable of reasonable ascertainment … The requisite clarity 
will not necessarily be found in there having been previous successful prosecutions 
in respect of similar conduct, since there has to be a first prosecution for every 
crime and we are in the early stages of international criminal law enforcement. Nor 
is it necessary, at the time of commission, for there to be in existence an 
international court with the power to punish it, or any foresight that such a court 
will necessarily be established. In every case, the question is whether the 
defendant, at the time of conduct which was not clearly outlawed by national law 
in the place of its commission, could have ascertained … that it was contrary to 
international criminal law.’590 
 
Against the above background, the scope and meaning of the principle of legality in 
South African law are considered. 
 
Section 35(3)(l) of the Constitution of South Africa provides as follows:  
                                                     
589 Dissenting opinion of Judge Robertson in Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman (supra) par 13. 
590 Dissenting opinion of Judge Robertson in Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman (supra) par 13. 
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‘Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right – not to be 
convicted for an act or omission that was not an offence under either national or 
international law at the time it was committed or omitted’. 
 
This constitutional provision has a number of implications for the application of 
criminal norms. 
 
Snyman commented that this means that any legislation that would criminalise 
conduct retroactively would be unconstitutional.591 Section 35(3)(l) actually 
constitutionalises the ius praevium (prohibition of retroactive criminalisation) 
component of the legality principle in criminal law. The other well-established 
components are:  Ius certum (clear language592); ius acceptum (conduct accepted 
in law as criminal conduct593); and ius strictum (narrow or strict interpretation of 
the definition of a crime594).595  
 
The legality principle, and in particular the ius certum aspect of it, does not mean 
that there must always be absolute certainty regarding the application of the 
elements of the crime. The approach of South African courts is, however, that 
statutory as well as common law offences that are too vague will be 
unconstitutional.596 Nico Steytler argued that the principle against retroactivity 
and the prohibition of vaguely defined offences share the same rationale: 
                                                     
591 CR Snyman Strafreg 5th (2006) Lexisnexis Butterworths, Durban, 48. See also Iain Currie & Johan de Waal 
The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th (2005) Juta, Cape Town, 787-788. 
592 S v Jordan 2002 2 SACR 499; 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC). 
593 S v Malgas 2001 1 SACR 469; 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA). 
594 S v Mintoor 1996 1 SACR 514 (C). 
595 For a discussion see Snyman (Strafreg) (supra) 41-51. 
596 See S v Friedman (1) 1996 (1) SACR 181 (W). On the ius certum component of legality and the impact of 
vagueness on the application of criminal law, see National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of 
Justice 1998 (2) SACR 102 (W) 117-119. 
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‘A vaguely-defined offence raises the same concerns that underlie the prohibition 
against retroactive offences. If the definition of an offence is so vague that it 
cannot give sufficient notification to citizens of the proscribed field of activity, it 
not only permits the unfair prosecution of an unwitting person, but it also allows 
the state a wide prosecuting discretion which it may abuse.’597 
 
The strict application of the legality principle was confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court in Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others598. In particular, 
Judge Nkabinde referred to the following aspects of the legality principle: 
                                                     
‘One of the central tenets underlying the common-law understanding of legality is 
that of foreseeability — that the rules of criminal law are clear and precise so that 
an individual may easily behave in a manner that avoids committing crimes.’599 
 
And further: 
‘Section 35(3)(l) of the Constitution confirms a long-standing principle of the 
common law that provides that accused persons may not be convicted of offences 
where the conduct for which they are charged did not constitute an offence at the 
time it was committed.’600 
 
The Constitutional Court also linked the common law and constitutional legality 
principle to the very nature of the constitutional dispensation in South Africa, 
namely that ‘legality is central to the rule of law’.601  
 
597 Nico Steytler (Constitutional Criminal Procedure) (supra) 374. 
598 Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others Case CCT 54/06, 10 May 2007 [unreported]. 
599 Nkabinde J in Masiya v DPP (supra) par 52. 
600 Nkabinde J in Masiya v DPP (supra) par 54. 
601 Nkabinde J in Masiya v DPP (supra) par 55. The judge relied on an earlier judgement of the Constitutional 
Court, in Veldman v Director of Public Prosecutions 2006 (2) SACR 319 (CC). The latter concerned the 
sentencing aspect of the legality principle (nulla poena sine lege).  
 - 207 - 
 
Considering the writings of publicists and the developing criminal and 
constitutional law jurisprudence discussed above, a number of submissions 
regarding the possible prosecution of individuals for the crime of aggression under 
customary international law are put forward. 
 
First, in the context of the dualist-monist debate, and the impact of the 
Constitution on the application of international law described in paragraph 5.1.1 et 
seq above, it is submitted that at present it will not be possible to prosecute an 
individual for the crime of aggression in a South African court. In the absence of 
legislation transforming or incorporating international norms into crimes under 
South African law, one cannot simply turn to the Constitution as a basis to 
prosecute individuals. The Constitution provides that customary international law is 
law in the Republic, but other constitutional and criminal law norms (notably the 
principle of legality) constitute considerable obstacles in the way of prosecuting 
individuals on the basis of customary international law. Secondly, on the 
assumption that there is no crime of aggression in South Africa law, the position is 
that judges cannot rely on international law as a basis to create the crime of 
aggression for purposes of convicting an individual for this crime in a South African 
court. The democratic principle is that the legislature is the sole creator of new 
crimes in South Africa.602 Thirdly, it is submitted that the uncertainty surrounding 
the elements and scope of the crime of aggression under customary international 
law, provides an additional reason why individuals can at present not be 
prosecuted for this crime in South African courts. Regardless of whether one 
supports the minimalist or the expansive view on the elements and scope of the 
crime of aggression under customary international law, the point is that an accused 
                                                     
602 For a discussion of this aspect of legality, see Snyman (Strafreg) (supra) 43. 
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will be able to raise this uncertainty as a valid constitutional (and criminal law) 
objection to his or her prosecution. Uncertainty offends the principle that crimes 
must not be vague. This in turn touches on the element of foreseeability. An 
accused (even in a leadership position) must be able to foresee that a certain 
policy decision or act that he authored and had knowledge of, will constitute the 
crime of aggression under customary international law. It was pointed out above 
that the minimalist view on the elements of aggression under customary 
international law will probably provide a better basis for the prosecution of 
individuals for the crime of aggression. But even then accused persons will be able 
to point to the ongoing debates and uncertainty surrounding the definition of 
aggression as an indication of the vagueness of the crime — also under customary 
international law. 
 
Another case (application of customary international (criminal) law in England) is 
considered to illustrate the difficulties in applying international criminal law in 
national courts. 
 
5.1.3.6 Case study:  The application of customary international (criminal) law in 
English law, with specific reference to the crime of aggression 
 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent ‘regime-change’ by the American-led 
coalition created much debate and animosity. While international lawyers debated 
the legality of the invasion603 (which was neither explicitly authorised by the 
                                                     
603 It is interesting to note that during the Vietnam conflict a number of individuals raised the issue of the 
legality of the use of force by the US in US courts. On balance, the cases showed the reluctance of courts to 
pronounce on matters of foreign policy and ‘political’ issues. However, some interesting dissenting opinions 
were delivered. In Dennis Mora et al v Robert S McNamara, Secretary of Defense et al 389 US 934, 88 SCt 282, 
Steward J and Douglas J (dissenting) were willing to accept the possibility that the use of force by the US in 
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Security Council, nor an apparent act of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter),604 people all over the world (including people in Britain and America) 
voiced their opposition to the invasion.605 Historians and international relations 
specialists will no doubt analyse the political implications of the 2003 invasion and 
subsequent occupation of Iraq. From an international law perspective the legality 
of the invasion will be debated for some time to come. However, for the time 
being there seems to be no real possibility that any (international) criminal law 
action will be taken against any individuals relating to the invasion of Iraq, and in 
particular the question whether any individuals can be held liable for the crime of 
aggression. Indeed, while the international community (including the Security 
Council) was bitterly divided on the initial question whether the US, the UK and the 
other members of the coalition had the necessary authority to use force, by May 
2003 the Security Council accepted the reality of the occupation and subsequent 
regime change in Iraq. With Resolution 1483 the Security Council reaffirmed the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, but at the same time also accepted the 
presence and role of the American and other coalition forces in Iraq.606 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Vietnam was illegal. See also an earlier opinion of Douglas J in David Henry Mitchell III v US 386 US 972, 87 SCt 
1162 at 1163. 
604 For comments on the legality of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, see Lori Fisler Damrosch and Bernard H Oxman 
(eds) Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict (2003), ASIL, Washington DC.  
605 See George Soros The Bubble of American Supremacy (2004), Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 22 – 24 for an 
argument of how the US-led invasion of Iraq prompted worldwide protests. There exists a vast amount of 
commentary, analysis and polemical writing on the Iraq-invasion. Some of the early comments referred to the 
international political implications of the perceived illegality of the invasion. See for instance:  Alain Gresh, 
Maria Ierardi, Olivier Pironet and Philippe Rivière ‘The US war on Iraq (L’empire contre L’Irak) Le Monde 
diplomatique, 2 Sep 2003 (available at http://mondediplo.com/focus/iraq/); ‘Casus belli voor Irak smelt weg’ 
De Standaard, 11 Jul 2003 (available at http://www.standaard.be/Misc/print.asp?articleID=DST11072003_024); 
Paul Krugman ‘Who’s Accountable?’ The New York Times, 10 Jun 2003 (available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/10/opi.../10KRUG.html?pagewanted=print&position); Stanley Hoffmann 
‘America goes backward’ The New York Review of Books, Vol 50 No 10, 12 Jun 2003 (available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16350); ‘Bush’s America loses hearts and minds’ Mail & Guardian 4 Jun 
2003 (available at http://mg.co.za/Content/13.asp?ao=15196).  
606 SC Res 1483 (22 May 2003), 42 ILM 1016 (2003). 
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 Although the above mentioned political and legal turmoil caused by the 2003 
invasion of Iraq will probably never result in any prosecutions of individuals for the 
crime of aggression (certainly not in the manner and form of international criminal 
tribunals like the IMT Nuremberg or IMTFE Tokyo), the question whether the 
invasion should be regarded as aggression under customary international law did 
come before the courts in England. In R v Jones et al607, the House of Lords 
considered an appeal608 that essentially concerned the following assertions:  
Aggression is recognised as a crime under customary international law; customary 
international law is (without the need for any statute or judicial decision) part of 
the domestic law of England and Wales; and efforts to prevent the crime of 
aggression must be seen as legal justifications for what would otherwise be 
criminal acts.609  
 
During February or March 2003 the twenty appellants before the House of Lords 
committed various criminal acts aimed at disrupting the activities at military 
facilities in the United Kingdom that were used by the American and British armed 
forces.610 Their purported justification (to stop the American and British ‘crime of 
aggression against Iraq’) was summarised by Lord Bingham of Cornhill as follows: 
‘The appellants acted as they did because they wished to impede, obstruct or 
disrupt the commission of that crime [aggression], or what they believed would be 
                                                     
607 R v Jones et al (Conjoined Appeals) 29 March 2006, 45 ILM 992 (2006). 
608 For a comment on the judgment by the Court of Appeal, see R Cryer ‘Aggression at the Court of Appeal’ 10 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2005) 209-230. 
609 See opinion of Lord Bingham of Cornhill in R v Jones (supra) para 1 - 36 for an exposition of the propositions 
made by the appellants. 
610 For instance, Margaret Jones and Paul Milling, two of the appellants, broke into the Royal Air Force Base at 
Fairfort in Gloucestershire where they caused damage to fuel tankers and bomb trailers. They were charged 
inter alia with counts of conspiracy to cause criminal damage contrary to sec 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 
1977. See R v Jones (supra) para 3 – 4. 
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the commission of that crime, by Her Majesty’s Government or the Government of 
the United States against Iraq in the weeks and days before (as we now know) 
hostilities began. They accordingly contend, or have contended, that they were 
legally justified in acting as they did. The House is not asked to rule whether, in 
preparing to make war against Iraq, the United Kingdom or the United States 
committed the international law crime of aggression, but it must rule whether, if 
they may have done, that would justify the appellants’ otherwise criminal 
conduct.’611 
 
In determining whether the crime of aggression is a crime under customary 
international law, Lord Bingham of Cornhill referred to certain milestones on the 
road to the acceptance of the crime of aggression as part of international law. 
These milestones include those instruments and cases discussed in previous 
Chapters of this dissertation, like the instruments from the League of Nations era, 
the Charter of the United Nations, the trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo (as well as 
the subsequent trials of individuals for the crime of aggression, especially under 
the Control Council Laws), the various drafts of the Draft Code of Crimes against 
Peace and Security of Mankind, the 1974 General Assembly Definition of Aggression 
and the Rome Statute of the ICC.612  
 
Importantly, Lord Bingham of Cornhill referred to the ICJ judgment in Nicaragua v 
United States613. He linked the finding of the ICJ that the prohibition on the use of 
force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter was accepted as jus cogens, to the 
conclusion of writers like Professor Brownlie that the criminalisation of aggression 
                                                     
611 Lord Bingham of Cornhill in R v Jones (supra) par 2. 
612 Lord Bingham of Cornhill in R v Jones (supra) para 12 – 17. 
613 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicaragua v United 
States) (supra).  
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(as set out in Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter) has become part of ‘general 
international law’.614 It was thus accepted by Lord Bingham of Cornhill that the 
crime of aggression is indeed part of customary international law. The question 
remained whether the customary international law notion of aggression was 
specific enough to serve as a basis for any criminal liability. Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill concluded as follows: 
‘It was suggested, on behalf of the Crown, that the crime of aggression lacked the 
certainty of definition required of any criminal offence, particularly a crime of this 
gravity. This submission was based on the requirement in article 5(2) of the Rome 
statute that the crime of aggression be the subject of definition before the 
international court [ICC] exercised jurisdiction to try persons accused of that 
offence. This was an argument which found some favour with the Court of Appeal … 
I would not for my part accept it. It is true that some states parties to the Rome 
statute have sought an extended and more specific definition of aggression. It is 
also true that there has been protracted discussion of whether a finding of 
aggression against a state by the Security Council should be a necessary pre-
condition of the court’s exercise of jurisdiction to try a national of that state 
accused of committing the crime. I do not, however, think that either of these 
points undermines the appellants’ essential proposition that the core elements of 
the crime of aggression have been understood, at least since 1945, with sufficient 
clarity to permit the lawful trial (and, on conviction, punishment) of those accused 
of this most serious crime. It is unhistorical to suppose that the elements of the 
crime were clear in 1945 but have since become in any way obscure.’615 
 
The next issue for consideration was whether crimes recognised in customary 
international law are also recognised and enforced by the law of England and 
                                                     
614 Lord Bingham of Cornhill in R v Jones (supra) par 18. See further discussion under par 5.1.3.3 supra. 
615 Lord Bingham of Cornhill in R v Jones (supra) par 19. 
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Wales, without the need for domestic statutory incorporation or judicial decisions. 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill accepted that crimes under customary international law 
‘may be assimilated into the domestic criminal law’ of England and Wales, but this 
assimilation is not automatic. Lord Bingham of Cornhill favoured the view that new 
crimes can only be introduced into English law via Parliament. Customary 
international law may very well be the legal basis or justification for Parliament to 
legislate on international crimes, for instance the crime of torture (Criminal Justice 
Act, 1988).616 It is submitted that this view on the need for an act of 
transformation in English law is consistent with the above espoused view on the 
application of crimes under (customary) international law in South African law. 
Indeed, it is submitted that the ultimate success of the application of international 
criminal law in national courts will to an important extent depend upon the firm 
assimilation into national law and legal doctrine, rather than on utopian notions of 
the direct application of international criminal law in national courts. 
 
5.2. Prosecuting the crime of aggression in national courts, state sovereignty 
and the Act of State doctrine 
 
State sovereignty617 — perhaps the most important feature of the international 
system — is ‘not unfettered.’618 While the prosecution of crimes in national courts 
is a fundamental function (and manifestation) of a sovereign state’s ability to 
conduct its own affairs, there are limits imposed by the ‘obligation to respect the 
sovereignty of other states.’619 This principle (sometimes expressed by reference to 
                                                     
616 Lord Bingham of Cornhill in R v Jones (supra) para 20 – 23. 
617 See general comments on the notion of state sovereignty in the context of the emerging system of 
international criminal law, Introduction par c.2 supra. 
618 Antonio Cassese (International Law) (supra) 98. 
619 Ibid. 
 - 214 - 
 
the maxim par in parem non habet imperium — ‘equals have no jurisdiction over 
one another’), manifests in a very important limitation on state sovereignty:  
sovereign immunity. Two important consequences flow from sovereign immunity. 
First, states ‘must not interfere with public acts of foreign sovereign [states] out of 
respect for their independence.’620 The second implication concerns the power of 
national courts over the conduct of foreign sovereign states and over the conduct 
of foreign affairs by the national government. Here the general approach is that 
the courts (judicial branch of state) should not interfere.621 The impact of 
immunities on the prosecution of crimes under international law will be addressed 
in paragraph 5.4 below in the context of the exercise of extraterritorial (and more 
specifically universal) jurisdiction by national courts. 
 
For present purposes it is necessary to highlight two other doctrines in English law 
that might limit the ability of a national court to pronounce on the conduct of state 
officials. The act of state doctrine (which is not to be confused with the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity)622 in general means that the acts of foreign states (within 
their own territories) and the conduct of foreign affairs of the domestic 
government fall beyond judicial scrutiny.623 The foundational principle here is that 
the sovereignty and equality of states must be respected.624 The related concept of 
‘non-justiciability’ (matters essentially within the competence of the executive 
branch of government) applies to domestic and foreign executive acts.625 The 
                                                     
620 Antonio Cassese (International Law) (supra) 99. 
621 Ibid. 
622 See in general Malcolm Shaw International Law 3rd (1991) Grotius Publications, Cambridge, 431-433. 
623 See in general on the development and historical origins of the doctrine Michael Zander ‘Act of State 
Doctrine’ 27(5) The Modern Law Review (1964) 588-593; for a discussion on the position in South Africa see 
John Dugard (International Law) (supra) 73-79. 
624 Malcolm Shaw (International Law) (supra) 128. 
625 Ibid. 
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decision by the executive to go to war is regarded as such a non-justiciable act.626 
The rationale for the doctrine of non-justiciability seems to rest (at least in part) 
on a policy consideration. For instance, it had been suggested that ‘judicial review 
would not be appropriate in a matter which would have serious international 
repercussions and which was more properly the sphere of diplomacy.’627 The 
doctrines of non-justiciability and act of state traditionally held that certain 
matters were (because of their discretionary nature) beyond the jurisdiction of the 
courts. Courts thus exercised judicial restraint in these matters. However, 
sovereign immunity (as a jurisdictional immunity) traditionally meant that a 
national court (which would have substantive jurisdiction over the matter) was 
simply prevented from exercising jurisdiction because of the immunity.628 
 
The following statement by Lord Hoffmann in R v Jones (House of Lords) illustrates 
the constitutional rules and prerogative powers associated with the act of state 
doctrine in English law concerning the conduct of foreign affairs by the English 
government:  
‘How, consistently with our constitution, is liability for [aggression] to be 
determined in a domestic court? First, there is the theoretical difficulty of the 
courts, as the judicial branch of government, holding not merely that some officer 
of the state has acted unlawfully … but, as a sine qua non condition, that the state 
itself, of which the courts form part, has acted unlawfully. Secondly, there is the 
practical difficulty that the making of war and peace and the disposition of the 
armed forces has always been regarded as a discretionary power of the Crown into 
the exercise of which courts will not enquire. I say that it is a practical difficulty 
                                                     
626 Malcolm Shaw (International Law) (supra) 129. 
627 See Malcolm Shaw(International Law) (supra) 129 and the reference to R v Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Pirbai, The Times, 17 Oct 1985, 4 (Court of Appeal). 
628 Malcolm Shaw (International Law) (supra) 431-432. 
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because, as Lord Devlin pointed out in Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions 
[1964] AC 763, 806-812, the reason why the courts cannot enquire is not the 
technicality that the powers form part of the royal prerogative. Lord Devlin’s view 
that the prerogative origin of the powers did not in itself exclude judicial control 
was affirmed by the House in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil 
Service [1985] AC 374. It is because of the discretionary nature of the power 
itself.’629 
 
Lord Hoffmann accordingly held that the ‘decision to go to war, whether one thinks 
it was right or wrong, fell squarely within the discretionary powers of the Crown to 
defend the realm and conduct its foreign affairs.’ Furthermore, the decision to go 
to war could in the view of Lord Hoffmann also be regarded as a non-justiciable 
issue.630  
 
The statements by Lord Hoffmann must be seen in the context of his reasoning. He 
did not find that the customary international law crime of aggression is not a crime 
in English law because of vagueness, or lack of definition. He stated: 
‘Of course the definition of a crime so recent and so rarely punished will have 
uncertainties. But it is true of other crimes as well. If the core elements of the 
crime are certain enough to have secured convictions at Nuremberg, or to enable 
everyone to agree that it was committed by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait [in 1991], 
then it is in my opinion sufficiently defined to be a crime, whether in international 
or domestic law.’631 
Lord Hoffmann identified two reasons why aggression should not be regarded as a 
crime in English domestic law. First, Parliament alone can create new crimes not 
                                                     
629 Lord Hoffmann in R v Jones (supra) par 65. 
630 Lord Hoffmann in R v Jones (supra) par 66. 
631 Lord Hoffmann in R v Jones (supra) par 59. 
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previously criminalised under English law.632 Secondly, Lord Hoffmann stated that, 
‘in the absence of statutory authority, the prosecution of [aggression] in a 
domestic court would be inconsistent with a fundamental principle of our 
constitution. Aggression is a crime in which the principal is always the state itself. 
The liability of individuals is in a sense secondary.’633 For this emphasis on the 
conduct by the state Lord Hoffmann relied on the ILC’s Draft Code of Crimes 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind of 1996.634  
 
It is not clear why Lord Hoffmann has chosen to refer to a draft document that 
preceded current debates around the definition of aggression. The 1996 Draft 
Code’s provision on aggression (discussed in Chapter 4 paragraph 4.2.2.3 above) 
must be seen in context. One should be mindful of the fact that the 1996 Draft 
Code contained a much shorter provision on aggression than the 1991 Draft Code. 
Indeed, Article 16 of the 1996 Draft Code in essence only confirms that individuals 
can be held liable for the crime of aggression. The ‘crime of aggression’ is not 
defined at all and according to the commentary on the Draft Code, Article 16 refers 
to the UN Charter and the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal as the main sources 
of authority with regard to individual criminal responsibility for aggression. To say, 
as Lord Hoffmann does, that aggression is a crime in which the ‘principal is always 
the state itself’, with the liability of individuals ‘in a sense secondary’, is not 
correct. It is not correct because it is a very sweeping generalisation, and does not 
take into account the different ways in which the crime of aggression can come 
about. States are abstract entities635 and individuals are indeed necessary to plan 
                                                     
632 Lord Hoffmann in R v Jones (supra) par 60. 
633 Lord Hoffmann in R v Jones (supra) par 63 (Emphasis added). 
634 For a discussion see Ch 4 par 4.2.2.3 supra. 
635 See criticism from an international criminal law perspective of the 1996 Draft Code in Ch 4 par 4.2.2.3 
supra. 
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and initiate aggressive policies. An individual leader with evil intent (who mobilises 
and employs the armed forces of a state as part of aggressive foreign policy) can be 
held liable for aggression without his responsibility resting on a finding of state 
liability first. This is the legacy of Nuremberg that forms the core of the crime of 
aggression under customary international law, as explained above in paragraphs 
5.1.3.3 and 5.1.3.4. 
 
Lord Hoffmann’s assumption that in the context of aggression ‘the principal is 
always the state,’ led him to consider the impact of the act of state doctrine and 
the non-justiciability of the decision to go to war (referred to above), on the 
question of whether liability for aggression can be determined by a domestic court 
in England. Lord Hoffmann held that the ‘discretionary nature or non-justiciability 
of the power to make war is … simply one of the reasons why aggression is not a 
crime in domestic law.’636 This way of reasoning precludes a first finding whether 
aggression is a crime in English law and then to consider whether the issues which 
the crime raises (notably individual liability) are at all justiciable. Indeed, the logic 
of Lord Hoffmann’s argument is that the very nature of the powers necessary to 
deploy the armed forces of the state is discretionary in nature. This is the reason 
why aggression is not a crime under domestic English law — not for reasons of 
vagueness of definition. It is unfortunate that Lord Hoffmann simply accepted that 
state liability is a condition sine qua non for individual liability for aggression.637  
 
Vagueness of the crime of aggression (under customary international law) is 
arguably a far better reason to state that it cannot be applied in domestic courts. 
Indeed, this was also one of the main criticisms against the 1991 Draft Code of 
                                                     
636 Lord Hoffmann in R v Jones (supra) par 67. 
637 Lord Hoffmann in R v Jones (supra) par 65. 
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Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.638 This reason, plus the 
argument that only Parliament can create new crimes (even when crimes under 
customary international law served as legal basis for such legislation) are better 
grounds to state that the crime of aggression is not part of English law. Instead of 
stating that state liability is a condition sine qua non to determine aggression, the 
better position is that a conclusion that a state has committed aggression (and in 
this regard a finding by the Security Council would be particularly relevant) could 
make it easier for a national court to find that aggression was perpetrated and 
whether any individuals can be held liable for the crime.639  
 
Another reason for a national court to refuse to exercise jurisdiction could also 
have been where sovereign immunity was an issue. This aspect is dealt with in 
paragraph 5.4 below. But sovereign immunity (as jurisdictional immunity) is not the 
same as saying that, because of the nature of the crime of aggression, a court 
cannot determine whether the crime is actually a crime under national law. It is 
submitted that the application of the doctrines of act of state and non-justiciability 
are not appropriate in the context of crimes under international law. Indeed, 
judicial restraint in this area of the law seems to be misplaced — given the 
movement against impunity for crimes that affect the whole of humanity. 
 
In South African case law it was held that the decision to go to war must be 
regarded as falling within the power of government to conduct foreign affairs.640 
The question is whether the South African courts will also regard the government’s 
                                                     
638 See discussion in Ch 4 par 4.2.2.2 supra. 
639 See argument by Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 117. 
640 Minister of Home Affairs v Bickle 1984 (2) SA 439 (ZS) at 450H. See further discussion by John Dugard 
(International Law) (supra) 70-72. 
 - 220 - 
 
decision to go to war as an act of state, a non-justiciable matter. Before the new 
constitutional dispensation of 1994, South African courts followed English law when 
considering the application of international law in South Africa. Dugard pointed out 
that the notion of ‘prerogative powers’ of the executive and other constitutional 
matters impacting on a court’s ability to pronounce on acts of state, derived from 
English law.641 After the adoption of the Interim Constitution in 1994 and 
thereafter the Constitution of 1996, the ‘principles of executive accountability and 
transparency’642 started to feature prominently.643 The position in South Africa now 
seems somewhat different from that of England, as discussed above. Dugard 
observed that while ‘the executive retains its discretionary non-statutory powers to 
enable it to conduct foreign relations, these powers are no longer beyond the reach 
of judicial review.’644 The fundamental difference between Lord Hoffmann’s 
understanding of the act of state doctrine and the non-justiciability of 
discretionary decisions of the state, on the one hand, and the position in South 
Africa under the present Constitution of 1996, on the other hand, seems to be the 
following:  South African courts may apply rules of customary international law (to 
the extent that the rules are not inconsistent with the Constitution itself, or with 
an Act of Parliament). The implication is that a court can apply a rule of customary 
international law — even when it is contrary to an executive decision645 (including 
what would be regarded as an ‘an act of state’.) The absolutist position under 
English law (apparently favoured by Lord Hoffmann) was summarised by the 
publicist JG Starke, as follows: 
                                                     
641 John Dugard (International Law) (supra) 73. 
642 Ibid. 
643 See in this regard President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) on the reviewability of 
the President’s ‘prerogative powers’. The Constitutional Court rejected the argument that certain presidential 
powers were not subject to review. 
644 John Dugard (International Law) (supra) 73. 
645 John Dugard (International Law) (supra) 74. 
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‘Acts of State by the Executive, for example a declaration of war, or an annexation 
of territory, may not be questioned by British municipal Courts, notwithstanding 
that a breach of international law may have been involved.’646 
 
Such an absolutist position seems not to be applicable to South African courts. The 
nature of aggression as involving the state (and I have already pointed out above 
that one should not view the responsibility of the state as a condition sine qua non 
for individual liability) cannot bar a court from enquiring whether the conduct of 
an individual amounts to the crime of aggression. The correct inquiry is whether 
the crime of aggression is indeed a crime under customary international and 
national law. This involves the issue of legality (and the concern of vagueness, also 
discussed in the South African context above) more than questions about the 
applicability of the act of state doctrine. And if one assumes that the crime of 
aggression is indeed part of domestic law (even on the basis of customary 
international law), questions of enforcement and jurisdiction will come into play. 
In turn, the impact of immunities (including state immunities) is also relevant in 
this context. These issues are addressed below. 
 
5.3 Application of international criminal law in the context of the universality 
principle, or universal jurisdiction 
 
5.3.1 Prosecution of international crimes on the basis of universal jurisdiction 
 
5.3.1.1 Case study:  The Belgian universal jurisdiction law:  Principles, practice 
and politics 
                                                     
646 JG Starke An Introduction to International Law 7th (1972) Butterworths, London. 
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 Belgium’s Act on the Punishment of Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law of 1993, as amended in 1999, (the ‘Genocide Act’)647 provided 
for the criminalisation and punishment of war crimes648, genocide, and crimes 
against humanity649. After the amendment in 1999, the Genocide Act was one of 
the most progressive (and controversial) legislative instruments in the world, 
providing for unlimited universal jurisdiction over the crimes referred to above. 
None of the traditional jurisdictional links (like personality or territoriality) with 
Belgium was necessary for a Belgian court to exercise jurisdiction over an 
individual accused. The Act also provided that the official status of the individual 
accused would not bar a prosecution.  
 
The unlimited universality of the Genocide Act led to a number of high-profile 
investigations for serious violations of international humanitarian law against a 
number of foreign Heads of State and Government, including the former President 
of Chile, General Augusto Pinochet, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi650, the (former) Prime 
Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, and — perhaps most controversially from a political 
perspective — against a number of American leaders and officials: Former President 
George HW Bush, former Secretary of State Colin Powell (in relation with the Gulf 
War of 1991), and President George W Bush, former Defence Secretary Donald 
                                                     
647 Wet 16 juni 1993 betreffende de bestraffing van ernstige schendingen van het international humanitair 
recht, gew wet 10 februari 1999, BS 23 maart 1999. For a discussion see Chris van den Wyngaert Strafrecht, 
Strafprocesrecht & Internationaal Strafrecht 5th (2003) Vol II, Maklu, Antwerp/Apeldoorn, 1110-1116. 
648 The 1993 Act provided only for war crimes (violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two 
additional Protocols to the Conventions, of 1977. 
649 After the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC of 1998, the Act of 1993 was amended in 1999 to include 
the crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity. See further Chris van den Wyngaert (Strafrecht) (supra) 
1110-1111. 
650 This criminal investigation led to the ICJ case of DRC v Belgium, discussed infra. 
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Rumsfeld, and General Tommy Franks (in relation with the Iraq War of 2003).651 
There were also investigations of a number of companies. One high-profile example 
is the investigation against the multinational oil giant Total-Elf Aquitaine, in 
relation with allegations of slave-labour in Myanmar (Burma).652  
 
None of the investigations (except against Pinochet and Yerodia) progressed 
beyond the initial, investigatory stages. The investigations against Pinochet and 
Yerodia led to arrest warrants against them.653 It is the latter arrest warrant that 
prompted the Democratic Republic of Congo (of which Yerodia was a former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs) to institute proceedings against Belgium in the ICJ.654 
This case is discussed below. Only one actual criminal case resulted from the 
investigations in terms of the Genocide Act, namely the so-called ‘Four of Butare’ 
case of 2001 (relating to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda). The accused in this case 
were eventually convicted.655  
 
Under considerable pressure from the United States, Israel and other nations, as 
well as some Belgian politicians,656 the wide-reaching Genocide Act was amended 
in 2003657 to restrict its scope and application.658 However, this proved not to have 
                                                     
651 Others included the former Pres of Chad, Hissen Habré, the former Iraqi Pres Saddam Hussein, and Pres 
Fidel Castro of Cuba. For further detail see Chris van Den Wyngaert (Strafrecht) (supra) 1111. 
652 Chris van den Wyngaert (Strafrecht) (supra) 1111. 
653 Chris van den Wyngaert (Strafrecht) (supra) 1111-1112. 
654 See discussion of Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v 
Belgium) ICJ 14 Feb 2002 (infra). 
655 Chris van den Wyngaert (Strafrecht) (supra) 1112. 
656 See Chris van den Wyngaert (Strafrecht) (supra) 1112-1113 for a description of the economic, political and 
diplomatic pressure on Belgium that eventually contributed to the amendment of the Genocide Act and the 
abolition of the far-reaching provisions on universal jurisdiction. 
657 For the English text, see ‘Belgium’s amendment to the Law of June 15, 1993 (As amended by the Law of 
February 10, 1999) Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of Humanitarian Law [April 23, 2003], 42 ILM 
749 (2003). 
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gone far enough, and in August 2003 the Genocide Act was repealed. The 
criminalisation provisions (on war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity) of 
the Act were transferred to the general Criminal Code (Strafwetboek) of Belgium 
and the controversial section on universal jurisdiction was replaced by a much 
stricter provision on extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Code on Criminal Procedure 
(Wetboek van Strafvordering).659 The latter provides for a very limited 
extraterritorial application of the Belgian criminal law on war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide. The universal jurisdiction of the controversial 
Genocide Act was thus replaced by a jurisdiction regime based on active and 
passive personality.660 In addition to the strict provisions on extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, the new position in Belgian law is that only the Federal Prosecutor has 
the competency to initiate a prosecution for war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide, committed abroad.661 
 
The controversies surrounding the universal jurisdiction provision of the Genocide 
Act coincided with a period of political tension following the American-led invasion 
of Iraq in 2003. Belgium, like many other countries, was vocal in her opposition to 
the war. When a prosecutor in Belgium proceeded to investigate possible war 
crimes charges against senior American officials (including the President) the 
Genocide Act’s provision on universal jurisdiction became the eye of a transatlantic 
                                                                                                                                                                     
658 For a comment on the controversies surrounding the Belgian Genocide Act, see Steven Ratner ‘Belgium’s 
War Crimes Statute:  A postmortem’ 97 AJIL (2003) 888 – 897. For a discussion of the scope of the universal 
jurisdiction provisions before the 2003 amendment, see Luc Reydams ‘Universal jurisdiction:  The Belgian State 
of Affairs’ 11 Criminal Law Forum (2000) 813 – 216. 
659 Chris van den Wyngaert (Strafrecht) (supra) 1113. 
660 The accused must be a Belgian national, or must have his/her principal place of residence in Belgium; or, 
jurisdiction can be exercised by a Belgian court if the victim is a Belgian national, or a person effectively, 
ordinarily and legally living in Belgium for at least three years. See discussion by Chris van den Wyngaert 
(Strafrecht) (supra) 1113. 
661 See discussion of the relevant provisions by Chris van den Wyngaert (Strafrecht) (supra) 1114. 
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political storm. The (international) political conditions were simply not conducive 
to rational appreciation of the legal principles contained in the Act. The legal 
principles underlying the Genocide Act were derived from international instruments 
like the Geneva Conventions of 1949 — which urge the international community to 
cast a wide net to end impunity for the worst crimes under international law.662 
Ultimately, the Belgian Genocide Act was perhaps also too idealistic and the 
application a bit cavalier — even irresponsible. One can certainly agree with 
Christine van den Wyngaert’s lament that the political and policy conditions of the 
time caused good legal principles to be sacrificed.663 Belgium and the progress of 
international criminal law are all the poorer as a result. The nadir in the saga of 
the Genocide Act came with the ICJ case DRC v Belgium. This case put the focus on 
the tension between the ideals of international criminal law and the realities of 
the international political and legal order. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
662 See for instance Art 49 of the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, 1949 (Geneva Convention I): ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any 
legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, 
any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article. Each High Contracting 
Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be 
committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own 
courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons 
over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned provided such High Contracting Party has made out a 
prima facie case. Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts 
contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches, defined in the following 
Article. In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence, 
which shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those following of the Geneva 
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949.’ This provision provides for the so-
called aut dedere aut judicare enforcement system in international criminal law. See further Richard van Elst 
‘Implementing universal jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions’ 13 LJIL (2000) 815-854. 
663 Chris van den Wyngaert (Strafrecht) (supra) 1114-1115. 
 - 226 - 
 
5.3.1.2 The Arrest Warrant case (DRC v Belgium) before the ICJ 
 
It was pointed out above that one of the investigations in terms of the Belgian 
Genocide Act led to an international arrest warrant (issued by a Belgian 
investigating judge) against Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, the former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo (henceforth ‘DRC’). In terms of 
this warrant Belgium sought the provisional detention of Yerodia (pending a request 
for his extradition to Belgium) for alleged serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, committed by him in the DRC. The DRC subsequently brought 
the matter before the ICJ664 in order to obtain a finding by the Court that the 
arrest warrant violated international law. While the issue before the ICJ evidently 
stemmed from Belgium’s exercise of universal jurisdiction over serious crimes 
under international law, the approach of the DRC was to focus on the issue of 
diplomatic immunity of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Thus, the notion of universal 
jurisdiction turned out to be a secondary issue in the case between the DRC and 
Belgium. However, the ICJ had the opportunity to consider this very important (and 
contentious) issue in international criminal law.665 
 
On the question of the exercise of jurisdiction over serious crimes under 
international law, the ICJ held as follows: 
                                                     
664 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) ICJ 14 Feb 
2002; 41 ILM 536 (2002). (Henceforth ‘DRC v Belgium’). 
665 DRC v Belgium (supra) par 42:  ‘The Congo, for its part, states that its interest in bringing these proceedings 
is to obtain a finding by the Court that it has been the victim of an internationally wrongful act, the question 
whether this case involves the “exercise of an excessive universal jurisdiction” being in this connection only a 
secondary consideration. The Congo asserts that any consideration by the Court of the issues of international 
law raised by universal jurisdiction would be undertaken not at the request of the Congo but, rather, by virtue 
of the defence strategy adopted by Belgium, which appears to maintain that the exercise of such jurisdiction 
can “represent a valid counterweight to the observance of immunities”.’ 
 - 227 - 
 
‘It should … be noted that the rules governing the jurisdiction of national courts 
must be carefully distinguished from those governing jurisdictional immunities:  
jurisdiction does not imply absence of immunity, while absence of immunity does 
not imply jurisdiction. Thus, although various international conventions on the 
prevention and punishment of certain serious crimes impose on States obligations of 
prosecution or extradition, thereby requiring them to extend their criminal 
jurisdiction, such extension of jurisdiction in no way affects immunities under 
customary international law, including those of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. These 
remain opposable before the courts of a foreign State, even where those courts 
exercise such a jurisdiction under these conventions.’666 
 
Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert stated in her dissenting opinion the following 
regarding the concept of universal jurisdiction: 
‘There is no generally accepted definition of universal jurisdiction in conventional 
or customary international law. States that have incorporated the principle in their 
domestic legislation have done so in very different ways. Although there are many 
examples of States exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction for international crimes 
such as war crimes and crimes against humanity and torture, it may often be on 
other jurisdictional grounds such as the nationality of the victim. A prominent 
example was the Eichmann case which was in fact based, not on universal 
jurisdiction but on passive personality. In the Spanish Pinochet case, an important 
connecting factor was the Spanish nationality of some of the victims.’667 
 
The issue of universal jurisdiction and the judges’ treatment of this subject also 
attracted academic commentary, especially from international criminal lawyers.668 
                                                     
666 DRC v Belgium (supra) par 59. 
667 Van den Wyngaert J in DRC v Belgium (supra) par 44. 
668 See for instance Kevin Hopkins ‘The international court of justice and sovereign immunity: why the Yerodia 
case is an unfortunate ruling for the development of public international law’ 27 SAYIL (2002) 256; Max du 
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Roger O’Keefe commented as follows on Judge Van den Wyngaert’s statements on 
universal jurisdiction: 
‘[One] might fairly question whether treaty or custom could be expected to provide 
such a definition [of universal jurisdiction], rather than just permissive or 
prohibitive rules regarding a phenomenon defined doctrinally. One might query, 
also, the genuineness or seriousness of the alleged debate over the meaning of 
universal jurisdiction. And, one might, with reason, point out that the absence of a 
customary or conventional definition and the supposed plurality of doctrinal 
definitions do not mean that no single soundest definition of universal jurisdiction 
cannot be given.’669 
 
Following on his critical comments concerning Judge van den Wyngaert’s treatment 
of the definition (or lack thereof) of universal jurisdiction, O’Keefe suggested the 
following definition: 
‘[Universal] jurisdiction can be defined as prescriptive jurisdiction over offences 
committed abroad by persons who, at the time of commission, are non-resident 
aliens, where such offences are not deemed to constitute threats to the 
fundamental interests of the prescribing state or, in appropriate cases, to give rise 
to effects within its territory.’670 
 
5.3.1.3 The notion of universal jurisdiction in the wake of DRC v Belgium 
 
Roger O’Keefe criticised671 the judges in DRC v Belgium for not being specific 
enough in the way they had dealt with the issue of universal jurisdiction. The result 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Plessis and Shannon Bosch ‘Immunities and universal jurisdiction – the world court steps in (or on?)’ 28 SAYIL 
(2003) 246. 
669 Roger O’Keefe ‘Universal Jurisdiction – Clarifying the basic concept’ 2 JICJ (2004) 744 – 745. 
670 Roger O’Keefe (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 745. 
671 Roger O’Keefe (Universal jurisdiction) (supra) 735-760. 
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was a muddled understanding of universal jurisdiction. Other commentators 
criticised the inconsistent methodology employed by most of the judges when 
determining the existence of universal jurisdiction under international law. In this 
regard, Claus Kreß pointed out that the judgment reflected a schizophrenic 
approach to the question of universal jurisdiction: While the majority of the judges 
had no problem to employ a methodology of ‘principled extension’ to extend 
customary immunity ratione personae to (acting) Foreign Ministers, the judgment 
reflects ‘an orthodox approach regarding the determination of the customary law 
on universal jurisdiction’.672  
 
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Beurgenthal framed their understanding of universal 
jurisdiction with reference to the following facts of the case: 
‘As Mr Yerodia [the DRC’s former Foreign Affairs Minister] was a non-national of 
Belgium and the alleged offences described in the arrest warrant occurred outside 
of the territory over which Belgium has jurisdiction, the victims being non-Belgians, 
the arrest warrant was necessarily predicated on a universal jurisdiction. Indeed, 
both it and the enabling legislation of 1993 and 1999 expressly say so. Moreover, 
Mr. Yerodia himself was outside of Belgium at the time the warrant was issued.’673 
 
The above statement proved, according to O’Keefe, the fusion of the prescriptive 
and enforcement elements of jurisdiction by the three judges. Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans and Buergenthal looked at various national legal systems (for instance 
the Australian War Crimes Act, 1945, the United Kingdom War Crimes Act, 1991, 
                                                     
672 Claus Kreß ‘Universal jurisdiction over international crimes and the Institut de Droit international’ 4 JICJ 
(2006) 561-585, 574. 
673 Joint Separate Opinion of Higgins, Kooijmans and Beurgenthal JJ in DRC v Belgium (supra) par 6. 
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and the Criminal Code of Canada, 1985)674 and compared them with the Belgian 
statute. The judges concluded: 
‘All of these illustrate the trend to provide for the trial and punishment under 
international law of certain crimes that have been committed extraterritorially. But 
none of them, nor the many others that have been studied by the Court, represent 
a classical assertion of a universal jurisdiction over particular offences committed 
elsewhere by persons having no relationship or connection with the forum State.’675 
 
Apart from the references to national legislation and national case law (notably the 
Bouterse case in the Netherlands676 and a German genocide case677), judges 
Higgins, Kooijmans and Beurgenthal also put the issue of universal jurisdiction in 
the context of certain relevant international instruments. With reference to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I of 1977, the judges 
concluded that the grave breaches provisions of these instruments provide for 
States parties to search for persons alleged to have committed grave breaches, and 
furthermore that such states have the obligation to bring such persons (regardless 
                                                     
674 See references to national legislation in Joint Separate Opinion of Higgins, Kooijmans and Beurgenthal JJ in 
DRC v Belgium (supra) par 20. 
675 Joint Separate Opinion of Higgins, Kooijmans and Beurgenthal JJ in DRC v Belgium (supra) par 21. 
676 The Bouterse case concerned the prosecution of an individual who tortured and murdered a number of 
persons in Paramaribo (Suriname) in Dec 1982. Regarding the question of extraterritorial or universal 
jurisdiction, the court in Amsterdam (which agreed with the expert opinion of Prof John Dugard) concluded 
that torture is a crime against humanity and that a state (any state) can – on the basis of customary 
international law – exercise extraterritorial (universal) jurisdiction over an individual accused of crimes against 
humanity. See Beschikking Hof Amsterdam 3 maart 2000, NJ 2000, 266, r.o. 2.2. (copy of summary on file). 
Later the Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) did attach certain conditions (notably nationality or presence on Dutch 
territory) to the extraterritorial application of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court furthermore held that a 
prosecution based on the direct application of crimes under customary international law (which were not 
criminalised under Dutch national law) violated the principle of legality, as protected in the Dutch constitution 
and in the Dutch Penal Code. See judgment of Dutch Supreme Court In re Bouterse 18 Sept 2001, NJ 2002/559. 
For an English translation see 32 NYIL (2001) 282-296. 
677 No further particulars were given by the judges. See Joint Separate Opinion of Higgins, Kooijmans and 
Beurgenthal JJ in DRC v Belgium (supra) par 24. The German case concerned a trial at the Bavarian Higher 
Regional Court ‘in respect of a prosecution for genocide (the accused in this case being arrested in Germany).’  
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of nationality) before their courts. The judges stated that this scheme suggests a 
‘true universality principle’. However, the judges also pointed to the Pictet 
Commentary on the First Geneva Convention ‘which contends that this obligation 
was understood as being an obligation upon States parties to search for offenders 
who may be on their territory.’678 The judges asked:  ‘Is [this] a true example of 
universality, if the obligation to search is restricted to the own territory? Does the 
obligation to search imply a permission to prosecute in absentia, if the search had 
no result?’679 Having considered national legislation and case law, the provisions of 
relevant international instruments and academic writings, Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans and Beurgenthal concluded: 
‘That there is no established practice in which States exercise universal 
jurisdiction, properly so called, is undeniable. As we have seen, virtually all 
national legislation envisages links of some sort to the forum State; and no case law 
exists in which pure universal jurisdiction has formed the basis of jurisdiction. This 
does not necessarily indicate, however, that such an exercise would be unlawful. In 
the first place, national legislation reflects the circumstances in which a State 
provides in its own law the ability to exercise jurisdiction. But a State is not 
required to legislate up to the full scope of the jurisdiction allowed by international 
law. … Moreover, while none of the national case law to which we have referred 
happens to be based on the exercise of a universal jurisdiction properly so called, 
there is equally nothing in this case law which evidences an opinio juris on the 
illegality of such a jurisdiction. In short, national legislation and case law, - that is, 
State practice – is neutral as to exercise of universal jurisdiction.’680 
 
                                                     
678 Higgins, Kooijmans and Beurgenthal JJ in DRC v Belgium (supra) par 31. 
679 Higgins, Kooijmans and Beurgenthal JJ in DRC v Belgium (supra) par 31. 
680 Higgins, Kooijmans and Beurgenthal JJ in DRC v Belgium (supra) par 45. 
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The conclusion of judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Beurgenthal (that State practice is 
neutral as to the exercise of universal jurisdiction) was criticised by O’Keefe on the 
basis that the terminological distinctions drawn by the judges ‘[were] less than 
sound’.681 Thus, the state practice that the judges refer to is in fact manifestations 
of universal jurisdiction (universal jurisdiction to prescribe). Whether a state would 
in any given case be in a position to enforce the jurisdiction with regard to the 
particular accused, is another matter. What is certain, is the meaning of universal 
jurisdiction with reference to the conduct concerned, and with reference to the 
individual accused concerned:  ‘[Universal jurisdiction] applies irrespective of 
whether this prescriptive jurisdiction is exercised in personam or in absentia’.682 
 
While judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Beurgenthal could not find state practice 
supporting the exercise of universal jurisdiction ‘properly so called’, they also 
stated that the exercise of universal jurisdiction would not be unlawful per se. In 
her dissenting opinion Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert also stated that the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction by a state is not illegal under international law. She stated 
that the only real obstacles to the exercise of universal jurisdiction are political or 
foreign relations limitations: 
‘It may be politically inconvenient to have such a wide jurisdiction because it is not 
conducive to international relations and national public opinion may not approve of 
trials against foreigners for crimes committed abroad. This does not, however, 
make such trials illegal under international law.’683 
 
                                                     
681 Roger O’Keefe (Universal jurisdiction) (supra) 754. 
682 Roger O’Keefe (Universal jurisdiction) (supra) 755. 
683 Dissenting opinion of Van den Wyngaert J in DRC v Belgium (supra) par 56 [Emphasis in the original]. 
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Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert also referred to certain practical or pragmatic 
reasons why states would not be inclined to exercise universal jurisdiction: 
‘A practical consideration may be the difficulty in obtaining evidence in trials of 
extraterritorial crimes. Another practical reason may be that States are afraid of 
overburdening their court system … The concern for a linkage with the national 
order thus seems to be more of a pragmatic than of a juridical nature. It is not, 
therefore, necessarily the expression of an opinio juris to the effect that this form 
of universal jurisdiction is contrary to international law.’684 
 
Indeed, as was pointed out above, the political ramifications of the application of 
Belgium’s Law of 1999 did prove to be so severe that the legislation was amended 
in 2003 in order to make it much more restrictive in terms of the application of the 
law.685 Roger O’Keefe also pointed out that other jurisdictions (for instance 
Scotland) thought it wise when the relevant legislation was debated in parliament 
to consider the political consequences of universal jurisdiction over crimes under 
international law.686  
 
From the judgment in DRC v Belgium and the various comments on the opinions of 
the judges, a very complex picture regarding the application of international 
criminal law through domestic legal systems (on the basis of the universality 
principle) emerges. It is clear that not only the ICJ’s treatment of diplomatic 
immunity (the central issue in the case) but also the issue of universal jurisdiction, 
sparked debate and led to more uncertainty instead of providing clear and 
satisfactory answers. Insofar as states would want to rely on universal jurisdiction 
                                                     
684 Ibid. 
685 See comments by Steven Ratner (Belgium’s War Crimes Statute) (supra). 
686 Roger O’Keefe (Universal jurisdiction) (supra) 758. The author referred to the International Criminal Court 
(Scotland) Act 2001. 
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to prosecute crimes under international law, the debate was certainly not 
terminated by the judgment in DRC v Belgium. Furthermore, despite the political 
fall-out caused by some of the high-profile investigations in Belgium under the 
(previous) Belgian universal jurisdiction law (the Genocide Act)687, that certainly 
did not stop other states from exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction (based on the 
universality principle) to prosecute crimes under international law.  
 
Apart from the chilling effect caused by political and practical limitations on the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction by states, there are also certain doctrinal reasons 
for domestic courts to be careful when confronted with a prosecution for a crime 
under international law. Claus Kreß warned:  ‘[The] criminalization of certain 
conduct under international law does not necessarily coincide with the existence 
of a right of states to universal jurisdiction; the latter must still be proven with 
respect to each crime under international law concerned.’688  
 
In her dissenting opinion in DRC v Belgium, Judge ad hoc van den Wyngaert made it 
clear that the exercise by a state of universal jurisdiction (prescriptive jurisdiction) 
over crimes under international law is not contrary to international law. She 
stated: 
‘International law does not prohibit States from asserting prescriptive jurisdiction 
of this kind. On the contrary, international law permits and even encourages States 
to assert this form of jurisdiction in order to ensure that suspects of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity do not find safe havens.’689 
 
                                                     
687 See discussion par 5.3.1.1 (supra). 
688 Claus Kreß (Universal jurisdiction over international crimes) (supra) 571 – 572. 
689 Dissenting opinion of Van den Wyngaert J in DRC v Belgium (supra) par 67. 
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A critical examination of the way national courts deal with domestic prosecutions 
(based on universal jurisdiction) for crimes under international law, is necessary. In 
other words, to follow on Claus Kreß’s warning referred to above, what elements 
should be present to enable a national court to exercise jurisdiction over a crime 
under international law on the basis of universality?  
 
The authors of The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction690 described the 
notion of universal jurisdiction in terms of the lack of traditional jurisdictional 
links between the offender and the forum state: 
‘A nation’s courts exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed in its territory and 
proceed against those crimes committed abroad by its nationals, or against its 
nationals, or against its national interests. When these and other connections are 
absent, national courts may nevertheless exercise jurisdiction under international 
law over crimes of such exceptional gravity that they affect the fundamental 
interests of the international community as a whole. This is universal jurisdiction:  
it is jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime.’691 
 
In terms of the further development and application of international law in 
domestic legal systems, the authors of the Princeton Principles thus proposed the 
following definition of universal jurisdiction: 
                                                     
690 The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, 23 Jul 2001 (available at 
www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf). The Principles were authored by a number of prominent 
international law and politics scholars, aimed at the study of the many problems raised by universal jurisdiction 
and to produce a set of principles on this notion (see Preface by Stephen Macedo), Princeton Principles (supra) 
11 – 12. In her dissenting opinion in DRC v Belgium (supra) Judge Van den Wyngaert observed that projects like 
the Princeton Principles can ‘be seen as the opinion of civil society, an opinion that cannot be completely 
discounted in the formation of customary international law today.’ See Van den Wyngaert J in DRC v Belgium 
(supra) par 27. 
691 Princeton Principles (supra) 23. 
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‘For purposes of these Principles, universal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction 
based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime was 
committed , the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality 
of the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction.’692 
 
The Princeton Principles proposed that states may exercise universal jurisdiction in 
order to try individuals, accused of committing ‘serious crimes under international 
law’.693 For purposes of the Principles, serious crimes under international law 
include ‘(1) piracy; (2) slavery; (3) war crimes; (4) crimes against peace; (5) crimes 
against humanity; (6) genocide; and (7) torture.’694 In their commentary on the 
Principles the authors stated that the list of ‘serious crimes under international 
law’ was ordered on the basis of ‘historical progression’ and not in terms of a 
ranking based on gravity.695 
 
One of the potentially far-reaching proposals contained in the Princeton Principles 
is Principle 3:  Reliance on universal jurisdiction in the absence of national 
legislation: 
‘With respect to serious crimes under international law … national judicial organs 
may rely on universal jurisdiction even if their national legislation does not 
specifically provide for it.’696 
 
For present purposes it is assumed that the essence of the theory of universal 
jurisdiction lies in the fact that the nature of the crime triggers the exercising of 
                                                     
692 Princeton Principles, Principle 1(1) (supra) 28. 
693 Princeton Principles, Principle 1(2) (supra) 28. 
694 Princeton Principles, Principle 2(1) (supra) 29. 
695 Princeton Principles, Commentary (supra) 45. 
696 Princeton Principles, Principle 3 (supra) 30. 
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jurisdiction of a state over the said crime, and it does so in the absence of any 
other jurisdictional nexus like territory or nationality.  
 
Roger O’Keefe analysed the meaning of universal jurisdiction with reference to 
some general observations on the different elements or components of jurisdiction. 
Firstly, O’Keefe pointed to the fact that jurisdiction ‘is not a unitary concept.’697 
There are two distinct aspects to jurisdiction relevant for present purposes, namely 
jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce. The first of the two concepts 
refers to ‘a state’s authority under international law to assert the applicability of 
its criminal law to given conduct, whether by primary or subordinate legislation, 
executive decree or, in certain circumstances, judicial ruling.’698 Jurisdiction to 
enforce, however, ‘refers to a state’s authority under international law actually to 
apply its criminal law, through police and other executive action, and through the 
courts.’699 Thus, the aspect of jurisdiction known as ‘prescriptive jurisdiction’ 
clearly refers to the ability or authority of a state to criminalise certain conduct, 
while enforcement jurisdiction refers to actions by the state like the arrest, 
prosecution and punishment of individuals for conduct criminalised in terms of the 
state’s law. O’Keefe observed that universal jurisdiction ‘is a species of jurisdiction 
to prescribe’.700 Obviously, in practice, as O’Keefe further noted, the ‘act of 
prescription and the act of enforcement are … intertwined.’701 It is submitted that 
the judgment of the ICJ in DRC v Belgium have important implications for the ‘act 
of enforcement’ of international criminal law. In this sense, although the primary 
question before the ICJ was on immunities, the judgment also affected the notion 
                                                     
697 Roger O’Keefe (Universal jurisdiction) (supra) 736. 
698 Roger O’Keefe (Universal jurisdiction) (supra) 736. 
699 Roger O’Keefe (Universal jurisdiction) (supra) 736. 
700 Roger O’Keefe (Universal jurisdiction) (supra) 737. 
701 Roger O’Keefe (Universal jurisdiction) (supra) 741. 
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(and practice) of universal jurisdiction. In fact, the judgment was one of the 
factors that caused Belgium to eventually repeal the Genocide Act that provided 
for universal jurisdiction.702 However, regardless of the actual or potential impact 
of the judgment in DRC v Belgium, there is a definite need to have clarity on the 
theory and practice of universal jurisdiction. Indeed, Claus Kreß’s submission on 
the adoption of an international convention on universal jurisdiction703 seems to be 
the best way forward.  
 
5.3.1.4 Case study:  Universal jurisdiction in Spain:  Law and legality 
 
An example from case law illustrating many of the difficulties with states’ assertion 
of universal jurisdiction, is the judgement of the Spanish Audiencia Nacional 
(National Court, hereafter ‘AN’) in the Scilingo case704. This case concerned the 
arrest and prosecution and eventual conviction in the AN in Spain of Adolfo Scilingo 
for crimes against humanity committed in Argentina during the reign of the Military 
Junta (1976 – 1983).705 Although Scilingo was initially charged with genocide, 
terrorism and torture, the AN convicted him for crimes against humanity. Crimes 
against humanity was only introduced into Spanish law in 2004, but the AN held 
that the conviction was not a violation of the nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege 
principle. The court reasoned that crimes against humanity existed in customary 
international law at the time of the alleged acts of torture and the other acts that 
                                                     
702 Christine van den Wyngaert (Strafrecht) (supra) 1115. The author stated that the absolute low point for the 
Genocide Act was the ICJ’s ruling against Belgium in DRC v Belgium (supra).  
703 Claus Kreß (Universal jurisdiction over international crimes) (supra) 584-585. 
704 For a discussion of the case, see Christian Tomuschat ‘Issues of universal jurisdiction in the Scilingo case’ 3 
JICJ (2005) 1074 -1081; Alicia Gil Gil ‘The flaws of the Scilingo judgment’ 3 JICJ (2005), 1082 – 1091; Giulia 
Pinzauti ‘An instance of reasonable universality’ 3 JICJ (2005) 1092 – 1105. 
705 Christian Tomuschat (Universal jurisdiction) (supra) 1074 – 1075; Alicia Gil Gil (Scilingo judgment) (supra) 
1082 – 1083. 
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constituted crimes against humanity.706 The AN in particular asserted its 
jurisdiction on the basis of universal jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that the 
relevant Spanish law did not provide for universal jurisdiction over crimes against 
humanity, and, as Alicia Gil Gil has pointed out, ‘no obligation of universal 
prosecution of the crimes at issue [crimes against humanity] is stipulated in any 
international treaty.’707 The assertion by the court of universal jurisdiction over 
crimes against humanity came in for criticism.  
 
Christian Tomuschat, in his analysis of the Scilingo case, employed the following 
notion of universal jurisdiction (as exercised by states) as opposed to the 
jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals: 
‘Universal jurisdiction means the right of national tribunals unilaterally to 
prosecute grave crimes, while international tribunals discharge a mandate that has 
been entrusted to them by the international community.’708 
 
The author accepted that crimes against humanity are indeed recognised as crimes 
under international law and that individuals can incur criminal liability for this 
crime. However, this still does not imply the necessary authority for a national 
court to exercise universal jurisdiction over an individual who allegedly committed 
crimes against humanity in a foreign state. Tomuschat writes: 
‘Even before attempting to show in a detailed analysis that universal jurisdiction 
exists for crimes against humanity, the AN pre-emptively claims that this is the 
case. It is of the view that individual criminal responsibility and universal 
jurisdiction go hand in hand, and that a twofold consequence derives from the 
                                                     
706 Alicia Gil Gil (Scilingo judgment) (supra) 1083. 
707 Ibid. 
708 Christian Tomuschat (Universal jurisdiction) (supra) 1079. 
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categorization of a crime as a crime against humanity, namely on the level of 
substantive criminal responsibility as well as on the level of procedure.’709 
 
Two questions remain:  Did the judgment of the AN in Scilingo satisfy the legality 
principle (nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege), which is accepted as a 
fundamental principle of not only all major legal systems of the world, but also of 
international criminal law generally710? How exactly did the court derive its 
jurisdiction from international law? 
 
With regards to the first question, Alicia Gil Gil concluded that the Scilingo 
judgment can be faulted because the court relied on customary international law 
‘to justify the retroactive use of a legislative provision’.711 With reference to the 
Spanish Constitution, Alicia Gil Gil stated the following:  ‘In my opinion, our legal 
system [Spain], which includes a strict principle of legality, precludes criminal 
tribunals from directly applying customary international law, since it does not meet 
the formal and material requirements that our legal system ascribes to the 
principle of legality.’712 Regarding the nature of crimes against humanity under 
customary international law, Gil Gil stated emphatically:  ‘It is obvious that 
international custom does not comply with the principle of specificity as far as 
crimes against humanity are concerned. Their definition has evolved notably since 
Nuremberg until the present day’.713  
 
                                                     
709 Christian Tomuschat (Universal jurisdiction) (supra) 1078. 
710 See Introduction par c.1.3 (supra). 
711 Alicia Gil Gil (Scilingo judgment) (supra) 1085. 
712 Alicia Gil Gil (Scilingo judgment) (supra) 1085. 
713 Alicia Gil Gil (Scilingo judgment) (supra) 1086. Not only national jurisprudence, but also the case law of the 
ad hoc tribunals ICTR and ICTY contributed to the development of the notion of crimes against humanity. 
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Regarding the second question referred to above, Alicia Gil Gil, like Tomuschat and 
other commentators, objected to the creative, but wrong manner in which the AN 
employed the notion of universal jurisdiction to assert its jurisdiction over crimes 
against humanity. Gil Gil also pointed out that the AN disregarded the fact that 
‘the obligation of universal prosecution of the crimes at issue [crimes against 
humanity] is not stipulated in any international treaty.’714 On this point, Giulia 
Pinzauti objected to the AN’s reasoning. The author summarised the AN’s approach 
as follows: 
‘[The] international rules prohibiting crimes against humanity are peremptory 
norms (jus cogens) which impose erga omnes obligations; it follows that the 
international community as a whole is injured by their violation, with the 
consequence that there arises a universal claim to the repression of such violations. 
The exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of a state other than the territorial one is 
also warranted, for the AN, by the unique nature of crimes against humanity:  as 
they are normally perpetrated by state officials, or at least with their connivance 
or acquiescence, it is indeed difficult for them to be prosecuted by the territorial 
state.’715 
 
5.4 The impact of immunities on the application of international criminal law in 
national courts 
 
In DRC v Belgium the ICJ stated that under international law it is firmly established 
that certain individuals (holders of high-ranking office of State) enjoy immunity 
from jurisdiction (civil and criminal) in other states.716 The majority of the ICJ 
                                                     
714 Alicia Gil Gil (Scilingo judgment) (supra) 1088 – 1089. 
715 Giulia Pinzauti ‘An instance of reasonable universality’ 3 JICJ (2005) 1095 – 1096. 
716 DRC v Belgium (supra) par 51. 
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seems to draw no distinction between the individual’s official and private 
capacities. The judges stated: 
‘That immunity and that inviolability protect the individual concerned against any 
act of authority of another State which would hinder him or her in the performance 
of his or her duties.’717 
 
And further, on the scope of the immunity: 
‘In this respect, no distinction can be drawn between acts performed by a Minister 
for Foreign Affairs in an “official” capacity, and those claimed to have been 
performed in a “private capacity”, or, for that matter, between acts performed 
before the person concerned assumed office as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acts 
committed during the period of office. Thus, if a Minister for Foreign Affairs is 
arrested in another State on a criminal charge, he or she is clearly thereby 
prevented from exercising the functions of his or her office. The consequences of 
such impediment to the exercise of those official functions are equally serious, 
regardless of whether the Minister for Foreign Affairs was, at the time of arrest, 
present in the territory of the arresting State on an “official” visit or a “private” 
visit, regardless of whether the arrest relates to acts allegedly performed before 
the person became the Minister for Foreign Affairs or to acts performed while in 
office, and regardless of whether the arrest relates to alleged acts performed in an 
“official” capacity or a “private” capacity.’718 
 
The above statements by the ICJ are indeed unfortunate. The ICJ in casu should 
have drawn a clearer distinction between immunity ratione personae (relating to 
the individual’s office, status or position) and immunity ratione materiae (referring 
to acts performed in an official capacity). Immunity ratione personae will typically 
                                                     
717 DRC v Belgium (supra) par 54. 
718 DRC v Belgium (supra) par 55. 
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apply to heads of state, heads of government or senior ministers of state. This 
immunity will protect them against criminal prosecution in a foreign state for the 
duration of their period in office.719 Although immunity ratione materiae used to 
be a kind of blanket immunity, covering all official acts performed by senior state 
officials, the House of Lords judgment in Pinochet720 provided progressive new 
perspectives on the scope of immunity ratione materiae. It is submitted that in 
light of the Pinochet judgment (and developments in international criminal law in 
general) immunity ratione materiae cannot be applied when an individual (for 
instance a former head of state) is charged with serious crimes under international 
law. This should especially be the case when the crime in question concerns a 
violation of jus cogens norms.721 In the context of international crimes (in 
particular the most serious crimes, namely aggression, war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity), Salvatore Zappalà argued that functional immunity does 
not apply to these crimes.722 Thus, the act of a state (constituting an international 
crime like aggression) is not merely attributed to the state. The state official also 
bears responsibility under international law. The state official is thus criminally 
liable and cannot (according to Zappalà) claim functional (or ratione materiae) 
immunity before a foreign court.723  
 
The nature of the crime in question is another aspect of the debate on immunities. 
In her dissenting opinion in DRC v Belgium, Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert 
                                                     
719 For a discussion of this immunity, see Salvatore Zappalà ‘Do heads of state in office enjoy immunity from 
jurisdiction for international crimes? The Ghaddafi case before the French Cour de Cassation’ EJIL (2001) 595. 
720 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate:  Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) 1999 2 All ER 97 (HL). 
721 See in general Powell and Pillay ‘Revisiting Pinochet:  The development of customary international criminal 
law’ SAJHR 2001 477. 
722 Salvatore Zappalà ‘The German Federal Prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute a former Uzbek minister’ 4 
JICJ (2006) 602-622. 
723 Salvatore Zappalà (The German Federal Prosecutor’s decision) (supra) 613-614. 
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criticised the majority judgment for not taking into account the nature of the 
crimes when considering immunity from criminal prosecutions. She held: 
‘In a more principled way, the case was about how far States can or must go when 
implementing modern international criminal law. It was about the question what 
international law requires or allows States to do as ‘agents’ of the international 
community when they are confronted with complaints of victims of such crimes, 
given the fact that international criminal courts will not be able to judge all 
international crimes.’724 
 
Subsequent to the judgment in DRC v Belgium (and considering other developments 
in international criminal law, for instance the judgment in Pinochet) the position 
seems that state officials (including the head of state and other senior government 
officials) may not claim immunity from jurisdiction (or functional immunity) for 
crimes under international law. However, senior state officials (including the head 
of state and senior officials like ministers of foreign affairs) are still entitled to 
personal immunities (based on comity and in order to prevent possible abuse of 
process) ‘as long as they hold office’.725 Thus, it is clear that for purposes of 
prosecution of individuals at international level (at international tribunals or the 
ICC) the official status of an individual is irrelevant. Article 27 of the Rome Statute 
of the ICC excludes immunities for state officials. Head of state immunity and 
diplomatic immunity726 will still apply for purposes of prosecutions in national 
courts.727 
 
                                                     
724 DRC v Belgium (supra) dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert par 5 [Emphasis in the original]. 
725 Antonio Cassese (International Law) (supra) 113. 
726 See judgment in DRC v Belgium (supra) par 61. 
727 See comments by Iain Cameron in Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnelly (eds) The Permanent 
International Criminal Court (2004) Hart Publishing, Oxford, 73-74. 
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5.5 Concluding remarks 
 
This Chapter highlights a number of issues relevant to the question whether the 
crime of aggression could (or should) be prosecuted at national level. The 
application of international criminal law at domestic level concerns many 
complexities of a procedural, substantive and policy nature. It raises constitutional 
issues.  
 
The one outstanding problem is that there is still much debate about the definition 
of aggression. This affects the very important principle of legality that is not only a 
fundamental principle in international criminal law, but is also protected in most 
national legal systems. Thus, the ability to apply international law to aggression in 
national legal systems is severely hampered by the many attempts to define 
aggression at international level.728 Even the elements and scope of the crime of 
aggression under customary international law, is too uncertain to apply in national 
systems. It is submitted that the problems highlighted with reference to English 
and South African law, are arguably largely the same reasons that caused the lack 
of state practice regarding the prosecution of aggression in national courts. 
 
Given the establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the 
permanent International Criminal Court, as well as the adoption of national 
legislation and a number of progressive judgments in national courts, considerable 
progress has been made during the past decade and a half to bring an end to 
impunity for international crimes like genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and torture. However, due to the considerable substantive and procedural 
                                                     
728 See Ch 4 (supra) on processes to define aggression for purposes of individual criminal liability. 
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difficulties discussed in this Chapter, the prospect that the crime of aggression will 
be prosecuted at national level on the same scale as war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, remain very slim indeed. The only way that this state of affairs can 
change is for the Assembly of States Parties of the Rome Statute of the ICC to 
adopt an acceptable definition of aggression. This would provide national legal 
systems with the practical and doctrinal impetus needed to apply international 
criminal law in domestic courts, including the most serious of crimes under 
international law. The debates and processes concerning the quest for a definition 
of aggression for purposes of the ICC are explored in Chapters 6 and 7 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 247 - 
 
  
 
 
 
Part E 
 
The International Criminal Court and the crime of 
aggression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 248 - 
 
Chapter 6 
 
The inclusion of aggression in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court 
 
6.1 Introduction:  The International Criminal Court 
   6.1.1 The importance of the principle of complementarity 
   6.1.2 The risk of politicised trials or abuse of process 
   6.1.3 The role of the ICC in international peace and security 
6.2 An overview of the legislative history of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998 
   6.2.1 The road(s) to Rome 
   6.2.2 The drafting history of the Rome Statute with respect to the crime of aggression 
     6.2.2.1 An overview of some of the main concerns at the Diplomatic Conference in Rome 
     6.2.2.2 Inclusion of the crime of aggression:  The compromise text of Article 5 
6.3 The road ahead:  The quest to draft a definition of aggression; and conditions under which the ICC can 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
   6.3.1 The context:  Political and criminal justice responses to international aggression 
   6.3.2 The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression  
 
6.1 Introduction:  The International Criminal Court  
 
The aim of this Chapter is twofold:  First, the process that led to the adoption of 
the Rome Statute of the ICC is described. Particular attention is given to the 
(unsuccessful) process to define aggression and the difficult task to draft a suitable 
definition in conformity with Articles 5(2), 121729 and 123730 of the Rome Statute of 
                                                     
729 Art 121 provides as follows:  ‘1. After the expiry of seven years from the entry into force of this Statute, any 
State Party may propose amendments thereto. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties. 2. No sooner than 
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the ICC. Second, the process to define aggression is discussed contextually with 
reference to the relationship between the Security Council of the UN and the ICC. 
This contextual background serves as an introduction to Chapter 7, where the 
various definitional options for the crime of aggression will be critically analysed. 
 
In Chapter 5 a number of factors relevant to the application of international 
criminal law at national level were identified. It was pointed out that these 
concerns pose particular problems for prosecuting individuals in national courts for 
the crime of aggression. It was concluded that, although the notion of universal 
jurisdiction and the possibility of so-called ‘direct application of international 
criminal law’ are today important features of the developing system of 
international criminal law, the peculiar nature of the crime of aggression leaves 
                                                                                                                                                                     
three months from the date of notification, the Assembly of States Parties, at its next meeting, shall, by a 
majority of those present and voting, decide whether to take up the proposal. The Assembly may deal with the 
proposal directly or convene a Review Conference if the issue involved so warrants. 3. The adoption of an 
amendment at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or at a Review Conference on which concensus 
cannot be reached shall require a two-thirds majority of States Parties. 4. Except as provided in paragraph 5, 
an amendment shall enter into force for all States Parties one year after instruments of ratification or 
acceptance have been deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations by seven-eighths of them. 5. 
Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for those States Parties which 
have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance. In 
respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction 
regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its 
territory. 6. If an amendment has been accepted by seven-eighths of States Parties in accordance with 
paragraph 4, any State Party which has not accepted the amendment may withdraw from this Statute with 
immediate effect, notwithstanding article 127, paragraph 1, but subject to article 127, paragraph 2, by giving 
notice no later than one year after the entry into force of such amendment. 7. The Secretary-General of the 
United Nations shall circulate to all States Parties any amendment adopted at a meeting of the Assembly of 
States Parties or at a Review Conference.’ 
730 Art 123 provides:  ‘1. Seven years after the entry into force of this Statute the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations shall convene a Review Conference to consider any amendments to this Statute. Such review 
may include, but is not limited to, the list of crimes contained in article 5. The Conference shall be open to 
those participating in the Assembly of States Parties and on the same conditions. 2. At any time thereafter, at 
the request of a State Party and for the purposes set out in paragraph 1, the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations shall, upon approval by a majority of States Parties, convene a Review Conference. 3. The provisions of 
article 121, paragraphs 3 to 7, shall apply to the adoption and entry into force of any amendment to the 
Statute considered at a Review Conference.’ 
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little scope for the prosecution of individuals in national courts for this crime. This 
state of affairs is ironic, since aggression is arguably the international crime par 
excellence.731 It is therefore perhaps even more ironic that the first permanent 
International Criminal Court (ICC) still does not have effective jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression.  
 
The historic first permanent ICC has jurisdiction over the most serious crimes 
under international law – genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The 
ICC also has formal (but not yet effective) jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression.732 
 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute provides that aggression is a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court, but the Court will only have effective jurisdiction once a 
definition of aggression and conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction are agreed 
on by the Assembly of States Parties. The article provides as follows: 
‘1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern 
to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance 
with this Statute with respect to the following crimes: 
(a) The crime of genocide; 
(b) Crimes against humanity; 
(c) War crimes; 
(d) The crime of aggression. 
2. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision 
is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting 
                                                     
731 Compare statement by the IMT Nuremberg that aggression is the ‘supreme international crime’. See Ch 3 
par 3.3 supra. 
732 For an overview of the Rome Statute of the ICC, see Adreas O’Shea ‘The Statute of the International 
Criminal Court’ 116 SALJ (1999) 243-261. The Rome Statute of the ICC came into force on 1 Jul 2002. 
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out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to 
this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the 
United Nations.’733 
 
Three important underlying themes recurring in the many debates and proposals on 
the crime of aggression are the principle of complementarity, the concern of many 
states that the ICC will be abused for political reasons, and the role of the ICC vis-
à-vis the United Nations in terms of international peace and security. The 
sometimes very technical discussions on a suitable definition for aggression must be 
seen in the context of the following important issues concerning the functioning of 
the ICC. 
 
6.1.1 The importance of the principle of complementarity 
 
One of the outstanding features of the Rome Statute of the ICC is the principle of 
complementarity. This means that national courts, provided that they have 
jurisdiction, will have the first option to exercise jurisdiction over a matter that 
would also fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Only if a state is unwilling or 
unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute a matter, will the ICC be able to step 
in.734 Jann Kleffner described the role of the ICC vis-à-vis national courts as 
follows: 
‘The ICC only assumes the role of a “permanent reserve court”, which completes 
the “international criminal order”, while national criminal jurisdictions are 
                                                     
733 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), UN Doc.A/CONF.183/9, ILM, 1998, 999; reprinted 
in Christine Van den Wyngaert (International Criminal Law) (supra) 125. 
734 See Par 10 of the Preamble, and Art 17 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. See further Sharon Williams ‘Issues 
of admissibility’ in Otto Triffterer (Commentary on the Rome Statute) (supra) 383-394. 
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regarded as remaining indispensable for achieving the ultimate goal of ending 
impunity.’735 
 
Regarding the respective roles of the ICC and national courts in the system of 
international criminal justice, it is important to note that there are other 
mechanisms that can also play a role. Ad hoc international criminal tribunals (for 
instance the ICTY and ICTR) and other forms of internationalised criminal courts 
(including so-called ‘hybrid’ courts736) complete the picture of the system of 
international criminal justice, which is aimed at ending impunity for the most 
serious international crimes.737 
 
There are certain situations where the Security Council can refer matters to the 
ICC. In these cases the ICC will have the necessary jurisdiction regardless of any 
national claims to exercise jurisdiction.738 In general, however, the principle of 
complementarity will apply. 
 
6.1.2 The risk of politicised trials or abuse of process 
 
The ‘risk of abuse of process’ was one of the bogeymen at the Rome Conference on 
the ICC. However, the risk of ‘political trials’ can even be bigger at national level. 
Jann Kleffner referred to an extreme example to illustrate this point: 
                                                     
735 Jann Kleffner Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdiction (2007) Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 115. 
736 For instance the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). For an assessment, see Chandra Lekha Sriram 
‘Wrong-sizing international justice? The hybrid tribunal in Sierra Leone’ 29 Fordham Int’l LJ 472-506. Courts 
like the SCSL combine international and domestic elements – in terms of both applicable law and staff. 
737 Jann Kleffner (Complementarity) (supra) 379-380. 
738 Art 13(b) Rome Statute of the ICC. See further Sharon Williams ‘Exercise of jurisdiction’ in Otto Triffterer 
(Commentary on the Rome Statute) (supra) 350. 
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‘That risk [of abuse of process for political reasons] is amply demonstrated by the 
proceedings against senior NATO leaders, including [former] US President Bill 
Clinton, [former] UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and [former] French President 
Jacques Chirac, before a court in Belgrade which resulted in their sentencing in 
absentia, on 21 September 2000, to 20 years in prison for “inciting an aggressive 
war, war crimes against the civilian population, use of prohibited combat means, 
attempted murder of the Yugoslav president, as well as with the violation of the 
country’s territorial integrity” committed during NATO’s bombing campaign against 
Yugoslavia [during the Kosovo conflict]. Slavisa Mrdakovic, who was appointed to 
defend French President Chirac, was quoted by the news agency Beta as saying: “If 
I were the judge, and it’s a good thing that I am not, I would … take a gun and 
shoot both Clinton and the other scum for all the evil they have done”, to applause 
in the courtroom. In January 2001, the new Serbian justice minister Vladan Batic 
was reported as saying that the verdict would be revised, stating that “This was not 
a trial, but a farce, a comedy” … The judgment was subsequently annulled.’739 
 
The risk of abuse of process and the possibility of so-called ‘politicised trials’ were 
addressed by the drafters of the Rome Statute. Some of the measures include the 
important role of the Pre-Trial Chamber740 on the admissibility of cases741, and the 
role of states in the selection and removal from office of the Prosecutor. These 
measures constitute checks to prevent abuse of process or arbitrary use of 
power.742 
                                                     
739 Jann Kleffner ‘The impact of complementarity on national implementation of substantive international 
criminal law’ 1 JICJ (2003) 105. 
740 See comments by Gideon Boas ‘Comparing the ICTY and the ICC:  Some procedural and substantive issues’ 
NILR (2000) 267-292, in particular 289-290. 
741 See for instance Art 15 and Art 18 Rome Statute of the ICC on, respectively, the rules regarding 
investigations by the Prosecutor, and preliminary rulings on admissibility.  
742 For favourable assessments of the checks against abuse of process and power in the Rome Statute, see 
Steven Ratner and Jason Abrams Accountability for Human Rights atrocities in International Law 2nd (2001) 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 216-219; Ruth Wedgwood in Sewall and Kaysen (United States and the 
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 6.1.3 The role of the ICC in international peace and security 
 
It is important to note at the outset, that the drafters of the Rome Statute were 
not only determined to create an international court with the jurisdiction to try 
individuals suspected of having committed serious international crimes, but also to 
reaffirm the ‘Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations’.743 
Furthermore, the Statute reaffirms that ‘all States shall refrain from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’. The 
drafters also emphasised that nothing in the Rome Statute ‘shall be taken as 
authorizing any State Party to intervene in an armed conflict or in the internal 
affairs of any State’.744 
 
It is thus clear that although the drafters of the Rome Statute could not agree on a 
definition of aggression or on conditions under which the ICC shall exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime, they regarded the prohibition on the use of force in 
international law and the maintenance of peace and security as fundamental values 
informing the Rome Statute. Morten Bergsmo described the relationship between 
the UN Charter and the ICC Statute as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                     
International Criminal Court) (supra) 119-136. For a negative assessment of the ICC’s ‘lack of political 
accountability’, see John Bolton ‘Courting Danger:  What’s wrong with the International Criminal Court’ The 
National Interest (1998/1999) 60, in particular 65-66. For a critical assessment of some of the objections to the 
powers and procedures of the ICC, see Douglas Edlin ‘The anxiety of sovereignty:  Britain, the United States 
and the International Criminal Court’ 29 (1) BC Int’l & Comp L Rev (2006) 1-22. 
743 For general comments on the relationship between the ICC and the UN, see Leila Nadya Sadat The 
International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law:  Justice for the New Millennium 
(2002) Transnational Publishers, New York 78-81. 
744 See Preamble to the Rome Statute of the ICC (supra).  
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‘To the extent a reaffirmation of fundamental Charter principles may serve as a 
reminder to States to effectively prevent and stop armed conflicts pursuant to the 
settlement regimes of the Charter, it contributes to the international prevention of 
the crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction. As international peace and criminal 
justice mandates gradually develop more mature modes of co-existence, it may be 
useful to remind ourselves of the commonality of the fundamental values of human 
life and person underlying both the Charter and the ICC Statute.’745 
 
The interest of international peace and security is perhaps the staying power 
behind efforts to include an effective definition of aggression in the Rome Statute 
of the ICC. However, it is this very issue that also lies within the political domain of 
the Security Council of the UN. Throughout the negotiations and discussions that 
preceded the Rome Diplomatic Conference on the ICC, this tension between 
aggression as an international criminal justice issue and aggression as an 
international political issue proved to be a very difficult item to deal with. 
 
6.2 An overview of the legislative history of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, 1998 
 
6.2.1 The road(s) to Rome 
 
Philippe Kirsch QC, who was elected as the first President of the ICC, has described 
the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC in 1998 as ‘a major step in a 
longstanding effort to establish a permanent forum of international criminal 
                                                     
745 Morten Bergsmo/Otto Triffterer ‘Preamble’ in Otto Triffterer (Commentary on the Rome Statute) (supra) 1-
16. See also comments by Gerhard Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 27-28 on peace and 
security as values of international criminal law. 
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justice’.746 Indeed, for almost the entire duration of the twentieth century, there 
were many attempts to establish an international criminal court. Cherif Bassiouni 
traced the ideal back to early attempts to establish tribunals with jurisdiction to 
try individuals for international crimes such as war crimes and crimes against 
peace. These various efforts culminated in the adoption at Rome of the Statute of 
the ICC747.  
 
The various attempts during the twentieth century to establish international 
criminal tribunals were not always successful. Adriaan Bos, who served as chairman 
of the preparatory committee that evaluated the draft Statute of the ICC prepared 
by the International Law Commission, described the genesis of the ICC from The 
Treaty of Versailles to the Rome Statute as follows: 
‘It is undeniable that something was achieved in 1998 that had proved elusive in 
1919 at Versailles, throughout the existence of the League of Nations, and even 
after the Second World War – that is, agreement within the international 
community on the establishment of an international criminal court.’748 
 
The realisation of the ICC with the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998 can be 
explained with reference to two closely related historical processes:  On the one 
hand there are the manifold norms and rules that developed through many 
centuries and in reaction to war and conflict. Various religious and philosophical 
thinkers had a great impact on what would during the nineteenth and twentieth 
century become the laws of war (the so-called ‘law of The Hague’ on the methods 
                                                     
746 Philippe Kirsch ‘Introduction’ in Herman von Hebel, Johan Lammers & Jolien Schukking (eds) Reflections on 
the International Criminal Court – Essays in Honour of Adriaan Bos (1999) TMC Asser Press, The Hague. 
747 Cherif Bassiouni ‘Historical Chronology’ and ‘International Criminal Justice A historical perspective’ in The 
legislative history of the International Criminal Court Vol I (2005) Transnational Publishers, New York 3-121. 
748 Adriaan Bos ‘The International Criminal Court:  A perspective’ in Roy Lee (ed) The International Criminal 
Court – The making of the Rome Statute (1999) Kluwer Law International, The Hague 464. 
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of warfare and the ‘law of Geneva’ on the protection of wounded combatants and 
civilians). The criminalisation of many of these rules and norms can be regarded as 
the necessary material precursors to the process that started in the early twentieth 
century to create international criminal tribunals to try individuals accused of 
crimes under international law.749 
 
Bassiouni has identified the first quasi-international criminal trial as that of 
Conradin von Hohenstaufen and Frederic of Baden that took place in 1268 in 
Naples, Italy. The charges, which stemmed from acts that occurred after the battle 
of Tagliacozzo near Rome, included the ‘plundering of civilian property’, ‘the 
killing of civilians’ and ‘destruction of private property, in violation of the laws of 
God and man’. Interestingly, there was also a charge identified by Bassiouni as the 
equivalent of aggression. The Hohenstaufens, who were supported by the ruling 
family of Baden from Germany, attacked Charles of Anjou of France, who was the 
king of Naples and Sicily. Bassiouni described the significance of this early example 
of a quasi-international criminal trial as follows: 
‘While this was one of the many inter-European wars that lasted until [the Second 
World War], it had an inter-regional character in that Germans fought French and 
Italians in Italy over territory in Italy and Sicily. Moreover, the trial was tantamount 
to a military field trial for crimes committed in the course of an armed conflict. 
While this may not exemplify an international criminal trial in the modern sense, it 
indicated the beginning of an effort to enforce certain laws in connection with the 
conduct of armed conflict.’750 
 
                                                     
749 See in general Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol I) (supra) 3-40. 
750 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol I) (supra) 15-16. 
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After the First World War there were also attempts to prosecute individuals (and, 
notably, the German Kaiser) for war crimes and related crimes under international 
law. However, the trial at Leipzig for individuals accused of war crimes was not an 
international trial, but a national trial under German law. Attempts to try the 
German Kaiser were unsuccessful, since he was granted asylum in the 
Netherlands.751 
 
The normative impetus for the creation of an international criminal court was, 
according to Bassiouni’s chronology, the creation of rules and later also the 
criminalisation of behaviour that affected the whole of humankind. In the 
aftermath of the Second World War the Agreement for the Prosecution and 
Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis (the London Charter) 
established the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg. This was an 
important milestone, and the IMT (and later the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East sitting at Tokyo) signalled the resolve of the fledgling international 
community to punish individuals responsible for the most serious crimes affecting 
humankind. Criticism that the IMT at Nuremberg and the IMTFE at Tokyo 
represented ‘victors’ justice’ notwithstanding, the two ad hoc tribunals achieved a 
measure of justice not seen before.752 
 
The post-Second World War efforts to codify and further develop the legal legacy 
of Nuremberg, was discussed in Chapter 4 above. Projects like the draft Code of 
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (in its various versions) were 
aimed at the development of substantive international criminal law. At the same 
time the UN General Assembly mandated a Committee to draft a statute for an 
                                                     
751 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol I) (supra) 22-26. 
752 See discussion of the judgments at Nuremberg (par 3.3.2) and Tokyo (par 3.4) in Ch 3 supra. 
 - 259 - 
 
international criminal court that could give effect to the norms and values of 
substantive international criminal law. By 1954 two draft statutes for an 
international criminal court were prepared. Ideally, the institutional process of 
drafting a statute for the court and the process to codify international crimes (the 
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind) should have been 
in tandem. Unfortunately for the development of both substantive and institutional 
international criminal law, the 1953 Revised Draft Statute for an International 
Criminal Court never got serious attention in the UN General Assembly, and no 
progress on this project was made. Bassiouni explained the apparent reason for this 
as follows: 
‘[Splitting] up of subject matters and giving them to different committees was a 
cold-war tactic designed to forestall having to draft measures enhancing 
international criminal justice. Since the IMT and IMTFE precedents were still so 
close in time, the major powers on both sides of the Cold War used procedural 
maneuvers to postpone, delay and prevent progress. Aggression, being the political 
crime par excellence, was the object of delays and maneuvers to prevent its 
application.’753 
 
In 1979 an important seed was planted that eventually developed into the draft 
Statute of the ICC adopted in Rome in 1998. During 1979 the Commission on Human 
Rights Working Group on Southern Africa mandated Cherif Bassiouni to draft a 
Statute for the Establishment of an International Criminal Jurisdiction to Enforce 
the Apartheid Convention of 1973754. Article V of the Apartheid Convention 
provides for the prosecution of individuals at national or international level for the 
crimes collectively known as the crime of apartheid: 
                                                     
753 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol I) (supra) 32. 
754 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973), ILM 1974, 50; 
reprinted in Christine Van den Wyngaert (International Criminal Law) (supra) 519.  
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‘Persons charged with the acts enumerated in article II of the present Convention 
may be tried by a competent tribunal of any State Party to the Convention which 
may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused or by an international penal 
tribunal having jurisdiction with respect to those States Parties which shall have 
accepted its jurisdiction.’ 
 
Bassiouni prepared a Draft Statute755 (based on Article V of the Apartheid 
Convention), but it was never adopted.756 However, this Draft Statute for the 
prosecution of apartheid criminals was later used as a model for the International 
Law Commission’s 1994 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court.757 In 1995 
this Draft Statute was submitted to the UN General Assembly’s Ad Hoc Committee 
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. The work of the Ad Hoc 
Committee was followed by that of yet another General Assembly committee, the 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. 
This Preparatory Committee eventually developed its own text for a draft Statute 
for an International Criminal Court. The work of the Preparatory Committee 
culminated in the Diplomatic Conference in Rome that lasted from 15 June to 17 
July 1998. At the end of this conference, which was convened by the UN General 
Assembly, the Rome Statute of the ICC was adopted.758 The legal framework for 
the first permanent International Criminal Court with jurisdiction to try individuals 
accused of the most serious international crimes thus became a reality. 
 
                                                     
755 UN Doc E/CN4/AC/22CRP.19/Rev.1 (10 Dec 1980). 
756 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol I) (supra) 33. 
757 Report of the International Law Commission, 46th Sess., 2 May-22Jul 1994, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp No 10, 
UN Doc A/49/10 (1994); Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol I) (supra) 36. 
758 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol I) (supra) 36. 
 - 261 - 
 
It is important to note that even before the adoption of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC in 1998, the willingness of the post-Cold War international community to give 
effect to the ideals of international justice were signalled with the creation first of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993759 and 
then the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994760. The creation of 
these ad hoc international criminal tribunals no doubt added to the momentum of 
the process that led to the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC in 1998. 
 
6.2.2 The drafting history of the Rome Statute with respect to the crime of 
aggression 
 
The delegates at the Rome Diplomatic Conference on the establishment of an 
International Criminal Court were not all in favour of the inclusion of aggression as 
a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Many delegations regarded the crime of 
aggression as essentially a crime committed by states, not individuals; other 
delegations regarded aggression as too ‘political’ a concept, not susceptible to 
legal definition. Some delegations were also concerned that the paramount role of 
the Security Council in matters of international peace and security would be 
eroded by the inclusion of aggression in the ICC Statute. Many delegations that 
were supportive of the inclusion of aggression shared some of the above mentioned 
concerns.761  
                                                     
759 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993) SC Res 827 (1993) on Establishing an 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia, ILM, 1993, 1192; reprinted in Christine 
Van den Wyngaert (International Criminal Law) (supra) 53. 
760 Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (1994) SC Res 955 establishing the International Tribunal 
for Rwanda, ILM, 1994, 1598; reprinted in Christine Van den Wyngaert (International Criminal Law) (supra) 115. 
761 See in general ‘Summary Records of the 1998 Diplomatic Conference’ in Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History 
Vol 3) (supra) 127-382. 
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 The final text of the Statute of the ICC adopted at Rome reflected a compromise 
between the delegations opposed to and those in favour of the inclusion of 
aggression. It also reflects some of the concerns of many of the delegations 
regarding the conditions under which the ICC should exercise its jurisdiction, as 
well as the role of the Security Council in terms of its Chapter VII powers. 
 
6.2.2.1 An overview of some of the main concerns at the Diplomatic Conference in 
Rome 
 
Most delegations referred to the different approaches to define aggression (notably 
the Nuremberg definition and the much more detailed, but state-centred 1974 UN 
General Assembly Definition762) and the difficulties in formulating a definition that 
is precise enough to be able to serve as a basis for individual criminal liability. For 
these reasons, some delegations rejected the idea of including aggression in the 
Statute. But they also advanced international political concerns. The Records of 
the Diplomatic Conference show for instance the following position taken by the 
delegation from Pakistan, which reflects some of the common concerns of many 
delegations: 
‘[Pakistan] agreed that the Statute should include the most heinous crimes of 
international concern but opposed the inclusion of aggression because of its 
controversial nature. The definition of aggression which had been adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1974 was considered by many States, including Pakistan, as 
being of a non-binding nature, and more political than legal. Regarding a role for 
the Security Council in the matter, any such role would introduce a political 
element which would undermine the trigger mechanism, and would also run 
                                                     
762 See discussion of UN Res No 3314 (XXIX) Def of Aggression (1974) in Ch 4 par 4.2.3 et seq, supra. 
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counter to the basic philosophy of complementarity devised to preserve the 
jurisdiction of national legal systems…Furthermore, aggression was traditionally 
considered a crime committed by States, whereas Pakistan favoured the principle 
that the Court’s jurisdiction should be limited only to crimes committed by 
individuals. That raised the complex problem as to how an individual might be 
prosecuted and punished for aggression, unless the Security Council first 
determined the existence of aggression, and that then those responsible were 
identified [sic]. In most cases those in authority would be the accused, something 
which threatened the concept of sovereignty of States.’763 
 
In the paragraphs that follow, some of the main concerns raised at the Diplomatic 
Conference will be highlighted. The intention is not to provide a summary of the 
positions taken by all the delegations but rather to point to the main concerns 
insofar as these had an impact on the eventual adoption of Article 5 (crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court) of the Rome Statute. These concerns related to both 
the definition of aggression and the role of the Security Council. 
 
The Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court (PrepCom) identified two sources as possible points of departure in its 
discussions on the crime of aggression, namely the provision on aggression in the 
Nuremberg Charter and the UN General Assembly Definition of Aggression, 1974. 
However, these two sources were not as such acceptable to the PrepCom as 
appropriate for inclusion in the Draft Statute.764 PrepCom thus decided on three 
options for inclusion in the Draft Statute. The fact that PrepCom was able to 
present three options on the crime of aggression reflected the fact that a large 
                                                     
763 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol 3) (supra) 130. 
764 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol 3) (supra) 127. 
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number of delegations held the view that aggression should, as a matter of 
principle, be included as a crime in terms of the Statute.765 On the definition of 
aggression, the following options were presented, but without prejudice to ‘the 
discussion of the issue of the relationship of the Security Council with the [ICC]’:766 
 
‘Option 1 
[For the purpose of the present Statute, the crime [of aggression] [against peace] 
means any of the following acts committed by an individual [who is in a position of 
exercising control or capable of directing political/military action in a State]: 
(a) Planning, 
(b) preparing, 
(c) ordering, 
(d) initiating, or 
(e) carrying out 
[an armed attack] [the use of armed force] [a war of aggression,] [a war of 
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment 
of any of the foregoing] by a State against the [sovereignty,] territorial integrity [or 
political independence] of another State [when this] [armed attack] [use of force] 
[is] [in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations] [in contravention of the 
Charter of the United Nations as determined by the Security Council].] 
 
Option 2 
1. [For the purposes of this Statute, the crime of aggression is committed by a 
person who is in a position of exercising control or capable of directing 
                                                     
765 Cherif Bassuiouni (Legislative History Vol 2) (supra) 24 fn 10. At Rome, a core group of states insisted on the 
inclusion of the crime of aggression as a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC. See Daniel Nsereko ‘Bringing 
aggressors to justice: From Nuremberg to Rome’ 2 UBLJ (2005) 5-32. 
766 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol 2) (supra) 24-25. 
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political/military actions in his State, against another State, in contravention of the 
Charter of the United Nations, by resorting to armed force, to threaten or violate 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of that State.] 
[2. [Acts constituting [aggression] [armed attack] include the following:] 
[Provided that the acts concerned or their consequences are of sufficient gravity, acts 
constituting aggression [are] [include] the following:] 
(a) the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another 
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such 
invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of 
another State or part thereof; 
(b) bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another 
State [, or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another 
State]; 
(c) the blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another 
State; 
(d) an attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or 
marine and air fleets of another State; 
(e) the use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another 
State with the agreement of the receiving State in contravention of the 
conditions provided for in the agreement, or any extension of their presence in 
such territory beyond their termination of the agreement; 
(f) the action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal 
of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of 
aggression against a third State; 
(g) the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such 
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement 
therein.]] 
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Option 3 
[1. For the purpose of the present Statute [and subject to a determination by the 
Security Council referred to in article 10, paragraph 2, regarding the act of a 
State], the crime of aggression means either of the following acts committed by an 
individual who is in a position of exercising control or capable of directing the 
political or military action of a State: 
(a) initiating, or 
(b) carrying out 
an armed attack directed by a State against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State when this armed attack was undertaken in 
[manifest] contravention of the Charter of the United Nations [with the object or 
result of establishing a [military] occupation of, or annexing, the territory of such 
other State or part thereof by the armed forces of the attacking State.] 
2. Where an attack under paragraph 1 has been committed, the 
(a) planning, 
(b) preparing, or 
(c) ordering 
thereof by an individual who is in a position of exercising control or capable of 
directing the political or military action of a State shall also constitute a crime of 
aggression.]’ 
 
During PrepCom deliberations it became clear that a number of states used the 
1974 General Assembly Definition as a working definition, thus supporting an 
approach where the definition would contain an enumeration of acts constituting 
aggression. However, as was shown in Chapter 4 above, the 1974 Definition was 
drafted with state-liability, and not individual criminal liability, in mind. Thus a 
number of delegations at the PrepCom delegations favoured a definition that would 
address many of the concerns relating to issues of gravity, clarity and legality from 
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a criminal law perspective. The German delegation presented an informal 
discussion paper (which contained many of the pivotal points of criticism against 
the 1974 Definition, as well as some important suggestions for a compromise 
definition). The summary records of the PrepCom deliberations767 on the definition 
for aggression for inclusion in the Draft Statute of the ICC, reflects the efforts of 
some delegates to find a suitable alternative to the 1974 Definition: 
‘The definition must not lend itself to frivolous accusations of a political nature 
against the leadership of a Member State. Also, the definition must not negatively 
affect the legitimate use of armed force in conformity with the Charter of the 
United Nations, the necessity of which could not be ruled out in the future. 
Furthermore, the definition contained in option 3 was in line with historic 
precedents such as the Charter of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal. It also met the 
strict standard of legal precision, clarity and certainty that was necessary for a 
norm providing for individual criminal responsibility. The broad and enumerative 
approach of General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) would not command general 
agreement.’768 
 
The concerns reflected above stemmed not only from a critique of the 1974 
Definition. Concerns were also raised regarding the content of the ICC Statute vis-
à-vis the UN Charter, and in particular the relationship between the ICC and the 
Security Council. Many delegates felt strongly about the primary role of the 
Security Council in the context of collective security. In terms of Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, the Security Council has the power to determine whether an act of 
aggression was committed by a state. Many states (especially states who are 
                                                     
767 As presented at the 6th meeting on the Draft Statute under the Chairmanship of Phillip Kirsch (Canada) on 18 
Jun 1998, A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.6, reprinted in Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol 3) (supra) 126-140. The 
question of a definition of aggression was discussed further at the 7th meeting, on 19 Jun 1998, 
A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.7, reprinted in Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol 3) (supra) 140-148. 
768 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol 3) (supra) 128. 
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regular contributors to international peacekeeping operations) were opposed to any 
circumvention of the role of the Security Council. At the same time many states 
(including states who were opposed to a circumvention of the role of the Security 
Council) pointed to the need for an independent International Criminal Court – that 
is, that ‘acknowledgment of the role of the Security Council would not and must 
not endanger the independence of the Court in determining individual criminal 
responsibility.’769 Thus, delegations that favoured the inclusion of the crime of 
aggression in the draft Statute not only had to come up with a suitable definition, 
but also with a definition that took into account the powers and responsibilities of 
the Security Council. 
 
At first, the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the Statute of the ICC 
experienced some opposition. However, the bloc of states known as the Non-
Aligned Movement, plus Germany insisted on the inclusion of the crime of 
aggression.770 There were mainly two reasons for the initial opposition:  First, the 
opponents regarded acts of aggression as acts of states – committed by states 
against states – and these did ‘not belong to the category of offences committed by 
individuals in violation of international humanitarian law, which was what the [ICC] 
Statute was intended to deal with.’771 Second, as was pointed out by the delegate 
from Israel, even if the crime of aggression was to be included in the Draft Statute, 
‘the exercise of jurisdiction [of the ICC] should be subject to determination by the 
Security Council that an act of aggression had occurred.’772 And just to add to the 
scepticism, the Israeli delegate also submitted the following:  ‘[A determination of 
                                                     
769 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol 3) (supra) 128. 
770 Daniel Nsereko (Bringing aggressors to justice) (supra) 5-32, in particular at 5. 
771 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol 3) (supra) 131. 
772 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol 3) (supra) 131. 
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an act of aggression] by the Security Council would adversely affect the major 
defences available to the accused before the Court, and might also affect the 
standing of the Court as an independent judicial organ.’773 
 
The positions taken by the various delegations (before and during the Rome 
diplomatic conference) should be seen in context:  The General Assembly 
resolutions that paved the way for the Diplomatic Conference in Rome have not 
resulted in legal-technical processes; the Conference was still characterised by the 
dynamics of diplomatic processes. Phillippe Kirsch and John Holmes pointed out 
that the positions that states took were to a large extent informed by their 
respective histories and political situations.774 Thus, for instance, a core group of 
states from the developing world, the so-called Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), 
resolved that the crime of aggression should be included in the Statute of the ICC 
‘at all costs’.775 Observers and participants closely associated with the diplomatic 
conference (and the processes that preceded the Rome conference) explained the 
NAM position with reference to the historical fact that many of the states 
comprising NAM were in the past victims of acts of aggression. These states were 
also concerned about the risk that history might repeat itself.776 
 
Equally informative to the position taken by the NAM-states referred to above were 
those of the major powers (like Germany and Italy) who are regular contributors to 
multinational peacekeeping forces (like in Lebanon 2006) or involved in collective 
security operations, like the Nato-operations in Afghanistan (since 2002). The 
                                                     
773 Ibid. 
774 Phillippe Kirsch & John Holmes ‘The birth of the International Criminal Court:  The 1998 Rome Conference’ 
36 Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 3-39, in particular at 8. 
775 Phillippe Kirsch & John Holmes (Birth of the ICC) (supra) 10. 
776 Phillippe Kirsch & John Holmes (Birth of the ICC) (supra) 10. 
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positions of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (United States, 
France, Russia, United Kingdom and China) warrant special attention, not only 
because of their special role in the collective security system777, but also because 
of their military, economic and political reach.  
 
The German position - that the need for a definition of aggression that does not 
‘negatively affect the legitimate use of armed force in conformity with the [UN] 
Charter’ - was pointed out above. This, together with the important role of the 
Security Council with respect to collective security and the Council’s responsibility 
of having to determine acts of aggression, was to Germany a sine qua non for the 
inclusion of the crime of aggression in the ICC Statute.778 Germany thus favoured 
the definition of aggression under Option 3 above, since that option provided for a 
central role for the Security Council. However, Germany also emphasised the need 
for an independent ICC, which must determine individual criminal responsibility 
without the fear of interference. Italy favoured Option 2 above, where the 
definition of aggression was linked to the importance of the UN Charter provisions 
on the use of force, but where the Security Council would not play such a central 
role in determining whether conduct would constitute an act of aggression, as a 
jurisdictional prerequisite for purposes of the ICC.779 Italy thus favoured an 
approach where the ICC alone would determine, on the basis of the definition 
contained in the Statute, whether conduct constitutes aggression. 
 
The United States, economically and militarily the most powerful state in the 
world, and a permanent member of the Security Council, was one of the few states 
                                                     
777 See discussion in Ch 1 supra. 
778 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol 3) (supra) 128. 
779 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol 3) (supra) 138. 
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that voted against the Rome Statute of the ICC. During the diplomatic conference, 
the US raised a number of issues it deemed as fundamental flaws in the draft 
Statute.780 The US delegation at the diplomatic conference at Rome was sceptical 
whether any of the three options for the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the 
draft Statute would be suitable. In particular, Theodor Meron (US State 
Department) explained to the PrepCom that the US could not support the UN 
General Assembly Definition of 1974 as a basis for a definition of aggression for 
inclusion in the Rome Statute. The US’s position was that the 1974 Definition is 
much wider in scope than aggression under customary international law. The US 
also rejected the notion that the 1974 Definition had become part of customary 
international law through state practice and opinio juris.781 
 
For the US, the problematic substantive aspect of defining aggression was difficult 
enough, but the critical issue was the role of the Security Council. The US would 
not agree to any reduced role for the Security Council in matters concerning 
possible acts of aggression.782 David Scheffer, who served as ambassador-at-large 
for war crimes under the Clinton administration, wrote that the US had a number 
of fundamental difficulties with the draft Statute of the ICC. While the US (at the 
time) was not opposed to the ICC in principle, these concerns were too serious for 
the US to vote for the Rome Statute. One of the concerns was that the United 
States could not vote for the inclusion of the ‘undefined’ crime of aggression.783 
The other concerns included the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC; the way in 
                                                     
780 For an overview of some of the US concerns, see Marten Zwanenburg ‘The Statute for an International 
Criminal Court and the United States:  Peacekeepers under fire?’ 10 EJIL (1999) 124-143. 
781 Theodor Meron as quoted in ‘Contemporary practice of the United States’ 95 AJIL (2001) 400-401. 
782 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol 3) (supra) 135. 
783 David Scheffer ‘The US perspective on the ICC’ in Sarah Sewall & Carl Kaysen (United States and the 
International Criminal Court) (supra) 115-118. 
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which crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC can be amended; the processes 
involving the addition of new crimes to the Rome Statute; constitutional concerns 
(from the perspective of the US); and, in general, political concerns relating to the 
United State’s global military presence. However, despite Scheffer’s explanations 
for the US’ opposition to the Rome Statute, it was already clear at the diplomatic 
conference that the US had serious doubts about the PrepCom draft and the three 
options for the definition of aggression as presented to the diplomatic conference. 
Even if the conference was able to define aggression, it is doubtful that that would 
bring the US to vote for the Rome Statute. The other concerns of the US were too 
fundamental for it to support the draft Statute. The US was eventually one of only 
seven states784 that voted against the Rome Statute of the ICC.785 
 
With the exception of China and the US, the other permanent members of the UN 
Security Council (Russia, France and the United Kingdom) were generally 
supportive of the ICC and of the idea to include the crime of aggression in the ICC 
Statute. However, their support was qualified:  Russia supported Option 3 (as 
quoted above) and strongly emphasised the role of the Security Council in cases of 
aggression.786 This emphasis on the role of the Security Council as a condition for 
the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression was also reflected in 
the statement by Russia after the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC. Thus 
                                                     
784 Only 3 states (China, Israel and the US) publicly explained why they have voted against the Rome Statute. 
The other 4 states decided not to make their positions known. Since the vote on the adoption of the Rome 
Statute was a non-recorded vote, it is not possible to identify the other 4 states. See Roy Lee (The 
International Criminal Court) (supra) 26. 
785 Press Release, UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, L/ROM/22, 17 Jul 1998, Dept of Public Information, United Nations; Roy Lee (The International 
Criminal Court) (supra) 26. See further Sarah Sewall, Carl Kaysen and Michael Scharf ‘The United States and 
the International Criminal Court: An overview’ in Sarah Sewall & Carl Kaysen (United States and the ICC) 
(supra) 1-27. 
786 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol 3) (supra) 136. 
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the position of Russia regarding a future definition for aggression (to be included in 
the Rome Statute) was based on the assumption that any definition of aggression 
‘would be linked directly to the exclusive prerogative of the Security Council to 
characterize the actions of a State as an act of aggression as a prerequisite for the 
institution of proceedings against an individual.’787  
 
France and the United Kingdom, like the other delegations from Western Europe, 
were both supportive of the ICC and of the inclusion of the crime of aggression in 
the ICC Statute, but on the conditions that (a) an adequate and precise definition 
of aggression be drafted (both supported definition Option 3 above), and, (b) that 
there must be a link between the prior determination of an act of aggression by the 
Security Council and the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction over individuals accused of 
the crime of aggression.788 
 
China ultimately voted against the Rome Statute, but was initially supportive of the 
inclusion of the crime of aggression in the Statute of the ICC. The Chinese 
delegation, like the other permanent members of the Security Council, was 
adamant that, apart from a clear definition of aggression, the central role of the 
Security Council in determining acts of aggression must be linked to the ICC’s 
exercise of jurisdiction. China, with the United States and five other countries 
ultimately voted against the Rome Statute, mainly because of the perceived 
jurisdictional overreach of the ICC.789 
 
                                                     
787 Roy Lee (International Criminal Court) (supra) 617 [emphasis added]. 
788 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol 3) (supra) 136-137. 
789 Cherif Bassiouni (Legislative History Vol 3) (supra) 141; Roy Lee (International Criminal Court) (supra) 582-
586. 
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6.2.2.2 Inclusion of the crime of aggression: The compromise text of Article 5 
 
Although there was no general support for any of the proposals regarding the 
inclusion of the crime of aggression in the Draft Statute of the ICC, Option 3 (as set 
out above) received wide support. However, because of the many debates and 
viewpoints on aggression, the three proposals were included in the Draft text that 
served as a basis for discussion at the diplomatic conference in Rome.790 
 
At the Rome Conference two opposing views emerged on the inclusion of the crime 
of aggression in the Statute of the ICC. These two blocs were much more 
intransigent in their respective points of view than the delegations at the meetings 
that preceded the Rome Conference. On the role of the Security Council, many 
states, but especially those from the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), wanted an 
absolutely independent court with no role for the Security Council. This included 
no role for the Security Council regarding the crime of aggression. Directly in 
opposition to this were many Western states and Russia who wanted a central role 
for the Security Council. Indeed, the permanent members of the Security Council 
persisted in their view that the role of the Security Council is an absolute condition 
for the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the ICC Statute.791 
 
At the Diplomatic Conference Option 3 (as set out above), that came about as a 
result of an informal discussion document distributed by Germany during meetings 
preceding the Rome Conference, was met with some resistance. A number of states 
(notably states from the developing world) wanted to expand the scope of the 
definition in Option 3 to include the ‘right to self-determination, freedom and 
                                                     
790 PrepCom Draft Statute 14-16; Roy Lee (International Criminal Court) (supra) 83. 
791 Roy Lee (International Criminal Court) (supra) 84. 
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independence’ as interests protected by the definition of aggression. The states 
that favoured the more minimalist definition contained in Option 3 feared that an 
expanded definition could be too politicised and open to abuse. The opposing views 
were such that no compromise seemed possible. However, the NAM states (who 
were committed to include the crime of aggression in the ICC Statute) proposed 
the basis for a legal framework on aggression that was eventually adopted as part 
of the ICC Statute. The proposal was to include the crime of aggression, but to 
leave the definition and conditions for exercise of jurisdiction for future 
deliberations.792  
 
The present Article 5(2) is thus a reflection of the NAM proposal, but there is also 
an important nod in the direction of those states who favour a role for the Security 
Council in cases of aggression. Article 5(2) provides that any future definition of 
aggression ‘shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations.’ Some commentators see this as an indication that the language of 
Article 5(2) provides for some threshold of Security Council role to play in any 
future decision on the definition of aggression.793 
 
6.3 The road ahead: The quest to draft a definition of aggression; and 
conditions under which the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression 
 
                                                     
792 Roy Lee (International Criminal Court) (supra) 85. 
793 D Sarooshi ‘Aspects of the relationship between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations’ Vol 
XXXII NYIL (2001) 27-53, especially 43-44; Daryl Mundis ‘The Assembly of States Parties and the Institutional 
Framework of the International Criminal Court’ 97 AJIL (2003) 132-147. 
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6.3.1 The context:  Political and criminal justice responses to international 
aggression 
 
The Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute established a Special Working 
Group (‘SWG’) in order to take further the matter of the definition and related 
issues concerning the crime of aggression. The SWG has met on a number of 
occasions (including informal discussions and workshops794). Before the various 
discussions and proposals of the SWG are discussed, these debates have to be put 
in perspective. 
 
In previous Chapters it was shown that two basic responses to the phenomenon of 
aggressive war emerged in the wake of the Second World War. Michael Reisman 
described these as ‘strategies’ born from the desire by the Allied victors who could 
no longer tolerate the fact that there was ‘no general prohibition in international 
law against the waging of war.’795 He described the two responses as follows: 
‘The first was a political response to aggression:  the United Nations Charter 
prohibited “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state” and authorized the Security Council to “take such 
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.” The second was a criminal justice response to 
aggression:  the victors established international tribunals for finding “individual 
                                                     
794 The Special Working Group on Aggression has held a number of ‘Inter-sessional meetings’ at the 
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University and more such 
meetings are contemplated. The meetings are normally informal and the idea is to make faster progress on the 
crime of aggression for purposes of the ICC. For a calendar of the meetings see http://www.icc-
cpi.int/asp/aspmeetings/asp_calender_WGCA.html.  
795 Michael Reisman ‘Introduction:  The definition of aggression and the ICC’ ASIL Proceedings (2002) American 
Society of International Law, Washington DC, 181. 
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responsibility” for “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of 
aggression.”’796 
 
Reisman pointed to the ‘latent tension’ between these two responses or strategies. 
From the discussion above of the opinions of the various delegations at the 
conferences preceding the Rome Statute of the ICC, as well as at the Conference 
itself, this ‘latent tension’ clearly manifested itself in the way the delegations 
viewed the role of the Security Council vis-à-vis the ICC. 
 
In Reisman’s opinion the Security Council is assigned the task of restoring and 
maintaining peace and order and this necessarily imports a ‘broad competence to 
engage in a contextual appreciation of whether to characterize certain uses of 
force as aggression.’797 On the other hand, according to Reisman, a criminal law 
approach ‘is not charged with world order concerns and does not admit a 
comparable contextual appreciation.’798  
 
It is submitted that the political approach (that is basically the collective security 
approach, dominated by the Security Council) differs in substance, methodology 
and outcome from the criminal justice response to international aggression. The 
question is whether these approaches can co-exist (or even complement) each 
other within a single definition and enforcement mechanism for the crime of 
aggression under the ICC Statute. 
 
                                                     
796 Michael Reisman (Definition of aggression) (supra) 181 [emphasis in the original]. 
797 Michael Reisman (Definition of aggression) (supra) 181. 
798 Ibid. 
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Indeed, Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute of the ICC reflects a compromise reached 
at the Diplomatic Conference in 1998. Underlying Article 5(2) is the tension 
between the political and criminal justice approaches to aggression referred to 
above. Phani Dascalopoulou-Divada noted the following in relation to the two 
conditions provided for in Article 5(2):  ‘Both issues are of course intimately 
interrelated; there can be no watertight separation between them.’799 Most 
importantly, Dascalopoulou-Livada linked both issues to the broader question of a 
future definition of aggression. In other words, the definition of aggression in the 
strict sense (basically the elements of the crime) and the issue of the relationship 
between the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of aggression and the powers of 
the Security Council stemming from Article 39 of the UN Charter, are all 
interdependent. 
 
6.3.2 The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 
 
A Review Conference on the Rome Statute of the ICC is due to be held in 2009 or 
2010. This event will present the Assembly of States Parties with the opportunity to 
amend the Rome Statute, including any progress made on the definition of 
aggression and the conditions under which the ICC could exercise its jurisdiction 
with respect to aggression, as prompted by Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute. 
 
In preparation of the Review Conference, the Special Working Group on the Crime 
of Aggression was set up in 2002. It is the task of the Special Working Group to 
discuss proposals for a provision on aggression. These discussions have already 
                                                     
799 Phani Dascalopoulou-Livada ‘The crime of aggression:  making operative the jurisdiction of the ICC – 
Tendencies in the PrepCom’ ASIL Proceedings (2002) American Society of International Law, Washington DC, 
185. 
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produced many discussion documents with different options and models on both 
the definition of aggression and the conditions of exercising of jurisdiction by the 
ICC.800 The main proposals are analysed in Chapter 7.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
800 For background see ‘Press conference by Chairman of Working Group on Crime of Aggression’ 31 Jan 2007 
(available at www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2007/070131_Wenaweser.doc.htm).  
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Chapter 7 
 
Drafting and diplomacy:  The Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression 
 
7.1 The process to adopt a definition of aggression and conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC 
   7.1.1 In the aftermath of the Rome Diplomatic Conference:  The proposals of the Preparatory Commission 
   7.1.2 The Assembly of States Parties’ Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 
7.2 The main proposals emerging from the Special Working Group on Aggression 
   7.2.1 The definition of aggression:  Two approaches taken at the Special Working Group 
   7.2.2 Defining the conduct of the individual 
     7.2.2.1 Variant (a):  The ‘differentiated’ approach 
     7.2.2.2 Variant (b):  The ‘monistic’ approach 
   7.2.3 The act of aggression and the conduct of the state 
   7.2.4 Conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC 
     7.2.4.1 The role of the Security Council 
     7.2.4.2 Procedural considerations 
       7.2.4.2.1 Security Council determination as condition for the exercise of ICC jurisdiction 
       7.2.4.2.2 Procedural options in the absence of a Security Council determination 
 
7.1 The process to adopt a definition of aggression and conditions for the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC 
 
7.1.1 In the aftermath of the Rome Diplomatic Conference:  The proposals at 
the Preparatory Commission 
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Since the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC in 1998801, the process prompted 
by Article 5(2) to find a suitable definition of aggression, involved many discussions 
at diplomatic and legal-technical level. A number of issues remained to be 
finalised, inter alia the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. At the first session of the Preparatory Commission (which had the task of 
carrying these processes forward) a group of states (mainly the states from the 
Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) as well as a number of Arab states) insisted that 
the issue of the crime of aggression be put on the agenda as well. Although the 
aggression-question was not a priority at that stage, the NAM and Arab states made 
sure that the issue was put on the agenda for the second meeting of the 
Preparatory Commission.802 
 
During the first number of meetings of the Preparatory Commission, three distinct 
approaches to the question of a definition for aggression and conditions for the 
exercise of jurisdiction of the ICC emerged. The three approaches were reflected 
in proposals represented to a special coordinator on the issue of aggression. 
Proposal One (by the Arab and NAM states) was a compilation of proposals that 
were made before, during and after the Rome Diplomatic Conference of 1998. It 
reflected a very broad approach to the crime of aggression and included references 
to the UN General Assembly Definition of Aggression of 1974.803 Proposal Two was 
submitted by Russia. It contained a concise and generic definition of aggression:  
                                                     
801 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) UN DocA/CONF.183/9, ILM, 1998, 999, reproduced 
in Christine Van den Wyngaert (International Criminal Law) (supra) 125. 
802 See analysis of the work of the PrepCom by Muhammad Shukri ‘Will aggressors ever be tried before the ICC?’ 
in Mauro Politi and Giuseppe Nesi (eds) The International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression (2004) 
Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 37-42. 
803 For the text of this Def, see Ch 4 par 4.2.3 supra. 
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‘For the purposes of the present Statute [of the ICC] and subject to a prior 
determination by the UN Security Council of an act of aggression by the State 
concerned, the crime of aggression means any of the following acts:  planning, 
preparing, initiating, carrying out a war of aggression.’804 
Proposal Three was presented by Germany and focussed on a narrower concept of 
aggression, with the element of ‘occupation’ as a central element. Thus, the 
German proposal represented a move away from the illustrative list contained in 
the UN General Assembly Definition of Aggression of 1974.805 
 
7.1.2 The Assembly of States Parties’ Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression  
 
Little progress was made at the various meetings of the Preparatory Commission. 
However, the discussion papers compiled by the Coordinators (first from Tanzania 
and then Argentina) served as valuable points of departure for the discussions of 
the Special Working Group on Aggression. The Special Working Group (which was 
created in 2002) had resolved to present the Assembly of States Parties with 
proposals on the crime of aggression at least twelve months before the Review 
Conference on the ICC Statute, to be held in 2009 or 2010.806 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
804 Discussion document PCNICC/1999/DP/12 presented at the Jul-Aug 1999 Session of Preparatory Commission. 
See further Muhammad Shukri (Will aggressors ever be tried before the ICC?) (supra) 38. 
805 Muhammad Shukri (Will aggressors ever be tried before the ICC?) (supra) 38-39. 
806 Press Conference by Chairman of Working Group on Crime of Aggression, 31 Jan 2007 (available at 
www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2007/070131_Wenaweser.doc.htm; Report of the Special Working Group on 
the Crime of Aggression, ICC-ASP/5/35 Annex II, 9 (available at www.icc-cpi.int/asp).  
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7.2 The main proposals emerging from the Special Working Group on Aggression 
 
It is important to note that the debates and discussions in the Special Working 
Group are symptomatic of the difficulties of reaching consensus on the definition of 
aggression — as also experienced during previous attempts by international bodies 
to define aggression.807 A fundamental difference, however, is the fact that the 
process is now conducted against the background of a functioning International 
Criminal Court.808 This was not the case during the various earlier attempts by the 
International Law Commission (ILC) to define aggression or during the adoption of 
the UN General Assembly Definition of Aggression. The sense of urgency809 to 
resolve the issue of aggression certainly prompted members of the Special Working 
Group to adopt realistic positions on the crime of aggression. Thus, the Chairman 
of the Special Working Group could note in January 2007 that the various proposals 
on aggression can be narrowed down to two different approaches:  the 
‘differentiated’ and ‘monistic’ approaches810. This is in contrast to the manifold 
opinions expressed and approaches taken by states before and during the Rome 
Diplomatic Conference. 
 
7.2.1 The definition of aggression:  Two approaches taken at the Special 
Working Group 
                                                     
807 See concluding remarks in Ch 4 par 4.3 supra. 
808 Information on cases before the ICC, as well as ongoing investigations into crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court, see www.icc-cpi.int.  
809 The Report of the Informal inter-sessional meeting of the Special Working Group of the Crime of Aggression, 
held at the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, US, (8-
11 Jun 2006) par 96 stated that the Special Working Group should conclude its work on the crime of aggression 
‘at the latest 12 months prior to the convening of the Review Conference [in 2009 or 2010]’. (available at 
www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ASP_Advancecopy_Aggression200629jun.pdf).  
810 Explanatory note, Discussion Paper proposed by the Chairman, ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/2 (16 Jan 2007) par 5 
(available at www.icc-cpi.int).  
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 The discussion paper of January 2007 proposed by the Chairman of the Special 
Working Group reflects the two above mentioned approaches. It proposed an 
Article 8bis to be inserted into the Rome Statute of the ICC. This proposed Article 
provides for two variants. Variant (a) reflects the differentiated approach and 
Variant (b) the monistic approach. 
 
‘Variant (a): 
1. For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a “crime of aggression” when, 
being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State, that person (leads) (directs) (organizes and/or directs) (engages in) the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of aggression/armed attack 
Variant (b): 
1. For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a “crime of aggression” when, 
being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State, that person orders or participates actively in the planning, preparation, 
initiation or execution of an act of aggression/armed attack 
 
continue under both variants: 
[which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter 
of the United Nations] [such as, in particular, a war of aggression or an act which has the 
object or result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of 
another State or part thereof]. 
 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means an act referred to in [articles 
1 and 3 of] United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974. 
 
under variant (a) above: 
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3. The provisions of articles 25, paragraph 3(f), and [28] of the Statute do not apply to the 
crime of aggression. 
 
under variant (b) above: 
3. The provisions of articles 25, paragraph 3, and [28] of the Statute do not apply to the 
crime of aggression. 
 
4. Where the Prosecutor intends to proceed with an investigation in respect of a crime of 
aggression, the Court shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has made a 
determination of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned. If no Security 
Council determination exists, the Court shall notify the Security Council of the situation 
before the Court. 
 
5. Where the Security Council does not make such a determination within [six] months 
after the date of the notification, 
 Option 1:  the Court may proceed with the case. 
 Option 2:  the Court may not proceed with the case. 
Option 3:  the Court may, with due regard to the provisions of articles 12, 14 and 
24 of the [UN] Charter, request the General Assembly of the United Nations to 
make such a determination within [12] months. In the absence of such a 
determination, the Court may proceed with the case. 
Option 4:  the Court may proceed if it ascertains that the International Court of 
Justice has made a finding in proceedings brought under Chapter II of its Statute 
that an act of aggression has been committed by the State concerned.’811 
 
 
 
                                                     
811 Assembly of States Parties, Resumed fifth session, Discussion paper on the crime of aggression proposed by 
the Chairman (16 Jan 2007), Annex, ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/2 (available at www.icc-cpi.int/asp).  
 - 286 - 
 
7.2.2 Defining the conduct of the individual 
 
The two approaches above entail the typologies of individual criminal responsibility 
provided for in the general principles provisions of the ICC Statute812. Article 25, 
which provides for the principle of individual criminal responsibility, is central to 
the function of the ICC, being an international court with jurisdiction over 
individuals (natural persons) accused of the crimes listed in the Statute.813  
 
7.2.2.1 Variant (a):  The differentiated approach 
 
Variant (a) above (the differentiated approach), provides for direct (immediate) 
perpetration, co-perpetration and perpetration by means (‘through another 
person’).814 In addition, it provides for the criminal responsibility of individuals who 
                                                     
812 See Part 3 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
813 Art 25 of the Rome Statute of the ICC provides as follows:  ‘1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural 
persons pursuant to this Statute. 2. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be 
individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute. 3. In accordance with this 
Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court if that person: (a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through 
another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible; (b) Orders, solicits or induces 
the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted; (c) For the purpose of facilitating the 
commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, 
including providing the means for its commission; (d) In any other way contributes to the commission or 
attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution 
shall be intentional and shall either:  (i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal 
purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime; (e) In respect 
of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide; (f) Attempts to commit such 
a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not 
occur because of circumstances independent of the person’s intentions. However, a person who abandons the 
effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for 
punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily 
gave up the criminal purpose. 4. No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall 
affect the responsibility of States under international law.’ 
814 Art 25(3)(a) Rome Statute of the ICC. 
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order, solicit, or induce the crime of aggression (whether it occurs in fact or is 
attempted).815 The forms of criminal responsibility that emanate from Article 
25(3)(b) are actually quite distinct. The first form of responsibility in this context is 
for a perpetrator by means. As Kai Ambos noted, ‘[a] person who orders a crime is 
not a mere accomplice but rather a perpetrator by means, using a subordinate to 
commit the crime.’816 In this sense Article 25(3)(b) actually complements Article 
28, which provides for command-responsibility.817 However, in the case of 
aggression, Variant (a) of the Definition of Aggression (above) explicitly states that 
Article 28 (Responsibility of commanders and other superiors) of the Rome Statute 
of the ICC does not apply to the crime of aggression. This makes sense, because the 
nature of the crime of aggression is such that it is really inconceivable that 
members of the military (who are not in a position to direct the political or military 
apparatus of the state) can commit the crime of aggression, for which their 
superiors will then (on the basis of Article 28) be held responsible.818  
 
                                                     
815 Art 25(3)(b) Rome Statute of the ICC. 
816 Kai Ambos ‘Individual criminal responsibility’ in Otto Triffterer (ed) (Commentary on the Rome Statute) 
(supra) 480. See further Prosecutor v Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No ICTR-96-4-T, 2 Sept 1998, par 483:  ‘By 
ordering the commission of one of the crimes … a person also incurs individual criminal responsibility. Ordering 
implies a superior-subordinate relationship between the person giving the order and the one executing it. In 
other words, the person in a position of authority uses it to convince another to commit an offence. In certain 
legal systems, including that of Rwanda, ordering is a form of complicity through instructions given to the 
direct perpetrator of an offence. Regarding the position of authority, the Chamber considers that sometimes it 
can be just a question of fact.’ For further comment on this case see William Schabas in André Klip & Göran 
Sluiter (eds) Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals Stud ed (2005) Intersentia, Antwerp – 
Oxford, 427-442. 
817 See comment by Kai Ambos in Otto Triffterer (Commentary on the Rome Statute) (supra) 480. 
818 Despite wide agreement in the Special Working Group that Art 28 should not apply to the crime of 
aggression, there was disagreement on whether the non-applicability needs to be specified or not. See 
Discussion paper on the crime of aggression (ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/2) (supra). 
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The second form of responsibility provided for in Article 25(3)(b) is ‘soliciting’. Kai 
Ambos commented as follows on the meaning of ‘solicits’ and ‘induces’ in this 
context: 
‘Soliciting a crime means, inter alia, to command, encourage, request or incite 
another person to engage in specific conduct to commit it. To induce basically 
means to influence another person to commit a crime. Inducing is a kind of 
umbrella term covering soliciting which, in turn, has a stronger and more specific 
meaning than inducing … In sum, both forms of complicity are applicable to cases in 
which a person is influenced by another to commit a crime. Such influence is 
normally of psychological nature but may also take the form of physical pressure 
within the meaning of vis compulsiva. Unlike in the case of “ordering” a superior-
subordinate relationship is not necessary.’819 
 
Variant (a) of the definition of aggression further provides for responsibility on the 
basis of aiding, abetting and assistance.820 In the context of aggression the meaning 
and application of the words ‘providing the means for its commission’ (as per 
Article 25(3)(c)) could have far-reaching consequences for individuals who are not 
necessarily political or military leaders. In this regard the historical examples of 
the so-called Nuremberg industrialists’ prosecutions821 could hold lessons for the 
criminal liability of individuals for the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute 
of the ICC. Although the prosecutions of a number of rich industrialists sympathetic 
to the Nazi-regime’s aggressive foreign policy were not successful as far as the 
charges relating to aggression were concerned, the implications for possible future 
prosecutions of individuals who made an aggressive war effort possible (through 
                                                     
819 Kai Ambos in Otto Triffterer (Commentary on the Rome Statute) (supra) 480-481. 
820 See Art 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute of the ICC.  
821 For a discussion of the implications of these post-Second World War prosecutions see Allison Marston Danner 
‘The Nuremberg Industrialist prosecutions and aggressive war’ 46 Virginia Journal of International Law (2006) 
651-676. See further Ch 3 par 3.5 (supra). 
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resources or other forms of assistance) should be considered. Allison Marston 
Danner noted the following: 
‘International prosecutors contemplating bringing charges of aggression against 
corporate officers will have to consider the Nuremberg precedents carefully. They 
must assess whether the political climate and legal understanding of aggression has 
changed sufficiently in the past sixty years to garner a different result than that 
recorded in the earlier cases.’822 
 
With reference to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc ICTY and ICTR, Kai Ambos 
concluded that aiding and abetting (in terms of the Rome Statute) should mean the 
following: 
‘[Aiding] and abetting encompasses any assistance, whether physical or 
psychological, which, however, had a substantial effect on the commission of the 
main crime. In other words, the limiting element is the “substantial effect” 
requirement. Thus, the question arises when an effect is “substantial”. This cannot 
be decided by an abstract formula but only on a case by case basis taking into 
account modern theories of attribution. At any rate, a concrete inquiry may be a 
mere academic exercise since the subsidiary mode of complicity of “assist 
otherwise” introduces an even lower threshold for accomplice liability than aiding 
and abetting. Although this concept is already included in the aiding and abetting 
formula as interpreted by the case law it makes quite clear that there should be 
virtually no objective threshold for accomplice liability.’823 
 
The subjective element contained in Article 25(3)(c) – ‘for the purpose of 
facilitating’ – means that the accomplice (the individual aiding or abetting) must 
have special knowledge about the circumstances in which the assistance is taking 
                                                     
822 Allison Marsten Danner (Nuremberg industrialist prosecutions) (supra) 676. 
823 Kai Ambos in Otto Triffterer (Commentary on the Rome Statute) (supra) 482-483. 
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place. Kai Ambos commented that this formulation goes further than the mens rea 
requirement in terms of Article 30824 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. The 
accomplice will thus have to be more than just aloof or nonchalant about his or her 
assistance; thus this is a ‘specific subjective requirement stricter than mere 
knowledge.’825  
 
Variant (a) of the definition of aggression also includes criminal responsibility on 
the basis of common purpose826, as provided for in Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome 
Statute of the ICC. The subjective element necessary in the context of common 
purpose was described by Kai Ambos as follows: 
‘[Participation] in a group crime within the meaning of [Article 25(3)(d)] requires, 
on the one hand, a “common purpose” of the group and, on the other, an 
“intentional” contribution of the participant, complemented by alternative 
additional requirements.’827 
 
The alternative additional requirements refer to ‘the aim of furthering the criminal 
activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves 
                                                     
824 Art 30 of the Rome Statute of the ICC provides for the mental element of criminal liability:  ‘1. Unless 
otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge. 2. For the 
purposes of this article, a person has intent where: (a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in 
the conduct; (b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it 
will occur in the ordinary course of events. 3. For the purposes of this article, “knowledge” means awareness 
that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. “Know” and 
“knowingly” shall be construed accordingly.’ 
825 Kai Ambos in Otto Triffterer (Commentary on the Rome Statute (supra) 483. 
826 See in general (including references to comparative material) Snyman (Strafreg) (supra) 262-271; Jonathan 
Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 3rd (2005) Juta, Cape Town, 574-597; Kai Ambos in Otto Triffterer 
(Commentary on the Rome Statute) (supra) 483-486, for commentary on the meaning of common purpose in 
the context of the Rome Statute of the ICC, including references to French, German and Spanish legal doctrine 
on common purpose. 
827 Kai Ambos in Otto Triffterer (Commentary on the Rome Statute) (supra) 484. 
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the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’828; or a contribution 
‘made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime’829. The 
first alternative typically involves a specific intent to ‘promote the practical acts 
and ideological objectives of the group’830. The second alternative refers to the 
participant’s knowledge or awareness of the crime that the group intends to 
commit.831 It is submitted that the language of the Rome Statute in this regard 
favours ‘active association’ rather than ‘conspiracy’ or ‘mandate’ as a basis for the 
doctrine of common purpose. ‘Active association’ seems to be a wider notion than 
‘agreement’.832  
 
Variant (a) of the definition of aggression does not provide for attempt (as per 
Article 25(3)(f) of the Rome Statute). It is curious that Article 25(3)(f) is excluded 
from variant (a) of the definition of aggression. At Nuremberg and Tokyo attempt 
liability was not explicitly provided for, but, as Kai Ambos has pointed out, the 
criminalisation of ‘preparation’ and ‘planning’ of a war of aggression was indeed 
made punishable ‘as a complete offence’ at the two ad hoc tribunals.833 However, 
it seems doubtful that ‘preparation’ and ‘planning’ of aggression can be understood 
as having the same meaning as ‘attempted aggression’. Gerhard Werle commented 
that the ICC Statute does not criminalise the preparatory phase: 
‘Criminal responsibility for attempt requires, under Article 25(3)(f) of the ICC 
Statute, the undertaking of conduct that “commences” the execution of a crime 
against international law “by means of a substantial step.” Under this unfortunate 
wording, the line between preparatory actions, which are not criminal under the 
                                                     
828 Art 25(3)(d)(i). 
829 Art 25(3)(d)(ii). 
830 Kai Ambos in Otto Triffterer (Commentary on the Rome Statute) (supra) 486. 
831 Ibid. 
832 CR Snyman (Strafreg) (supra) 263. 
833 Kai Ambos in Otto Triffterer (Commentary on the Rome Statute) (supra) 488. 
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ICC Statute, and criminal attempts is crossed if the perpetrator has begun to 
execute the crime and a material element of the definition of the crime is already 
in place. In addition, however, conduct taking place before the actual execution 
may also be criminal. A “substantial step” is present if the perpetrator’s purpose 
has been reinforced or corroborated.’834 
 
Thus the present position seems to be that, under customary international law, the 
planning and preparation phases are regarded as criminal with regard to the crime 
of aggression.835 This rule of customary international law follows from the 
prosecutions at Nuremberg and Tokyo,836 as well as the Control Council Law No 
10837 in Germany after the Second World War. Planning, preparation, initiation or 
waging of a war of aggression were criminalised in terms of the Nuremberg 
Charter838, the Tokyo Charter839 and Control Council Law No 10840. With regard to 
the criminality of ‘planning and preparation’ of a war of aggression, Gerhard Werle 
submitted that there can only be criminal responsibility for planning and 
preparation if such activities ‘actually result in the initiation of hostilities.’841 From 
the Nuremberg judgments it is clear that much of the aggressive display of military 
force by Nazi Germany that led to the occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, 
was regarded as ‘aggressive action’ by the IMT Nuremberg.842 These actions were 
referred to as evidence of Germany’s aggressive foreign policy, but did not form 
                                                     
834 Gerhard Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 168. 
835 Gerhard Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 167. 
836 See Ch 3 par 3.3 et seq, supra. 
837 See Ch 3 par 3.5 supra. 
838 Nuremberg Charter Art 6(a). 
839 Tokyo Charter Art 5(a). 
840 Control Council Law No 10 Art II(1)(a). 
841 Gerhard Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 399. 
842 See Ch 3 par 3.3.2 supra. 
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the basis of criminal liability as such.843 Thus, while variant (a) of the proposed 
definition of aggression provides for the planning, preparation, or initiation of an 
act of aggression/armed attack, it is submitted that this would add a very specific 
dimension of individual criminal responsibility to the Rome Statute. While the 
Rome Statute does provide for responsibility on the basis of ‘attempt’ (but not on 
the basis of preparatory conduct), the customary law position (namely that 
individuals can be held liable for the preparation of a war of aggression), should be 
reflected in any definition of aggression for purposes of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC.844 
 
7.2.2.2 Variant (b):  The ‘monistic’ approach 
 
Variant (b) of the definition of aggression (as quoted in paragraph 7.2.1 above) 
does not provide for any of the grounds of individual responsibility as listed in 
Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute of the ICC. While some delegations who 
participated in the discussions in the Special Working Group on Aggression 
supported the ‘simple and pragmatic’ approach contained in variant (b), the more 
detailed approach reflected in variant (a) received more support. The delegations 
that supported variant (a) felt that this approach ‘would preserve consistency 
among the crimes contained in the Statute and with the “General Principles of 
Criminal Law” contained in Part 3 of the Statute, in particular [Article 25(3)].’845 
Thus, while both variants (a) and (b) define aggression as a leadership crime, 
                                                     
843 See Gerhard Werle (Principles of International Criminal Law) (supra) 399 for a discussion of the judgment of 
the IMT Nuremberg with respect to the ‘planning’ of aggression. See further Ch 3 par 3.3.2 et seq (supra). 
844 More on this proposal in Ch 8 infra. 
845 Discussion paper proposed by the Chairman, Assembly of States Parties, Resumed 5th session, (29 Jan-1Feb 
2007) Annex II, Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, ICC-ASP/5/35 (available at 
www.icc-cpi.org) [Emphasis added]. 
 - 294 - 
 
variant (b) seems to be too restrictive in its approach. It is submitted that variant 
(a) is much closer to the understanding of individual criminal liability for aggression 
as applied at Nuremberg and the subsequent trials. Aggression is a leadership crime 
par excellence; however, the criminalisation of forms of criminal liability such as 
incitement or common purpose (as per Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute) best 
reflects the complexities of leadership and the structures that often make 
leadership (and decision making) effective.  
 
The classical proponents of the Just War Theory argued that ‘[monarchs] and those 
who command the sovereign power of the state are assigned exclusive 
responsibility for recourse to aggressive war, that is, for matters of jus ad bellum, 
whereas the responsibility of soldiers is limited to the use of proper methods of 
fighting and other issues of jus in bello.’846 At present a distinction is still drawn 
between the crime of aggression (in essence, the criminalisation of the decision to 
go to war) and war crimes (the criminalisation of conduct during the war, 
irrespective of the legality of the war).847 However, it is submitted that the 
definition of aggression as proposed in variant (a) is not only a better reflection of 
the scope and understanding of aggression as a leadership crime since the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments, but is certainly more in line with the 
complexities of the very notion of ‘leadership’. With reference to the distinction 
between ‘leaders’ and ‘soldiers’ in the context of aggression, David Rodin noted 
the following: 
‘It seems plausible to conclude that soldiers, and not just sovereigns, are 
responsible for the aggressive wars in which they engage. This is true in the sense 
                                                     
846 David Rodin War & Self-Defense (2002) Clarendon Press, Oxford, 167. 
847 See Introduction par a.2 (supra) for a discussion on the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello as 
issues of demarcation. 
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that anyone who participates in, and contributes towards, a larger communal 
project is responsible for the legality or morality of that project:  they are 
responsible for their contribution.’848 
 
The notion that an individual should be held liable for his or her contribution to the 
criminal conduct certainly lies at the heart of the general principles of individual 
criminal responsibility as provided for in Article 25 of the Rome Statute. It is my 
submission that variant (a) best reflects this notion — a notion which is in 
accordance with the general principles of individual criminal responsibility. Variant 
(b) is simply too limited in its approach.849 
 
7.2.3 The act of aggression and the conduct of the state 
 
The two variants of the definition of aggression (the proposed Article 8bis to be 
included in the Rome Statute of the ICC) provide not only for the conduct and 
responsibility of the individual, but also for the required state conduct.850 Both 
variants (a) and (b) of the proposed definition refer to ‘act of aggression’ and 
‘armed attack’ to describe the act of the state. Although both terms were retained 
in the two variants of the proposed definition, the Report of the Special Working 
Group on the Crime of Aggression noted that ‘broad support’ was expressed for the 
term ‘act of aggression’. The latter is a term that is used in Article 39 of the UN 
Charter and was furthermore defined in the General Assembly Definition of 
Aggression of 1974 (Resolution 3314 (XXIX)). The Special Working Group regarded 
the use of the term ‘act of aggression’ as a well-established term (with some 
                                                     
848 David Rodin (War & Self-Defense) (supra) 173 (emphasis added). 
849 See further Ch 8 infra for more on this submission. 
850 See para 1 and 2 of the Special Working Group’s proposed Art 8bis to be included in the Rome Statute of the 
ICC, as quoted in par 7.2.1 supra.  
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Security Council resolutions851 on ‘acts of aggression’ to help guide interpretation 
in this regard). Future interpretation of the term could thus be guided by Article 39 
and the General Assembly Definition.852 
 
It was noted in the Report of the Special Working Group that, although the term 
‘armed attack’ was linked to the concept of self-defence under Article 51853 of the 
UN Charter, it lacked a specific definition. It was not defined in the Charter or in 
other international instruments.854 There is also a difference in wording between 
Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the Charter. While the latter refers to ‘armed attack’, 
Article 2(4) refers to the broader notion of ‘threat or use of force’. The difference 
between the narrower concept of ‘armed attack’ in Article 51 and the broader 
notion of ‘threat or use of force’ in Article 2(4) led Albrecht Randelzhofer to the 
following conclusion: 
‘[Any] state affected by another state’s unlawful use of force not reaching the 
threshold of an ‘armed attack’, is bound, if not exactly to endure the violation, 
then at least to respond only by means falling short of the use or threat of force, 
which are thus often totally ineffective. This at first sight unacceptable result is 
undoubtedly intended by the Charter, since the unilateral use of force is meant to 
be excluded as far as possible. Until an armed attack occurs, states are expected to 
renounce forcible self-defence … Only if and when the prohibited use of force rises 
                                                     
851 See also references to SC Resolutions on ‘acts of aggression’ in Ch 5 par 5.1.3.3 supra. 
852 ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Resumed 5th Session, 29 Jan-1Feb 2007, Discussion paper proposed by the 
Chairman, Annex II, Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, ICC-ASP/5/35 par 14 
(available at www.icc-cpi.org).  
853 Art 51 of the UN Charter provides as follows: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until 
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures 
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security 
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the 
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security’ (emphasis added). See further Ch 2 par 2.5.1 supra. 
854 See Report of the Special Working Group (supra) par 14. 
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to an armed attack can the state concerned resort to forcible measures for its 
defence.’855 
 
The difference between the two notions does make sense in terms of the UN 
Charter’s general intention to discourage the use of force by states. In terms of the 
criminalisation of aggression, the view was expressed in the Special Working Group 
that ‘the notion of “armed attack” should be retained as it reflected the idea that 
only [the] gravest violations of the United Nations Charter are covered by the crime 
of aggression.’856 This view is also consistent with the commentary of the 
International Law Commission on Article 16 of the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, as discussed in Chapter 4 above.857 The 
conduct of the State will thus have to be of a serious nature. This could be a 
violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter858 or conduct that constituted ‘a 
sufficiently serious violation of an international obligation’.859 
 
The Report of the Special Working Group reflects the general view that the conduct 
of the state will in essence be ‘the use of armed force’860 and will in all probability 
be an act listed in Article 3 of the General Assembly Definition of Aggression of 
1974.861 That list is not exhaustive and ‘the Security Council may determine that 
other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter.’862 The impact 
of technology on the means by which states could ‘attack’ other states (and cause 
                                                     
855 Albrecht Randelzhofer ‘Article 51’ in Simma (Charter of the United Nations Vol I (supra) 790. 
856 Report of the Special Working Group (supra) par 15. 
857 See discussion in Ch 4 par 4.2.2.3 (supra). 
858 See discussion in Ch 2, in particular par 2.3 et seq, supra. 
859 Arthur Watts (The International Law Commission Vol III) (supra) 1739. 
860 See Art 1 of the UN General Assembly Def of Aggression (1974) quoted in Ch 4 par 4.2.3 (supra). 
861 For the full text of the UN General Assembly Def of Aggression (1974), see Ch 4 par 4.2.3 (supra). 
862 Art 4 UN General Assembly Def of Aggression (supra). 
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the kind of damage that could equal or surpass any armed attack), must be 
considered. For instance, in May 2007 it was reported that Russia (or at least 
entities in Russia acting in a concerted fashion) unleashed a so-called ‘cyberwar’ to 
massively disable the Estonian government and financial institutions, which are all 
heavily dependent on functioning websites. Estonia, a member of NATO, regarded 
the attacks as very serious and raised the issue with other countries in Europe and 
with NATO. However, the Estonian defence minister conceded that Article V of the 
North Atlantic Treaty (concerning collective self-defence) could not be activated, 
since the Treaty does not define cyber-attacks as ‘clear military action’.863 
 
The nature or object and the result of the act of the State was a further 
contentious issue that the Special Working Group had to consider. This issue 
essentially concerns the nature of the act of aggression or the armed attack (in 
terms of the proposed Article 8bis paragraph 1). The text in the two sets of 
brackets under the proposed paragraph 1 describes the nature of the act of 
aggression/armed attack with reference to ‘a manifest violation of the Charter of 
the United Nations’ and links that with a ‘war of aggression’ (which was the term 
used by the Nuremberg Tribunal), or, alternatively, ‘an act which has the object or 
result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of another 
State or part thereof’. The threshold provided for in the first sets of brackets 
(‘manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations’) received broad support 
in the Special Working Group – the supporters of this threshold wanted to exclude 
‘borderline’ cases from the jurisdiction of the ICC.864 It is true that the Preamble 
as well as Article 1 of the Rome Statute of the ICC also make reference to the 
                                                     
863 See statements by Defence Minister Jaak Aaviksoo in ‘Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable 
Estonia’ The Guardian 17 May 2007 (available at www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,329864981-103610,00.html)  
864 Report of the Special Working Group (supra) par 16. 
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inherent limitation of the jurisdiction of the ICC to ‘the most serious crimes of 
international concern’. It is submitted that the threshold contained in the first set 
of brackets provide an important context and should be retained since it is 
consistent with the nature of the crime of aggression as a crime against the peace 
and security of mankind. The jurisdictional threshold provided for in the Rome 
Statute of the ICC must be seen in the context of the collective security framework 
of the UN Charter. This would provide the proper threshold to determine whether 
state conduct is serious enough to be regarded as an act of aggression. Apart from 
this, one should also be mindful of the envisaged role of the Security Council, 
which is considered below. 
 
The text in the second set of brackets under paragraph 1 of the proposed Article 
8bis links the threshold in the first set of brackets to a non-exhaustive list of 
instances of violations, but highlights the two particular instances of ‘manifest 
violations’ of the UN Charter, namely ‘a war of aggression’ or ‘an act which has the 
object or result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory 
of another State or part thereof’. The Report of the Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression noted the following: 
‘Different views were expressed concerning the usefulness of retaining the second 
set of brackets. While some support was voiced for the notion of “war of 
aggression”, mainly so as to utilize the Nuremberg precedent, other delegations 
emphasized that such a reference was not desirable as it was closely linked to the 
modalities of warfare in World War II and would unduly limit the scope of the crime 
of aggression. It was also pointed out that the non-exhaustive list of examples in 
the second set of brackets was difficult to reconcile with the principle of legality. 
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Some delegations therefore called for the deletion of the content of the second set 
of brackets.’865 
 
It was pointed out in Chapter 4 above that although the UN General Assembly 
Definition of Aggression (1974) was the result of political compromises (in an era of 
détente) and does not constitute a legally binding instrument,866 it nevertheless 
has the potential to serve as a valuable text for purposes of determining possible 
acts of aggression.867 It was however also pointed out that a number of 
international legal scholars criticised the text as being weak from a (criminal) law 
perspective. Thus it is concluded that the text could best serve as a guide to the 
Security Council to help determine acts of aggression, which is essentially a 
political and not a legal exercise.868 
                                                     
 
The Report of the Special Working Group on Aggression noted that ‘broad support 
was expressed for the retention’ of the reference to the UN General Assembly 
Definition of Aggression in paragraph 2 of the proposed Article 8bis.869 According to 
one proposal an ‘act of aggression’ means the acts listed in Articles 1 and 3 of the 
General Assembly Definition. The supporters of this proposal at the Special Working 
Group argued that a reference to the General Assembly Definition as a whole would 
be a perpetuation of many of the criticisms raised against the Definition (as also 
pointed out in Chapter 4 above). For instance, Article 4 of the General Assembly 
Definition contains references to unspecified acts, which is problematic from a 
legality point of view. However, a reference to Articles 1 and 3 was regarded by 
865 Report of the Special Working Group (supra) par 18. 
866 See Ch 4 par 4.2.3.1 supra. 
867 Ibid. 
868 Ibid. 
869 Report of the Special Working Group (supra) par 19. 
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many delegates at the Special Working Group as ‘pertinent and concrete’ enough 
to satisfy the legality principle.870 Some delegates argued that all the articles in 
the General Assembly Definition of Aggression are interlinked and should be 
interpreted as a whole. The supporters of the inclusion of the General Assembly 
Definition as a whole apparently gave a lot of weight to the fact that the 1974-
Definition was a ‘careful compromise’ that should not lightly be tampered with. 
 
7.2.4 Conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC 
 
7.2.4.1 The role of the Security Council 
 
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Special Working Group’s definition of aggression (as 
quoted in paragraph 7.2.1 above) set out the proposed role of the Security Council 
as part of the conditions for the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression. It was pointed out in Chapter 6 that most delegates at the Rome 
Conference on the ICC were adamant that the Security Council’s primary 
responsibility for peace and security should be respected and accommodated in the 
context of ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. The debate on the role of 
the Security Council continued as part of the process to find an acceptable 
definition for aggression as well as conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction of the 
ICC. 
 
The Report of the Special Working Group on Aggression noted the following: 
‘Divergent views were expressed as to whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression should require a prior determination of the State act of 
                                                     
870 Report of the Special Working Group (supra) par 20. 
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aggression by the Security Council, and on the consequences of the absence of such 
determination. A view was expressed that in either case the [ICC] would benefit 
from the authority of the Security Council as there would be political backing for 
the Court’s investigation of situations.’871 
 
From the discussions in the Special Working Group four broad proposals emerged 
regarding the precise role of the Security Council vis-à-vis the ICC in cases of 
aggression.  
 
The first proposal envisaged a dispensation where the Prosecutor of the ICC could 
proceed with an investigation into a possible case of aggression without prior 
determination by the Security Council as to the existence of an act of aggression. 
From the Report of the Special Working Group it seems that some delegates felt 
that the independence of the ICC (and thus also the Prosecutor’s office) would be 
undermined if the Security Council (a political body) first had to determine the 
existence of a state act of aggression. The second proposal focused on Article 5(2) 
of the Rome Statute of the ICC which provides that any future provision on the 
crime of aggression ‘shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter 
of the United Nations.’ Thus, ‘[under] Article 39 of the Charter, the Security 
Council was the only organ competent to determine that a State act of aggression 
had occurred.’872  
 
The third proposal also regarded the role of the Security Council as important, but 
slightly less important than the second proposal suggested. In terms of this point of 
view, the ‘competence of the Security Council under Article 39 of the Charter [is] 
                                                     
871 Report of the Special Working Group (supra) par 23. 
872 Report of the Special Working Group (supra) par 26. 
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primary, but not exclusive’.873 This third grouping also envisaged roles for the 
General Assembly and the International Court of Justice. It seems that this third 
proposal put the emphasis on the independence of the ICC (and the competence of 
the ICC to make an independent determination of a State act of aggression as a 
jurisdictional fact). However, unlike the first proposal above, this third proposal 
would want to allocate complementary roles to the main bodies of the United 
Nations (the Security Council, the General Assembly and the International Court of 
Justice) to help the ICC to determine the existence of a state act of aggression. It 
is suggested in Chapter 1 above that the relationship between the main UN bodies 
— especially the Security Council and the General Assembly — should not be seen as 
a static relationship. The realities of international relations and political events 
can have an impact on the relationship between these bodies. It is furthermore 
submitted that the Uniting for Peace Resolution can play an important role in the 
relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council. It needs to be 
pointed out here that Paragraph 1 of the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950 
provides that when the Security Council fails to exercise its primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular in cases 
where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of 
aggression, then the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with 
a view to making appropriate recommendations to member states for collective 
measures (including the use of force) to be taken.874 The main purpose of the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution is to provide for a role for the General Assembly to 
take action when the Security Council is for some or other reason (most probably 
because of a veto by one of the permanent members) not in a position to take 
action when there are situations which could be acts of aggression or other threats 
                                                     
873 Report of the Special Working Group (supra) par 27. 
874 See discussion in Ch 1 par 1.1.1 supra. 
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to international peace. In the Israeli Wall case875 the ICJ considered a request by 
the General Assembly (in terms of a resolution adopted at an emergency session of 
the General Assembly in terms of the Uniting for Peace Resolution) for an advisory 
opinion by the ICJ concerning the legal consequences arising from the wall 
constructed by the Israeli government. As pointed out in Chapter 1 above, this wall 
(which separates the territory of Israel from Palestinian territories) is very 
controversial and the effect of the wall is considered by many to violate the human 
rights of Palestinians, and to be a threat to the peace in the region. The reason 
why the General Assembly became involved in the matter was that the Security 
Council (the primary organ responsible for matters concerning peace and security) 
was not able to act because the US used its veto in the Security Council to block 
any discussions on the construction of the wall and the implications of that for 
peace and security. However, the matter remained on the Security Council’s 
agenda. The ICJ held that the General Assembly can make recommendations 
(including a request for an advisory opinion form the ICJ) where the Security 
Council is incapable to act in situation affecting peace and security, or on acts of 
aggression. This power of the General Assembly is derived from the Uniting for 
Peace Resolution. The ICJ held that the General Assembly can even exercise this 
power while the particular situation is still on the Security Council’s agenda.876 It is 
submitted here that any proposal that other UN bodies (besides the Security 
Council) should also play a (complementary) role in the determination of acts of 
aggression, should also consider the implications of the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution on the relationship between the Security Council and the General 
                                                     
875 See reference in Ch 1 par 1.1.1.1 supra. 
876 See Israeli Wall case (supra) par 30 et seq. For a critical discussion of the case, see Michael Cowling ‘The 
relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly with particular reference to the ICJ 
Advisory Opinion in the “Israeli Wall” case’ 30 SAYIL (2005) 50-81. 
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Assembly. If this third proposal is to be a realistic one, it should also take into 
consideration the possibility that the Security Council could be incapable of making 
any determination concerning a possible act of aggression (for instance due to a 
veto by a permanent member). The role of the General Assembly in matters of 
peace and security in these circumstances should be acknowledged. While the 
General Assembly can provide a way out of a deadlock caused by Security Council 
inaction, the implications for a pending case of aggression before the ICC might not 
be in the interest of the accused. The action by the General Assembly might be 
beneficial from a political perspective (and in the interest of collective security) 
but the mechanism provided by the Uniting for Peace Resolution can potentially 
add another political dimension to the criminal justice process before the ICC. 
 
Emphasizing the rights of the individual accused, this third proposal (wisely) 
suggested that the ICC should not be bound by any prior determinations of an act 
of aggression by UN bodies (including the General Assembly and the Security 
Council).877  
 
A fourth proposal suggested that a system of checks and balances should be put in 
place in order to fulfil the requirements of Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC. The challenge seems to be to find a solution ‘which duly takes into account 
the special responsibility of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter, while allowing the [ICC] to act in the absence of a determination 
by the Security Council.’878 
 
                                                     
877 Report of the Special Working Group (supra) par 27. 
878 Report of the Special Working Group (supra) par 28. 
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It is submitted that the debate about the role of the Security Council in terms of 
the crime of aggression is more about procedure than substance. The proposed 
Article 8bis of the Rome Statute of the ICC (on the definition of aggression) should 
contain only the elements of the crime of aggression. To add to this article 
essentially procedural matters, like the respective roles of the Prosecutor and the 
Security Council, would cloud the definition of aggression. This in turn could affect 
the precision or clarity of meaning expected from a criminalisation provision. Thus, 
it is submitted (in line with some of the proposals at the Special Working Group) 
that ‘paragraphs 4 and 5 should not be part of the proposed new article 8bis, but 
instead be inserted separately as a new article 13bis.’879 
 
7.2.4.2 Procedural considerations 
 
7.2.4.2.1 Security Council determination as a condition for the exercise of 
ICC jurisdiction 
 
Paragraph 4 of the Special Working Group’s proposed definition and conditions for 
the exercise of jurisdiction (quoted above) provides for Security Council 
involvement in cases of aggression before the ICC. The text of the proposed 
paragraph 4 reflects the fine balance between an independent ICC and the 
traditional role of the Security Council in matters concerning international peace 
and security. According to this proposal, before the Prosecutor can proceed with an 
investigation into a possible case of aggression, ‘the Court shall first ascertain 
whether the Security Council has made a determination of an act of aggression 
                                                     
879 Report of the Special Working Group (supra) par 33. 
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committed by the State concerned.’ If such a determination exists, the ICC ‘shall 
notify the Security Council of the situation before the Court’.  
 
On the face of it, Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute of the ICC might provide a 
procedural avenue for Security Council determinations of state acts of 
aggression,880 thus playing a role in the process of ICC jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression. Article 13 provides as follows: 
‘The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 
in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: 
(a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is 
referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14881; 
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is 
referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations; or 
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in 
accordance with article 15.’ 
 
The fact that a referral of a situation by the Security Council is one of the so-called 
‘trigger mechanisms’ of the ICC, must be seen in context. Where cases are referred 
to the Prosecutor in terms of Article 13(a) or where the Prosecutor initiates an 
                                                     
880 In Ch 8 infra it is argued that the political dimension to Security Council determinations of acts of aggression 
makes it very difficult to rely on from a substantive point of view. While the role of the Security Council is 
accepted in the context of the conditions for the exercise of ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, it is 
also submitted (and elaborated on in Ch 8 infra) that Security Council decisions on aggression should not form 
part of the definition of aggression for purposes of individual criminal liability.  
881 Art 14 provides as follows:  ‘1. A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to 
investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons should be 
charged with the commission of such crimes. 2. As far as possible, a referral shall specify the relevant 
circumstances and be accompanied by such supporting documentation as is available to the State referring the 
situation.’ 
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investigation proprio motu in terms of Article 13(c), state acceptance is a 
precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC.882 The trigger mechanism 
provided for in Article 13(b) was one of the controversial issues before and during 
the Rome Diplomatic Conference on the ICC in 1998. While the majority of 
delegations were in favour of a referral role for the Security Council, there was a 
small minority of delegations who argued that a referral role for the Security 
Council could lead to political abuse. In particular, these delegations were worried 
that the Permanent 5 members of the Security Council could use their veto to stop 
referrals of situations where they, their allies or their interests were involved or 
affected.883 These concerns were ultimately rejected in favour of the inclusion of 
the present Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute.  
 
The majority of delegates accepted that the Security Council has a pivotal role to 
play in the collective security system. Furthermore, in the ICTY case Prosecutor v 
Dusko Tadic884 the tribunal held (with reference to Article 41 of the UN Charter) 
that the Security Council has the necessary competency to refer situations that 
affect international peace and security to international criminal tribunals. Thus, it 
was argued at the Rome Conference that the same competency should also apply 
with reference to the ICC.885 In this regard, the delegates who supported the 
                                                     
882 See Art 12(2) of the Rome Statute of the ICC:  ‘In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may 
exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:  (a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in 
question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that 
vessel or aircraft; (b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.’ 
883 See in general Sharon Williams ‘Article 13 – Exercise of jurisdiction’ in Otto Triffterer (Commentary on the 
Rome Statute) (supra) 349. 
884 See Prosecutor v Tadic (Appeal on Jurisdiction) (supra) par 33 – 36. See further discussion in Ch 1 par 1.4.2 
(supra). For critical comments on the role of international criminal tribunals as responses to threats to 
international peace or acts of aggression, see discussion in Ch 1 par 1.4.2 of Michael Reisman ‘Stopping wars 
and making peace) (supra). 
885 Sharon Williams in Otto Triffterer (Commentary on the Rome Statute) (supra) 349. 
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referral role of the Security Council pointed to the enforcement powers886 of the 
Security Council which could add to the effectiveness of the ICC-regime. Article 
87(7) of the Rome Statute provides that where the Security Council has referred a 
matter to the ICC, the ICC can refer a state which fails to co-operate with the ICC 
to the Security Council. While states party to the Rome Statute are legally obliged 
to co-operate with the ICC, non-party states can, on the basis of Security Council 
referrals, be forced to co-operate with the ICC.887 
 
It was also pointed out that once a ‘situation’ (which is a vaguer term than the 
originally proposed term of ‘matter’888) has been referred to the ICC Prosecutor, 
the Prosecutor will be able to act independently and the Security Council will not 
be in a position to influence the proceedings or decisions of the Prosecutor with 
regard to the individual accused.889 
 
7.2.4.2.2 Procedural options in the absence of a Security Council 
determination 
 
Paragraph 4 of the Special Working Group’s proposed article on aggression provides 
that if no Security Council determination on aggression exists, the ICC must notify 
                                                     
886 See Security Council enforcement powers (under the UN Charter) in terms of Art 41 (eg severance of 
diplomatic relations, complete or partial interruption of economic relations, and interruption of rail, sea, air, 
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication); and Art 42 (the use of military force) of the UN 
Charter. 
887 See comments by Claus Kreß and Kimberly Prost in Otto Triffterer (Commentary on the Rome Statute) 
(supra) 1064-1068. 
888 It was argued that the term ‘situation’ is broad enough to only identify the possible criminal conduct, while 
the term ‘matter’ would be too specific and would give the Security Council the ability to pinpoint individual 
accused, thus playing a more substantive role in the conduct of criminal proceedings and undermining the 
independence of the Prosecutor. See Sharon Williams in Otto Triffterer (Commentary on the Rome Statute) 
(supra) 349. 
889 Sharon Williams in Otto Triffterer (Commentary on the Rome Statute) (supra) 349. 
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the Security Council of the situation (of possible aggression) before the ICC. 
Paragraph 5 contains four options pertaining to those instances where the Security 
Council does not make a determination within six months after it was notified by 
the ICC of a situation of possible aggression.  
 
The views expressed in the Special Working Group reflect the spectrum of ideas on 
the role of the Security Council vis-à-vis the organs of the ICC. The argument was 
made in the Special Working Group that, if the Security Council does not make a 
determination of a possible act of aggression within six months after it was notified 
by the ICC, the ICC should be in a position to proceed with the case. It was argued 
that this Option 1 under the proposed paragraph 5 was the only option consistent 
with the ICC’s independence under the Rome Statute.890  
 
The proposal that the ICC should be in a position to proceed with the case if the 
Security Council does not make a determination of an act of aggression within six 
months after referral by the ICC, must also be evaluated in the context of Article 
16 of the Rome Statute, which provides as follows: 
‘No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this 
Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to 
that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same 
conditions.’ 
 
The deferral of investigations or prosecutions under Article 16 represents a further 
aspect of the so-called ‘three-pronged relationship’ between the ICC and the 
                                                     
890 Report of the Special Working Group (supra) par 36. 
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Security Council.891 The other two were already referred to above, namely the 
‘trigger-mechanism’ in Article 13(b) and the enforcement mechanism in Article 
87(7) of the Rome Statute. This power of the Security Council to defer 
investigations or prosecutions is a clear manifestation of the political versus 
criminal justice approaches to aggression.892 The linking of the deferral power of 
the Security Council with its Chapter VII powers under the UN Charter is a clear 
indication that, under certain conditions, the ICC will have to yield to requests by 
the Security Council where international peace and security issues are at stake. 
The fact that the Security Council is, in the context of Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute, obliged to issue its request for deferral via a Chapter VII (UN Charter) 
resolution, has, according to Bergsmo and Pejić, the following implications: 
‘First, it ensures that the deferral of an investigation or prosecution is undertaken 
on the basis of a legally binding Security Council decision, thereby establishing a 
legal duty on the [ICC] to comply with the deferral request. Secondly, given that a 
Chapter VII resolution pertains to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and 
acts of aggression, issuing such a resolution may make the Council acknowledge 
implicitly that ICC proceedings would be detrimental to the maintenance of 
international peace and security.’893 
 
Those delegates participating in the Special Working Group most in favour of a 
central role for the Security Council, pointed to the ‘primary responsibility of the 
[Council] for the maintenance of international peace and security and the powers 
of the Council under Article 39 of the Charter.’894 These delegates favoured option 
                                                     
891 See Morten Bergsmo and Jelena Pejić ‘Article 16 – Deferral of investigation or prosecution’ in Otto Triffterer 
(Commentary on the Rome Statute) (supra) 373. 
892 See also Introduction par c.1.1 supra. 
893 Morten Bergsmo and Jelena Pejić in Otto Triffterer (Commentary on the Rome Statute) (supra) 381-382 
(emphasis in the original). 
894 Report of the Special Working Group (supra) par 37. 
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2 under paragraph 5 of the Special Working Group’s proposed text. It is submitted 
that option 2 would give too much power to the Security Council vis-à-vis the ICC 
and would fundamentally undermine the independence of the Court. Option 1 is 
arguably the better of the first two options – acknowledging the role of the Security 
Council without undermining the competency and independence of the ICC. 
 
The two remaining options (3 and 4) under paragraph 5 of the Special Working 
Group’s proposed text, introduce two other international role-players in the 
context of those instances where the Security Council would not make a 
determination after having been notified by the ICC of a possible situation of 
aggression. Option 3 provides for the UN General Assembly to make (at the request 
of the ICC) a determination on aggression. Option 4 provides for the ICC to fall 
back on a determination of an act of aggression by the ICJ, and to then proceed 
with its own investigation and prosecution. 
 
The Report of the Special Working Group noted that certain delegates were 
concerned that ‘the involvement of the International Court of Justice…would 
undermine the independence of the [ICC] and [would] create a hierarchy between 
these two institutions.’895 A previous Report of the Special Working Group on 
Aggression noted that the concern was raised that to wait for an advisory opinion 
(on the existence of an act of aggression) from the International Court of Justice 
‘would seriously delay the case [before the ICC].’896 Advisory opinions can be 
delivered by the International Court of Justice in terms of Chapter IV of its Statute. 
The January 2007 proposal of the Special Working Group thus reflects a move away 
                                                     
895 Report of the Special Working Group (supra) par 39. 
896 Report of the Special Working on the Crime of Aggression (29 Jun 2006) par 80 (available at www.icc-
cpi.int/library/asp/ASP_Advancecopy_Aggression200629jun.pdf).  
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from the proposal that the ICC would have to wait (under the circumstances 
referred to above) for an ICJ advisory opinion before proceeding with an 
investigation and prosecution of a case of aggression.  
 
Option 4 above refers to the Chapter II competencies of the ICJ, which provide for 
the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in legal disputes between 
states.897 For instance, in Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda898, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) instituted legal action in the ICJ against the 
Republic of Uganda in respect of a dispute concerning ‘acts of armed aggression 
perpetrated by Uganda on the territory of the [DRC], in flagrant violation of the 
United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity’.899 
Both parties in this matter accepted the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction900 under 
Chapter II of the ICJ Statute901. In its application before the ICJ, the DRC inter alia 
requested the Court to declare that: 
‘Uganda is guilty of an act of aggression within the meaning of Article 1 of 
resolution 3314 of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 14 December 1974 
and of the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, contrary to Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter;’902 
 
In casu the ICJ held that Uganda had ‘violated the principle of non-use of force in 
international relations and the principle of non-intervention.’903 Thus, there was no 
finding or declaration on possible ‘acts of aggression’. This finding would arguably 
                                                     
897 See ICJ Statute (26 Jun 1945), Ch II, reprinted in Simma (supra) Vol I. 
898 Case concerning Armed Activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda). 
See also discussion of this case in Ch 2 par 2.3 supra. 
899 DRC v Uganda (supra) par 1. 
900 DRC v Uganda (supra) par 1-2. 
901 Art 36(2) ICJ Statute. 
902 DRC v Uganda (supra) par 23. 
903 DRC v Uganda (supra) par 345. 
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not be suitable for purposes of Option 4 under paragraph 5 of the Special Working 
Group’s proposal on aggression, as discussed above.  
 
On the preliminary assumption that the ICJ should play a role in the context of the 
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC, it is submitted that the 
reference to the Chapter II competencies of the ICJ provides the ICC with a better 
fallback option in situations where the Security Council does not make a 
determination regarding an act of aggression. In terms of this proposal, the ICJ 
would already have determined that an act of aggression had occurred. The ICC 
Prosecutor can then simply refer to that. For the ICC to wait for an advisory 
opinion by the ICJ (under Chapter IV of its Statute) on the existence of an act of 
aggression would indeed prolong any investigation and ultimate prosecution of 
individuals for the crime of aggression. Thus it is submitted that the General 
Assembly and/or the ICJ could have some role to play in situations where the 
Security Council did not make any determination on whether an act of aggression 
has occurred. However, it is submitted that this proposition should only be 
supported as an alternative to option 1, which is the better choice. The 
independence of the ICC is thus respected, without denying the Security Council its 
primary role in matters of peace and security. 
 
For present purposes it is submitted that the independence of the ICC is of 
paramount importance. Too many layers of conditions for the exercise of its 
jurisdiction will probably undermine the ICC’s independence. However, a clear role 
for the Security Council should be accepted as one of the conditions for the 
exercise of jurisdiction. In the next Chapter these submissions and proposals are 
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dealt with in the context of my own outline on the definition of and conditions for 
the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. 
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Chapter 8 
 
A proposed framework for individual criminal liability for the 
international crime of aggression 
 
 
8.1 Aggression in historical, institutional and legal perspective 
   8.1.1 The core crime of aggression 
   8.1.2 Expanding the crime of aggression: ‘Acts of aggression’ (‘short of war’) affecting interests other than 
the international community’s response to ‘aggressive war’ 
     8.1.2.1 A shift from war to non-war armed conflicts 
     8.1.2.2 A rational basis for the criminalisation of aggression 
8.2 Submission on the elements of the crime of aggression for purposes of ICC jurisdiction 
   8.2.1 War of aggression 
   8.2.2 Other ‘acts of aggression’ 
   8.2.3 The subjective element:  Mens rea 
8.3 Submission on the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over the crime of aggression 
   8.3.1 Should the Security Council play a role?  
8.4 Prosecuting the crime of aggression in national courts 
8.5 Concluding remarks 
 
8.1 Aggression in historical, institutional and legal perspective 
 
8.1.1 The core crime of aggression 
 
Authors maintain904 and courts have accepted905 that aggression is a crime under 
customary international law. The notion of aggression as a crime under 
                                                     
904 See in general Ch 5 para 5.1.3.3 and 5.1.3.4 supra. 
905 See Ch 5 par 5.1.3.6 supra. 
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international law developed as a result of the wars and conflicts of the twentieth 
century and the political and legal responses to those events.906 The historian Niall 
Ferguson has pointed out that the First and Second World Wars were unmatched in 
terms of geopolitical impact and number of battlefield deaths as percentages of 
world population. The Second World War in particular was ‘the greatest man-made 
catastrophe of all time’.907 Incredibly, this war caused an approximate 1.3 percent 
of the world’s population to perish on the battlefield.908 Thus the statement by the 
IMT Nuremberg that war is essentially evil:  ‘To initiate a war of aggression, 
therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime 
differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the 
accumulated evil of the whole.’909  
 
The criminalisation of ‘crimes against peace’ (in particular ‘wars of aggression’), as 
at Nuremberg and later Tokyo, was in reaction to the worst international conflict 
ever. It was the bloodiest war in a century, ‘far more violent in relative as well as 
absolute terms than any previous era.’910 ‘War of aggression’ as a crime was 
shaped in the context of perhaps the last great total war of the twentieth 
century.911 In this regard the key concept is the orthodox meaning of ‘war’, as 
articulated by scholars and as applied for instance by the court in Driefontein 
Consolidated Gold Mines v Janson912: 
                                                     
906 See in general Part C (Ch 3 – 4) supra. 
907 Niall Ferguson The War of the World (2006) Penguin Books, London, xxxiv. 
908 Niall Ferguson (War of the World) (supra) xxxv. 
909 See passage from Nuremberg judgment referred to in Ch 3, par 3.3 supra. 
910 Niall Ferguson (War of the World) (supra) xxxiv. 
911 For a discussion of the distinction between ‘war’ and ‘non-war’ armed conflicts, see JG Starke An 
Introduction to International Law 7th (1972) Butterworths, London, 489-504. 
912 Driefontein Consolidated Gold Mines v Janson [1900] 2 QB 339. 
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‘When differences between States reach a point at which both parties resort to 
force, or one of them does acts of violence, which the other chooses to look upon 
as a breach of the peace, the relation of war is set up, in which the combatants 
may use regulated violence against each other, until one of the two has been 
brought to accept such terms as his enemy is willing to grant.’913 
 
The elements of the above definition were further refined by Yoram Dinstein. He 
proposed the following definition of ‘war’: 
‘War is a hostile interaction between two or more States, either in a technical or in 
a material sense. War in the technical sense is a formal status produced by a 
declaration of war. War in the material sense is generated by actual use of armed 
force, which must be comprehensive on the part of at least one party to the 
conflict.’914 
 
The IMT Nuremberg’s characterisation of the German invasion of Poland that 
started on 1 September 1939 as a ‘war of aggression’,915 referred to ‘war’ in the 
above mentioned terms. The Tribunal accepted the prosecution’s submission that 
this war (which was certainly comprehensive on the part of the Germans) was a 
manifestation of aggressive German foreign policy. The Tribunal held individuals 
responsible for the crime of aggression, in its manifestation as a war of aggression. 
 
The above mentioned criminal justice response to aggressive war emanated from a 
number of scholars and policy makers who articulated notions of individual criminal 
liability for crimes under international law,916 including aggression. This 
                                                     
913 Driefontein Consolidated Gold Mines v Janson (supra) 343. 
914 Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression and Self-Defence) (supra) 15 (emphasis added). 
915 See discussion in Ch 3 par 3.3.2 supra. 
916 See Ch 3, par 3.3.1.1 supra. 
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development was also a consequence of the evolving jus contra bellum. The legal 
developments regarding the jus contra bellum occurred in large measure as a 
result of political efforts by the international community to curb the use of force 
by states.917 The process to establish a system of collective security (as an 
international constitutional limitation on the use of force) was first embodied by 
the failed League of Nations and later, in the wake of the Second World War, by 
the United Nations.918  
 
The international community’s legal and political responses to the two world wars 
culminated in the international criminal tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, as well 
as the various organs of the UN, notably the Security Council, which has the 
primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.  
 
Whether one regards the post-war trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo as ‘victors’ 
justice’,919 or as the important first building blocks in the evolving system of 
international criminal law,920 the contention here is that halfway through the 
twentieth century the political,921 institutional,922 and legal923 conditions were set 
in place for the core of the crime of aggression to take shape, namely the 
criminalisation of ‘waging a war of aggression’. It is submitted that this crime, 
which came as a result of political and criminal justice responses to half a century 
                                                     
917 See in general Ch 2 supra. 
918 See discussion in Ch 1 supra. 
919 See Ch 3 para 3.3.2.1 and 3.4 (supra). 
920 See concluding remarks, Ch 3 par 3.6 (supra). 
921 In this sense the political power and influence of the victorious Allied powers constituted a condition sine 
qua non for the very existence and effectiveness of the IMT Nuremberg as well as the IMTFE Tokyo. 
922 See Ch 3 par 3.6 (supra). Allied political and logistical support made the IMT and the IMTFE possible. 
923 See Ch 3 par 3.3.1.1 (on the legislative history of the Nuremberg Charter) and par 3.4 on the processes that 
led to the formation of the IMFTE Tokyo. 
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of wars that engulfed the world, must form the core of the crime of aggression to 
be defined for purposes of the International Criminal Court. 
 
8.1.2 Expanding the crime of aggression:  ‘Acts of aggression’ (short of ‘war’) 
affecting interests other than the international community’s responses to 
‘aggressive war’ 
 
8.1.2.1 A shift from war to non-war armed conflicts 
 
In the decades that followed the Second World War — the period generally known 
as the Cold War — conventional armed conflicts occurred not between the two 
superpowers (the US and the Soviet Union) or the other big powers, but rather on 
the periphery of these powers’ spheres of influence, and in the developing world in 
particular. During this period the nature of the armed conflicts changed from the 
classical major wars of the first half of the twentieth century to armed clashes and 
hostilities short of war. Rather more complex were the Korean War (1950-1953) 
and the Vietnam War. The latter really started as an anti-colonial uprising against 
France in the 1950’s and ended with large-scale US involvement in the 1970’s. The 
Korean War never officially ended, but there is at present no armed conflict in the 
Korean peninsula. Both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts were complex, with 
international and internal elements.924  
 
The shift from major wars between states to various forms of armed conflict and 
border clashes short of war during the second half of the twentieth century 
provides the context for the various efforts to define the crime of aggression for 
                                                     
924 See JG Starke (Introduction to International Law) (supra) 489-494; Henry Kissinger (Diplomacy) (supra) 473-
492, 620-702; Niall Ferguson (War of the World) (supra) xxxix. 
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purposes of international criminal jurisdiction, as analysed in Chapters 4, 6 and 7 
above. During this period no individuals were prosecuted for the crime of 
aggression — neither at international nor national level925. The nature of armed 
conflict and efforts to draft legal frameworks in response to conflict, point to the 
changing notion of aggression. The notion of aggression had to be expanded to 
include acts of aggression beyond the narrower concept of war of aggression. 
Support for this expanded notion is certainly not universal. But such support as 
there is, notably from the developing world, remains fairly widespread. This is also 
clear from the submissions made by representatives of states at the various 
diplomatic conferences and meetings before, during and after the Rome 
Conference on the ICC in 1998.926 Decades earlier the expanded notion of 
aggression already started to take shape during the various efforts of the 
International Law Commission to define aggression.927 Furthermore, in 1974 the 
General Assembly adopted the so-called ‘Consensus Definition’ of Aggression.928 It 
was pointed out that this attempt by the international community to define 
aggression (albeit not with individual criminal liability in mind) was not universally 
well-received by publicists. The sceptics argued that any attempt to define 
aggression (for whatever purpose) would negatively impact on the institutions of 
collective security. It was suggested that it would restrict the function of the 
Security Council in determining the occurrence of aggression.929 However, others 
suggested that the time was ripe to move from an essentially political response to 
aggression (via the Security Council) to a legal response, first by accepting a 
                                                     
925 See in general Ch 5 (supra). 
926 See comments in Ch 7 par 7.1.1 supra on support for a very broad approach to the definition of aggression, 
mainly supported by the NAM and Arab states. 
927 See Ch 4 para 4.2.2.1, 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.3 supra. 
928 See Ch 4 par 4.2.3 supra. 
929 See comments in Ch 4 par 4.3 supra. 
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definition, and then to create the necessary institutions to deal with individual 
criminal liability for aggression. Proponents of individual liability for aggression had 
to wait till 1998 for a serious attempt to provide for the necessary legal framework 
for individual criminal liability for this crime.930 
 
8.1.2.2 A rational basis for the criminalisation of aggression 
 
It is evident from the discussion on the shift from jus contra bellum to the 
criminalisation of aggression931 that certain protected interests constitute the 
rationale for this criminalisation. One can frame the analysis with reference to the 
main Anglo-American view on the need to criminalise conduct, namely the harm 
principle.932 The question, quite simply, is whether conduct is ‘sufficiently 
harmful’ to warrant punishment. The IMT Nuremberg certainly held crimes against 
the peace to be harmful to others in the extreme.933 Indeed aggression provides 
the conditions under which other crimes like war crimes are often committed.934 
Some publicists argue that harm is not enough to justify criminalisation. A broader 
analysis of protected interests is necessary. This should furthermore be coupled 
with an analysis of the effectiveness of the criminal sanction.935 It is a complex 
theoretical and practical analysis. The evil ‘inherent in war’, plus the interests of 
peace and security generally,936 form a rational basis for the criminalisation of 
aggression. The considerations of ‘harm’ and ‘effectiveness’ also manifest on 
                                                     
930 See in general Ch 6 supra. 
931 See in general Part C supra. 
932 Simester and Smith (Harm and Culpability) (supra) 4-6. 
933 See Ch 3 par 3.3 supra. 
934 See pronouncement by IMT Nuremberg referred to in Ch 3 par 3.3 supra. 
935 See in general HL Packer The limits of the criminal sanction (1968) Stanford University Press, Stanford, and 
more specifically MA Rabie and SA Strauss Punishment:  An Introduction to Principles 5th (1994) Lex Patria, 
Durban, 103-104; 140. 
936 See in general Ch 1 supra. 
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another level, namely the distinction between the criminal justice and political 
responses to aggression.937 
 
The conditions immediately after the end of the Second World War were conducive 
to the creation of tribunals (the IMT Nuremberg and the IMFTE Tokyo) by the 
international community to try individuals for crimes under international law, 
including crimes against peace.938 The unsuccessful attempts to define aggression 
and the lack of prosecutions at international and national level (as shown in 
Chapters 4 and 5 above) can be attributed to a number of reasons, most important 
of which is the lack of political consensus. It is submitted that the minimalist 
approach939 to the crime of aggression corresponds with the substantive notion of 
aggression as an inherently evil phenomenon. To expand the notion of aggression 
beyond the core concept of ‘war of aggression’ would require political (legislative) 
will. Rabie and Strauss pointed out that the modern notion of crime is in fact a 
‘sociopolitical artefact’. They explained: 
‘What a legislature will label as criminal, may differ from one period in history to 
another and from one society to another, since legislatures are influenced by 
ideals, needs and values governing a particular society at a given time. There may 
be various moral, social, economic and other considerations why certain conduct is 
made criminal; however, when conduct has once been criminalised, it will be 
criminal not because it is immoral or harmful to the community, but because it has 
been declared criminal by the legislature. Although social harmfulness may have 
been a consideration why certain conduct is criminally prohibited, this conduct, 
                                                     
937 See Ch 6 par 6.3.1 supra. 
938 See Ch 3 par 3.3.1.1 supra. 
939 See Ch 5 par 5.1.3.4 supra. 
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when it is declared criminal, will be criminal not because it is harmful to the 
community, but because the legislature deems it to be so harmful.’940 
 
There is no international legislature (in the above sense). The Assembly of States 
Parties to the Rome Statute is a diplomatic gathering. It is submitted that the 
Assembly of States Parties should carefully consider the history of the 
criminalisation of aggression. This history shows that there had been a number of 
attempts to define aggression. There is an opportunity now to define aggression for 
purposes of individual liability. A rational and realistic approach — in terms of 
which the definition largely corresponds with the essential protected interests 
underlying the criminal notion of aggression — stands a good chance of being 
successful. In this sense the crime of aggression is more than a socio-political 
artefact. It is embedded in the historical criminalisation of the jus contra 
bellum.941 It has customary status.942 There are many debates on the scope and 
understanding of the modern jus contra bellum — especially in the light of 
phenomena such as the ‘war on terror’,943 ‘pre-emptive self-defence’,944 ‘regime 
change’,945 and humanitarian intervention.946 These debates should not cloud the 
essence of the crime of aggression for purposes of individual criminal liability in the 
context of the ICC, or of national courts. 
 
                                                     
940 Rabie & Strauss (Punishment) (supra) 5 (emphasis in the original). 
941 See Ch 2 and Ch 3 supra. 
942 See especially discussion in Ch 5 supra. 
943 See Ch 2 par 2.5.1.1 supra. 
944 See Ch 2 par 2.5.1 supra. 
945 See Ch 2 par 2.5.2 supra. 
946 Ibid. 
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In the following paragraphs some thoughts on the elements of the crime of 
aggression as well as conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime are 
put forward.  
 
8.2 Submission on the elements of the ‘crime of aggression’ for purposes of ICC 
jurisdiction 
 
In the preceding paragraphs it was argued that the notion of aggression has to be 
understood in light of political/institutional, historical and legal developments 
since 1945. In essence, the notion of aggression consists of a core (‘war of 
aggression’) and additions to the core (‘other acts of aggression’). The main 
purpose of the collective security system that developed in the wake of the Second 
World War is not only to prevent devastating wars, but also to act on lesser ‘acts of 
aggression’ that are considered to be threats to international peace and 
security.947 To this end, the role of the Security Council is acknowledged as the 
principal international body responsible for the maintenance of peace and 
curity.948 
manity, and can also be regarded as threats to international peace 
nd security.949 
 
                                                     
se
 
In addition to the political role of the Security Council (and to a lesser extent the 
General Assembly of the UN) in matters of international peace and security, there 
is also the criminal justice response to international atrocities which shock the 
conscience of hu
a
947 See in general Ch 1 (in particular para 1.4, 1.4.2, 1.4.3) and Ch 2 (in particular para 2.3 and 2.5) supra. 
948 Ch 1 par 1.4.2 supra. 
949 See Introduction par c.1.1 supra. 
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The movement in support of the criminal justice response to international 
atrocities (a movement against impunity for individuals guilty of international 
crimes) culminated in the Diplomatic Conference in Rome in 1998 where the 
Statute of the first permanent International Criminal Court was adopted.950 The 
most serious crimes under international law are included in this Statute, thus 
providing the ICC with jurisdiction over individuals responsible for genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. The ICC will also have jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression, once a definition is adopted by the Assembly of States party to the 
Rome Statute.951 These processes were discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 above. 
 
In the following paragraphs an outline for the objective elements of the crime of 
aggression is suggested. This outline is in turn succeeded by submissions regarding 
the subjective element necessary for individual criminal responsibility. 
 
8.2.1 War of aggression 
 
It was pointed out that the ‘core’ of the crime of aggression should be the crime of 
waging a war of aggression, as developed by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, 
and confirmed by the international community as constituting a crime under 
international law. Waging a war of aggression is furthermore per definition serious 
and would satisfy the threshold test in Article 1 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. In 
terms of the principle of complementarity, states party to the Rome Statute would 
perhaps find the crime of aggression (as under customary international law) to be a 
firm (and politically acceptable) legal basis for purposes of incorporation.952 In 
                                                     
950 See Ch 6 par 6.2.1 supra. 
951 Ch 6 par 6.2.2 supra. 
952 See for instance comments by the House of Lords in R v Jones, Ch 5 par 5.1.3.6 supra. 
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Chapter 7 support was given to the proposal that individuals should also be held 
liable for the preparation of a war of aggression. This proposal is consistent with 
the position under customary international law.953  
 
8.2.2 Other ‘acts of aggression’ 
 
‘Acts of aggression’ (however defined) must be of a serious nature if the ICC is 
going to exercise jurisdiction over the crime. In order to avoid the vagueness of the 
term ‘act of aggression’ — an undefined term associated with the powers of the 
Security Council under Article 39 of the UN Charter — the elements of the crime of 
aggression in addition to ‘war of aggression’, must be clearly defined. The element 
‘use of armed force’ is a starting point and must be included as one of the 
elements of the crime of aggression. To the extent that the list of acts that would 
constitute ‘acts of aggression’ in terms of the UN General Assembly Definition of 
Aggression of 1974 will form the basis for the constituting elements of the crime of 
aggression, one objection is raised. Article 4 of the General Assembly Definition 
provides that the acts of aggression referred to in Article 3, are not exhaustive and 
the Security Council ‘may determine that other acts constitute aggression’. It is 
submitted that Article 4 is intended for purposes of the Security Council’s 
(political) role as being primarily responsible for peace and security. Article 4 of 
the Definition cannot ipso facto form part of any future definition of aggression for 
ICC purposes. Such an open-ended element will be in violation of the principle of 
legality, in particular the principle that crimes should not be too vaguely defined. 
Indeed, Article 3 of the General Assembly Definition contains specific acts of 
aggression that can be used to add to the core of the crime of aggression, namely 
                                                     
953 See Ch 7 par 7.2.2.1 supra. 
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‘war of aggression’. The condition here is that the acts must be linked to the 
threshold of seriousness (as provided for in Article 1 of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC). Additions to the core notion of ‘war of aggression’ are supported from a 
policy point of view, provided that the acts included in the definition are listed 
explicitly and linked to the threshold of seriousness. From the discussion in Chapter 
7 there seems to be a considerable degree of support for the expansion of the core 
crime. From a diplomatic point of view one cannot ignore this. Diplomatic support 
is vital for the proper functioning of the ICC. It was pointed out in Chapter 5954 that 
from an international policy perspective, the expansive view of some publicists 
favours a notion of aggression under customary international law that includes not 
only the core crime of what was criminalised at Nuremberg, but also some of the 
acts of aggression listed in the General Assembly Definition, in particular those 
listed in Article 3. Ideally this expanded notion should be supported, since it better 
reflects the view of the international community; and one can therefore assume 
that it would at least draw substantial diplomatic support in future processes to 
define aggression for ICC purposes. However, it is submitted that — from a national 
criminal justice point of view — the crime of aggression under customary 
international law is, presently and all matters considered, rather more in line with 
the minimalist approach (the crime of aggression as the core crime based on the 
Nuremberg precedent) favoured by some publicists.955 This leaves us with the 
conundrum that in the past most states were not willing to provide for aggression 
as a crime under domestic law — not even on the basis of the crime of aggression 
as prosecuted at Nuremberg. Why would states party to the Rome Statute now 
support an expanded notion of aggression that goes beyond the core crime of 
waging of an aggressive war? One can speculate on the diplomacy. The answer from 
                                                     
954 Ch 5 par 5.1.3.4 supra. 
955 Ch 5 par 5.1.3.4 supra. 
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a policy/legal perspective might lie in the fact that the crime of aggression is best 
prosecuted at international level, where the legal, and, more importantly, political 
difficulties experienced or foreseen at national level, can be accommodated with 
greater ease. As was indicated in Chapter 5, problems regarding universal 
jurisdiction and immunities will not negatively affect prosecutions at international 
tribunals in the same way as these issues do affect prosecutions in national courts. 
 
On balance, the objective elements of any future definition of aggression for 
purposes of the Rome Statute should as a minimum include the core crime based on 
the Nuremberg precedent. Other acts of aggression (basically the acts listed in 
Article 3 of the General Assembly Definition of Aggression) should also be included, 
provided that this list is linked to an element of seriousness, in line with Article 1 
of the Rome Statute. States party can incorporate or transform the crime of 
aggression (based on the Rome Statute definition) to suit their own local 
constitutional and other legal requirements. At any rate, if an individual is 
prosecuted for conduct constituting a crime under national law (and under the 
Rome Statute) the ICC cannot try the case as long as the national criminal justice 
system is willing and able to hear the matter.956 Furthermore, it is not necessary 
(in line with the principle of complementarity) for the national court to rely on a 
definition of the crime that corresponds exactly with the definition provided for in 
the Rome Statute. The test seems to be that there must be substantial overlap 
between the crimes at national and international level — but the categorization is 
irrelevant.957 
 
                                                     
956 Art 17 Rome Statute of the ICC. 
957 See Art 20 Rome Statute of the ICC; Immi Tallgren in Otto Triffterer (Commentary on the Rome Statute) 
(supra) 430-431. 
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8.2.3 The subjective element:  Mens rea 
 
The subjective element (mens rea) is one of the main legal elements that 
constitute a crime. In the context of international criminal law, the subjective 
element can also play an important role for purposes of determining the scope (and 
extent) of personal liability for a crime under international law. While the 
objective elements of aggression as outlined above are often present as a result of 
the conduct of soldiers on the ground (or in the air), it is the leaders who formulate 
policy or give the orders to invade another country, that are ultimately liable for 
the crime of aggression. Aggression is par excellence a leadership crime, and it is 
the subjective state of mind of the leaders and policy makers that will form the 
basis for proof of their liability.958 
 
It is not enough (for purposes of individual criminal liability) to participate in, or to 
perpetrate, the acts that constitute the crime of aggression. The acts must be 
accompanied by the subjective element of mens rea. The leader who commands 
the armed forces must know that he is waging a war of aggression. The senior 
government officials and generals who are participating in the war must have 
knowledge that the war is a war of aggression. In short, intent (dolus) regarding 
the aggressive aims of the war or the other acts of aggression must accompany the 
objective elements referred to above.959 Aggression is not a crime of negligence. 
Furthermore, the subjective element is essential, since strict liability (liability 
without fault) is not acceptable.960  
                                                     
958 See in particular Antonio Cassese (International Criminal Law) (supra) 193-194. 
959 See in general Ch 7 par 7.2.2 supra. 
960 Publicists like Snyman argues that strict liability (‘strenge’ or ‘skuldlose’ liability) is not only incompatible 
with a civilised criminal justice system, but may also be inconsistent with certain fundamental human rights, 
notably the right to a fair trial. See Snyman (Strafreg) (supra) 244-245. This view is also consistent with the 
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 8.3 Submission on the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over 
the crime of aggression 
 
8.3.1 Should the Security Council play a role? 
 
The role of the Security Council vis-à-vis the ICC (in the context of conditions for 
the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over the crime of aggression) is perhaps even 
more difficult an agenda item than the definition of aggression. 
 
Before, during and after the Rome Diplomatic Conference on the ICC, the 
important — indeed primary — role of the Security Council in matters concerning 
international peace and security was acknowledged. In Chapter 7 a number of 
proposals regarding the role of the Security Council were highlighted and discussed. 
It is submitted that the Security Council has an important political role to play — 
also where aggression is concerned. It is the responsibility of the Security Council 
to maintain international peace and security. This much is clear from the analyses 
in Chapters 1 and 2 above. At the same time the independent role of the ICC 
(which is not an organ of the UN) as the primary criminal justice response to 
international atrocities must be respected and encouraged. Any proposal that a 
prior determination of aggression by the Security Council must be a prerequisite to 
the ICC’s hearing of the case, cannot be supported. There needs to be a balance 
between an independent ICC and the role of the Security Council in international 
affairs.961 
                                                                                                                                                                     
way in which the doctrine of personal liability has developed in international criminal law. See US v Wilhelm 
von Leeb (High Command case) (supra) 543-544. 
961 See in general Ch 7 par 7.2.4 supra. 
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 The important (and very reasonable) mechanism provided for in Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute is noted in this regard. The Security Council can request the ICC to 
defer the case, on the basis that the trial is, for instance, hampering efforts to 
restore international peace after the outbreak of hostilities. This political check on 
the criminal justice process is a reflection of the important theme of collective 
security. No criminal justice response to aggression can proceed without 
acknowledging the role of the institutions of collective security. At the same time, 
the prosecutor must be in a position to determine whether there is enough 
evidence to proceed with a case against an individual, accused of being responsible 
for the crime of aggression. The prosecutor must be in a position to make up his 
own mind. The political processes and decisions of the Security Council should not 
serve as absolute jurisdictional facts for the Prosecutor to rely on. Establishing an 
independent role for the Prosecutor is not in conflict with Article 5(2) of the Rome 
Statute. This article provides that any future provision on the crime of aggression 
‘shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations.’ The fact that the ICC will defer cases on request of the Security Council 
(in the context of Security Council action on matters concerning international 
peace and security) is evidence of the ICC’s role as promoter of not only 
international justice, but also international peace and security, in line with the 
aims of the UN Charter.  
 
The role of the Security Council as primarily responsible for matters affecting 
international peace and security (and the secondary role of the General Assembly 
in this regard) was set out in Chapter 7. There is no contradiction in providing for a 
political role for the Security Council (and the General Assembly), while insisting on 
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an independent criminal justice response to aggression. Both strategies represent 
important epochs of the twentieth century:  collective security and the evolving 
system of international criminal law as a quest to end impunity for the worst 
crimes under international law. Both strategies stem from the historical reaction of 
the international community (civitas maxima) to the two world wars of the 
twentieth century, resulting in the formation of the UN (as primary embodiment of 
collective security) and the evolving system of international criminal law. The 
latter involved the formation of various ad hoc international criminal tribunals, and 
culminated in the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC.  
 
It is submitted that Security Council determination of an act of aggression should 
not form part of the definition of aggression for purposes of the Rome Statute of 
the ICC. The correct balance between the collective security responsibility of the 
Security Council and the criminal justice role of the ICC, lies in the acceptance and 
mutual respect between these organisations. Where individual criminal liability for 
aggression is the issue, the ICC should proceed to determine that independently. 
Where international peace and security is the issue (and a collective security 
response is warranted) then the Security Council must be able to deal with the 
situation. The Rome Statute provides for the necessary mechanisms for the ICC to 
defer to the Security Council in such situations. Herein lays the balance between 
the political and criminal justice responses to aggression.  
 
8.4 Prosecuting the crime of aggression in national courts 
 
In Chapter 5 the lack of national prosecutions for the crime of aggression was 
analysed with reference to a number of legal factors. It was pointed out that 
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constitutional and other legal factors present considerable obstacles to the 
application of customary international criminal law in domestic courts. In the 
absence of treaties providing for individual criminal liability for the crime of 
aggression, it is very difficult for national courts (even where customary 
international law is normally regarded as part of domestic law) to simply rely on 
customary international law to hold individuals liable for aggression. It is submitted 
that the process to define aggression for purposes of the Rome Statute of the ICC, 
will provide a strong impetus for states parties to define aggression for purposes of 
ICC-jurisdiction as well as national jurisdiction. This is, after all, the implication of 
the principle of complementarity — national systems have the first opportunity to 
prosecute individuals for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. The ICC will only 
step in when a particular state party (with the required jurisdiction) is unwilling or 
unable to prosecute. Whether one accepts the minimalist or the expansive view of 
aggression as a crime under international law, it is clear that (apart from problems 
presented by the principle of legality) the nature of the crime of aggression (in 
particular the fact that it is a leadership crime) presents further important 
obstacles in the way of prosecution at national level. The question is whether the 
adoption of a definition for inclusion in the Rome Statute will solve the problems at 
national level. Part of the answer lies in the complementarity-regime of the Rome 
Statute:  States parties will be in a position to implement the Rome Statute 
definition of aggression in their national legal systems. The modes of 
implementation will depend on the particular legal and constitutional system 
concerned. However, unresolved issues like the scope of sovereign immunity and 
the possible impact of the act of state doctrine and the related doctrine of non-
justiciability of certain executive decisions, can make prosecution of individuals at 
national level unlikely. Thus, the adoption of a definition of aggression at 
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international level could help solve problems stemming from the principle of 
legality, but other legal and political obstacles will probably remain. 
 
8.5 Concluding remarks 
 
War and other lesser forms of aggression affect the stability of the international 
legal and political order. Apart from these rather abstract-sounding interests that 
are negatively affected by war, the fact is that aggression also affects the lives of 
individuals. At the same time wars and conflicts are sometimes presented as 
justified (wars of national liberation, self-defence, humanitarian intervention). 
Collective security, one of the key features of the international system, developed 
to discourage the use of armed force in ways not provided for in the principal 
international instruments, notably the UN Charter. The jus contra bellum provides 
the normative impetus for the political reaction to aggression. 
 
The criminal justice response to aggression is still underdeveloped. It is submitted 
that the non-criminalisation of aggression at national level (and the concomitant 
lack of prosecutions) must be understood in the light of multiple constitutional, 
doctrinal and political reasons. It is further submitted that the process to define 
aggression for purposes of the ICC Statute provides a very realistic opportunity to 
states to reassess their view of and response to aggression. Rhetoric and the 
intricacies of diplomacy aside, the time seems to be ripe for a realistic and 
effective regulation of individual criminal liability for the crime of aggression to 
take shape.  
____________________ 
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